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SUMMARY 
This study deals with the growth of unionisation in 
the London Clearing Banks between 1960 and 1970. In 
Chapter One the growth of white collar occupations and white 
collar trade unionism in the British economy is briefly 
characterised. After a review of the literature on the 
determinants of white collar unionisation in Chapter Two 
and a discussion of the nature and history of banking as an 
occupation, the collective organisations recruiting in the 
banking industry and the nature of labour relations in 
banking in Chapter Three, a model of bank workers' orientations 
to work, employment and trade unions is hypothesized in 
Chapter Four. This model is tested and revised in Chapters 
Five and Six by reference to a survey of bank workers' 
attitudes conducted by the author during 1972 and 1973. 
The revised model is then used in Chapter Seven as part 
of an apparatus of interpretation of the history of industrial 
relations in banking during the decade 1960-70. 
In interpreting the growth of trade unionism in the 
London Clearing Banks, causal factors - such as employment 
concentration and employer recognition - which currently 
enjoy a wide currency in explaining white collar union 
growth are rejected as major explanatory variables for 
banking. Instead, attention is concentrated on the internal 
occupational structure of banking and the changing 
characteristics of the labour force recruited to this structure. 
It is argued that the increasingly bureaucratized and 
feminized character of bank employment during the 'sixties 
was the central factor influencing the growth and recognition 
of the National Union of Bank Employees. 
(iii) 
In a concluding Chapter, aspects of banking 
as an occupation are compared with national trends in 
the white collar occupational structure in an attempt 
to assess the sociological impact of the feminisation 
of routine white collar occupations on the growth of 
white collar unionism and the class identification of 
white collar workers. 
(iv) 
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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
In 1967, following a period of rapid membership 
growth, the National Union of Bank Employees entered 
into strike action against the London Clearing Banks. 
The result of this action was the full recognition of the 
union by the bank employers which had been withheld since 
the formation of the union in 1918. This action was 
neither predicted nor even hinted at by the academic 
social scientists who had studied the determinants of 
white collar unionisation and recognition or in studies 
dealing with the topic which were published in the same 
year. 
In this study, we seek to account for the events of 
1967 in the London Clearing Banks. We are thus engaged in 
accounting for one example of what Weir has termed 'the 
sporadic and intermittent outbreaks of white collar 
militancy'. This does not imply however that the entire 
focus of this study is an isolated and perhaps unique event 
in the history of industrial relations in British banking. 
On the contrary, the central value of studying the unique 
event. derives from the light which is thereby shed on the 
routine and typical features of industrial relations in an 
occupation or industry. So it is with banking. The focus 
on the unique events of 1967 may serve to enable us to 
highlight the features which underly the relatively tranquil 
industrial relations of the banking industry. 
One factor which we believe to be of the highest 
significance in coming to an understanding of industrial 
relations in white collar bureaucracies is the division of 
interests among white collar workers within a given occupa- 
tional structure. Whilst many such divisions may be engendered 
within specific white collar occupational structures, the most 
0 
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far reaching and perhaps the most neglected division of 
interests may derive from the sexual division of labour, 
which is characteristic of many large scale white collar 
organisations, Because the 'feminisation' of routine 
white collar occupations has become so marked in recent 
years, and because this process of 'feminisation' is, we 
believe, a central factor in any understanding of the 
development of labour relations in banking, we have taken 
the unusual step of maintaining a continuous focus on the 
differentiation of male and female workers throughout 
this study. Although the adoption of this procedure 
undoubtedly makes for a certain clumsiness of exposition, 
the additional insights derived from this approach are, we 
believe, sufficiently far-reaching to outweigh such 
drawbacks. 
The author is indebted to many people and organisations 
whose assistance has made this study possible. The Staff 
Directors at Danks 'A' and 'B' made it possible for me to 
interview numbers of their staff and in approaching this 
task I was greatly assisted by the Regional Staff Managers 
of the two banks in the Yorkshire and Midland areas. The 
Managers of the bank branches at which the interviews took 
place were both hospitable and unfailingly constructive 
and courteous in their dealings with a researcher still in 
his salad days. 
The Research Officers of the National Union of Dank 
Employees and the Central Council of Bank Staff Associations 
responded with patience and promptness to an extended stream 
of requests for information of all kinds and I am most 
conscious of, and grateful for, their assistance. 
(x) 
I am profoundly indebted to Professor Zygmunt Bauman 
for his unwavering intellectual and personal support for 
this project. This support has extended beyond the call 
of duty and I record it with gratitude. Professor George 
Bain kindly allowed me access to statistical information 
on union membership held by the Industrial Relations 
Research Unit at the University of Warwick. Tony Elger, 
Peter Fairbrother, Bob Price and Professor Margaret Stacey 
read and commented upon some Chapters of this study to my 
immense profit and I am glad to have this opportunity to 
thank them for their advice without implicating them too 
deeply in the opinions which follow and which they may 
not share. 
My wife, Margaret, has contributed to this study in 
innumerable ways. Most importantly, her steadfast support 
and encouragement throughout the past several years has 
been a source of inspiration without which the study 
might never have been completed. 
Finally, I should like to thank the men and women 
of Banks 'At and 'B' who consented to be interviewed in 
connection with this study and especially Mr. Hugh Jones 
of Bank 'B' whose encouragement and support originally 
made the study a possibility. This thesis is dedicated 
to the above mentioned bank employees with an apologias 
"Ich hätte gerne ein gutes Buch hervorge- 
bracht. Es ist nicht ausgefallen; aber die Zeit ist vorbei, in der es von mir 
verbessert werden könnte". 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
1.1 The topic of white collar unionisation has, without 
doubt, proved its durability and significance throughout 
the past fifty years. This durability and significance 
has been guaranteed by the continuous growth of white collar 
employment in the majority of industrialised countries since 
the turn of the century which, in its turn, has repeatedly 
renewed the relevance of sociological studies directed at 
establishing the social location of the white collar worker 
and the sociological significance of his unionisation. A 
major point of departure for such studies has centred on 
the question of the proletarianisation of the white collar 
worker. 
(1) 
This substantive focus, of course, traces its 
theoretical lineage back to Marx's original 'polarisation' 
thesis, but a substantial proximate political impetus for 
its continuing centrality may be located in the struggle for 
political control of industrialised nation states between 
forces of the left and of the right. Thus in Weimar 
Germany, for instance, the analysis of the social location 
of the white collar worker became the object of a struggle 
which extended far beyond the bounds of the academy and 
became transformed into a general ideological conflict 
between socialist and "co-operationist" organisations of 
white collar workers. 
(2) 
During the calmer post-war 
period this debate on the class position, social location 
-2- 
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and (false) consciousness of the white collar worker 
has continued to attract attention which has remained 
focused both on the proclivities of this group to unionise 
and the form of its class awareness. 
(3) 
In the British context, the growth of debate on 
the nature and function of trade unionism in the mixed 
economy which contributed to the formation of the Donovan 
Commissiont 
(4) 
has resulted in a substantial quantity of 
more or less policy-oriented research by industrial 
relations experts directed at establishing the impact of 
the growth of white collar employment on aggregate levels 
of unionisation in the United Kingdom and the representative 
standing of the trade union movement. This research, 
which has necessarily focused on factors underlying the 
general level of white collar unionisation in the U. K., 
has tended to follow lines which are, in some respects, 
at variance with the classic sociological debates and has 
reached conclusions which display points of antagonism with 
sociological orthodoxy. 
(5) 
The central conclusions of the major researcher in 
this field, Professor G. S. Bain, were that the fall in the 
density of trade union membership, which occurred between 
1948 and 1964, has resulted from the contraction of those 
manual occupations in which unionisation has traditionally 
been high and the concomitant growth of white collar 
-3- 
occupations in which trade union membership is relatively 
low. 
(6) 
Turning to the generally lower levels of unionisa- 
tion in white collar occupations, Bain argued that such 
levels were in part a function of the dispersion of white 
collar workers in large numbers of small establishments, 
but were also the direct product of employer hostility to 
white collar unionism which has taken the form of various 
types of competition with such unionism and the refusal to 
recognise white collar unions for negotiating purposes. 
This argument, which found its first expression in 
a research paper for the Donovan Commissiong 
(7) 
was 
summarised by the author in the following terms: 
"First, if the trade union movement is 
to continue to play an effective role in 
the British industrial relations system, 
it must reverse the present downward 
trend of the density of unionisation by 
expanding its membership among the poorly- 
organised areas of the labour force, 
particularly among the rapidly increasing 
number of white collar employees in 
private industry. Second, a major 
obstruction to the expansion of union 
membership in these areas is employers' 
refusal to recognise unions and their 
pursuance of policies designed to discourage 
or prohibit their employees from joining 
them. Third, most white-collar unions, 
and even some manual unions, have obtained 
recognition from private employers largely 
as a result of government policies, and 
these unions are unlikely to obtain further 
major concessions of recognition without 
government assistance. Those generalisa- 
tions, in sum, lead to the conclusion that 
the continued growth and effectiveness of 
the British trade union movement largely 
depend upon government action to encourage 
union recognition". (8) 
- 
Bain thus joined a significant group of organisations and 
individuals(9) in recommending government intervention in 
the area of union recognition and a smaller group who 
specifically favoured the formation of a tribunal to deal 
with recognition disputes. 
(10) 
During this period between 
1965 and 1968, which was in many respects a "watershedt for 
the British trade union movement, the topic of white collar 
unionisation became, once again, an issue of political, 
as well as sociological, significance. 
The topic of white collar unionism has remained 
significant in the first instance because of the continuous 
growth of white collar occupations in the majority of indus- 
trialised countries, but also because the level of 
unionisation in the white collar sector cannot but have an 
impact on the overall strength and representativeness of the 
trade union movement. Moreover the nature and character of 
white collar unionism has provided an important additional 
focus for discussions of the social location of white collar 
workers together with related issues as to their proletarian- 
isation. 
1.2 The topic of this thesis is the growth of trade 
unionism in the London clearing banks during the decade 
1960-1970. This group of banks - so called because its 
members operate a clearing house through which they exchange 
cheques between themselves - dominates the banking industry 
in the United Kingdom and employs approximately 75 per cent 
5 
of all bank staffs. Throughout the period in question, 
the London clearing banks maintained a number of common 
policies which tended to restrict competition on several 
fronts. 
(") 
These common policies extended to such staff 
matters as levels of pay(12) and attitudes towards the 
collective organisations of employees. 
(13) 
Although 
maintained on an informal basis, these latter policies 
tended to restrict competition among the banks for 
employees during a period in which rapid expansion in the 
industry as a whole necessitated large scale additional 
staff recruitment. The existence of these common 
policies - together with the clearing banks' do facto 
domination of the industry - constitutes a part of the 
warrant for the restriction of this study to unionisation 
within this group of banks. 
The study of unionisation in banking, however, is 
complicated by the existence of two distinct types of 
organisation which seek to organise bank staffs. On the 
one hand, the National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE) has 
sought for over half a century to organise bank employees 
on a national, industry-wide basis which takes only minimal 
account of the institutional differences between the 
individual bank employers. For fifty years (from 1918 to 
1968) the union sought in vain to fulfil ordinary trade 
union functions for its members without achieving 
negotiating rights with any of the London clearing bank 
employers. 
( 14) Throughout this period, the union has 
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maintained a stance which openly recognises certain 
basic divergences of interest between bank employees 
and their employers particularly, of course, over the 
question of salaries and related conditions of work. 
The provision of a strike clause within the NUDE 
constitution, for example, has continuously affirmed 
this divergence of interests from its inception. 
Throughout its history too, the union has sought to maintain 
links of identification and solidarity with the trade 
union movement and has been affiliated to the Trade 
Union Congress for the majority of its existence. 
(15) 
The alternative to the union, which was originally 
developed with the aim of combatting the influence of 
NUBE among bank staffs, has taken the form of a collection 
of internal or 'house' unions (the staff associations) 
which have sought to organise bank employees on an 
institutional or bank by bank basis. These organisations 
have sought to adopt a position which stresses the 
identity of interests between bank employees and their 
employers. In keeping with this stance, their constitutions 
uniformly contain no strike clauses and they have not sought 
to establish links with the wider trade union movement. 
Founded at the instigation of the bank employers(16) and 
rapidly recognised by them for negotiating purposes, these 
bank staff associations constitute a locus classicus for 
the very form of employer-generated hindrance to white 
-7- 
collar unionism cited by Bain as a major cause of the 
generally low levels of white collar unionisation. 
From the 'twenties onwards, thorefore, bank 
staffs have been able to exercise a degree of choice 
in selecting the organisation they wish to represent 
them. In this context, the 'unionisation' of bank 
employees is understood to consist in (1) the growth of 
the union (NUBE) in numerical strength and density, (2) 
growth in the militancy of LAUBE, and (3) changes in the 
characteristics of the staff associations which have 
resulted in the development of a more union-like character 
and function for these organisations. 
(17) All three types 
of change, each of which occurred during the period selected 
for investigation, are seen as indicative of tendencies 
among bank employees to adopt a more aggressive stance 
towards their employers. 
j The growth in the National Union of Bank Employees, 
which was concentrated in the period after 1966, did not 
occur in isolation. In fact, white collar union membership 
grew very substantially in the Unitod Kingdom during the 
latter part of the 'sixties#. Thus Price and Dain(18) 
estimate the growth of aggregate white collar union member- 
ship in the United Kingdom between 1964 and 1970 at 33.8 
per cent, whilst Lumley(19) indicates that white collar 
unions affiliated to the TUC grow by an aggregate 75 per 
cent during the same period. This General aggregate growth 
-8- 
in white collar unionism in part reflected massive growth 
within individual unions: ASTMS for instance grew by a 
spectacular 296 per cent between 1964 and 1970. 
(20) 
Although LAUBE did not achieve this rate of growth during 
the period, it was nonetheless one of the major sources 
of growth in the white collar sector growing by 58 per 
cent between 1964 and 1970. This rate of growth was 
approximated only by TASS (601;. ), NUT (44%, %) and APECCS 
(58) among the larger white collar unions. 
(21) 
In 
overall terms, the aggregate growth of white collar union 
membership stands in marked contrast to the aggregate 
growth in manual union membership for the period which 
was a more 0.7 per cent. 
(22) 
Underlying these contrasting trends in manual and 
white collar union growth however, were substantial changes 
in the pattern of employment in the British economy. For, 
whilst the total number of workers in the manual sector of 
the economy fell by some 5 per cent between 1961 and 1971, 
the number of workers in white collar occupations rose by 
22.7 per cent during the same period, 
(23) 
Thus although 
the number of manual unionists barely rose between 1964 and 
1970, the aggregate density of manual unionisation rose by 
3. per cent. 
(2ý 
This performance was the more significant 
since, as Price and Bain have shown(25) it was achieved 
against a background of contraction in the numbers of 
workers employed in traditionally highly unionised 
industries (e. g. railways, coal mining and cotton) and 
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expansion in relatively undor-unionised industries (such as 
chemicals and food, drink and tobacco). In short, the 
redistribution of the labour force during the post-war 
period has been unfavourable to manual unionism'because the 
numbers of workers employed in manual occupations have 
declined whilst, at the same time, changes in the pattern 
of employment within the manual sector have been unfavourable 
to the maintainance of aggregate manual union density. 
By contrast, the growth of white collar occupations 
has been favourable to the aggregate growth of white collar 
unionism and, between 1948 and 1964, the growth of white 
collar unionism was actually insufficient to maintain 
aggregate white collar union density. During this period 
then, white collar unions actually became marginally less 
representative of white collar workers and, in this context, 
discussions of white collar union growth were very often 
couched in terms which stressed the 'growth illusion' 
generated by the rapid expansion of white collar occupations. 
By 1970 however, it was no longer possible to explain 
the growth of white collar unionism in terms of the growth 
of white collar employment. As Bain and Price comment: 
-10- 
"While it was possible in 1964 to talk 
of the 'growth illusion'of white collar 
unionism, resulting from rapid union 
growth which only kept abreast of the 
increasing white collar labour force, 
by 1970 membership had forged far 
ahead of employment growth", (26) 
White collar union density had started to increase and 
grew rapidly during the last part of the decade. 
Table 1.1 sets out the aggregate growth of white 
collar unionism in the United Kingdom between 1948 and 
1970 and displays comparable figures for the organisations 
recruiting in the London clearing banks (NUBE and the 
combined bank staff associations), whilst Table 1.2 sets 
out parallel information in density terms. 
Table 1.1 
(27) 
The Growth of White Collar Unionism in the United Kingdom 
1948-1970. with Comparisons from Unionism in the London 
Clearing Banks 
White collar 
NUBS 
Union 
(194 
1948 
Males 100 
Femalos 100 
Males 100 
Females 100 
Members 
B 100) 
1964 
132.7 
143.9 
154.3 
301.5 
hip ¶ Increase 
1970 1948-64 1964-70 
169.1 32.7 27.4 
207.6 43.9 44.3 
201.5' 54.3 30.6 
664.6* 301.5 220.4 
Males 100 144.8 148.1 44.8 2.3 
Staff Assns 
Females 100 201.5 186.0 201,5 -7.7 
- 71 - 
Table 1.2 
(28) 
The Growth of White Collar Union Density in the United 
Kingdom 1948_1970. with Comparisons from Unionism in the 
London Clearing flanks 
Union Density (ý) Increaso 
1948 1964 
_ 
1970 1948-64 1964-70 
Males 33.8 33.4 40.0 -o. 4 +6.6 
White Collar 
Females 25.4 24.9 30.7 -0.5 +5.8 
Males 29.4 36.6 42.8* +7.2 +6.2 
NUDE 
Females 19.4 22.5 36.2* +3.1 +13.7 
dales 51.2 59.8 54,3 +8.6 -5.5 
Staff Assns 
Females 49.3 38.4 24.8 -10.9 -13.6 
Despite the high levels of aggregate Growth in white 
collar unionisation among both men and women between 1948 and 
1964 indicated in Table 1.11 Table 1.2 shows that this growth 
was more than accounted for by the Growth of the numbers of 
men and women employed in white collar occupations and hence 
that 1948 levels of density were not maintained. The 
subsequent further aggregate expansion of white collar 
union membership between 1964 and 1970 howovor was in part 
attributable to the continued Growth of the whito collar 
12 - 
labour forcog but there was also a decisive increase in 
union density among men and woman in white collar 
occupations. 
Turning now to the growth of membership in the London 
clearing banks between 1948 and 1964, it is clear that in gross 
terms the growth in both union and staff association member- 
ship among both men and women far exceeded the rates of 
aggregate male and female growth in white collar unions as 
a whole, In part, this was because employment grew more 
rapidly in banking than it did in the white collar sector 
as a whole. Between 1951 and 1966 white collar employment 
increased by 36.2 per cent 
(29) 
whilst employment in banking 
increased by 65.9 per cent(30) during the same period. 
Moreover, within these figures, the very high growth of 
female membership in banking is, in part, due to the fact 
that the proportion of female employees in banking grow 
more rapidly than the proportion of female employees in 
the white collar labour force as a whole. Between 1951 
and 1966 the proportion of female white collar workers grew 
from 42.3 per cent to 46.5 per cent, whereas the proportion 
of female employees in the clearing banks grew from 29.9 
per cent in 1948 to 48.1 per cent in 1966 and increased by 
283.7 per cunt in the process. 
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During this period then, the organisations 
recruiting members in banking had to run very hard to 
hold their own particularly with respect to female member- 
ship. Thus a 300 per cent gross increase in NUKE 
membership between 1948 and 1964 translated into an increase 
in density of only 3.1 per cent, and a combined staff 
association increase of 200 per cent in the same period 
resulted in a 10.9 per cent density loss. The growth in 
male clearing bank staff during this period was somewhat 
more restrained at 30.5 per cent and here sizeable gains in 
the memberships of both NUDE and the staff associations 
resulted in solid density gains for both organisations which 
run counter to the national aggregate trend of male white 
collar unionisation which underwent a marginal fall in 
density over the same period. A striking feature of the 
growth of staff organisation membership (i. e. NUDE plus 
combined staff association membership(31)) among men in 
the London clearing banks during this period was an increase 
in their propensity to join one or other of the types of 
collective organisation available to them. Thus the 
combined density of all staff organisations' memberships 
among men in the London clearing banks rose from 80.6 per 
cent in 1948 to 96.4 per cent in 1964. 
- 14 
The period between 1964 and 1970 presents a rather 
more complex aspect. Despite the fact that employment in 
the clearing banks rose more rapidly (by 18.2 per cent) 
between 1966 and 1970 than it did in white collar occupations 
as a whole (10.0 per cent) between 1966 and 1971, overall 
NUBS density rose more substantially between 1964 and 
1970 (by 8.9 percentage points) than did aggregate white 
collar density which grew by 5.6 per cent. 
(32) 
This trend 
was particularly marked among female NUBE members whose 
density rose by 13.7 per cent between 1964 and 1970 whilst 
aggregate white collar female density rose by 5.8 per cent 
and was achieved against a background of expansion in the 
female clearing bank labour force which was three times 
as rapid as that of the aggregate growth of female white 
collar employees. Among male bank clerks, the growth in 
NUKE density was broadly in line with the aggregate density 
growth of male white collar unionists. 
At the same time, however, staff association membership 
stagnated among male bank clerks and incurred a loss among 
female bank clerks. Against the background of expanding 
employment in the industry between 1964 and 1970, this 
poor staff association membership performance resulted in 
substantial falls in density among both men and women which 
were approximately equal to the growth in NUF3E density over 
the period. Thus male staff association density fell by 5.5 
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per cent whilst male NUDE density rose by 6.2 per cent 
and, similarly, the 13.6 per cent fall in female staff 
association density was almost exactly matched by a rise 
in female NUDE density of 13.7 per cent. Thus although 
the National Union of Bank Employees participated to the 
full in the general boom in white collar unionism which 
occurred during the second half of the 'sixties, it clearly 
did so primarily at the expense of the staff associations 
with which it has been in competition for many years. 
In sum, the boom in white collar unionism during this 
period was expressed in banking as a turning away from 
organisations whose character deviated in significant 
respects from orthodox trade unionism and a movement 
towards the one trade union recruiting in the field. 
1.4 We can now begin to locate some significant 
points of interest arising from the lcind of study attempted 
in the present thesis. 
Firstly, as we have seeng the growth of NUBE during 
the 'sixties was a facet of a more general trend of white 
collar union growth which gathered momentum during this 
period, 
(33) 
Whilst it is true that the development of 
unionism in banking took a somewhat idiosyncratic course 
during the 'sixties in response to local conditions of 
competition for membership with the bank staff associations, 
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there was nonetheless a decisive trend during this 
period towards 'unionisation' in banking as that term is 
understood in the context of this investigation. There 
thus exists the possibility that an examination of the 
factors underlying this trend, although complicated by the 
existence of rival organisations, may be expected to provide 
some indications as to the factors underlying the growth of 
white collar unionism in general. In this connection, a 
particularly significant feature of NUBE growth during the 
'sixties was the massive shift in female allegiances from 
the staff associations to the union. Investigation into 
the bases of this shift may be expected to yield some 
insights into the nature and dynamics of female unionisation. 
A second major point of interest from the present 
study arises from the fact that the banking industry 
presents a most clear-cut case of successful employer 
competition with a union. It is safe to say that practically 
every element in the strategies of 'peaceful competition' and 
'forcible opposition' to trade unionism outlined by Bain in 
his original research report has been employed by the 
clearing banks against NUBE at one point or another during 
j 
the the past fifty yoars. In this respect, the banking 
industry is indeed a 1locus classicus1. In particular, 
the staff associations, formed at the instigation of the 
bank employers to combat the union,, have for a variety of 
I, 
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reasons proved to be a complex and substantial obstacle to 
union recognition down the yoars. 
In 1967 this state of affairs changed dramatically when, 
after a series of strikes, the clearing bank employers 
conceded recognition to the union virtually on bloc. 
(35) 
Yet despite the initial conformity between the characteristics 
of the banking industry and the features of white collar 
employment diagnosed by Bain as generating a low level of 
white collar unionisation, e. g. low employment concentration, 
employer opposition to trade unionism etc., the achievement 
of recognition by NUBE was deviant in relation to Bain's 
analysis in several important respects. In the first 
instance, the strike activities were mounted without 
support from other (manual) unions which, as Bain shows, 
was a regular feature of many previous white collar recognition 
strikes, 
(36) 
Secondly, recognition was conceded by the bank 
employers as a direct result of industrial action and not, 
in the first instance, as a result of government policy. 
(7) 
Moreover recognition, as we shall see, did not result in any 
large scale NUBE growth as predicted by the Bain model(38) 
and finally the level of employment concentration per 
establishment, which also plays a large role in the Bain 
model(39) was not a relevant factor in the growth of 
unionism in banking. 
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Wo have already noted above that Bain's analyses of 
white collar unionism display certain points of antagonism 
with sociological arguments. It thus appears that the case 
of banking may provide an occasion for the constructive 
interrogation of Bain's conclusions. Such a proposal 
however can only be taken up with the following caveat. 
Baines conclusions have resulted from work on highly aggre- 
gated data. Whilst it is a defect of such an approach 
that quite significant factors operative over a large 
number of local instances may slip through the wide meshed 
aggregate net or be cancelled out through the operation 
of inverse factors in other collections of cases, it is 
a defect of the 'case study' approach that typicality 
can rarely be claimed for studies of particular industries. 
Our interrogation of Baines conclusions then must 
necessarily proceed with caution. Bearing this caveat 
in mind however, and despite Moore's comment that 
"to attempt to account for the unique 
or even the rare event is to set an 
imp 
impossibly 
high standard for theory" 
we are nonetheless committed to the view that the sociological 
understanding to union growth must be firmly located with 
respect to local institutional contexts, Only when 
analyses are related to such contexts is 'causal adequacy' 
properly supplemented by 'adequacy at the level of meanings 
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and only then does sociological explanation meet with 
sociological understanding. In short, the sociological 
task must ultimately imply a meeting between the case study 
and the aggregated analysis. 
Thirdly and finally, a major source of interest for 
this study arises from the traditional sociological inter- 
pretation of bank employees as the 'aristocracy' of clerks. 
Lockwood, for example, refers to them as 'this ultra-middle- 
class group of workers' 
(41) 
-a view which is broadly affirmed 
by other observers of white collar employees. The rapid 
unionisation of bank employees cannot, given this characteri- 
sation of their social position, avoid commanding some degree 
of sociological attention. In this context, the sociological 
understanding of the nature of unionisation in the banking 
industry and of the factors lying behind it may be expected to 
provide information for the wider sociological debate on the 
broad questions of the social location, proletarianisation and 
prospects for the increasing numbers of white collar workers 
in an increasingly bureaucratised society. 
1 In conformity with the interests outlined above, this 
study will take the following form. Chapter 2 will survey a 
number of factors which are commonly believed to have an impact 
on white collar unionism. Chaptej will summarize the more 
significant background characteristics of the banking industry 
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which are relevant to an understandint of the nature of union 
growth in the industry during the 'si. xties, In Chanter 4a 
model of clerical orientations to work will be set out and 
the impact of such orientations, as hypothesized, on the operation 
of some of the factors discussed in Chapter 2 will be evaluated. 
In Chapters 5 
-and 
6 the results of a survey of bank employees 
conducted by the author will be used to evaluate the model 
of clerical orientations hypothesized in Chapter 4. This 
information, together with the conclusions of the previous 
chapters, will then be used in Chapter 7 to account for the 
growth and pattern of development of trade unionism in banking 
during the decade 1960-1970. In Chapter 8 this account will 
be used to assess the relevance of the factors set out in 
Chapter 2 in accounting for the growth of trade unionism in 
banking and, more specifically, to interrogate Bain's model 
of trade union growth. Finally, in Chapter 9, developments 
in banking will be used to illustrate larger changes in the 
nature of white collar work, the white collar occupational 
structure and the future prospects for the mode of orientation 
of participants in white collar work. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE FACTORS AFFECTING WHITE COLLAR UNIONISATION 
2,. 1 Introduction 
There are several types of response which may be 
made by propertyless workers who wish to use their 
market power in order to influence the market 
distribution of resources in their favour. These 
responses may broadly be divided into those which are 
individual and those which are collective in character. 
As individuals, workers may decide to work longer 
or harder irrespective of whether they are employees or 
self-employed professionals. Alternatively, self- 
employed individuals may unilaterally raise the price 
of their services whilst employees may seek individual 
raises in remuneration or seek higher paying jobs 
either inside or outside the current place of employment 
or employing organisation. Insofar as they are 
successful in these activities, such individuals may be 
said to have exercised a certain degree of market power in 
the Weberian sense of having realised an objective in the 
face of opposition from others in the social relationship. 
In general however, attenuated individual market 
power has resulted in the formation of collectivities with 
the objective of exercising greater influence in the 
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market. Such collectivities have been formed by 
employers, self-employed and professional groups as 
well as by employees. Although the Webbs(l) viewed 
this process as one involving a straightforward 
substitution of collective for individual bargaining, 
Flanders(2) has argued that it is more accurate to 
regard a collective agreement as 'regulating' the 
individual bargain. As Banks comments: 
"The individual workman makes his 
bargain in the context, so to speak, 
of collective regulations governing 
the sale and purchase of labour". (3) 
This formulation is clearly the more appropriate when we 
consider the combination of employers, professionals or the 
self-employed in which overt or covert agreements 
regulate individual bargains. 
Although the central objective of collective 
organisations may reasonably be said to be to increase the 
market power of their members collectively by comparison 
with the total market power of the membership as individuals, 
the pursuit of this objective has had the consequence of 
socialising market forces through the formation of systems 
of institutionalised rules regulating jobs. Following 
Flanders, 
(4) 
we may distinguish six types of external(s) 
job regulation: 
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(1) State regulation by statute or common law. 
(2) Social regulation by custom and convention. 
(3) Unilateral regulation by employers' associations. 
(4) Unilateral regulation by trade unions. 
(5) Collective bargaining or joint regulation 
in which 'trade unions and employers or their 
associations act as joint authors of rules made 
to regulate employment contracts'. 
(6) 
(6) Tripartite regulation involving unions, 
employers and public representatives. 
Whereas certain craft unions in the nineteenth century(7) 
and certain professional organisations today(8) have 
attempted to exert unilateral control over job regulation, 
the majority of employee collectivities have arisen to 
combat unilateral job regulation by employers. As 
Flanders puts it: 
"Historically, the leading theme in 
the evolution of external job regula- 
tion has been the social need of 
employees, especially manual workers, 
for protection against the devastating 
and demoralising effects of unregulated 
labour markets. With the rise of 
laissez faire capitalism destroying or 
weakening the statutory or customary 
defences or trades, and creating new 
classes of manufacturing operatives 
with little or no protection at all, 
new external rules which would qualify 
the freedom of the employer were 
required... " (9). 
These $new external rules$ are broadly of two types. 
Substantive rules, relating to rates of pay, hours, 
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conditions of work, fringe benefits and so on, directly 
regulate jobs. These substantive rules may also regulate 
the supply of labour by limiting numbers of apprentices, 
apportioning work between the sexes, imposing closed 
shops and so on. Secondly, procedural rules regulate 
the making, interpretation and enforcement of the 
substantive rules. These procedural rules deal with 
such matters as 
"the methods to be used and the stages 
to be followed in the settlement of 
disputes or perhaps the facilities 
and standing to be accorded to repre- 
sentatives of parties to the agreement". 
(10). 
Since unionisation has historically involved the substitu- 
tion of bilateral job regulation for unilateral job 
regulation by employers in a majority of cases, and 
since clerical unionisation is in no way exceptional in 
this regard, it is not surprising that clerical unionisa- 
tion has commonly developed in the face of considerable 
opposition from employers(11) and has often required 
favourable circumstances in order to take root and flourish. 
In this chapter, wo survey a variety of factors which 
are commonly believed to be relevant to the development 
of trade union activity among white collar workers. 
Each of these factors has undoubtedly played a role in 
influencing the development of white collar unions although 
the influence of each factor has varied with circumstances. 
The factors broadly divide into two groups, 
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(1) Sociological 'facilitating' factors which exert 
broad long term effects on white collar trade 
union formation and membership by influencing 
the market power of white collar workers. We 
include the following factors in this group: 
control over marketable skills, bureaucratisation, 
composition of the labour force, employers' 
attitudes and class consciousness. 
(2) Economic 'triggering' factors such as the level 
and rate of change of prices, earnings and 
unemployment, 
Before we proceed to a discussion of these factors however, 
we first need to discuss the concept of 'unionisation'. 
2.2 The Concept of 'Unionisation' 
Unionisation is not an easy concept to define in 
a sociologically satisfactory manner. Thus, whilst it is 
possible to speak of a process of unioninsation when 
increased numbers of employees join a collective body 
which has as a principal object the regulation of relation- 
ships between employers and employees, it is unsatisfactory 
to operationalise the concept by reference to a simple 
'head count' from two separate points of view. Specifically, 
we would feel insecure in describing aggregate membership 
growth as 'unionisation' where 
(1) Union membership was not growing as rapidly as 
the field of potential membership, or 
(2) The growth of the union membership was associated 
with the weakening or abrogation of normal union 
ideology, activities or functions. 
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In practice, it has proved relatively simple to 
cope with the first problem and it has become standard 
in this connection to discuss unionisation in terms of 
density, 
(12) 
where union density is expressed by the 
formula: 
Actual Union Membership 
Potential Union Membership 
X 100, 
Using this concept of density is valuable in two major 
respects. Firstly, it permits comparisons of unioni- 
sation across industries which may differ widely in both 
numbers of union members and numbers of potential unionists. 
Secondly, although the absolute size of a union may give 
some indication of its power, density is a more reliable 
indicator of union power as it relates to the industrial 
relations field in which the union operates. In sum, 
density gives a measure of the strength and support of 
trade unions operating in diverse occupations and 
industries. 
Our second problem, the problem of what a union 
does, is much more difficult to resolve. We would certainly 
not feel secure in suggesting that the character of a 
collective organisation is irrelevant to the question of 
whether its members are 'unionised'. If, for example, 
large numbers of employees transfer from a collective 
organisation whose constitution contains no provision for 
strike action to one whose constitution does contain 
- 31 - 
such a provision, common sense demands that we speak of 
this group as exhibiting an increased measure of 
'unionisation'. Or again, if a collective organisation 
deletes a highly restrictive strike clause from its 
constitution and substitutes a less restrictive clause, 
are we not to say that 'unionisation' has been increased? 
Addressing this type of problem, 
(13) 
Blackburn was 
led to formulate a second dimension of 'unionisation' 
which he termed union character. Blackburn defined 
union character in terms of seven items of 'unionateness': 
"... the unionateness of an organisation 
is measured by the extent to which the 
following characteristics apply: 
(1) It regards collective bargaining and 
the protection of the interests of 
members, as employees, as its main 
function, rather than, say, professional 
activities or welfare schemes. 
(2) It is independent of employers for 
purposes of negotiation. 
(3) It is prepared to be militant, using 
all forms of industrial action which 
may be effective. 
4) It declares itself to be a trade union. 
5 It is registered as a trade union. 
6 It is affiliated to the Trade Union 
Congress. 
(7) It is affiliated to the Labour Party". (14) 
Certain difficulties arise in the use of these items as a 
measure of unionateness, Most of those difficulties arise 
from the diversity of origins from which trade unions have 
developed and the heterogeneity of social, economic and 
political contexts in which they operate, Thus, in the 
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case of craft unions which originated as an attempt at 
unilatoral job regulation, Blackburn's emphasis on 
collective bargaining as a criterion of unionateness 
would seem to be anomalous in the face of the observation 
that 
"if anything, unilateral regulation 
could be taken to be more unionate 
than collective bargaining". (15) 
Again, as Bain et al. have pointed out, less than 50 per 
cent of the unions affiliated to the Trade Union Congress 
in 1970 had the word 'union' in their title and the presence. 
of this word by no means singled out the most 'unionate' 
unions. 
(16) 
Moreover registration as a trade union may 
be informed by a diversity of political and economic 
motives and similarly affiliation to the TUC or Labour 
Party may be less a measure of unionateness than of 
calculation by union organisers in response to-specific 
socio-economic conditions. 
(17) 
In sum, not one of 
Blackburn's criteria relates to unionateness in a wholly 
unambigous way and, with respect to the first three 
criteria in particular, it may prove difficult to 
establish in any clear-cut way what conformity to the 
criteria would consist in, given the variety of contexts 
in which 'militancy', 'independencof and so on may be 
assessed, 
The criteria of unionateness devised by Blackburn 
have their origins in systematic sociological attempts 
to distinguish white collar trade unions from professional 
associations (in particular qualifying and occupational 
associations(18)) on the one hand, and to identify points 
31 
of difference between white collar trade unions and their 
blue collar counterparts on the other. 
(79) 
Given this 
point of reference, it is not surprising that Blackburn's 
criteria are particularly useful for treating those 
historically 'respectable' white collar occupations in 
which there has been competition for membership between 
more unionate trade unions on the one hand and less 
unionate internal staff associations on the other. 
Within such occupations, Blackburn's items of unionateness 
have proved to be subjectively salient issues for white 
collar workers edging their way towards union membership. 
Significantly, as Blackburn himself has documented, each 
one of his seven items has been the object of debate, 
controversy and ideological competition between NUBE and 
its rivals in the banking industry. 
Thus, although Blackburn's criteria may require 
important modifications for inter-occupational, inter- 
industry and international comparative purposes, they 
remain extremely useful as they stand for comparative pur- 
poses in contexts in which several organisations are 
competing for membership within white collar occupations 
or industries, in which the vagaries of context are to a 
large extent neutralised. They remain outstandingly 
useful in the field of banking whore they have proved to 
be a focus for rivalry and competition. Hence, we 
shall define the notion of union character in terms of 
Blackburn's items of unionateness and we shall define 
'unionisation' within the context of the banking 
industry to consist of the following: 
-34+- 
(1) Increases in the membership of the more unionate 
organisation, where the less unionate organisations 
either (a) lose membership or 
(b) retain constant 
membership. 
(2) Increases in the membership of the less unionato 
organisation, where the more unionato organisation 
has not lost membership. 
(3ý Increases in the unionatoness of all or some of 
the organisations in the field. 
We now turn to address the various factors cited earlier as 
having an impact on white collar unionism. 
2,1 Factors Affecting the Market Power of Clerical Workers 
We have already distinguished between those factors 
defined as sociological 'facilitating' factors and economic 
factors. Wo can now clarify this distinction by noting 
that these sociological factors have a long-term impact 
upon the market power exercised by white collar workers 
both as individuals and as collectivities. Whilst it is 
always difficult to generalise, we may reasonably claim that 
where the effect of the operation of these factors is such 
as to weaken the market power of white collar workers as 
individuals, this effect will tend to stimulate unionisation 
and, in general, the collective power of groups of white 
collar workers. Whore the factors combine to increase 
the market power of individuals, they may weaken the market 
power of the collectivity by influencing the individual 
power holder away from collectivity membership or towards 
less unionate collectivities. The relationships between 
the factors to be outlined on the one hand, and individual 
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and collective market power on the other are complex and 
in certain respects paradoxical. There are, therefore, 
no straightforward or uncomplicated relationships between 
tho factors affecting individual market power on the one 
hand and unionisation on the other. 
2. lt Control Over Marketable Skills 
The ownership of a specific type of knowledge or 
skill may, as Wright Mills has pointed out, form the 
'capital' of the propertyless worker. However, in 
industrial capitalistic societies the ownership of skills 
is not hedged about with the same legal safeguards as is 
the ownership of economic capital, and, in this context, 
combination aimed at collective job regulation has proved 
a frequent substitute for legal protection. 
Groups both of white collar and blue collar workers 
have formed combinations with the aim of preventing the 
'dilution' of their skills or the expansion of the 
numbers of the owners of such skills. Thus, as Turner 
(20) 
and Clegg et al, 
(21) 
have shown, the early craft unions 
sought unilateral control over particular trades in order 
to regulate prices and entry to them. In the United 
States, as Ulman has pointed out, the craft union 
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"sought to reserve to its members the 
exclusive right to perform all jobs 
which knowledge of their craft enabled 
them to perform ..... Less frequently, 
it sought actively to enlarge this sphere 
of opportunity by holding down the number 
of qualified craftsmen through restrictive 
apprenticeship regulations". (22) 
Similarly, both in Britain and in the United States, 
associations of holders of professional skills have 
sought, with considerable success, to exert collective 
controls over entry to their occupations and over the 
prices of their services. 
(23) 
The formation of trade unions by white collar 
workers has also constituted a response to incursions 
by employers upon their skill-based market powers. 
Thus DATA (then the Association of Engineering and Ship- 
building Draughtsmen AESD) was formed in 1913 as a response 
to a combination of employers in Clydeside which restricted 
competition for draughtsmen's skills and their inter-job 
mobility, As Roberts at al, comment: 
"Mobility was an increasing charac- 
teristic of the ambitious draughtsman: 
blocked mobility served to bring home 
his position in the labour market. " 
(24) 
Similarly the A. Sc. W. and ASSET were formed during the 
tight labour market conditions of World War I in order 
to exploit the special skills of their memberships and 
emulate the successes of the manual unions during this 
period, 
(25) 
_, 37 w 
In these cases of both white collar and manual 
workers, however, the formation of combinations centred 
on specific, idontifyable skills which were passed on 
through apprenticeship to a trade or were established 
by formal qualification. The skills of the clerical 
worker, by contrast, wore both too general and too 
specific to provide a straightforward focus for unioni- 
sation, consisting of (1) the once-scarce skills of 
literacy, and (2) specialised task-related knowledge 
about the business of the employer. 
With respect to the skill of literacy, it is 
possible to suggest that prior to the 1870 Education 
Act individual clerical workers enjoyed considerable 
individual market power simply through their ownership 
of literacy. Insofar as literacy was a scarce resource 
however, it could form the basis of individual market 
power only until approximately 1890 when a growing 
number of sch,: )ol-educated and hence suitably qualified 
persons reached the job market. At this point, the 
formation of clerical unions to defend living standards 
might be expected. Literacy however is very far from 
being a 'trade' or a skill specific to a particular industry 
or occupation. As such, literacy is not a skill around 
which a particular occupational culture can form and attempts 
at employee job regulation can coalesce. As a generalised 
and diffused skill, literacy was a poor basis for the 
formation of 'craft' unionism or protective associations, 
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Thus the clerical 'craft' 
(26) 
unions which were formed 
in the 1890's were, with the exception of the CAWU, formed 
on an occupational basis. The local government officers 
began to organise in 1905, tho parent body of the CSCA 
was formed in 1900 and the CAI M was formed in 1892. 
Given the broad truth of the above assertions 
however, there is reason to suppose that the decline of 
literacy as a scarce resource began rather earlier than 
1870. The expansion of education began considerably 
before this date and, as early as 1848, John Stuart Mill 
remarked that: 
"Until lately, all employment which 
required even the humble education of 
reading and writing could be recruited 
only from a select class, the majority 
having no opportunity of acquiring 
these attainments. All such employments 
accordingly were immensely overpaid, as 
measured by the ordinary remuneration of 
labour. Since reading and writing have 
been brought within the reach of the multi- 
tude, the monopoly price of the lower grade 
of educated employments has greatly fallen, 
the competition for them having increased 
to an almost incredible degree". ('27). 
If Mill's assessment is correct, the 1870 Education Act 
merely accentuated a process which was already well under 
way and which was, in addition, exacerbated by the 
increasing proportion of female clerical labour and the 
importation of Scots and German clerical workers during 
the 1870's. 
(28) 
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The decreasing scarcity of clerical literacy 
skills undoubtedly weakened the individual market power 
of the clerl: and stimulated the development of 'defensive' 
craft-style unionism. As we have seen, this, unionism 
was centred on the occupation rather than the skill because 
the skill itself was too diffuse to form the basis of a 
craft culture. In many cases however, the formation of 
an occupation based union continued to be inhibited by 
the specialised character of acquired skills gained within 
employment itself, Office work was indeed highly 
specialised during the latter part of the nineteenth 
century(29) and the blend of skills acquired by the office 
worker tended to be tailored to the business activities of 
his employer and were difficult to transfer into other 
employment contexts, This lack of standardisation of 
clerical skills made it virtually impossible for clerical 
workers to achieve lateral mobility and, in its turn, 
this rigidity led clerical workers to focus their hopes 
for economic advancement on their immediate employer, In 
this context, unionisation was profoundly inhibited and 
conditions were favourable to the maintainance of 
'unitory' loyalty to the employer, In sum, the specificity 
of clerical skills inhibited any display of hostility to 
employers and equally made union activity, which is 
necessarily geared to general rather than specific and 
localised objectives, extremely difficult to organise in 
an effoctive way. As Lockwood has argued: 
_40_ 
"Tho dependence of the clerk on a 
particular employer, and the difficulty 
of mobility between firms once a 
mature age had been reached, were, in 
theory at least, counterbalanced by the 
opportunities for advancement through 
staying with one firm and gradually 
'making oneself indispensiblo'. It is 
thus possible to see that the particularism 
of : the relationship between clerk and 
employer, the possibility of rising from 
one position to another and the largely 
individual and informal training within 
the counting house, served to strengthen 
ties between individual clerks and 
individual employers and thereby weaken 
the common interosts that existed among 
clerks as a body. Perhaps the most 
important factor is that such personal and 
particular relationships produced a 
bewildering lack of uniformity in clerical 
salaries, for not only did every establish- 
ment have its own scale, but practically every 
clerk his own price". (30) 
In sum, during the latter part of the nineteenth century the 
market power of individual clerks was eroded by the general 
rise in literacy whilst, at the same time, the development 
of clerical unionism was impeded in many cases by the 
continuingly specific character of acquired clerical skills 
and the particularistic office relationships which accompanied 
this specificity. The white collar unions which were formed 
earliest were, by and large, either 'craft-based' (e. g. 
DATA and A. Sc. W. ) or based in increasingly concentrated 
and bureaucratised industries (e. g, national and local 
government). Ultimately the unionisation of the commercial 
clerk depended upon the concentration of employing organisa- 
tions in the financial industries and the bureaucratisation 
both of his skills and of office relationships. 
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2.5 Thtreaucratisation. 
The expansion of the white collar labour force has 
been one of the outstanding features of the development 
of Western economies during the past half century. In 
Britain the number of white collar workers increased by 203 
per cent between 1911 and 1971 and whereas white collar 
workers formed 18.7 per cent of the occupied population in 
1911, by 1971 they formed 42.7 per cent of the total work 
force. During the same period the manual share of the 
occupied population fell from 74,6 per cent to 54,7 per 
cent, 
(31) 
This trend is by no means peculiar to Britain, 
A recent estimate for the United States by Mackenzie(32) 
put manual and white collar workers on an equal numerical 
footing at 48 per cent of the labour force each, whilst a 
figure of 27 per cent white collar workers (out of the 
non-farm labour force) was estimated for Japan in 1963(33) 
and a figure of 23.1 per cent was estimated for France in 
1960. 
(34) 
In Britain the pattern of growth has been led 
by the clerics who have almost tripled as a percentage of 
the labour force between 1911 and 1971 and have quadrupled 
(from 832,000 in 1911 to 3,412,000 in 1971) in absolute 
numbers. 
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Tablo 2.135) 
Clerks as a Proportion of the British Labour Force 
Year Proportion of Clerics (per cent 
1851 0. s 
1911 4.5 
1951 10.4 
1971 14.0 
This kind of increase testifies to the increasing 
complexity of administrative functions in the British 
economy and is itself responsive, as Wright Mills has 
pointed out, to the rise of big business, and big government. 
"In moving from smaller to larger 
and more elaborate units of economic 
activity, incroased proportions of 
employees are drawn into co-ordinating 
and managing. Managerial and profes- 
sional employees and office workers of 
varied sorts - floorwalkers, foremen, 
office managers - are needed; people 
to whom subordinates report, and who 
in turn report to superiors, are links 
in chains of power and obedience, 
co-ordinating and supervising other 
occupational experiences, functions and 
skills. " (36), 
This growth of big business and big government creates 
considerable potential for whito collar unionisation in 
several wayst 
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(i) By concentrating administrative control 
over large numbers of white collar workers in 
less and less hands. 
(2) By increasing the employment concentration of 
white collar workers in larger places of work. 
(3) By establishing formalised and standardised 
procedures for dealing with work contingencies, 
and 
(4) By developing specialised clerical functions. 
The concentration of control over large numbers of 
clerical workers in less and less hands has two major 
effects. It eliminates the particularisms and 
specificities in clerical employment which derive from 
a multitude of employers each having their own idiosyncratic 
employment practices. Thus business concentration'will 
tend automatically to reduce the 'bewildering lack of 
uniformity in clerical salaries and conditinns of 
work' which Lockwood cites as inhibiting the growth of 
clerical unionism. Moreover, a single large employer 
forms a unified focus for collective hostilities and 
resentments. Thus the formation of the BOG was 
preceded by an extensive process of concentration in 
banking when, as Allen and Williams point out: 
"Between 1891 and 1918 the number 
of private banks decreased from thirty 
seven to six. The number of joint 
stock banks in England and Wales fell 
from forty three in 1913 to twenty six 
in 1918 while the total number of 
branches increased". (37) 
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Similarly Lockwood argues with respect to the unionisation 
of local government employees that where Whitleyism 
prevailed and some kind"of uniformity in salaries and 
conditions of employment was present, NALGO membership 
was high. More generally he states that 
"The growth of NALGO .. has gone 
hand in hand with the subordination 
of local particularism in working 
conditions to a set of national 
standards common to the service". 
(38) 
More recently, Clive Jenkins' so-called 'combines 
policy' recognises that, given 'the movements in industry 
towards monopoly, oligopoly, takeover and rationalisation... 
it would only be possible to build up union financial 
strength rapidly and efficiently by organising the big 
employers'. 
(39) 
Here then we have a virtuous circle 
for union growth. Concentration within industry creates 
favourable conditions for white collar unionisation, 
whilst recognition of these conditions by union organisers 
ensures that these conditions will be capitalised upon. 
The concentration of white collar industries may 
also stimulate unionisation by concentrating white collar 
workers in larger workplace units. In a study of white 
collar unionisation in manufacturing industry, Bain 
found that employment concentration was a significant 
factor influencing union densities. As he put its 
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".., some but not 
in the pattern of 
in Britain can be 
variations in the 
concentration". 
all of the variation 
white collar unionism 
accounted for by 
degree of employment 
40) 
Clearly, larger groups of white collar workers will work 
in more impersonal surroundings and may be led to realise 
common interests more rapidly than in smaller groups. 
Additionally, unions may find it more advantageous to 
recruit among large groups of employees both because 
recruiters can recruit more rapidly and cheaply and 
because large groups of employees can be represented 
more cheaply than small groups. In short: 
"employees are more likely to roalise 
the need for trade unionism and trade 
unions are more likely to be interested 
in recruiting them, the more concentrated 
their employment". (41) 
Behind the realisation of common interests by 
clerical employees lie the processes of bureaucratisation 
which develop rapidly in the large company. The process 
of managing and deploying large numbers of administrative 
workers itself poses problems which are broadly handled 
by bureaucratising the organisation. As Ingham has 
suggested. - 
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"Large organisations .... favour 
the 
use of bureaucratic rules in the problem 
of the administration of the labour 
force 
and its work. Such rules are, 
in this 
case, important in the 'remote control' of 
the organisation which, by virtue of 
its 
size, is difficult to deal with 
in any 
other way". 
(42) 
The bureaucratisation of clerical work involves 
the last 
two processes cited above: (3) the establishment of 
formalised and standardised procedures for dealing with 
as many of the contingencies arising in the context of 
work as possible, and (4) the specialisation of clerical 
functions within the organisation. 
The trend towards the standardisation of 
' procedures militates against all forms of individual 
market power by weakening the significance of personal 
and particularistic modes of negotiation over salaries 
and conditions of work. In this sense, the bureaucratic 
rationalisation of clerical tasks itself represents a 
unilateral process of job regulation against which the 
individual is powerless. The very introduction and 
operation of bureaucratic practices within white collar 
organisations servos to weaken the sense of individual 
efficacy and control over life chances within the 
work organisation and to accentuate the significance 
of collective attempts to exercise control over the 
organisation of work. As Dubin points out, the 
development of bureaucratisation means that the worker: 
0 
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"... becomes aware of his personal 
inability to make an individual 'deal' 
for himself outside the company rules 
and procedures, except under the circum- 
stances of a 'lucky break'. 11e tends 
also to view himself as part of a group 
of similarly situated fellow-employees 
who are defined by the rules as being 
like each other. In addition, uniform 
rule making and administration of the 
rules make unionism easier, and, in a 
sense, inevitable. It should be reaso- 
nably clear that collective bargaining 
is joint rule-making. It is no great 
step to joint determination by union and 
management of rules governing employment 
from the determination of them by manage- 
ment alone. Both proceed from the same 
assumption that generally applicable rules 
are necessary to govern the relations 
between men in the plant. Once the worker 
accepts the need for general rules covering 
his own conduct, he is equally likely to 
consider the possibility of modifying 
existing ones in his favour rather than seek 
their total abolishment". (43) 
Whilst consideration of the history of the struggle of 
white collar unions for recognition from employers may 
counsel a certain degree of caution in accepting Dubin's 
comment that it is 'no great step' from unilateral to 
joint job regulation, the central point is perfectly 
acceptable. The bureaucratisation of clerical occupations 
will ultimately create an acceptance of collective means 
to market power precisely because bureaucratisation 
severely erodes individual market power, In particular, 
it structures the parameters of clerical employment for 
even the most individually energetic of employees and, at 
_4R_ 
minimum, encourages the co-existence of both individu- 
alistic and collectivistic approaches to the exercise 
of market power. 
The impact of the final aspect of bureaucratisation, 
specialisation of function, is rather more ambiguous. 
Whereas in manual work, specialisation of function has 
led to the increasing homogenisation of work-tasks and, 
to a considerable extent of the labour force, the charac- 
ter of clerical work has not lent itself so easily to 
this tendency. Opinion is thus divided on the nature 
and significance of the specialisation of clerical 
functions. Thus a number of writers such as Mills, 
(44) 
Hoos(45) and, more recently, Braverman(46) have argued 
that clerical work is undergoing increased specialisation 
and mechanisation which will culminate in the total homo- 
genisation of clerical tasks via increasing sub-division, 
computerisation and the development of assembly-line 
techniques (including work measurement) in the organisation 
of clerical work tasks until clerks are simply reduced to 
the role of machine operators and machine minders. 
Underlying this writing is an image of the clerical work 
environment as an office-factory in which the physical lay- 
out of the office and impersonal and standardised social 
relationships result in social isolation and alienation 
for the individual worker and in a profound do-identifica- 
tion with management. Hoos, for example, argues that in 
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such a context, the trade union is the solo avenue of 
social identification for atomised office workers who 
labour in a physical environment characterised by isola- 
tion and self-estrangement, and Braverman argues that 
clerical work has become extensively do-skilled in ways 
which parallel the de-skillisation of craft work. 
Against these views must be set the arguments of 
those who argue that the specialisation of function 
which is entailed in larger administrative units has 
resulted less in the 'office-factory' than in the 
distribution of office workers, to quote Lockwood, 
"... in small working groups where 
they are in personal and co-o erative 
contact with management. " (47) 
This arrangement preserves many of the particularisms of 
the 'counting house' alongside the bureaucratic structure 
of the modern large-scale commercial organisation. 
Similarly, other studies of automation in the office have 
not confirmed Hoos' somewhat apocalyptic views. Mumford 
and Banks, 
(48) 
for example, note that whilst work was 
generally found to be 'less interesting' as a result of 
automation in bank branches, it had not taken on the 
character of assembly line work. Similarly Shopard's 
comparative study of man-machine relationships 
(49) 
found 
no significant differences in the degree of 'alienation' 
experienced by office workers who worked with machines as 
opposed to those who did not. In this context, it is 
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worth recalling that very many clerical tasks have had 
a high 'detail' component prior to mechanisation, and 
that mechanisation may ease the burden of these detail 
tasks rather than accentuate it. It is perhaps therefore 
over-romantic to claim that automation has brought about 
a de-skillisation of clerical work. 
The bureaucratisation of clerical employment then 
probably has its most profound effects through the standar- 
disation of the parameters of clerical employment rather 
than through the standardisation of clerical work per so. 
This standardising effect is most apparent with respect 
to the character of promotion opportunities. A crucial 
feature of bureaucratisation is that it erodes personal and 
particularistic bases of promotion and salary advancement. 
Since personal promotion constitutes a central means by 
which an employee may exercise individual market power, the 
bureaucratisation of control over promotion opportunities 
and a decline in the availability of these opportunities 
will stimulate the switch to collective means of maintaining 
market power in order to promote economic advancement. The 
role of personal and particularistic employee-employer 
relationships in determining promotion reaches its nadir 
when collectivities demand joint regulation of bureaucratised 
promotion schemes in the interest of collective strength. 
Thus W. W. Daniel writes of petrochemical workers that 
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... they opposed the principle 
of promotion on the basis of 
'merit' (or rather the idea that 
management should be allowed to 
select men for promotion on its 
definition of merit) and they 
supported the principle of 
promotion on the basis on seniority 
with certain built-in safeguards 
such as union/management agreement 
that the man was up to the job. 
They eschewed the opportunity of 
personal advancement that promotion 
on merit might give them because 
they perceived that ultimately their 
own betterment was linked more to 
collective advancement than to 
individual advancement, and that if 
they permitted promotion on a mana- 
gerial definition of merit this 
would reduce their collective strength 
and their basis for collective advance- 
ment ... Thus their perception of 
conflicts of interest, and their aware- 
ness that ultimately their own advance- 
ment was linked inextricably to that of 
the groups. of which they were members, 
led them to forego opportunities for 
personal gratification in the interests 
of collective strength". (50) 
Few white collar workers have adopted an approach to 
promotion which-is as collective as this, but nonethe- 
less almost all writers on white collar unionism have 
stressed the inverse relationship between promotion 
opportunities (individual market power) on the one hand 
and unionisation (collective market power) on the other. 
Thus Mills argues that 
"Not job dissatisfaction in general, but 
a specific kind of job dissatisfaction - the feeling that as an individual he can- 
not got ahead in his work - is the job 
factor that predisposes the white collar 
employee to go pro-union. This opinion 
is more important in the conscious 
- 
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psychology of white collar unionism 
than the good or bad will of the 
company, the degree of job routina- 
sation etcetera. There is a close 
association between the feeling that 
one cannot get ahead, regardless of the 
reason, and a pro-union attitude". (51) 
Similarly, Lockwood argues that 
"In varying degrees, therefore, bureau. 
cratisation is conducive to the blockage 
of clerical promotion and to the isolation 
of a separate clerical class. Thus defined, 
bureaucratisation represents a set of 
conditions extremely favourable to the growth 
of collective action among clerical workers". 
(52) 
By the same token, Sykes(53) study of the attitudes of 
manual and clerical workers concluded that two internally 
consistent sets of attitudes held by the two groups were 
directly related to promotion opportunities. The 
tendency for clerical workers to value promotion was 
directly related to favourable attitudes to night school 
attendance and a dislike of management training schemes 
and to a preference for individual bargaining processes 
as opposed to collective ones. A rapid process of 
unionisation among the clerical workers during the 
course of Sykes' study attested to the inverse relation- 
ship between promotion opportunities (which had boon 
frustrated by the introduction of a new management training 
scheme) and unionisation. 
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Again, Roberts et al's(5{ study of technicians 
demonstrated that frustration centering on lack of 
promotion opportunities, together with poor differentials 
in comparison with manual workers, was a major factor 
in stimulating unionisation. 
Lockwood has similarly pointed out that the 
formation of the CSCA was closed tied to the 
"... post-191$ reform of the civil 
service, one of the outstanding 
features of which was the creation 
of a homogeneous and isolated class 
of clerical workers, distinct in 
status, rewards and opportunity from 
the higher officials". (55) 
The character of the civil service after this reform, 
he argues, constituted 
".., a close approximation to the 
pure bureaucratic model of admini- 
stration. A clear-cut classifica- 
tion of functions, qualifications, 
remuneration and criteria of advance- 
ment pxemitted a high degree of 
standardisation of conditions through- 
out government departments. In 
particular, the resulting isolation 
of a clerical class, common to the 
service and made up of individuals 
whose chances of promotion were 
relatively small, provided the basis 
of the Civil Service Clerical Association, 
which assimilated into itself the hither- 
to splintered clerical associations". 
(56) 
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Allen and Williams describe a similar phenomenon in 
banking. Banking conditions before World War I, they 
argue, encouraged a belief in economic individualism 
because all promotions and salary increases depended 
upon personal recommendation by branch managers. Dy 
the end of the war however, 
"The banks had become much more 
impersonal places in which to work. 
The determination of such matters as 
promotion policy and salary scales 
had moved into the hands of people 
with whom the ordinary clerk had no 
contact and on whom, in any case, he 
could make no impression with his 
individual demands. " (57) 
A large amount of evidence, therefore, points to the loss 
of individual market power - in the form of personalised 
negotiations over salaries and particularistic advancement 
opportunities in a relatively 'open' promotion setting - as 
a central factor in the growth of collective means to market 
power in the form of unionisation. 
These observations should be treated with a certain 
amount of caution for, as Lockwood has pointed out, 
"... blocked mobility in itself would 
appear to be an insufficient cause of 
unionisation; the individuals whose 
chances of promotion are curtailed must, 
in addition, be aware of their common 
identity as an occupational group, and 
this awareness is first and foremost a 
product of standard working. conditions". 
(58) 
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Bureaucratisation then plays a double role in the white 
collar unionisation process. The bureaucratisation and 
blockage of white collar promotion opportunities creates 
a conscious need for an alternative source of market power. 
However an alternative collective source of market power 
will only develop where common occupational identification 
is possible. In the case of 'craft' unionism, this 
common identification is already present in the shared 
experiences of the 'craft culture'. In the case of 
clerical occupations the bureaucratisation of the work 
situation culminating in the standardisation of office 
conditions under large scale common employers is necessary 
to promote a sufficient degree of occupational identifica- 
tion. 
As many of the studies cited above have indicated 
however, the process of bureaucratisation is by no means 
complete in clerical occupations. Where bureaucratisation 
of the work situation is relatively advanced, but bureau- 
cratisation of employment has resulted only in a standardi- 
sation of the parameters of promotion opportunity rather than 
an actual blockage of those opportunities altogether, it is 
likely that trade unions will be formed which have relatively 
high densities but low levels of unionateness (see section 
2.8 below). 
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2.6 Composition of the Lahotir Forco 
In 1971 approximately 8.75 million British women 
wont out to worlc. 
(59) 
They constituted 36.0 per cent 
of the labour force. 
(60) 
By contrast, in 1911 women 
made up only 29.6 per cent of the labour force and only 
5.5 million women were gainfully employed. The growth 
of female employment has been most spectacular in the 
area of white collar work. In 1911 women made up 29.8 
per cent of a white collar labour force of 3.4 million. 
BY 1971 women constituted no loss than 46.2 per cent of 
a white collar labour force of 10.14 million. In 
the last sixty years therefore, approximately three 
million extra women have been absorbed into the white 
collar sector during a period in which women have formed 
a slightly declining proportion of a broadly static 
manual labour force. 
As might be expected, the growth of female employment 
has been'most spectacular in the high growth areas of white 
collar employment - the clerical and sales sectors. 
Whereas in 1911 female clerks constituted 21.1E per cent of 
a total of 832,000 clerks, by 1971 women made up 71.9 per 
cent of 3.4+ million clerical workers. Similarly womon 
made up 35.2 per cent of the 989,000 strong British sales 
force of 1911, whilst by 1971 they constituted 59.4 per 
cent of a salosforce of nearly 1.11 million. 
(62) 
In 
other areas women havo marked time in proportional terms 
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and thus expanded numerically with the general expansion 
of the area (e. g. , 
the category of 'managers and adrninistra- 
tors'), or they have declined as a proportion of an occupa- 
tional category but remained constant numerically due to 
the general expansion of the category as a whole (e. g. the 
category of 'lower professionals and technicians'). Thus 
if the growth in the whito collar labour force is the most 
significant change in our occupational structure during 
this century, the growth of female employment within this 
sector is undoubtedly a highly significant development 
within the context of that change. Sturmthal(63) writes 
of this change in the sox ratio of white collar workers as 
'conspicuous'. 
A number of factors would appear to indicate that 
women might be more difficult to unionise than men. Firstly, 
female participation in paid employment has a marked tendency 
to be discontinuous or even episodic. Thus whilst as many 
as 75.4 per cent of single women between the ages of 15 
and 34 were gainfully employed in Britain in 1965, 
(64) 
some 
83 per cent of them will marry, 
(65) 
and the majority of them 
will cease work in order to raise a family. remale employ- 
ment, in the early years at least, is thus an essentially 
short-run affair which often involves residence with parents, 
dependent domiciliary status and a low level of financial 
responsibilities with earnings tending to become significant 
as 'pin money'. In short, work is rarely a 'central life 
interest' for young female employees. 
(66) 
Thus Nyrdal 
and Klein comment that 
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"... most shorthand typists, shop assis- 
tants and women employed in jobs of a 
similar routine nature, with little 
prospect of advancement, long to escape 
into a world in which they will have 
neither a boss nor a fixed time table. 
Though the change may in effect be the 
substitution of one routine for another, 
it replaces one which is imposed from 
outside - either by the impersonal workings 
of the machinery or by the will of a 
superior - with another that the woman can 
to some extent manipulate herself and which 
therefore gives her the feeling of freedom". 
(67) 
Similarly Mumford and Banks argue that 
"Women - or rather girls, for the great 
majority are under twenty five - will, 
at present accept routine jobs that are 
unlikely to lead anywhere. For most of 
them matrimony is their chief objective 
or interest and work is regarded as 
temporary and incidental, rather than 
central in their lives. Because of 
this they are willing to put up with 
tasks that seem intrinsically dull and 
for the same reason they are not unduly 
anxious about promotion'". (G8) 
And again, 
".., the fact that women do not show much 
job' satisfaction does not necessarily mean 
that they are dissatisfied with the total 
work situation, and we have already commen- 
ted that many found pleasant social relation- 
ships the most attractive aspect of work. 
Young women in dull, routine jobs with few 
prospects of promotion are not, and cannot 
be expected to b©, highly job-orientated. 
Their important goals lie outside the work 
situation and work is treated as a moans for 
earning a living and securing a pleasant 
social situation". (69) 
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Whilst this kind of 'traditional' outlook has undergone a 
certain degree of erosion amongst the more professional 
female white collar workers, 
(70) 
it remains highly 
significant in the consideration of female clerical 
employment. 
Recently there has been an increasing trend towards 
the resumption of employment after basic family commit- 
ments (and in particular, child bearing) have been completed. 
This has generated a bimodal distribution of female 
employment with a steep decline in the numbers of women 
employed between the ages of 20 and 3071) Thus a 
growing proportion of working women are married: the 
proportion of married women workers has risen from 13.6 
per cent in 1911 to 38 per cent in 1951, and 57 per cent 
in 1966. Similarly whereas only 9.6 per cent of married 
women went out to work in 1911,38 per cent did so in 
1966. 
(72 
However, here again, to the extent that a 
wife's earnings are conceptualised as secondary and 
supplementary to the masculine wage packet, it seems 
likely that there will again be a lack of long term 
commitment to work either as a central life interest or 
as an instrumental source of income. Under these 
circumstances, women may seek satisfactions from jobs 
which relate less to pay and security and more to such 
characterstics as hours, conditions of work or a 'good 
_6o_ 
social atmosphere'. As Mumford and Banks point out in 
the last cited passage, female office workers often find 
social relationships the most positive and rewarding 
aspect of their employment and similar conclusions may 
be inferred for women in manual jobs. A recent study 
by Beynon and Blackburn 
(73) 
of manual workers in light 
industry revealed that the female workers rated such 
aspects of their employment as promotion opportunities and 
the character of their local union branch as the least 
important features of their jobs, whereas hours, conditions 
of work and 'good workmates' (together with the more 
traditional categories of 'pay' and 'security') were 
regarded as the most important aspects of the job. 
Beynon and Blackburn summarise their results with respect 
to their female sample by remarking that 
"... it seems that although the friendly 
atmosphere at Gourmets was highly valued, 
it was not regarded as an essential part 
of the job. The importance of hours to 
those with home responsibilities shows up 
not only in the priorities of the part- 
time women but also in a tendency among 
the full time women for those mentioning 
hours to be the married womeng particularly 
those with children. The lower importance 
attached to security by the women, especially 
the part-time workers, reflects the fact 
that a women in our society is rarely the 
main breadwinner for a family. The 
married women were probably more concerned 
about their husbands' security, and the 
single women were likely to become 
married". (74) 
If women, especially the young and unmarried, have a low 
commitment to work, it is unlikely that they will attach 
a groat deal of significance to union activities or so 
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and particularly when the benefits of union membership 
are perceived as medium- or long-term in character. 
This generalisation probably holds a fortiori in those 
cases whore a union is either not recognised or is 
insufficiently institutionalised. Moreover unions may 
fail to cater to the needs of working women in any syste- 
matic or organised way. Studios of white collar unions 
demonstrate that men take up a disproportionate number 
of roles in union structures, 
(75) 
and uncbr these 
circumstances women may come, as Beynon and Blackburn 
indicate, to regard trade unions as aspects of a 'hostile 
control system'. 
(76) 
These then are the kind of arguments devised to 
account for the consistently lower levels of unionisation 
among women in both manual and white collar employment as 
compared with their male counterparts as sot out in Table 
2.2. 
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Table 2z. 2(77) 
Unionisation by Sex and by Major Occupational 
Group in the United Kingdom, 1948-1974. 
Union Density (fl Increase 
1948 1964 1970 1974 1948/74 1970/4 
Males 33.8 33.4 40.0 44.5 +10.7 +4.5 
White 
Collar Females 25.4 24.9 30.7 32.6 +7.2 +1.9 
Males 59.5 60.0 63,3 64,7 +5,2 +1.4 
Manual 
Females 26.0 32.6 35.2 42.1 +16,1 +6.9 
Males 52.9 51.4 55.0 56.9 +4.0 +a. 9 
Total 
Females 25,7 28.6 32.7 36. *7 +11,0 +4.0 
As Table 2.2 demonstrates, there is a large and continuing 
gap between the densities of male and female unionisation 
in both the manual and white collar fields. In the white 
collar field, this gap has widened during the post-war 
period. 
Notwithstanding the evidence summarised in Table 2.2 
and despite the intuitive appeal of many of the above argu- 
ments, there is little general agreement that women as a group 
are resistant to unionisation. Lockwood, for example, 
argues that 
63 - 
"A high proportion of women in a clerical 
occupation is not universally associated 
with a low degree of unionisation, nor 
does unionisation necessarily proceed 
farthest where women are in a minority. 
Indeed if a generalisation is to be made, 
it is that the proportion of women in 
clerical unions is usually roughly equal 
to their representation in the field of 
employment which the unions seek to 
organise. Differences in the degree of 
unionisation are therefore to be attribu- 
ted to something other than differences in 
the sex ratio of the group". (78) 
Certainly a glance at Table 2.3 should be sufficient to 
forestall any rapid or oversimplified conclusions on 
this topic. 
Table 2,379) 
Number of Men and Women in Trade Unions and 
their Percentage of All Employees in Predominantly 
Non-manual Industries, U. K. 1962. 
Distributive 
Trades 
Insurance, 
Banking and 
Finance 
Educational 
Services 
Other Profes- 
sional and 
Scientific 
Services 
Cinemas, Thea- 
tres, Sport, 
Radio, Dotting 
National Govt. 
Service 
Local Govt. 
Service 
Men Women Total 
No. (, 000) % No. % No. % 
234 16 171 11 405 13 
136 40 6o 22 196 32 
190 58 227 32 417' 40 
109 25 141 18 250 20, 
72 55 23 20 95 38 
254 66 134 73 388 68 
350 57 227 (100) 577 70 
1,345 36 983 25 2,328 31 
of 
_6t; _ 
Although Table 2.3 indicates that, overall, women are less 
unionised in white collar occupations than their male 
counterparts, it also indicates that this trend is not 
uniform throughout all white collar occupations. In 
national and local government - areas where men are highly 
unionised - the female workforce is more highly organised 
than their male counterparts. It was in the light of 
these kinds of contrasts that Lockwood reported that 
"... the factor of sex is of relatively 
small importance among the conditions 
affecting unionisation. In other 
words, the differences between different 
types of clerical employment are much 
more significant than differences in 
their sex composition". (80) 
Similarly Bain, whilst reinforcing the differential 
unionisation thesis and additionally noting (contra Lockwood) 
a correlation between low density of unionisation and a high 
proportion of female workers in manufacturing industry, goes 
on to suggest that this correlation is spurious. Women, 
Bain argues, tend to work in smaller establishments than 
men and their low degree of unionisation can therefore be 
attributed to the more powerful factor of employment 
concentration. Bain concludes that 
"In short, the proportion of women has 
not been in itself a significant deter- 
minant of the pattern of manual or white 
collar unionism in Britain". (81) 
Dain's conclusion precisely echoes that of the TUC who note 
that 
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"Where men are weil organised in a 
particular plant, generally women 
are too. The fact that the propor- 
tion of women in employment who belong 
to trade unions is only about half that 
of men is mainly to be accounted for by 
differences in their industrial and 
occupational distribution". (82) 
There is thus a powerful arsenal of arguments and authori- 
ties ranged against those with the temerity to assert that 
women- are more difficult to unionise than men. 
Despite the confident tone of the various statements 
quoted above, there remain a number of unresolved questions. 
Table 2.3 clearly does not support Lockwood's assertion 
that men and women are normally unionised in similar 
proportions in specific industries or unions. What 
differences in industrial and occupational distribution 
between men and women account for the variation in the 
degree of male and female unionisation in banking and 
finance, or education, or indeed national and local 
government? Why are women in local government more 
unionised than women in banking and so on. 
One central factor which may help to disentangle 
the complex and contradictory evidence before us may be 
the degree of recognition and institutionalisation accorded 
to trade unions in different industries and occupations. 
It is noticeable, for example, that in national and local 
government, where union recognition is total and levels 
of male density are high, female density is very high. 
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On the other hand, in insurance, banking and finance 
where union recognition is patchy and male density is 
lower, women show lower density levels than their male 
counterparts. 
These observations are consistent with our earlier 
comments about the generally lower level of commitment to 
work and, by extension, to trade unions on the part of 
female workers. A recent study of membership participa- 
tion in NUBE by Brown( 
83) 
found that women had a pronounced 
tendency to give no, substantive reasons for joining the 
union and could give little indication of the advantages 
and disadvantages that membership conferred. Perhaps 
the most plausible interpretation of this finding is 
simply that the level of female commitment to work is 
such that trade unions are issues of such low salience that 
women are rarely interested in expressing any real commit- 
ment to them. 
There is thus some reason to suppose'that woment 
lacking powerful reasons to join trade unions, tend to make 
their decision to join on the basis of the 'climate of 
opinion' that may exist in a given organisation or workplace. 
In this connection, Blackburn(84) has noted the role of 
'office norms' in facilitating or inhibiting union attach. 
ments in banking and Brown(85) has similarly commented upon 
the high proportion of her sample of female NIJBE members 
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who cited themselves as having been 'persuaded' to join 
the union whilst giving no other basis for joining. 
Extrapolating from these observations, we can 
suggest that where white collar unions are thoroughly 
institutionalised and joining a union is seen as a. 
normal activity, women - lacking any particular motive 
to take up or to refuse union membership - may be parti- 
cularly inclined to join the relevant or favoured 
organisation. This tendency may well be accentuated by 
the short-run involvement of women in the world of work 
which virtually ensures that the 'separate clerical class' 
spoken of by Lockwood will be overwhelmingly female. Under 
these conditions, female unionisation may be accentuated 
in both density and unionsatemess. Conversely however, 
women workers may frequently lack the impetus to join 
unrecognised and non-institutionalised unions where the 
benefit of membership may depend upon the recognition of 
the union during some future period when the current 
female employees are likely to have left the organisation 
concerned. 
These considerations are strengthened by a con- 
sideration of the high rate of turnover among female 
clerical employees. If the rate of turnover is high, 
institutionalised unions will find it easier to recruit the 
large numbers of new employees necessary to maintain female 
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density levels. Unrocognised or non-institutionalised 
unions will correspondingly find this task more difficult 
and this factor will also tend to depress their female 
density levels relative to institutionalised unions. 
The high level of female turnover also points to a further 
reason why female clerks will tend not to join unrecognised 
unions. Simply, when faced with unsatisfactory salaries 
or working conditions, they will seek improved conditions 
elsewhere rather than join an unrecognised union to fight 
for benefits in the far distant future. 
Thus, whilst Bain has noted that: 
"Female employees appear to have no 
inherent characteristics which make 
them more difficult to unionise than 
men, or, at least if they have, unions 
have been able to overcome them". (86) 
We would resporriby noting that women have orientations to 
work which tend to render them 'fair weather friends' to 
trade unions. Whilst the place of women in the division 
of office labour may frequently incline them towards more 
unionate orientations than their promotion-oriented male 
counterparts, this orientation is likely to be captured only 
by the institutionalised union. In short, unions overcome 
unfavourable female dispositions to work and to trade 
unionism by being recognised and institutionalised. 
0 
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As the figures from Table 2.2 demonstrate, women 
are now joining white collar unions in increasing numbers. 
This increase probably reflects several factors. Firstly, 
the increased tendency for 'two income' families to become 
the norm with correspondin[y greater long-term female 
commitment to paid employment may be affecting female 
attitudes to trade unions, Secondly, white collar trade 
unions themselves may be becoming increasingly interested 
in, and attractive to, their expanding potential female 
memberships. Thirdly, there has been a general upsurge 
in white collar unionism which may, in turn, be 'normalising' 
white collar union membership among substantial sectors 
of white collar employment and further exercising a multi- 
plier-style 'bandwagon' effect which would affect female 
recruitment to trade unions disproportionately. This 
effect may be further stimulated by the increasing 
acceptibility of white collar unions to employers, and it 
is to the, role of the attitudes of employers on white 
collar unionisation that we now turn. 
2_. Z The Attitudes of Dnp1oyerrs, 
Power is a 'zero-sum' concept. This fact implies 
that when employees, either individually or collectively, 
gain in market power this gain will be matched by a 
corresponding decrease in the market power of employers. 
The rules in terms of which an ongoing industrial concern 
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is organised may be taken as a rough indicator of the 
balance of organisational and market power which currently 
exists between employer and employees. In this sense, 
job regulation is essentially a 'political' phonomenon. 
(87) 
The transition from unilateral job regulation by employers 
to bilateral job regulation by its very nature involves 
the recognition and consolidation of a transfer of power 
from employers to employees, and a corresponding curtailment 
of the 'areas of discretion' which were previously the 
exclusive prerogative of employers and managers. 
It is therefore not surprising to find that employers 
are generally resistent to the formation of trade unions 
among their employees. Bain, for instance, states 
that 
"Most private employers, unlike those 
in the public sector, refuse to recognise 
and negotiate with white collar unions, 
and many of then even pursue policies 
designed to discourage their white collar 
employees from joining unions". (88) 
Bain additionally cites an unpublished Ministry of 
Labour (now Department of Employment) estimate that some 
85 per cent of white collar employees in manufacturing 
industries were not covered by collective agreements in 
the early 'sixtieso. 
(89) 
Given the existence of a 
considerable level of hostility towards white collar 
unions from a substantial proportion of employers, it is 
clear that both unionisation in general and union recog- 
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nition in particular can be very greatly affected by the 
attitudes of employers. As Bain, the principal analyst 
of the role of employers' attitudes in the development 
of white collar unionisation, has stressed:. 
"... even the most superficial reflec- 
tion should indicate that employer 
policies and practices may profoundly 
affect the growth and development of 
trade unionism. Where employers 
disapprove of trade unions and pursue 
policies designed to discourage their 
employees from joining them, trade union 
growth is likely to be retarded. 
Conversely, where employers recognise 
and negotiate with trade unions and 
encourage their employees to belong to, 
them, trade union growth is likely to 
be stimulated". (90) 
Whilst this formulation clearly holds for all forms of 
trade unionism in both the manual and non-manual sectors, 
there are grounds for supposing that it holds with special 
force in the sphere of white collar unionism. 
There are a number of reasons for supposing that 
white collar workers are especially susceptible to the 
influence of managerial attitudes towards trade unions. 
Firstly, although as we have seen there has been a wide- 
spread bureaucratisation of the parameters of white collar 
work, the concrete work situation of many white collar 
workers retains many aspects of the old particularism, 
There remains, in contrast to the shop-floor situation, 
a degree of constant contact with managerial staff and 
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managerial attitudes which, if dominant, can clearly be 
instrumental in 'setting a tone' which is hostile to trade 
unionism and which may undermine the formation of potentially 
deviant sub-cultures organised around the concept of 
employee solidarity. Close contacts with management,, 
for example, may assist in the maintainance of a 'unitary 
ideology', 
(91) 
among white collar workers which stresses 
the common objectives and values which unite all 
participants in an enterprise long after such an ideology 
has vanished from the manual sector. 
Secondly, the antagonistic relationship which exists 
between personal promotion opportunities and the commitment 
to collective methods of economic advancement will be 
greatly accentuated by an employer's hostility towards 
trade unionism. In any situation in which"a 'career 
structure' is offered to employees the advantages of joining 
a trade union .- especially one which is unrecognised and 
has no effective power - are minimised whilst the dis- 
advantages in terms of deteriorated relationships with 
managers are maximised. Moreover the would-be promotes 
may be encouraged to believe that current trade union 
membership is inconsistent with a future managerial 
orientation or position. 
These effects area in turn, greatly enhanced by 
the composition of the labour force in clerical and other 
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white collar occupations. An increasing trend Li the 
white collar sector is the employment of women to under- 
take routine clerical and administrative tasks which are 
not fully embedded in the occupational career structure. 
The effect of this trend is to produce a group of 
organisational roles which are quite clearly 'dead-end' 
in character and which would, in the normal way, stimulate 
their incumbents towards trade union membership, In 
filling these posts with female employees, employers can 
avert this tendency by using labour which is essentially 
'short-run'. Given the low commitment to work of many 
female employees and their low a priori commitment to 
trade unionism, this group of employees will be influenced 
either towards or away from unionisation by the prevailing 
organisational attitudes which derive from the more 
permanent male staff who are influenced by their promotion 
prospects and other inducements away from union membership. 
Moreover, the more permanent male staff are, by the very 
employment of impermanent female staff, afforded improved 
promotion opportunities. They therefore become more 
oriented towards promotion, 
(92) 
tend to be less oriented to 
collective means of advancement. succumb more easily to 
managerial pressures against trade unionism, and hence 
contribute more powerfully towards the prevailing unitary 
'tone'. This pattern of interactive effects can be 
stimulated merely by employers' hostility to white collar 
trade unions. It can lead to a situation in which, as one 
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NACSS official claimed, in order to recruit white collar 
trade unionists 
"You have to be able to show them that 
their employer is not really opposed, 
that they won't be disloyal by joining, 
and that, all in all, there is not going 
to be much of a battle". (93) 
This kind of situation arises all the more readily when the 
employers of white collar workers undertake specific 
activities designed to curtail the advance of unionisation. 
One of the most straightforward procedures which an 
employer can utilise to combat the activities of a trade 
union is simply to ignore it. The non-. recognition of 
trade unions is easily justified on the grounds that they 
are not representative of the staff or are 'inappropriate' 
for certain types of employee. In pursuit of this objective, 
the criteria of 'representativeness' may be set at an 
extraordinarily high level. For example, one company 
cited by Bain demanded that a union organise 80 per cent 
of its staff before recognition would be accorded. 
(94) 
Other companies have demanded that unions represent sub- 
stantial proportions of certain grades of staff across 
entire industries before they are prepared to recognise 
them for the company in question. Non-rocognition can be 
a highly effective 'passive' response to incipient white 
collar unionisation. White collar workers are particularly 
prone to base their decision to join a union on the grounds 
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of its effectiveness rather than on more traditional and 
ideological grounds of class solidarity. In this 
situation, non-recognition of a white collar union by 
an employer which effectively denies the possibility of 
immediate effectiveness to the union can stimulate a self 
defeating spiral of falling membership and diminished 
efficacy among the organised sections of white collar 
workers. - 
Whilst non-recognition remains the most important 
'passive' form of employer resistance to white collar 
unions, there are additional and more active methods which 
can be employed. Bain(95) has distinguished between two 
basic types of active anti-union strategy which an employer 
can utilise: the strategy of 'peaceful competition' and 
the strategy of 'forcible opposition'. The strategy of 
peaceful competition involves such activities as 
"... paying salaries equal to or better 
than those in unionised forms; - granting 
salary increases during a union recruit- 
ment campaign; establishing welfare, 
profit sharing and other benefit schemes; 
offering various types of rewards to 
'loyal' employees; giving speeches and 
interviews designed to convince employees 
that their interests can be batter cared 
for by management than by a union; granting 
monthly staff status; and establishing 
'company unions'. " (96) 
By contrast, the strategy of forcible opposition may be 
implemented through 
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".., overlooking union members for 
promotion and pay rises; transferring 
active unionists from department to 
department; threatoning to discontinue 
any 'extras' prosently being paid above 
the union rate; sending management 
officials to union recruitment meetings 
to note the names of those employees 
attending; and dismissing union members". 
(97) 
These two types of strategy are clearly ideal types and it 
is difficult to locate hard and fast dividing lines between 
the elements of each. Similarly mixtures of elements of 
the two strategies may be involved in a particular indus- 
trial or occupational setting. Although it is not possible 
to estimate with any degree of accuracy the extent to which 
the two techniques are employed, Bain himself suggests 
that 
"... such methods are used by a 
considerable number of employers to 
discourage their white collar 
employees from joining trade unions", 
8 
Although it is not easy to estimate the extent to which 
employer hostility can affect trade union growth in the 
white collar sector, some indications can be gained by 
comparing the progress of various white collar unions 
immediately after the post-World War I boom in white 
collar union membership. 
The First, World War did a great deal to stimulate the 
growth of trade unionism. It accelerated the trend towards 
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larger administrative units which had existed prior to the 
outbreak of war and, at the same time, the wartime require- 
ment that wage claims should go to compulsory arbitration 
promoted a tendency towards national wage settlements 
rather than the time consuming piecemeal local agreements 
which were characteristic of the pre-war years. The union 
movement, the co-operation of which was required for the 
successful prosecution of the war effort, gained increased 
power and influence both inside and outside government 
circles as a result of its increasing administrative 
responsibility. In line with these developments, the 
post-war advance of Whitleyism maintained a continuing 
emphasis on regular employer-union consultations through 
Joint Industrial Councils together with the innovatory 
proposal that minimum wage fixing machinery be established 
in those industries where workers were relatively unorganised. 
Above all perhaps, Whitloyism stood for the principle of 
trade union recognition and the abandonment of outmoded forms 
of unilateral job regulation by employers. 
During the decade after World War I then, there was 
considerable official support for well regulated collective 
bargaining of the type envisaged by the Whitley Committee. 
This support was given a certain degree of tangible expres- 
sion through the activities of the Ministry of Labour which 
were directed towards realising stable negotiating frame- 
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works within which the participants in various industries 
could meet and discuss common problems. In this) context, 
a National Whitley Council was established for the Civil 
Service shortly after the war and a similar one was 
developed for local government though the latter subsequently 
succumbed to the pressures of local particularism in 1921. 
In banking, by contrast, where the domination of the 
five largest clearing banks was already established and 
the speed of concentration in the industry was such that in 
1918 a Treasury Committee was set up to investigate the 
desirability of further amalgamations, 
(99) 
a single union 
(the Bank Officers' Guild) was organising noarly 50 per cent 
of the labour force and conditions were highly favourable 
for the development of industry-wide negotiating machinery, 
the bank employers were able to prevent its development. 
The strength of the bank employers' hostility to Whitleyism 
was sufficient to withstand widespread public support for 
collective bargaining procedures for white collar workers 
which included a House of Commons resolution, passed on a 
free vote without division in 1923, which stated that: 
"... local authorities, banks, insurance 
and shipping companies, and other employers 
of professional and clerical workers should 
follow the example of the Government in 
recognising the organisations of these 
workers". (100 
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The bank employers' antipathy to collective bargaining 
at this time was, as Price(101) has pointed out, rooted 
in a 'unitory' ideology which stressed loyalty to the 
bank and its objectives above all else. In this 
spirit of opposition, the bank employers, and in parti- 
cular the 'Big Five' banks, began to employ a number of 
the techniques of 'peaceful competition' against the 
newly formed BOG. 
Undoubtedly the most important weapon in the banks' 
armouries was the development of internal staff associa- 
tions. One by one between 1919 and 1921 each of the 
banks sot up its own internal staff association in 
competition with the union, 
(102) 
Male bank clerks were 
expected to join these organisations as a matter of course, 
indeed membership was automatic in some cases, whilst 
membership fees were either nominal or non-existent. 
The formation of the staff associations was a masterstroke 
in that they competed with the union and simultaneously 
symbolized in concrete and tangible form the 'unitory' 
ideology of the bank employers. The staff associations 
were justified from the outset in highly 'unitory' terms. 
As the Chairman of the British bankers' Association put it 
in a letter to the President of the BOG in 1920: 
"It is the opinion of the Association 
that the formation of 'internal 
associations' democratically elected 
and representative of directors, manage- 
mont, and all sections of the staff, yet 
- 80 - 
personal to each bank, does form 
the best safeguard for the interests 
of all, and moreover continues the 
spirit of clannish pride that each 
bankmau feels towards his own bank". 
103) 
Similar sentiments were expressed with respect to the 
internal staff associations forty years later 
(in 1960) 
by the Chairman of the Central Council of Dank Staff 
Associations (CCBSA) who stated that: 
"In banks there is no cleavage as 
between labour and capital. In 
banks we are all in the bank together. 
We meet our general management in 
negotiation. Our own general manage- 
ment have risen from the ranks themselves. 
We do negotiate domestically here the 
whole time, and we do not wish to have a 
paid organiser from outside with no 
intimate knowledge of our day-to-day 
banking affairs to come in and do the 
negotiating for us". (104) 
The formation of the internal staff associations was the 
central element in the pattern of peaceful competition 
which was to characterise union-employer relationships 
in banking for the next forty years. In 1920-21, when 
the BOG was still making rapid advances in membership, the 
employers awarded large bonus increases and new wage 
scales which restored a considerable proportion of the 
differentials lost by bank clerks during the war years. 
As post-war economic conditions., improved the need for 
militant trade unionism became?. less obvious and the 
spirit of comradeship born in the trenches declined. 
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In this context, the formation of the internal staff 
associations and the strategic pay awards were designed 
to restore the 'unitory' loyalties of bank clerks and as 
Blackburn comments, 
".., there seems little doubt that by 
increasing salaries (the bank employers) 
hoped to curb the growth of the Guild 
and avoid giving recognition". (105) 
Finally, considerable efforts were made through public 
meetings and circular letters to ensure that bank clerks 
were aware of the employers' disapproval of the new union. 
These efforts bordered at times on the tactics of 'forcible 
opposition'. Thus at the 1927 Annual General Meeting of 
the BOG four cases of intimidation were reportedg(106) 
and there were a number of instances over a period of 
years in which the banks did nothing to quash widespread 
rumours that membership of the BOG could hamper promotion 
chances. General intimidation of a mild variety 
particularly concerned with promotion lingered throughout 
the 'thirties in a number of clearing banks. 
(107) 
Whilst there can be no doubt that the banks employed 
all the techniques of peaceful competition to the full 
during this period, it is also clear that their efforts 
were materially assisted by the widespread appeal of the 
'unitory' ideology among bank clerks. The BOG was itself 
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established as a highly conciliatory body with a highly 
restrictive strike clause, roflecting the unwillingness 
even of the more militant bank clerks to acknowledge a 
full-blooded conflict of interest with their employers. 
Moreover the ideology of internalism did reflect many 
bank clerks' perceptions of their role and status within 
the bank. When, additionally, the banks' pay increases 
were attributed to the activities of the staff associations, 
the difficulties of the Guild were compounded. In a 
succinct summary of this complex situation, Allen and 
Williams conclude that: 
"The promptness with which the bank 
employers established internal associa. 
tions; the apparent reasonableness of 
their action and the extent to which it 
accorded with significant elements in 
the work and social situations of bank 
clerks made strong counter-action by the 
Bank Officers' Guild a necessary means of 
obtaining recognition. They also made 
it more difficult to attain. Bank clerks 
had barely been introduced to trade unionism 
before they were presented with an alterna- 
tive which the majority considered to be 
adequate and more appropriate", (108 
It is clear then that intransigent hostility towards the 
Guild was expressed by the bank employers and that most 
of the tactics of 'peaceful competition' were employed 
against it during this period. 
The response of the bank employers towards the 
Guild stands in marked contrast to the pattern of response 
..... 8 .3 
to clerical unionisation in local and national government 
during the same period where, as wo have soon, Whitley 
Councils were set up. This differential pattern of 
response resulted in quite different degrees of unionisa- 
tion in local and national government as compared with 
banking during the 'twenties and 'thirties, Against a 
context of widespread unemployment and poverty and a 
falling retail price index during this period, the real 
value of clerical salaries rose between 1920 and 1936 
(see infra, p. 101). During this same period, the member- 
ships of both NALGO and the CSCA rose rapidly, whilst the 
BOG membership fell very substantially until it bottomed 
out in 1939. Although other forces also influenced the 
growth of the CSCA and NALGO during this period, the most 
marked contrast between national and local government and 
banking lies between the attitude of government employers 
towards white collar trade unionism and that of the bank 
employers. The dramatic contrast in the fortunes of the 
BOG, which began on an initially stronger numerical basis 
than either the CSCA or NALGO, with the unions organising 
clerks in local and national government testifies to the 
very substantial impact of the attitudes of employers upon 
white collar unionisation. 
In the context of a major survey of white collar 
unionism in manufacturing industry, Bain has argued that 
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"There can be little doubt that a major 
reason for the difference in the density 
of white collar unionism between the 
private and public sectors of the economy 
is the difference in employer policies and 
practices with regard to union rocognition1. 
(109) 
and that 
"... those areas of private industry in 
which some form of white collar recogni- 
tion has generally existed for several 
years are also those in which the density 
of white collar unionism is highest". (110) 
There is clear evidence to support the view that these same 
relationships also hold within the non-manufacturing sectors 
of white collar employment, where hostility on tho part of 
employers to white collar trade unionism may depress both 
the density and the unionatenoss of white collar unions. 
In industries in which white collar workers are employed 
over long periods of time in a career structure, the 
influence of the attitudes of employers on clerical unioni- 
sation is likely to be strongest and cannot be ignored. 
Much of what passes for the false class consciousness 
and status anxieties which are conventionally associated 
with white collar workers' attitudes to trade unions may 
be traced to anxieties about the reaction of employers 
to trade union membership. It is to such concerns over 
status and, more generally, to the aims attd goals of 
white collar workers that we now turn. 
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2,8 Clerical Status Ideologies and Uniontsation 
It is well known that white collar workers are loss 
unionised than their manual counterparts and that this is 
an international phenomenon. Thus in a recent study, 
Bain et al. point out that 
"Only 13 per cent of white collar 
workers are unionised as compared 
to 56 per cent of manual workers in 
the United States, 24 per cent as 
compared to 42 per cent in Germany, 
30 per cent as compared to 81 per cent 
in Australia, 38 per cent as compared 
to 53 per cent in Britain, 58 per cent 
as compared to 65 per cent in Norway, 
and 70 per cent as compared to over 80 
per cent in Sweden". (111) 
Faced with such data, it is especially tempting to look 
for common characteristics among white collar workers 
themselves which might account for their relatively low 
aggregate degrees of unionisation across the world as 
compared to manual workers in their respective countries. 
A major argument in this connection is that white 
collar workers have certain characteristics in common 
which make them unwilling to join trade unions, or which 
make them willing to join only those unions which are 
not militant. A common strand of argumentation within 
this view stresses that white collar workers have a higher 
status position than their blue collar countorparts and 
additionally come from higher status backgrounds. Both 
features may militate against union membership, it is 
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argued, because high status generates a status ideology 
which is inimical to trade union organisation. The 
general relationship cited is summaried by Bain et al, 
in the diagram reproduced below, 
(112) 
Union Growth Union Character 
Social Im gory 
Social Position 
The characteristics of status ideology or status conscious- 
ness which are usually taken to be inimical to union growth 
are a belief in the social structure as a harmoniously 
organised hierarchy of positions ranked in order of 
prestige and a belief in individual effort to climb up 
the ranks of this hierarchy. To this view is counterposed 
a class conscious ideology composed of a 'power' model of 
society in which conflict over the distribution of social 
rewards is seen as endemic and class-based and collective 
approaches to the redistribution of rewards are seen as 
valuable both intrinsically and instrumentally, 
(11 ) 
Almost all writers on white collar trade unionism 
have alluded to the status of white collar workers as a 
factor which affects their unionisation. Writers such 
as Klingender, 
(114) 
Mills(115) and Allen(' 
16) 
have seen 
the status ideology of clerical workers as a barrier to 
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trade union activism which mast be overcome by demonstra- 
tions of trade union effectiveness. Loclcwood(h17) has 
also argued that status consciousness is a general back- 
ground variable affecting trade union membership among 
white collar workers, although he has stressed that it 
cannot form part of an explanation of variations in the 
extent of white collar unionism or its character. 
Blackburn, 
(118) 
I'lills, 
('19) 
Kornhauser, 
(120) 
and IIindell(121 
have all argued that those who are responsible for white 
collar union policy formation face a continuing 'trade 
off' problem in recruitment. This problem consists of 
balancing the 'tough' policies necessary to ensure union 
effectiveness with the requirement that the union conforms 
to the standards of 'responsibility' demanded of it by 
the status images and aspirations of its membership, who 
aim at 'professional' status without 'professional' market 
power. A militant approach which would achieve results 
and demonstrate effectiveness might, in this analysis, have 
the effect of alienating potential members. In this view 
therefore, the status ideology and aspirations of white 
collar workers create a situation in which high densities 
of white collar union membership can only be achieved by 
establishing a union character with a low degree of unionate- 
ness and may thus ultimately result in low density levels. 
In short, the 'trade off' requirod of white collar union 
organisers by the status orientations of their constituency 
places them in a cleft stick which may drastically inhibit 
unionisation. 
- 88 - 
Bain, by contrast, is almost unique in criticising this 
view: 
"There can be little doubt that most 
white collar workers generally think 
of themselves as being socially superior 
to manual workers, as belonging more 
with management and the middle class than 
with the manual workers and the working 
class. Nor can there be much doubt that 
the status of almost all white collar 
groups has been declining over the course 
of the twentieth century. But this does 
not necessarily mean that the first fact 
prevents white collar workers from joining 
unions or that the second will encourage 
them to do so". (122 
In a subsequent work, Bain and his collaborators sharply 
attack the literature which seeks to link unionisation 
with social class position and related variables, 
(123) 
and there can be little doubt that other factors such as 
employment concentration and employer hostility to white 
collar unions may, in varying degrees, be primarily 
responsible for the inhibition of white collar unionisation 
in. a variety of differing national contexts. 
Whilst we cannot comment in detail on the vast 
literature linking social stratification with trade union 
membership, a few points are perhaps in order. In certain 
respects it seems inevitable that, as long as some of the 
variation between manual and white collar unionisation 
remains unexplained, it will be attributed to the status 
consciousness of the white collar worker. However, as the 
work of Lockwood and Bain demonstrates, the key issue 
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remains the extent to which concrete elements in the 
work and market situations of white collar workers rein- 
force and sustain such a 'status ideology' with its low 
Selective affinity' to trade unionism. For example, it 
may well be the case that low levels of employment 
concentration, the particularisms of specific work 
situations, opportunities for personal promotion, a 
'unitory' office ideology and employer hostility to 
trade unionism may sustain, or at least fail to contradict 
a status ideology which militates against high levels of 
trade union density or unionateness. But in this case, 
the status ideology is to be thought of either as a depen- 
dent or an intervening variable with respect to the kinds 
of factors already discussed in this chapter, rather than 
the product of a rather disembodied 'social position'. 
In sum, whilst it is valuable to examine the relevance of 
a 'status ideology' to unionisation, the 'status ideology' 
itself should be set firmly against the background of the 
work and market situations of clerical workers which 
sustain or fail to sustain such an ideology. 
In this connection we would argue that the availability 
of personal promotion opportunities is a key factor in 
determining the adherence to a class or status ideology 
insofar as such an ideology impinges on tendencies to 
unionise. There can be little doubt that the permanent 
availability of opportunities for promotion will encourage 
r. 
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a belief in individual effort directed at climbing a 
social hierarchy of positions, and that conversely 
membership of a separate clerical class will tend to 
favour a belief in collective approaches to the social 
distribution of rewards and a conflict model of society. 
To-the extent that these beliefs articulate with the 
decision to join or not to join a trade union those ideo- 
logies will influence white collar unionisation. Thus 
where promotion is relatively open within an occupation 
or an industry, as it is for men within banking, a status 
ideology may seem more appropriate to the concrete charact- 
eristics of the clerk's market situation and trade unionism 
may be inhibited as a result. If, by contrast, promotion 
opportunities are closed to a sector of white collar 
employees, as they are effectively for women in banking, 
a class ideology may come to be seen as more appropriate, 
and trade unionism may be facilitated. Of course, matters 
may become more complex. If, for example, a status 
ideology is strongly held in an industry, such as banking, 
in which 'open' promotion opportunities (for man) are an 
established fact, widely visible and understood as normal, 
the status ideology may 'carry over' to those with a short- 
run involvement in banking for whom promotion is not a 
seriously entertained possibility. This 'carry over' 
will, of course, be accentuated to the extent that it is 
fostered by employers and others. 
- 91 - 
Thus far, we have been dealing in ideal typical 
terms. But of course, unionisaion is not an all or 
nothing phenomenon and neither are class and status 
ideologies. Several writers have indicated that white 
collar workers may join unions without abandoning their 
individualistic aspirations. Mills, for example, 
writes that 
"In the union or out of it, for it, 
against it, or on the fence, the white 
collar employee usually remains 
psychologically the little individual 
scrambling to get to the top, instead 
of a dependent employee experiencing unions 
and accepting union affiliation as 
collective moans of collective ascent. 
... to most members, the union is an 
impersonal economic instrument rather 
than a springboard to new personal, 
social or political ways of life". 
(124) 
And 
"Unions are usually accepted as something 
to be used, rather than as something in 
which to believe. They are understood 
as having to do strictly with the job and 
are valued for their help on'the job ... 
Acceptance of them does not seem to lead 
to new identifications in other areas 
of living". (125) 
Strauss(126) has similarly argued that white collar 
workers may accept trade unions on an 'instrumental' 
rather than an ideological basis. In short, white 
collar unionists may accept collective objectives 
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related to the bureaucratised parameters of clerical 
employment whilst simultaneously adhering to the belief 
that personal and individual merit should enter into the 
determination of individual market opportunities. Few 
white collar workers would perhaps currently concur with 
Daniel's petrochemical workers(127) that promotion should 
be a matter for collective decision making. Some might, 
like Reynaud's 'cadres' 
(128) 
accept that opportunities for 
further education and training should be matters for 
collective decision making whilst promotion and salaries 
should remain matters for individual bargaining. Many 
clerical workers in the large financial and governmental 
bureaucracies would accept that salary scales, job grades 
and the parameters of promotion opportunity should be 
areas for joint regulation whilst individual promotion 
should be based on personal negotiation and personal 
achievement and merit. In sum, the objects of collective 
bargaining may easily vary from organisation to organisation 
where a key variable may be the availability of promotion 
opportunities. A status ideology or orientation may by 
the same token coexist with the acceptance of collective 
objectives but may involve some limitation on the typo 
and variety of objectives accepted as legitimately 
collective. 
Moreover, the degree of status ideology prevalent in 
an organisation and responsive to its characteristics, may 
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exercise an influence on union character. Those who 
expect to influence their market power by their own efforts 
are more likely to commit themselves to unionism only to a 
relatively small (and instrumental) extent. They are 
unlikely to commit themselves to militant union policies 
except in extremis, and they are unlikely to support 
organisations which the management they hope to join 
seriously opposes. 
Finally, a status ideology or orientation may limit 
the density of white collar unionisation. Here a key 
variable will be the character of the union involved. 
Assuming that the status ideology of the union constituency 
will have already influenced the unionateness of the union 
concerned, there is little reason to suppose that a status 
ideology will limit union density to any great extent. 
As Bain et al. summarise the position% 
"Stratification variables may at least 
partly explain why, in a situation of 
loss than total unionisation, a parti- 
cular individual joins a union and another 
does not. In other words, the group 
need to unionise flows from pressures 
within the work environment itself. But 
at the margin those pressures might be 
mediated by the differential impact upon 
individuals within the group of such 
aspects of stratification as social 
imagery, relative deprivation, and 
status inconsistency". (129) 
In sum, we conclude that status ideologies of white collar 
workers, insofar as they impact upon unionisation, are 
_91& 
maintained by and mediate aspects of the work and market 
situations of clerical workers and must be understood 
against such a background. Such status ideologies, we 
conclude, will influence the objectives and unionateness 
of white collar unions but not their densities. 
We now turn to a consideration of the second group 
of factors influencing white collar unionism described at 
the beginning of this chapter - tho economic 'triggering' 
factors - which may be broadly defined in terms of secular 
movements in prices, incomes and levels of employment. 
.2 Unionisation and Secular Trends 
Given that the development-of unionisation is a 
collective response towards a distribution of power and 
resources allocated through the medium of 'market forces', 
we should certainly expect to find that unionisation is 
affected by movements in the market distribution of 
resources. Certainly the union movement itself has argues 
for such an interpretation. Thus as early as 1904, Samuel 
Gompers, the first President of the American Federation of 
Labor, referred to a 'law of growth in organised labor' 
which he loosely characterised in the observation that 
unionisation had 
"grown with each year of industrial 
activity and receded to some degree 
with each industrial depression". (130) 
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Nearer home, a recent TUC document referred to the lovel 
of employment as the most important factor conditioning 
the level of trade union membership. 
(131) 
Academic specialists have not been slow to confirm 
these general observations, to provide reasons why they 
should hold good and to compute the relationships between 
some of the variables involved. . Thus Commons at all 
in the course of demonstrating the relationship between 
unionisation and the business cycle, argued that: 
"During a time when the level of prices 
is rising, employers generally are making 
profits, are multiplying sales, are 
enlarging their capital, are running full 
time and overtime, are calling for more 
labor, and are able to pay higher wages. 
On the other hand the cost of living and 
the hours of labor are increased, and 
workmen, first as individuals, then as 
organisations are impelled to demand both 
higher wages and reduced hours. Consequently, 
after prices are well on the way upward the 
'labor movement' emerges in the form of unions 
and. strikes, and these are at first successful. 
Then the employers begin their counter- 
organisation, and the courts are appealed to. 
The unions are sooner or later defeated, and 
when the period of depression ensues, with 
its widespread unemployment, the labor 
movement either subsides or changes its form 
to political and socialistic agitation, to 
ventures in co-operation or communism, or 
to other panaceas". (132) 
Whilst a shortage of hard data on union density forced Commons 
et al. to focus on union character changes in response to 
the business cycle - in particular on the shift from 
strikes (enterprise unionateness) during times of prosperity 
to political activity (society unionateness) during 
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depressions(133) - their analysis of changes in union 
character was later complementod by Weyforthts(134) 
analysis of union membership statistics. Weyforth 
also added arguments which further endorsed the rationale 
informing the hypothesisod relationship between unionisation 
and the business cycle, suggesting that 
"... there are several important reasons 
why trade union membership is dectdely 
influenced by the general state of business. 
In the first place, during a period of 
depression when there is much unemployment, 
it becomes difficult o impossible for 
many members to keep up their dues, Many 
lapses occur for this reason. Secondly, 
not only is it harder to hold old members, 
but it is more difficult to obtain new ones. 
When many people out of employment are 
waiting to take the workman's place, he is 
less inclined to run the risk of antagonising 
his employer through trade union activities 
than at times when jobs are plentiful. 
Finally, the union occupies a weaker strategi- 
cal position in times of depression than in 
times of prosperity. When business is active, 
employers are, generally speaking, reaping 
their harvest. Hence an interruption of 
their business is extremely undesirable, and 
often they may prefer to yield to the demands 
of their workmen rather than undergo the losses 
incident to a shutdown. Moreover, even in 
case the employer is inclined to fight, he will 
find it more difficult to recruit his force 
with competent non-union workmen because there 
is a smaller labor supply of the unemployed 
available than in times of depression. But 
in times of depression not only is the employer, 
because of the largo supply of unemployed work- 
men, better able to make a fight against the 
union, but he is also less disinclined to do so, 
since with business running low, a strike of 
his men may provide a convenient excuse for 
shutting down his plant". (135) 
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Weyforth's comments are, of course, not necessarily of 
universal validity, Indeed his conclusions are contingent 
upon a number of structural factors such as the absolute 
size and strength o'-' the labour movement, the attitude 
of the government in power, the intordopendence of 
industrial production, the question of whether the 
unions concerned are established and recognised, the degree 
to which closed shop or union protection agreements are 
in operation and so on. Nonetheless, econometricians 
such as Hines, 
(136) 
ýshenfelter and Pencavel(137) and 
Sharpe(138) have gone on to specify the relevant business 
cycle variables for unionisation with more precision, and 
to build more complex models of union growth on related 
assumptions. 
As we shall see, the significance of these studies 
of trade union growth is partially attenuated, for our 
purposes, by the fact that all of them deal with aggregated 
data (incorporating both manual and white collar union 
membership) over long time periods and, most significantly, 
by the fact that they deal with established and recognised 
unions. Where the longitudinal aggregate data is valuable 
is in its relevance in enabling theorists to pin-point the 
precise features of the business cycle which stimulate or 
retard union growth. Before looking at this work in some 
detail, it will be instructive to examine a 'rod herring' 
in the discussion of white collar unionisation: this 
argument stresses the significance of white collar/manual 
differentials in influencing white collar unionisation. 
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2.10 White Collar. Unionisation and White Col1nr/Manu l 
Differentials 
Correlating unionisation with changes in the 
distribution of income has a great deal to commend it at 
face value, for it would seem obvious at a common sense 
level that unionisation is primarily about earnings and 
that declining income differentials with organised manual 
workers would stimulate white collar workers to join trade 
unions in order to restore lost differentials. A recent 
study of technicians by Roberts et ai. 
(139) 
strikingly 
confirmed this common sense hypothesis. Technicians were 
found in this study to occupy a marginal position between 
skilled shop-floor workers and 'staff' employees. Highly 
ambitious but in a context of blocked mobility opportunities, 
the technicians reacted to the erosion of their differentials 
with shop-floor workers either by seeking alternative employ- 
ment or by joining collective organisations. Their concern 
over differentials was interpreted by Roberts et al, as 
symptomatic of a strong status anxiety in which the technicians 
who believed in their white collar 'staff' status experienced 
strong feelings of relative deprivation. Significantly, 
one company's response to this problem was to employ 
technicians with lower aspirations. 
(11; 0) 
Although some writers, such as Nil1s, 
(141) 
have argued 
that falling white collar differentials may stimulate a 
'status panic' among white collar worltors in which the 
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significance of minute differences among grades of 
employee is accentuated thus preventing the development 
of white collar solidarity, many have argued with 
Klingender, 
(142) 
Allen, 
(143) 
and Shlakman( 
144) that 
income 'proletarianisation' would ultimately prove a 
powerful stimulus to white collar unionisation. 
Despite the relative clarity of this theoretical 
position however, there remains a considerable measure 
of debate both about the degree of erosion of white 
collar differentials and the empirical significance 
of this erosion for white collar unionisation. 
With respect to the question of the degree of 
white collar/manual differentials, Lockwood argued, 
basing himself on 1956 data, that 
"the gross change in income rela- 
tivities is unmistakable. The 
main result of this change is that 
the average clerk is very roughly 
on the same income level as the 
average manual worker, or perhaps 
even slightly below". (145) 
Braverman, reporting on data for the United States, 
cites Bureau of Labor Statistics (for 1971) to the 
effect that 
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"the median usual weekly wage for 
full-time clerical work was lower 
than that in every type of so-called 
blue-collar work. In fact it was 
lower than the median in all urban 
occupational classifications except 
service employment". 146) 
With respect to Britain, Bain demonstrates that although 
many white collar groupings have earned and continue to 
earn more than skilled manual workers, the clerks in 
all industries now uniformly earn less than skilled 
manual employees. However the clerks had, by 1960, 
drawn slightly ahead of the average income for manual 
workers. 
(147) 
Nevertheless, in the final analysis, 
Bain agrees with other commentators that 
"The narrowing of the white-collar manual 
earnings differential has been one of 
the most striking changes in pay structure 
during the twentieth century". (148) 
even though, as Table 2.4 demonstrates, different groups 
of white collar workers have fared quite differently. 
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Table 2,4,149) 
The Change in the Average Annual Earnings of Various 
White-Collar Occupational Groups Relative to the Change 
in the Average Annual Earnings of All Manual Workers 
in Great Britain. 1922/4. - 1960 
(1922-4 = 100) 
Occupational Group Sex 1922-4-1935-6 1955-6 1960 
1. All Higher Profes- 
sionals M 100 102 75 78 
Engineers M 100 .. 90 
95 
Chemists M 100 86 70 69 
2. All Lower Profes- 
sionals and M 100 90 54 
60 
Technicians F 100 98 70 77 
Draughtsmen M 100 94 77 81 
Laboratory Techni- 
cians M 100 87 59 60 
3. Foremen M 100 95 83 85 
F 100 100 105 1o6 
4. All Clerks M 100 98 81 84 
F 100 92 102 109 
Railway Clerks M 100 94 71 76 
Industrial Clerks M 100 .. 94 98 
F 100 .. 119 128 
Bank Clerks M 100 125 102 96 
F 100 92 77 74 
Civil Service 
Clerks M 100 86 50 52 
F 100 90 72 82 
One fairly obvious source of confusion over the degree of 
erosion of white collar/manual differentials is fairly 
apparent from Table 2.4 as deriving from the choice of 
baseline dato for comparative purposes. If the baseline 
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date is taken from the 'twenties or 'thirties, the squeezing 
of differentials will appear most acute as the relative 
earnings of white collar workers were probably higher then 
than at any time between 1906 and 1960. On the other , 
hand, if the baseline is set at 1955, the relative earnings 
of most white collar groups will be seen to have increased. 
Clearly the choice of baseline will be influenced by the 
theoretical task at. hand. The longer time-scale 
comparisons are useful for historical purposes but are almost 
certainly redundant in any discussion of white collar workers 
perceptions of earnings differential erosion. 
Whilst the data does demonstrate that there has been 
an unambiguous, long-term erosion of white collar/manual 
differentials in average annual earnings, the common sense 
hypothesis that these narrowing differentials stimulate 
unionisation is not supported. Bain's major cross-sectional 
study of white collar unionisation in manufacturing industry 
concluded that 
"The density of unionism among white 
collar workers did not correlate 
significantly with the degree to which 
the differential between their earnings 
and those of manual workers had been 
reduced". (150) 
and thus that 
"there is no obvious relationship 
between the degree to which white 
collar workers in manufacturing 
industries have been unionised and 
the extent to which the differential 
between their earnings and those of 
manual workers has been narrowed", 
(151) 
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Bain's conclusions are supported by evidence relating 
to income levels per se. Thus Lockwood found that 
"There is little domonstrable connection 
between unionisation and 'economic' 
position in the narrow sense of income 
and degree of job security. Those 
clerks with the least income and 
security of tenure are not those with 
the greatest degree of organisation. 
On the contrary, it is among the more 
highly paid and secure clerical popula- 
tion that the degree of unionisation 
is highest". (152) 
Bain also supports this conclusion commenting both that: 
"White collar workers whose earnings 
relative to those of manual workers 
have declined the most are not neces- 
sarily those who have been most ready 
to join trade unions. It is true 
that groups such as male and female 
civil service clerks whose relative 
earnings have been reduced very greatly 
between 1922-4 and 1960 are unionised 
very highly, and that other groups such 
as male and female industrial clerks 
whose relative earnings have deteriorated 
very little or even improved are unionised 
very poorly. But the reverse is equally 
true: the relative earnings of male 
laboratory technicians and chemists have 
been eroded very seriously and yet they 
are organised very poorly while the rela- 
tive earnings of male bank clerks have 
been reduced very little and yet they 
are organised quite highly". (153) 
and that 
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"Nor does there appear to be any 
relationship between the absolute 
level of white collar workers' 
earnings and the degree to which 
these workers are unionised. .... 
The lowest paid white collar workers, 
like the lowest paid manual workers, 
are not generally among the most 
highly unionised". 154) 
Whilst these results might seem to indicate that levels of 
income are the dependent rather than the independent variable 
with respect to unionisation, Bain also rejects this 
possibility, stressing that- 
"The increase in white collar earnings 
between 1948 and 1964 has been 
considerable; yet.., the density of 
white collar unionism held more or 
less constant during this period". 
(155) 
Notwithstanding this evidence, it is indeed curious that two 
major trends in occupational life, the erosion of white 
collar/manual differentials and the growth of white 
collar unionism should be unrelated. When we move towards 
accounting for this failure of relationship however, we 
find that there are sound theoretical reasons for accepting 
this conclusion. 
There are four basic positions which one can take 
up with respect to the evidence. 
(1) One can argue that white collar workers have always 
been oriented to the issue of differentials but that, whilst 
comparisons with manual workers reveal declining differentials 
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in terms of gross earnings, such comparisons also 
reveal that manual workers have to work longer in order 
to generate the Game gross earnings and moreover that 
whilst collar workers are a great deal better off In terms 
of 'fringe benefits'. Thus in 1966, manual workers 
averaged over lttt hours per week as compared to the 374' 
hours per week worked by white collar workers,, 
(156) 
Manual workers continued during the 'sixties to be less 
well off in respect of such fringe benefits as paid 
holiday entitlement, sickness benefit, occupational 
pensions, company welfare benefits and security of 
employment. 
(157) 
These arguments are important. 
is offset however, by two alternative 
the one hand, if white collar workers 
question of fringe benefits into accoi 
comparisons with manual workers, they 
the 'fringe benefit' differential has 
erosion, if only in the sense that 
Their significance 
considerations. On 
do take the 
ant in making 
will perceive that 
also undergone 
"the terms and conditions of employ. 
ment to which they previously had 
exclusive right are now being shared 
by other workers". (158) 
Further, if those 'fringe benefits' are perceived as 
status-related, and if white collar workers seek to restore 
lost status by pressing for wage and salary increases as 
suggested by Roberts et al., then white collar attention 
to the trends in the sphere of 'fringe benefits' might 
imaginably accentuate the stimulus to unionisation. 
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Alternatively, on the other hand, it has boon argued that, 
when evaluating differentials, white collar workers tend 
to focus on gross earnings and to discount the less 
obvious and observable aspocts of pay structure such as 
the number of hours worked for a weekly wage packet or 
'fringe benefits'. As Lockwood comments: 
"The various elements of a strict 
calculus of economic welfare are 
not so finely weighed against each 
other when inter-class comparisons 
are being made". (159) 
If this is the case, then 'fringe benefit' differentials 
will neither influence white collar workers to unionise 
nor offset their tendencies to unionise in response to 
falling earnings differentials. In either reading 
of the 'fringe benefits' issue, consideration of fringe 
benefits will not inhibit white collar union growth in 
response to falling differentials, indeed on the first 
reading falling fringe benefits may accentuate this 
tendency. 
(2) It is possible to take the position that whilst 
white collar workers may be oriented to the question of 
falling differentials, this orientation has not paid off 
in terms of a unionisation/falling differentials relation- 
ship because this relationship, in its turn, has been off- 
set by more powerful factors influencing unionisation such 
as employment concentration, bureaucratisation or the 
influence of employer attitudes. This would seem to be 
the position taken up by Bain. 
(160) 
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(3) It can be argued that any relationship which could 
be established between the erosion of white collar/manual 
differentials and unionisation is likely to be spurious 
because it is impossible for white collar workers to make 
meaningful comparisons between themselves and manual 
workers over a period of years. For instance, if white 
collar staff turnover is high - as it is among female 
employees in many white collar occupations - white 
collar workers may not remain in employment long enough 
for the erosion of their differentials to become apparent, 
Similarly, many white collar employees are paid salaries 
with annual increments or experience promotion to higher 
salary scales. They may thus experience a rising personal 
standard of living which limits their awareness of the 
erosion of occupational differentials. The payment of 
white collar workers on incremental salary scales thus 
creates a situation in which, as Dain has pointed out: 
":.. even when the relative earnings of 
a white collar group are falling, those 
of individual white-collar workers 
within this group may be increasing 
because of promotion and age or length 
of service increments". (161) 
For example, using data from Routh, 
(162) 
Bain calculated 
that between 1947 and 1960 the average annual earnings of 
Civil Service Executive Officers as a group rose by 97 
per cent, but the salary of an average unpromoted CSEO 
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who started work at 18 years in 1947 would have risen by 
362 per cent. 
(163) 
As Bain himself comments, this is a 
rate of increase which few manual workers could match. 
On this basis, personal comparisons with manual workers 
over time, if meaningful, would yield a strong balance 
in favour of the white collar worker. 
(4) Finally, it can be argued that comparative 
reference groups, like 'images of society', 
(164) 
tend to 
be informed by 
"the individual's primary social 
experiences, rather than his position 
in a socio-economic category". (165) 
In this connection, it is argued, for example, that white 
collar workers such as the Railway Clerks unionised rapidly 
as a result of their close proximity to the activities 
and example of manual workers in the railway industry(166) 
which dispelled their status-conscious illusions concerning 
trade unionism. It is equally possible however, that 
their unionisation was a response to the visible erosion 
of their differentials with manual workers in the industry. 
This case is clearly argued by Roberts et a1. 
(167) 
with 
respect to technicians and Fox 
(168) 
commenting on an earlier 
presentation on this topic 
(169) 
particularly notes the 
dissatisfaction of white collar workers organised in 
BISAKTA and their tendency to Join specifically white 
collar unions. 
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However. if these white collar groups are placed 
in close proximity with manual workers and compare 
themselves accordingly, many groups of white collar 
workers may not share any dimension of their occupational 
or social experience with manual workers and may not 
engage in such comparisons at all. Administrative 
and clerical workers in the large bureaucracies of 'big 
government' and 'big business' would seem at face value to 
fall into this category. Runciman(170) has documented 
the tendency for Income comparisons to be accomplished on 
bases which remain close to the class-and occupational 
positions of the comparer and this evidence supports the 
view that the occupational and social environment of white 
collar workers will militate against comparisons with 
manual workers which centre on the question of differentials. 
In sum, a wide variety of arguments can be advanced 
to account for the failure of declining white collar/manual 
earnings differentials to exhibit a direct correlation -with 
white collar unionisation. Ultimately, Bain's broad 
conclusion that the 'differential' factor, if it exists, 
is overlaid by more powerful causal factors remains the 
most cogent conclusion, The arguments which stress 
either that meaningful white collar/manual comparisons are 
difficult to make or are not made may themselves be valid 
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only to the extent that (1) the economy is not 
experiencing hyperinflation and (2) that government 
incomes policy is not extending the area of debate over 
relativities. Goldthorpe has commented in this connection 
that: 
"It is not simply that a 'freeze' or 
period of tight control over incomes 
may be followed by heightened militancy 
in wage demands, threatening greater 
inflationary problems than before. 
There is a further, yet more awlcward 
possibility: namely, that through 
increasing information about, and 
interest in, differences between occupa- 
tional rewards and conditions, the 
actual operation of an incomes policy 
will serve to broaden comparative 
reference groups among the mass of 
the population, and at the same time 
bring issues of equity and fairness 
into greater subjective salience". (171) 
It is also clear that increasing publicity given to cost 
of living indices and to both manual and white collar wage 
settlements may fuel feelings of relative deprivation. 
Consideration of this question however, brings a further 
possibility into view: namely, that both white collar and 
manual workers may be stimulated to unionise by earnings 
deprivation of an absolute, rather than a relative, kind 
in both 'normal' and 'abnormal' economic conditions. The 
publicity now being given to the retail price index may only 
accentuate a perfectly normal trend towards unionisation 
in response to declining real earnings. Wo thus now turn 
to look at the relationship between white collar unionisation 
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and more basic economic variables: the cost of 
living, the level of money wages and the level of 
unemployment. 
2.11 White Collar Unionisation and the Business Cycle 
The experience of constructing econometric 
models of union growth has left economists with rather 
definite preferences for some indices rather than others. 
Unlike sociologists who have tended to dwell upon the 
issue of differentials between manual and white collar 
workers as a factor stimulating the unionisation of the 
latter, the economists, with their aggregate trend data 
to be dealt with, have tended to focus on such indices 
as the rate of change in the cost of living and the rate 
of change of money wages (sometimes combining the two to 
get an index of the rate of change of real earnings). 
There are two good sociological reasons for 
following the economists' lead in this matter. Firstly, 
factors such as the cost of living and the level of 
money wages would seem, a priori, to have a direct impact 
on workers' constructions of their standard of living which 
is independent of whether or not they expect promotion 'in 
the long runt and which does not require white collar 
workers, in particular, to cast their minds back to an 
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hypothesised 'golden age' of favourable relativities 
which the vast majority of them may never have experienced. 
Secondly, an examination of those indices could provide 
the beginning of a clear-cut account of the relationship 
between unionisation and economic variables which evades 
the complexities and inconsistencies of white collar/ 
manual relativities to which, indeed, white collar workers 
may not even be oriented. In sum, the direct examination 
of economic indices may provide us with an approach to a 
source of unionisation which iss moreover, directly related 
to a central function of trade unions (the economic protec- 
tion of members) and which will have a direct impact upon 
white collar workers regardless of their location in a 
career structure or of their orientation to white collar/ 
manual relativities. 
A recent and powerful econometric model produced 
by Bain and Elsheikh explains union growth (or more strictly, 
the proportional rate of change of union growth) as the 
product of four factors: the current rate of change of 
retail prices, the current rate of change of money wages, 
the level of unemployment and the level of union density. 
Price rises, Bain and Elsheikh argue, effect both 
the prospensity and the opportunity to unionise through 
the 'threat effect' and the 'prosperity effect', The 
'threat effect' refers to the tendency of workers to 
perceive increases in the upward rate of change of retail 
S 
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prices as a threat to their standard of living and to 
become, and remain, union members as a result. The 
'prosperity effect''rests on the assumption that price 
rises indicate a degree of prosperity in industry, Isere 
it is argued that when industry is prosperous employers will 
be more willing to concede to worker demands for union 
recognition thus increasing the opportunities for workers 
to unionise. Both the' 'threat effect' and the 'prosperity 
effect' suggest that there will be a positive relationship 
between union growth (the rate of change of union 
membership) and the rate of change of retail prices. 
Money wage changes exert their impact on the propensity 
of employees to unionise through the 'credit effect', Here 
Bain and Elsheikh argue that when money wage rates are 
rising, workers may 
"rightly or wrongly, credit 
such rises to unions and 
hope that by beginning or 
continuing to support them 
they will do as well or even 
better in the future. In 
other words, it is possible 
that while a 'threat effect' may 
encourage workers to unionise 
when prices aro rising, a 'credit 
effect' may lead them to unionise 
when money wages are rising". 
(172) 
Unemplopment,, IIain and Elsheikh argue, affects both 
the opportunity and propensity to unionise by increasing 
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the willingness of employers to oppose unionisation and 
their ability to resist strikes. Insofar as unemployment 
reduces aggregate demand, the production lost through strikes 
will be less costly to employers and they will be more 
prepared to face and/or prolong them by resisting union 
demands. Moreover, during periods of high unemployment an 
alternative labour force is more easily recruited by 
employers and this possibility may also influence them to 
resist union pressures. If unemployment increases the 
strength of employers to resist strikes and increases their 
will to do so, it weakens the will and ability of employees 
to unionise by weakening their propensity to join and remain 
in trade unions. Unemployment weakens the propensity to 
join trade unions because there is little that the unions 
can do to benefit unemployed workers. Additionally, the 
cost of remaining in a union will be greater in real terms 
to a worker who is unemployed. Similarly, unemployment 
may weaken the propensity to remain in a trade union for 
both unemployed and employed union members. Union gains, 
even if achieved, are of little benefit to the former and, 
to the extent that high unemployment weakens the union and 
reduces its capacity to generate benefits from the employer, 
the lack of benefits may induce members to feel that union 
membership is no-longer worthwhile. 
Finally, the level of union density affects union 
growth in two ways depending on the prevailing level of 
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density. Medium levels of density may increase the propen- 
sity of employees to unionise via the 'enforcement effect'. 
In this connection, Hain and Elsheikh argue that as union 
density rises from low levels employers will find it more 
difficult to retaliate against union members whilst unions 
will be more able to persuade employees to become or 
remain union members. As union density approaches unity 
however, a 'saturation effect' tends to outweigh the 
'enforcement effect'. The 'saturation effect' refers to 
the fact that as density approaches unity, unions will find 
it increasingly difficult to grow both because there are 
fewer employees left to recruit and because those who are 
left will tend to have a lesser propensity and/or ability 
to unionise. As a result, unions will have to expend 
greater effort to recruit the remaining workers and union 
growth will be far less sensitive to the economic factors 
already outlined. 
Using a model based upon these factors, Bain and 
Elsheikh have achieved considerable success in accounting 
for union growth in four advanced industrial economies 
(Dritain, Australia, Sweden and the United States) during 
the twentieth century. 
(173) 
Despite some significant 
national variations, their model demonstrates the signific- 
ance of these factors in accounting for the rate of change 
of union membership. 
(174) 
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There are, of course, great difficulties in 
applying the model to white collar unionisation per se- 
or to white collar unionisation in specific industries. 
As Bain and Elsheikh themselves note% 
"the model is concerned with explaining 
aggregate rather than disaggregate 
patterns of union growth, and hence 
factors which are unique to particular 
industries, occupations, regions, or 
companies are likely to be irrelevant 
to the explanation". (175) 
Some of the difficulties can be illustrated by comparing 
the fortunes of various white collar unions during the 
post-World War I period when the economy underwent 
considerable expansion and inflation followed by deep 
recession. If we begin by looking at the period between 
1916 and 1920, we find that retail prices rose by 187 per 
cent, manual wage earnings rose by 238.7 per cent whilst 
unemployment varied between 0.4+ per cent and 2.0 per cent. 
During this period, aggregate union membership grew by 
179 per cent. Between 1920 and 1936, by contrast, retail 
prices fell by 44.6 per cent, manual wage earnings fell by 
30.4 per cent and unemployment rose to 22.1 per cent in 
1932 and stood at 13 per cent in 1936. During this period, 
aggregate union membership fell below the 1916 level in 
1933 (a fall of 47.4 per cent) and was still over 36 per 
cent below the 1920 level in 1936. 
(176) 
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During the periods under review it is clear that 
all three of the major economic factors in the Bain- 
Blsheikh model combined to exercise their influence in a 
common direction. During the first period, inflation 
generated powerful 'threat effects' which were more than 
matched by the rise in manual earnings which provided 
very large 'credit effects' for trade unions whilst the 
low level of unemployment also favoured unionisation. 
During this period, union membership rose by 3.7 million 
persons and by 19.6 percentage points in density. During 
the second period, from 1920 to 1936, there was a contin- 
uous fall in the retail price index which bottomed out 
in 1934-5. Manual wage earnings fell precipitously between 
1920 and 1923 after which they remained broadly stable 
until 1936 (varying around a range of approximately six 
percentage points). During this period, then, there were 
continuously negative 'threat effects' from retail prices, 
unions were unable to benefit from bredit effects' 
and the level of unemployment was extremely unfavourable 
to unionisation throughout the period. 
If we now turn to the effects of these trends on 
white collar unionisation, we find that the effect of the 
war-time inflation was to encourage white collar workers 
either to join or to form trade unions. For example, the 
aggregate membership of the CAWU rose by over 300 per cent 
between 1916 and 1919-20 and the Railway Clerks' Association 
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also grew extremely rapidly during this period. Similarly, 
a large number of white collar unions were formed during 
this period: ASSET, AScW (now ASTMS), DATA (now the TASS 
section of the AULW), NATSOPA, NALGO, and NUDE were all 
formed during this period, whilst the CSCA began, if only 
slowly, to assume greater numerical strength. What is 
significant about the formation and growth of these unions 
is that, since they did not generate 'credit effects' 
from their inception, this growth was impelled almost 
entirely by 'threat effects'. In fact, whilst manual 
workers earnings were either keeping pace with or exceeding 
the rate of inflation during this period, several groups of 
white collar workers did very poorly indeed, Bank Clerks, 
for example, saw their real earnings decline by about 50 
per cent during the war period(177) and civil service clerks 
did only a little better. 
(178) 
Only the railway clerks 
were able to keep pace with inflation. 
(179) 
When inflation began to reverse itself in 1920-21, 
many of the larger white collar unions began to experience 
falls in membership equivalent to those taking place in 
manual unions. Thus NUDE (at that time the Bank Officers 
Guild) suffered a slide in membership from approximately 
30,000 in 1921-2 to a stable average of 19,000 during the 
late 'thirties. 
(180) 
Substantial falls were also registered 
by other white collar unions. The CAWU, which had a weak 
occupational and industrial base, fell from 43,222 members 
in 1919 to approximately 8,000 during the late 'twenties 
and early Ithirties. 
(181) 
Other white collar unions in 
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manufacturing industry also lost approximately a third 
of their membership (e. g. NACSS and DATA 
182 
which 
approximated the losses among manual unions generally. 
With the exception of the local government workers and 
the cavil servants, white collar unions lost the same 
proportion of their memberships as unions in the manual 
sector. 
(183) 
Although the white collar unions experienced broadly 
similar membership trends with manual unions, there are 
reasons for supposing that the Bain-Elsheikh factors 
operated in different ways to produce this effect on 
white collar unionisation than they did with respect to 
manual unionisation. It is well-known, for example, 
that white collar workers suffered less extensively from 
the effects of unemployment. Lockwood, for example, 
notes that the level of unemployment among clerks in 1931 
was less than half that of the labour force as a whole(184) 
and similar estimates are given by Clark, 
(185) 
Given 
estimates of 5,5 per cent unemployment among clerks during 
this period, it seems unlikely that unemployment could 
have resulted in 84 per cent loss of membership in the 
CAWU. Neither is it likely that unomployment among bank 
clerks (which never exceeded 1 per cent during this period) 
could have seriously influenced the 30 per cent losses 
in NUDE membership. 
(186) 
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If this argument is correct, it seems likely that 
some combination of the 'threat' and 'credit' effects made 
a greater contribution to the decline in white collar 
unionism during this period than they did in the case of 
manual unionism. 
With respect to the 'credit effect', two comments are 
in order. Firstly, during the period 1920-1936 white 
collar earnings rose little faster than manual earnings 
(see Table 2. L) and thus white collar unions, like their 
manual counterparts, had few credit effects to benefit from. 
However, secondly, since many white collar unions were not 
recognised during this period this factor may have contribu- 
ted to an attenuation of such 'credit effects' as were 
available from pay increases (for'instance, in the case of 
bank clerks) and to weaken the resolve of white collar 
- workers to remain in unions after the immediate 'inflationary 
crisis' was over. The Bain-Blsheikh model basically applb s 
to institutionalised trade unions, and lack of recognition 
of white collar unions may accentuate the impact of 
'negative' threat and credit effects. The relevant compari- 
son here is with the local government workers and the civil 
service clerks. As we have alreädy noted, these unions 
were recognised during the early 'twenties and continued 
to grow throughout the 1920-36 period when the majority of 
manual unions and (unrecognised) white collar unions were 
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experiencing membership falls. Like the bank workers, 
the Civil Service clerks were broadly shielded from the 
effects of unemployment. Unlike the bank clerks however, 
the earnings of civil service clerks actually fell between 
1922-4 and 1935-6, and their union (CSCA) cannot have 
enjoyed any powerful benefits from 'credit effects'. 
Among the bank workers, by contrast, considerable pay 
rises during the same period were not translated into 
'credit effects' for NUBE because the latter remained 
unrecognised. In short, the recognised CSCA progressed 
during the 'twenties and 'thirties despite a decline in 
money earnings among civil service clerks, whilst NUBE 
declined in strength during the same period despite 
considerable increases in money earnings among bank clerks 
because it was unable to benefit through the 'credit 
effects' from this increase due to its lack of recognition. 
'Credit effects', therefore, are most likely to be operative 
in favour of recognised and institutionalised trade unions. 
Where trade unions are unrecognised or where two organisa- 
tions are competing for 'credit effects' the benefits from 
such effects In the form of increased unionisation are likely 
to be attenuated. 
With respect to the 'threat effect' further evidence 
comes from the growth of white collar unionisation between 
1964 and 1974. Between 1964 and 1970, white collar union 
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density rose by nine percentage points and 
between 1970 
and 1974 by a further 
14.2 per-centago points, 
(187) 
In 
interpreting the 1964-70 increase, which 
displayed a marked 
accelerating tendency 
(the period 1969-70 accounting for 
(1$8) 
nearly half the increase in density), 
Bain and Price 
point to the accelerating increase 
in the retail price 
index and the low rate of increase in weekly real 
earnings 
which was sustained in the four years preceding the 'wage 
explosion' of 1970 and also cite the favourable climate 
for the extension of collective bargaining established 
by the Labour government. Similarly, with respect to 
the 1970-71 period, Price and Bain comment that 
"the question is not whether rising 
prices and wages helped to bring 
about the expansion in union membership 
between 1971 and 1974, but why the 
expansion was not greater than it was. 
For 1971-74 had a slower rate of union 
growth but a faster rate of price and 
wage inflation than 1969-70". (189) 
Price and Bain answer their own question by citing the non- 
linear relationship between price increases and unionisation 
established by Bain and Elsheikh. As Bain and Elsheikh 
summarise the position: 
",,. price rises do not have a constant 
impact upon union growth regardless of 
their size. After they reach a level 
of about 4+ per cent per annum, their 
positive impact on the rate of chango 
of union membership continues but at a 
lower rate". (190) 
In this analysis, workers become numb to rising prices and 
this factor, together with the hostile political environment 
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towards unionisation and the 'dampening' effect of 
higher unemployment, Price and Bain argue, lowered the 
rate of increase of unionisation in 1971-4 despite 
higher 'threat' and 'credit' effects. 
Although a variety of factors may be cited as 
generating exceptions to the conclusions of Bain and 
his collaborators as to the impact of the 'threat 
effect' generated by rising prices with respect to 
specific groups of white collar workers, we would only 
wish to modify these conslusions in two respects at this 
point,. Firstly, evidence already cited indicates that 
the annual incremental salary increases enjoyed by some 
groups of white collar workers may make them insensitive 
to the declining economic fortunes of their occupational 
group as a whole. It is equally possible that such 
increments may also weaken the propensity of their recipients 
to unionise by blunting the perceived 'threat effects' of 
rising prices. This possibility may be accentuated in 
circumstances where the workers concerned have the opportu- 
nity to join only unrecognised unions with low levels of 
density. Such workers would require higher 'threshold' 
levels of inflation to impoll them to unionise whilst, 
similarly, the level of inflation at which its impact 
'continues at a lower rate' is likely to be higher for 
the incrementally salaried employee. Secondly, as Bain 
(191) 
has demonstrated, it is the white collar worker who may prove 
- 124 - 
most sensitive to employer-generated or government-generated 
hostility to unionisation and this factor may have had a 
greater dampening effect on levels of white collar 
unionisation during the 1971-4 period than on levels of 
manual unionisation. 
In sum, whilst there can be no doubt that the 
factors discussed by Bain and Elsheil; h exert a formidable 
'triggering' impact upon white collar unionisation, it is also 
clear that our own specific interest in their impact upon 
the membership of unrecognised white collar unions, the 
potential membership of which are incrementally salaried 
and only weakly subject to the impact of unemployment, 
dictates certain modifications to the Bain-Elsheikh 
conclusions. Firstly, the unrecognised status of a white 
collar union and/or competition between unions for member- 
ship and/or competition between an unrecognised white 
collar union and a recognised staff association may operate 
to undermine the significance and impact of 'credit effects' 
resulting from increases in earnings on union growth. 
Such an undermining effect is very clearly visible with 
respect to NUBE during the period between 1922-4 and 1935-6. 
Secondly, incrementally salaried employees may fail to 
unionise in response to 'mild' threat effects from rising 
prices particularly where the relevant trade union is 
unrecognised and/or in competition with other organisations 
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and/or is the object of employer hostility. In this 
case, the impact of the 'threat effect' on unionisation 
will be weakened, Finally, in occupations characterised 
by little or no unemployment, the effects of unemployment 
as a factor influencing-unionisation may be attenuated. 
Since all these modifying conditions existed in banking 
between 1917 and 1967, we may reasonably expect the 
significance of secular trends in the economic variables 
discussed on unionisation to be mitigated in this 
industry during this period. To make this claim is, in 
certain respects to re-affirm the view that these economic 
factors are 'trigger' factors influencing unionisation 
among white collar workers and are dependent for their 
operation upon the underlying long-term sociological 
factors already discussed. 
2.12 Conclusion 
No student of the literature on white collar 
unionisation, of which only a sample has been presented 
above, can fail to be impressed by the complexity and 
multiplicity of the issues involved. These charactori- 
stics of complexity and multiplicity are further complicated 
by the fact that the influence of each factor upon white 
collar unionisation is itself sensitive to the co-presence 
of the others and, more generally, to the wider political 
- 126 - 
and social climate of the day. For these reasons, 
any review of these factors resists straightforward 
summary. Moreover, the evaluation of the relative 
significance of the various factors is inhibited by the 
lack of genuinely comparative data in which some factors 
are held constant whilst others are varied. Thus the 
wide variety of opinions concerning the relative 
significance of the various factors, in part derives from 
the almost equal variety of case studies in which these 
opinions are embedded. 
(192) 
The present study iss unfortunately, no exception to 
this general rule. However the study of the banking 
industry does afford an excellent opportunity to 
examine the differential orientations of male and female 
white collar workers to their work and employment situations, 
to their employers and to unionisation. Additionally, the 
banking industry is an excellent example of the rapid 
'feminisation' of a clerical labour force which results in 
the progressive differentiation of a 'separate (feminine) 
clerical class' without real prospects of promotion. 
Thus, in studying the banking industry, we shall be able to 
focus both upon the differential bureaucratisation of the 
market situations of men and women in banking and upon the 
ways in which the two groups respond to the various factors 
influencing unionisation described above. 
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In pursuit of this objective, we shall describe the 
changing nature of bank employment and the organisations 
representing bank workers in the next chapter and focus 
on the differentiated orientations of men and women to 
work, employment and unionisation in the subsequent three 
chapters. Only then will we be in a position to evaluate 
the impact of the growth of female employment on white 
collar unionisation in the industry and its impact on the 
other factors influencing white collar unionisation 
outlined in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
BANKS, BANK STAFFS AND STAFF ORGANISATIONS 
3.1 Introduction: The Banking Industry 
The banking industry embraces a variety of different 
types of organisation, The London Clearing Banks which 
operate cheque services for their customers dominate the 
industry and employ approximately 75 per cent of all bank 
staffs. A similarly substantial role is played in 
Scotland by the Scottish Banks of Issue, so-called because 
they have the right to print bank-notes, which employ a 
further 8 per cent of United Kingdom bank staffs. The 
remainder of bank staffs are employed by one or two 
smaller banks which issue cheques (C. w. S., Lewis' Bank), 
the Trustee Savings Bank which began as organisations 
specifically geared to the needs of the small saver but 
which now issue cheques, a number of merchant banks, 
finance houses and secondary banks, the foreign banks 
mainly located in the City of London and the Dank of 
England, 
The London Clearing Banks themselves are dominated 
by the 'Big Four' all of which grew substantially during 
the decade from 1960 to 1970 which saw a very substantial 
increase in the demand for banking services and a 
correlative increase in the numbors of bank staffs, In 
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1960, the total number of staff employed in tho cloaring 
banks was some 115,000 whereas by 1970 this figure had 
risen to nearly 177,000, a rise of 50 per cent, 
(') 
This increase has been accompanied by a change in the 
ratio of men and women employed in banking. In 1960 men 
outnumbered women in the industry by a factor of 3 to 2 and 
banking was, so to speak, a predominantly 'masculine' 
occupation albeit less so than during the immediate post- 
war period during which the male/female 
ratio stood at 
approximately 5 to 2. The trend towards the 'feminisation' 
of the banking labour force continued throughout the decade 
and by 1970 women outnumbered men in the clearing banks 
by a clear 109000 (men: 83,000; women: 94,000)» 
2) 
The same period has also seen a marked increase 
in the concentration of the banking industry. During 
the decade which ended in 1970, eight of the eleven clearing 
banks were involved in mergers and only six remained. The 
major bank mergers during the 'sixties were as follows. In 
1962 the National Provincial Bank took over the District 
Bank and both combined with the Westminster Bank in 1968 
to form the-National Westminster Group. In 1968 Barclays 
Bank merged with Martins Dank after proposals for a 
tripartite merger with Lloyds Bank had been abandoned 
following'an adverse report from the Monopolies Commission. 
(3) 
Finally in 1970 a tripartite merger was achiovod between 
Glyn Mills Bank, the National Bank and Williams Deacons 
Bank to form the Williams and Glyns Bank. A similar pattern 
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emerged among the Scottish Banks of Issue where only 
three banking groups remain of the original six extant in 
1959" In 1959, the Commercial Bank of Scotland merged with 
the National Bank of Scotland to form the National Commercial 
Bank of Scotland. This organisation subsequently merged 
with the Royal Bank of Scotland and currently trades 
under that title. Similarly, the British Linen Bank merged 
with the Bank of Scotland in 1971 and the resultant organisation 
trades under the latter title. 
Even this catalogue understates the connections among 
the major banks however. Thus Barclays Bank has substantial 
connections with the Bank of Scotland (through Barclays' control 
of the British Linen Bank) and the Yorkshire Bank. Llgeyds 
Bank has substantial holdings in the Royal Bank of Scotland 
which, in turn, controls the Williams and Glyns conglomerate. 
Lloyds Bank also has considerable holdings in the Yorkshire 
Bank and Lewis' Bank. The Midland Bank controls the 
Clydesdale Bank and owns two Northern Irish banks, the 
Belfast Banking Co. and the Northern Bank. Finally, the 
National Westminster Bank Group controls Coutts Bank, has 
a holding in the Yorkshire Bank and controls the Ulster 
Bank, It would thus be no exaggeration to assert that 
the 'Big Four' (Barclays, Lloyds, Midland and National 
Westminster) control the vast majority of the United 
Kingdom banking industry and this view is only further 
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confirmed by a consideration of their combined interests 
in the finance houses, secondary banks and related 
credit organisations. 
The period between 1960 and 1970 then has boon one 
of substantial amalgamation and consolidation within the 
banking industry. It has also been a period of 
considerable expansion in the volume of banking business - 
an expansion to which amalgamation, growth in branch 
numbers and computerisation have been three characteristic 
responses. One clear indicator of the growth in the 
volume of bank business is the 50 per cent growth in staff 
numbers alluded to above and the concentration of this 
growth among female staff, the vast majority of whom are 
engaged in routine clerical functions. Thus whereas the 
total male clearing bank staff rose by 26.2 per cent during 
the decade, female staff grow by 92.2 per cent. The 
evidence for growth from bank staff numbers is corroborated, 
for part of the decade, by evidence from a variety of other 
banking indices. 
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Table 3.1(4) 
Activity Indicators of the London Clearing Banks 
1 961 j.. 962 1963 1964 196 
Numbers of Credit and 100 105 113 123 129 
Debit Clearings 
Numbers of Accounts 100 102 108 114 120 
Numbers of Branches 100 102 10L 107 109 
Numbers of Bank Staff 100 105.5 109 115 119 
Numbers of Males 100 103 105 108 111 
Numbers of Females 100 108.5 114E 123 129 
Table 3.1 reveals some striking symmetries. In the 
first instance, it is clear that the Genoral expansion in 
the demand for bank accounts durinG this period was met 
by increasinG the total number of bank staff. There 
appears to have been little increase in productivity during 
the period and few, if any, economies of scale were 
realised. This tendency for the expansion in the demand 
for bank services to be met by increasinG manpower in the 
industry provided a considerable part of the motive force 
for the widespread mechanisation and amalgamation within 
the industry which occurred during the latter part of the 
decade. The parallel between the growth of total bank 
staffs and growth in total bank accounts is not the only 
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element of symmetry in Table 3.1 howovor. There are also 
close parallels between (1) the growth in the number of 
branches and the growth in total male staff and (2) the 
growth in the number of credit and debit clearings and 
the growth in total female staff. We shall have occasion 
to comment on these parallels further below, but it is 
clear the expansion was achieved in two ways: firstly, by 
expanding the numbers of staff within existing branches 
to cope with the additional 'routine' work and secondly, 
by expanding the total number of bank branches. The 
first method was clearly the more economical since it 
required no investment in additional capital assets neither 
did it require significant additions to the (predominantly 
male) senior branch staff who would run the enlarged 
branches. 
Throughout the first half of the 'sixties, banking 
costs outran all the above activity indices by a small 
factor which increased sharply during 1965 and thereaftor. 
(5) 
This growth in costs, of which labour costs constituted a 
high proportion, was instrumental in stimulating the banks 
towards a heavy investment in EDP techniques. 
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An important feature of the banking industry during 
the 'sixties is that competition was conducted primarily on 
a 'quality' rather than a price basis. In practice this 
meant that the clearing banks vied with one another in 
providing conveniently located branch outlets as an 
attraction to consumers. This practice has contributed 
to the very low level of employment concentration in the 
industry. 
In 1968, the bulk of the cleaing banks' staff 
(approximately 153,000 persons) were employed in 8,700 branches. 
The average sized branch had a staff of 8-10. Nearly 75 per 
cent of all branches had a staff of less than 14, whilst 
nearly 50 per cent had a staff of less than 10. 
(5) 
This branch structure in commercial banking with its 
attendant low levels of employment concentration is signi- 
ficant both in contributing to personal and particularistic 
work relationships within the branch and in militating against 
the establishment of a rigid division of labour among bank 
workers. To the extent that small branch size contributes 
towards common and overlapping experiences of work among bank 
eiiployees, it will also contribute towards a community of 
outlook within the branch and towards the formation of 
'branch norms' which influence attitudes in the branch to 
all aspects of the work situation, 
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3.2 Dank Clerks 
In his major study of unionisation in the banking 
industry, researched between 1960 and 1963 and published 
in 1967, Blackburn noted a 
"cloarcut sex distinction in the staff. 
Careers in banlcinC are for men; the 
routine work such as machine operating 
is for women. This distinction is 
basic; women are employed for twomen's 
work' and it is only the oustanding women 
who can progress to 'men's work"'. (6) 
In this section we seek to evaluate the accuracy of 
Blackburn's 'clearcut sex distinction in the staff' by 
looking at three major dimensions of work experience 
(salaries, job content and promotion opportunities) and 
enquiring whether sexually-based differentiations in work 
experience operate with respect to these dimensions. 
3.2.1 Salaries 
The basic pay policy with respect to clerical Grades 
in banking and utilised by all the clearing banks throughout 
the 'sixties were premissed on a simple relationship between 
age and pay. Salary scales, established for all clerical 
staff between the ages of 16 and 31 yoars, wore ago-related 
and incorporated successive incremental stops which worn 
made payable on birth-datos. Those age-related incremental 
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scales diverged little fron bank to bank. By 'shopping 
around' a prospective bank clerk might increase his, salary 
by £10 p. a. at the ago of sixteen yoars, and by from 945 p. a. 
(wome4 to £75 p. a. (men) at the ade of thirty one during 
the decade. 
(7) 
Equal pay for men and women was normal on those 
incremental scales until the aCe of twenty three, after which 
the scales for men and women divorce substantially. Thus in 
1968, the pay of men and women at the top of the scale 
diverged to the tune of £320 p. a., the men earning 40 per 
cent more than their female coileagues. 
(8) 
Additionally, 
during the later 'sixties the major banks began to offer 
salaries which were in excess of the normal scale payments 
to graduate males and older male school leavers in an 
attempt to attract these classes of personnel to the industry. 
This change in policy additionally widened the differentials 
in payment to male and female staffs. Moreover these 
differentials were further widened by the practice of promoting 
male staff to higher salary scales before they had reached 
the age of thirty two years. 
After the age of thirty two, unappointod clorical staff 
salaries progressed by periodic increases, Once staff 
reach lappointedt or 'manaCorial' status (see infra, ), their 
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pay is calculated in accordance with the banks' evaluation 
of the responsibility of the post$ the incumbent's performance 
and by reference to his (or her) age and experience. Using 
figures whose origin must remain anonymous, I calculate that 
the pay of approximately 66 per cent of the women in one 
large clearing bank overlapped with approximately the bottom 
24 per cent of the bank's male staff under this system of 
payment in the late 'sixties. Whilst it is certainly the 
case that the bunching of female staff in the lower age 
groups made a considerable contribution to this result, it 
remains undeniable that equal pay for men and women in 
banking was very far from being a reality during the 
'sixties and the significance of this observation is only 
increased when we take into account the 'fringe benefits' 
such as cheap housing loans and the like which were available 
to male bank clerks, but not in general to their female 
counterparts, during this period. 
Salary scales based on age criteria persisted in 
banking until 1971 when, in a double shift, the age-related 
salary scales were abolished and a system was established 
in which pay was related to job content. This change has 
resulted in the formal achievement of 'equal pay$, that is, 
a situation in which men and women are paid the 'rate for 
the jobt regardless of , ex. As wo shall see, however, men 
and women do not have equal access to the bettor-paid jobs. 
Clerical work is now graded on a four point scale and the 
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adoption of this system has eliminated some of the more 
anomalous and invidious situations in which lower-paid 
women werd occupying relatively senior posts vis-a-vis 
higher-paid male colleagues. 
3.2.2 Job Content 
It is possible to distinguish three basic typos of 
work which were carried out in ordinary bank branches during 
the 'sixties and indeed are still carried out today. The 
first type of work consists of the basic secretarial and 
typing services which are routinely available in all large 
commercial organisations. This work is entirely handled 
by women who stand outside normal banking activities and are 
excluded a priori from a banking career. Secondly, there is 
a large mass of discrete activities which are largely Geared 
to the processing and distribution of choquos and cash 
both within the branch itself and externally to other bank 
branches. 
(9) 
Prior to the advent of mechanisation, much of 
this work demanded a considerable degree of concentration 
and precision because the discovery of Idifforencest between 
ledger totals which should balance initiated a search for 
errors which could involve the majority of a branch's staff 
for several hours. This second typo of bank work is 
highly routinised and, to the outsider at least, appears 
intrinsically dull. The third and final Group of 
activities within the branch require special compot©nces of 
one typo or another, either in the special areas of banking 
(such as work relating to securities or foreign currencies 
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and transactions) or the more general exorcise of executive 
and managerial responsibility. Posts involving special 
competence, e. g. accountant, senior clerk, senior securities 
clerk, are normally 'appointed posts' which are paid on 
different salary scales from the remainder of the clerical 
staff. Executive, managerial and sub-managerial posts are 
often known as 'Board appointments' as, in contrast to 
'appointed' posts which are normally ratified by a General 
Manager or Chief General Manager, they require formal 
ratification by the Board of the bank. One further point 
may be made in relation to the distinction between appointed 
and unappointed staff. This is that, whilst appointed 
staff occupy positions involving the exercise of special 
competences, these compotences are not acquired at a single 
point in time. Since they in fact require a considerable 
degree of training, special course work, academic examination 
etc., and since much of this training is achieved by gaining 
experience in various areas of bank activity, it is clear 
that clerks who are assigned to the securities or foreign 
section of a branch are, in effect, being offered the 
opportunity of the kind of experience which will ultimately 
lead to appointed or managerial status. 
Turning now to the distribution of these throe typos 
of bank worl: between the sexes, the vast majority of secretarial 
and low-grade clerical posts aro occupied by womon. in 1967, 
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women made up 60 per cent of the total unappointed staff 
employed by the London clearing banks and today will 
constitute an even higher percentage. Another way of 
looking at this figure is to point out that, of the 70,000 
women employed by the London clearinG banks in 1967, 
98.7 per cent were employed as unappointod staff. 
(10) 
Dy 
contrast, 67.3 per cent of the male staff were unappointod 
during the same year and man occupy 99.65 per cent of the 
managerial posts and 93.65 per cent of the 'appointed' 
posts. Similar, though loss extreme, figures are 
reproduced in a study of employment in the American banking 
industry where 73 per cent of all office and clerical posts 
are occupied by women as opposed to 15 per cent of the 
'official/managerial' positions. 
( ) 
The young women who occupy the bulk of the routine 
clerical jobs in British banking do not, by and large, 
remain with their banks for very lone. Thus in 1968 the 
wastage rate for women in the 18-23 yoars age croup employed 
in the London clearing banks was 25 per cent p. a. 
(12) 
A 
complete turnover of the fomale labour force under 23 years 
old could be expected every four years on these figures, 
and in a slightly longer period for the whole female staff 
(irrespective of ago) whose overall wastage rate was 21 
per cent p. a. 
(13) 
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The contrast which Blackburn makes between "men's 
work" and "women's work" is quite clearly established in 
the National Board for Prices and Incomes Report "Bank 
Charges" which notes a report from a firm of management 
consultants employed by the NDPI to look at manpower usage 
in the banks to the effoct that 
"... all banks now employ a high 
proportion of young women, the majority 
of whom do not expect to make a career 
in banking, yet they are by tradition 
given training in a variety of banking 
functions which most of them are unlikely 
to need during their comparatively brief 
stay in employment. Instead there should 
be special courses in specific clerical 
operations for employees, especially 
young women, recruited for high volume 
work" . 
(14) 
The report goes on to note that this form of training, 
together with other forms of staff reorganisation, would 
result in the possibility that 
"... savings of the order of 30 per cent 
could be achieved over a period of three 
to four years in staff requirements for 
high volume clerical processes in medium 
sized and largo branches. This would be 
equivalent to a saving of about 12 or 
cent of total clerical staff. " (15) 
Under these assumptions, the banks clearly had powerful 
incentives to rationaliso the organisation of work tasks in 
their branches, though this would have been achieved at 
considerable costs to the integration of branch life. 
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Small wonder that the NBPI report also advised the 
banks during a period (May, 1967) of growing staff unrest 
to take the opportunity 
"... to introduce a more up-to-date 
approach to staff relations in which 
the importance of meaningful prior 
consultation is recognised. " (16) 
The contrast between "men's work" and "women's work" in 
banking is deeply entrenched and requires little sociological 
insight to perceive. Even simple observation in any local 
bank branch is sufficient to confirm that branch work is 
organised by men but mainly performed by women. 
Blackburn additionally noted three major trends in 
the job content of bank activities which are significant 
for the evaluation of the division of men's work and women's 
work. These trends were: (1) an increasing tendency for 
the volume of women's work to expand; (2) a tendency for 
women to do jobs which were previously men's work (e. a. 
counter clerk) and which occupied an interstitial location 
between routine clerical occupations and positions of 
responsibility; and (3) an accelerating tendency for men 
to move rapidly through the routine clerical posts to 
positions of responsibility. "The man"t says Blackburn 
in this connection, 
- 155 - 
"moves from job to job, including at 
first the 'women's jobs', gaining 
familiarity with, but not proficiency 
on, the various accounting machines". 
(17) 
It is instructive to deepen our initial understanding of the 
distribution of job content in banking by asking whether 
these trends have continued during the 'sixties, bearing 
in mind the widespread impact of the introduction of 
Electronic Data Processing (EDP) into the majority of the 
banking system during the last decade. 
It is quite clear simply by looking at the growth in 
bank staffs that the volume of "women's work" continued to 
expand at a very considerable rate during the decade from 
1960 to 1970. Indeed, assuming no changes in the distri- 
bution of work-tasks within the bank between the sexes, the 
figures on staff growth and the sexual distribution of that 
growth would indicate that the volume of "women's work" 
expanded over twice as fast as the volume of "mop's work". 
As we have already seen, there was a tendency during the first 
half of the decade for the growth of female employment in 
banking to remain proportionate to the growth in the volume 
of routine work (as indexed by the growth in the volume of 
credit and debit clearings indicated in Table 3.1 supra). 
Since there was a similar relationship between the growth of 
male staff and the Growth in the numbers of bank branches, 
it would seem reasonable to maintain that the growth in the 
volume of "women's work" is at least approximately indexed 
by the growth in female employment in the banking system. 
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During the second half of the decade, the rate of growth of 
male staff was lower and the rate of growth of female staff 
was higher than during the first half. During this second 
half of the decade there was considerable expansion in the 
use of EDP and a degree of rationalization of the banks' 
branch networks consequent upon the bank mergers of 1968. 
It is thus notable that the volume of "women's work" continued 
to expand at a rapid rate despite the introduction of labour 
saving computer equipment whilst more significant savings 
were achieved among male 'career' staff by branch 
rationalisation. 
Despite the traditional image of the computer as a 
consumer of jobs, the continued growth of the female labour 
force in banking in the face of computerisation is unsurprising. 
As Mumford and Banks have pointed out: 
"Mechanisation is now probably the most 
important factor in the +feminisation' 
of the routine clerk, although there are 
other influences tending to raise the 
proportion of female clerks". (18) 
The growth of the banking industry thong together with the 
expansion of mechanisation in banking, is extending the trend 
noted by Blackburn for the volume of "women's work" to 
expand relative to the Growth in branch numbers and the 
growth of male staff. 
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We have now established that there has been a 
definite expansion in the routine clerical functions performed 
by women in the clearing banks and that this expansion has 
not been offset by the automation of aspects of clerical work. 
This expansion of routine clerical work undoubtedly forms 
the basis for the rapid expansion in female bank employment 
which occurred during the decade. At the same time, an 
additional source for the growth in the female labour force 
in banking may be hypothesised as the 'feminisation' of 
previously male occupational preserves in the bank branch. 
A 'test case' for the hypothesis that male occupational 
preserves were indeed 'feminised' during the 'sixties relates 
to the interstitial role of counter clerk. 
On the basis of his research in the early tsixtiesq 
Blackburn noted that 
"It is becoming increasingly common for 
women to be cashiers and to do other jobs 
which used to be 'men's work"'. (19) 
Even a few cursory visits to banks in the United Kingdom 
will reveal that female counter clerks now easily outnumber 
their male colleagues. In my sample, for example, female 
counter clerks outnumbered males by a factor of two. 
Similarly, female clerks are becoming relatively unremarkable 
in such specialist areas as the 'Foreign' dopartmont. Yet$ 
as Blackburn points out, this trend towards the +feminisation' 
of male jobs may involve a routinisation and downgrading of the 
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tasks in question rather than an expansion of opportunities 
for women. 
"Because of a shortage of men, more jobs 
are being opened to women, and sometimes 
doing such jobs is regarded as promotion 
for women, but not always. Going on the 
counter may be a reward for good work or 
a routine move for a fairly new Girl; in 
either case it may moan a little higher 
status, but no extra money... " (20) 
Whilst there is no doubt that the counter clerk remains 
the 'shop-window' of commercial banking, this post is 
nowadays hardly a significant stop on the road to higher 
things, The grading of bank jobs which was associated 
with the 'equal pay' reorganisation of clerical roles in 
1971 eventuated in the grading of 'counter-clerk' at Grade 
2 out of four clerical grades and in most large bank 
branches promotion to counter-clerk is regarded as an 
automatic step regardless of sex. It is clear than that$ 
whilst the role of counter-clerk has undergone considerable 
feminisation over the past twenty years, this fominisation 
has been associated with the downgrading of the role. At 
the same time, supervisory roles with respect to counter 
activities have tended to remain a male preserve. Moreover 
the introduction of 'cash machines' both inside and outside 
the bank building symbolically highlights the relationship 
between mechanisation and feminisation in banking and tostifios 
to the relationship between those two processes and the 
routinisation and down-grading of the Job specification. 
It is difficult, in short, to find any evidence for the 
widening of job opportunities or the enrichment of job content 
for women in the feminisation of the counter cleric's role. 
- 159 - 
The third trend noted by Blackburn was a tendency 
for men to move through the "women's jobs" with increasing 
rapidity. Nechanisation has probably extended this tendency 
in a number of ways. Thus many manual operations, which 
wore performed by both male and female clerks during the 
'fifties, are now processed in a 'machine room' staffed 
entirely by women and presided over by a female supervisor - 
the only supervisory status routinely open to women. Under 
these circumstances there is a tendency for male clerks' 
knowledge of the routine activities undertaken in the 
'machine room' to become increasingly cursory in character. 
Given that the men pass through the array of "women1s work" 
at a faster rate, their own promotion prospects are 
accelerated at the cost not only of a failure to thoroughly 
'understand the business' which is itself accentuated by 
more general trends towards the rationalisation and centralisation 
of bank decision making processes, but also of a widening gap 
in the work experience of men and womon. This common work 
experience has been an important factor in Generating solidarity 
among the bank staffs of earlier periods and may have 
contributed to the considerable influence of 'branch norms' 
in determining clerical attitudes which has been documented 
by }3lackburn. 
(21) 
With the division of work experiences in 
banking the homogeneity of outlook among bank, staffs, regard- 
less of sex and occupational position, may be undergoing a 
degree of dissolution. 
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3.2.3 Careers in Banks 
Turning now to the question of differential accoss 
to careers in b ankinC, Blackburn's assertion that 
"Careers in banking are for men, the 
routine work... is for women" (22) 
remains substantially correct. As we noted earlier, women 
formed only 0.35 per cent of the banks' managerial staff 
and 6.35 per cent of the appointed staff in the London 
clearing banks. A survey of women's appointments in American 
banks has revealed a substantially similar pattern in which 
women occupy a somewhat larger (15 per cent) proportion 
of 'official/managerial' positions. What this moans in 
career terms can be illustrated by reference to the Chase 
Manhatten Bank where less than 10 per cent of the female 
staff hold 'official/managerial' positions. Alexander and 
Sapery report that 
"Not long ago, the bank made an in-house 
study of the time its employees spent on 
the staff before becoming officers. 
According to an informal source, it 
showed that women waited an average of 
fifteen years, compared with six for 
men". (23) 
Gross statistical differences of the kind cited above index 
collections of radically different attitudes to men and women 
in banking. Ile have already noted the accolorating tendency 
for men to move rapidly through the array of "womon's jobs". 
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However this movement is itself part and parcel of a widor 
pattern of movement, through different posts and different 
branches, which the career-oriented young man must participate 
in to widen his banking experience and prepare him for posts 
of responsibility. Male clerks are additionally expected 
to undertake night school courses and summer schools which 
will equip them to pass the Institute of Danl: ors examinations 
which are a pre-requisite for real career progress in 
banking. 
These pressures' intensified for male bank staff during 
the 'sixties partly because there was a general decline in the 
male 'career' entry to banking but also because the post-war 
'bulge' of bank managers was reaching retiring age, 
(24) 
creating large numbers of vacant managorships. Both tendencies 
resulted in a generally increased level of promotion 
opportunities for men who were consequently encouraged to fit 
themselves for promotion as rapidly as possible, Those then 
are some of the factors which have influenced the general 
availability of promotion opportunities for 'career'-male 
clerks, Are there any factors which weight the distribution 
of promotion opportunities unfavourably towards women? 
When one remarks to senior bank officials that 
women's chances of obtaining promotion in banking seem to 
be outstandingly poor, the normal response is wholehearted 
agreement which is coupled with expressions of rogrot that so 
few women express an interest in careers in banking. The 
- 162 - 
statistical evidence for this 'lack of intorost' is 
overwhelming. During the latter part of the 'sixties the 
average stay with the bank among young Girls at tho putative 
beginning of their 'careers' in the industry was loss than 
two years. 
(25) 
Predictably, very few young women take the 
Institute of Bankers examinations which constitute the caroor 
qualification in banking, and the majority thus render 
themselves ineligible for any meaningful career in the 
industry. Thus in the sample to be reported on in Chapter 
6, whereas 92 per cent of the male clerks interviewed had 
undertaken work leading to the Institute of Bankurs 
qualifications, 92 per cent of the female clerics had not 
done so. 
Once again some relatively simple factors lie behind 
these statistics. Approximately 85 per cent of the female 
population marry during their lifetime, 
(26) 
and in 1967 
76 per cent of them were married before the age of 24 
years. 
(27) 
Most women expect - and, in terms of those 
figures, expect reasonably - to marry and to marry relatively 
early in life. Within the prevailing culture of this 
society both marriage and, more strongly, the rearing 
of children tend to be regarded as occupations in their own 
right. Under these circumstances, many young women who 
enter banking tend to see their employment as a short term 
affair which will be terminated upon marriage or pregnancy 
and, within this framework of assumptions, there is little 
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incentive to undertake the arduous schedule of study and 
examinations which would load to an (ultimately redundant) 
career qualification. 
For those women who look beyond marriage to a career 
in banking, the difficulties are truly formidable. The 
core difficulties centre on tha conflict between the demands 
of a career in the industry and the norms mediating the 
marriage relationship in our society which traditionally 
require females to shoulder the burdens of family life and 
to subordinate their career ambitions to those of their 
husbands. 
A central conflict of this type centres around the 
requirement that 'career' bank staff be geographically mobile. 
As noted earlier, the banks pursue a policy of moving career- 
oriented clerks from branch to branch in order to widen their 
experience of the banking scene. Even assuming that the 
fema}. e clerk's husband remains static geographically, this 
kind of movement can pose very serious problems for family 
life in general, and for the wives who conventionally 
shoulder the major part of the burdens of family life in 
particular. This point holds for moves even within the 
framework of a banking system inside a largo city such as 
London, Birmingham, Manchester or Leeds. It holds a fortiori 
in smaller cities where moves may have to be made to branches 
which are 20 or 30 miles distant. If one additionally adds 
the assumption of a geographically mobile husband to the 
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cultural requirement that a wife should subordinate her 
career ambitions (and her mobility) to his, the problems of 
career discontinuities are exacerbated by the possible non- 
availability of appropriate career 'slots' in the areas 
removed to. 
Moreover the arrival of children will add further 
discontinuities at crucial points in the female bank clerk's 
career. For whilst the male clerks are making their way up 
the hierarchy of bank appointments between the ages of 28 
and 40 years, their ambitious female counterparts are most 
likely to be exercised by the demands of a growing family. 
Finally, during the period under review (1960-1970), the 
pay structure in banking with its increasing differentials 
between men and women after the age of 23 years, did little 
to encourage women to remain in the industry. For those women 
who would have wished to male a career in banking then, 
substantial difficulties and disincentives - several of which 
could have been alleviated by appropriate undertakings by the 
banks - remained to daunt the hardiest career woman. 
Whilst our senior bank officials will express regret 
at the lack of female interest in bank careers and pass on 
to indicate some of the concrete organisational difficulties 
facing the would-be female bank managor, there nonetheless 
remain certain substantial advantages for the banks in the 
current state of affairs. Firstly, women can be persuaded 
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to undert& e dull, routine jobs in banking precisely because 
they estimate that they will not be doing the job for a 
protracted period of time, Similarly, low rates of pay 
can be offered to women who envisage themselves as working 
for the period between leaving school and getting married. 
Such women are not, by and large, weighed down by 
financial responsibilities: in the majority of cases indeed 
they may be living at home and hence effectively be working 
for 'pocket money'. As far as many female clerks are 
concerned then, marriage is the 'light' at the end of a none 
too arduous 'tunnel'. As Numford and Banks deftly summarise 
the situation in respect of the female clerk, 
"For most of them matrimony is their 
principal objective or interest and 
work is regarded as temporary and inci- 
dental, rather than central to their 
lives. Because of this they are 
willing to put up with tasks that 
seem intrinsically dull and for the 
same reason they are not unduly 
anxious for promotion ... In addition, 
girls can easily be trained for office 
machine jobs requiring a high degree of 
dexterity and they also represent a 
pool of cheap labour... The growth in 
the scale of offices ... produces of 
itself a division of labour which s©para- 
tes out the more highly skilled from the 
less skilled work, which is then suitable 
for relatively short term female labour". 
(28) 
In sum, the banks have benefited in two major ways from the 
employment of young women on a 'non-career' basis, Firstly, 
they have acquired a relatively docile and compliant labour 
force whose degree of involvement with work is too low to form 
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the basis for serious disgruntlement with either work- 
tasks or pay. Secondly, by employing a continuously renewed 
labour force of women whose avorago ago remains constantly 
low, average labour costs - which, it will be recalled, were 
based on age criteria during the 'sixties - are substantially 
reduced. 
A third source of advantage to the banks in recruiting 
short term female staff arises from the elimination of the 
latter from the 'promotion race' which, in turn, enables the 
banks to hold out bettor prospects of promotion to their 
male 'career' entrants and hence to attract hither quality 
male staff. In 1967,33 per cent of the male staff hald 
a non-clerical appointment in the clearing banks and, among 
men aged over 32 years, this proportion rises to 60 per cent. 
(29) 
If women were counted as equal competitors with their 
male colleagues and were afforded equal promotion opportunities, 
the chances of promotion beyond the clerical grades for 
male clerks would recede from 1 in 2 or bettor to approximately 
1 in 5. 
Finally, on the noCative side, it would clearly be 
expensive for the banks to train staff who might only remain 
in employment for two or three years to a high level of 
banking competence. Thus a situation has arisen in which the 
bank employers tailored their salary structures and demand 
for female labour in conformity with the thou-provailing 
attitudes with respect to the position and legitimate 
expectations of young women within our society. Those staff 
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policies have, as we have soon, resulted in concrete 
economic gains to the banks as well as more intangible 
advantages. They have resulted in the clear division of 
bank staffs into 'career' and 'non-careen groups on the 
basis of sex. 
This division, which has contributed a level of gains 
to the banks which has been sufficient to prevent the 
growth of any 'affirmative action' to facilitate the advance- 
ment of women in banking, is not wholly advantageous. For 
instance, there is now a widening gap between the work 
experiences of male and female clerks. It is likely that 
this now-disappearing unity of work experience has contributed 
considerably to the 'family atmosphere' and 'unitory ideology' 
of banking and that the destruction of this unity of 
experience may contribute in the future to a weakening of 
sources of social control operating within branch life. 
3.3 Staff Organizations in D, "Icing 
Since the early 1920's bank staffs have had the 
opportunity of choosing from among organisations seeking to 
represent their aims and aspirations with respect to their 
salaries and conditions of work. The organisations from 
which they can choose, as noted in Chapter 1, consist of the 
National Union of Dank Employees (NUDE, formerly the Bank 
Officers Guild) on the one hand, and a variety of internal 
I 
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staff associations which are specific to each clearing 
bank on the other. During the period between 1920 and 
1960, NUi3E had little opportunity to provide adequate 
representation for itsmembership as it remained totally 
unrecognised by a majority of clearing banks and achieved 
only formal recognition (without true negotiating rights) 
from the remainder. The staff associations, by contrast, 
were recognised by the clearing bank employers from the 
moment of their inception in the banks for which they were 
relevant. Throughout the forty years then, there has been 
a clear and consistent preference on the part of the bank 
employers that the staff associations should be the bodies 
to represent the wishes of bank staffs and, as the more 
existence of the preference indicates, NUBE and the staff 
associations were locked in conflict for membership throughout 
the period. As we shall see, the histories and characters 
of the two organisations are closely intertwined. 
NUBE was founded in 1918 as the Bank Officers' Guild 
(BOG) after several previous attempts to form a union for the 
banking industry had foundered, The Guild was established 
with the aim of pursuing broad trade union objectives, 
namely, to improve the pay and conditions of its members, 
settle disputes between the various bank employers and its 
members and assist the unemployed. 
(30) 
It also oxprossod 
an identification with the aims and interests of the banking 
profession and, in line with this identification, the Guild 
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stressed its constructive and conciliatory character from 
the outset. As the president of the Guild put it in 1919, 
"We want to find 
but ... a basis 
Guild is seeking 
Hostility to the 
not in the minds 
Guild movement. '' 
not a basis of antaaonism, 
of cooperation.... The 
a basis of cooperation. ** 
Banking Directorates is 
of the leaders of the 
(31) 
Despite this conciliatory position and a certain, characteri- 
stically middle class, myopia on issues relating to trade 
union solidarity, 
(32) 
it is abundantly clear that the Guild 
conceived itself as a trade union. Guild members were 
prepared to insert a strike clause in the union rule book and 
thus affirmed a major dimension of union activity even though 
the conditions under which a strike was to be called (a five 
eighths majority on a national ballot) virtually precluded 
the possibility of strike action. Additionally, the Guild 
applied to the Ministry of Labour and tho banks for the 
formation'of a Whitley Council for the banking industry in 
May 1919. This application was approved by the Ministry 
but was rejected by two of the clearing banks and ignored 
by the remainder. Under these circumstances, the proposal 
for a Whitley Council was shelved. Finally, the first Annual 
Delegate Meeting (ADI'I) of the Guild in 1919 approved a 
resolution to apply for registration as a trade union, and 
registration was completed in April 1920, Thus from the 
outset the Guild conceived itself as a trade union whose 
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central function would be collective barCainina in which 
the sanction of industrial action would be a possibility. 
The Guild grew rapidly during the first three years 
of its existence, reaching a membership of 30,000 by 1922(33) 
and claiming to organise half the staff of the clearing 
banks by mid-1921,04) This rapid growth in membership 
paralleled the growth of the union movement as a whole 
during this period and reflected a rapid post-war rate of 
inflation, the war-time 'thaw' in the political climate with 
respect to trade unions, as well as factors more specific 
to banking such as the bureaucratisation and oligopolisation 
of the banking industry during the war and the experiences 
of the middle-class bank clerks who had fought shoulder 
to shoulder with their working class comrades during the war. 
In sum, by 1922 the DOG was a substantial organisation 
which had established itself explicitly as a trade union, 
registered as such and espoused straightforward trade union 
objectives. At the same time the union sought to sustain 
a middle class image and to a large extent distanced itself 
from the trade union movement and from the more divisive 
trade union methods, whilst, on the debit side, the union 
had been completely unable to secure any form of recognition 
from the bank employers and its moderate policies placed 
it in a defensive position vis-a-vis the employers from the 
outset. 
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It was the bank employers' opposition to the Guild 
which was the lcey factor in the establishment of the second 
form of staff representation in banking, the internal staff 
associations. The rapid growth of the DOG and tie post- 
World War I climate of Whitleyism were instrumental in 
making some form of staff representation advantageous to 
the bank employers. 
(35) 
Thus one by one the major banks 
took steps to form their own internal staff associations 
during 1918 and 1919 until, by 1920, Barclays Bank remained 
the sole clearing bank without a staff association. Barclays 
finally established its own staff association in 1921 after a 
committee of Barclays members of the BOG had sought discussions 
w ith the Directorate over the unsatisfactory state of salaries. 
The bank responded by giving its clerical staff a 20 per cent 
rise in salary and a 30 per cent rise in bonus payments, and by 
establishing a subscription-free staff association of which all 
the bank's staff were deemed automatically members. 
The Barclays response was typical of bank practice during 
this period. In each case, the institution of an internal 
staff association followed a rapid rise in Guild membership 
and staff unrest over salaries and conditions of work. In 
most cases, subscriptions to the nowly-formod staff associations 
were nominal or non-existent and in several cases bank staffs 
were virtually forced to 'contract out' from the association 
in order to register their lack of support for it. In the 
majority of cases, the banks gave financial assistance for 
the administration of the staff associations. Recognition of 
the associations for consultative purposes was automatically 
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granted except in the case of the National Provincial 
Staff Association which had boon formed independently of the 
bank, and which was only recoGnised after a joint application 
in 1920 for recognition with the Guild. This joint 
application resulted in the acceptance of the staff 
association and the rejection of the Guild, and after this 
point the staff association fell progressively into line 
with the aims of the National Provincial Bank and was 
involved in increasing conflict with the Guild during 1922 
and 1923.36) 
During the first five years of the Guild's 
existence then, the bank employers successfully pursued the 
classic policies of 'peaceful competition'. 
(37) 
In 
addition to the successful establishment of rival organisations, 
the banks were also successful in undercutting the sources 
of grievance which had led to the formation of the Guild. 
In several cases, large increases in salaries and bonuses 
were awarded and subsequent increases were presented as 
the toutcome' of discussions with the newly established staff 
associations. These increases were the more significant 
as prices began to fall and unemployment to rise by the 
end of 1920. 
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The key to the tangled sories of events of the 
immediate post-World War I period which resulted in the 
creation of both the BOG and the collection of staff 
associations is undoubtedly the 'unitory' ideology which 
mediated both the bank clerks' reactions to the economic and 
social pressures of the period, and the bank employers' 
reactions to the new climate of Whitleyism and the creation 
of the BOG. Both the bank clerks and the employers tended 
to regard each individual bank as a unitory system having 
! 'one source of authority and one focus 
of loyalty". (38) 0 
Fox argues that when the participants in an enterprise view 
it as a unitory system, they tend to view it on the analogy 
of a 'team' in which the members are expected to 
"strive jointly towards a common objective, 
each pulling his weight to the best of his 
ability. Each accepts his place and his 
function gladly, following the leadership of 
the one so appointed. There are no 
oppositionary groups or factions, and therefore 
no rival leaders within the team. Nor are 
there any outside it; the team stands alone, 
its members owing allegiance to their own loaders 
but to no others. If the members have an 
obligation of loyalty towards the loader, the 
obligation is certainly reciprocated, for it is' 
the duty of the leader to act in such ways as 
to inspire the loyalty he demands. Morale and 
success are closely interconnected and rest 
heavily upon personal relationships". (39) 
It is clear that the founders of the Guild. 'boli©vod that the 
majority of bank staffs took this kind of unitory approach towards 
their employers, as their presentation of the Guild as constructive 
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and non-antagonistic testifies. This belief was 
undoubtedly validated by the contributions from the floor 
at the Guild's first AGM whore it was proposed, for instance, 
that the Guild might go on strike to defend the bank 
directorates against tho immoderate demands of other 
unions, 
(40) 
The reasonable, respectable and responsible 
unionism of bank workers during this period then did 
reflect the presence of a non-conflictual ideology even 
among the more militant clerks who were prepared to join the 
Guild, and also a desire to attact those of a more unitory 
persuasion who had remained outsido the ranks of the Guild. 
In sum, whilst the 'national' approach of the Guild to 
employee reprosentation in banking did represent an attempt 
by bank clerks to think on an industry-wide rather than a 
'bank-by-bank' basis and hence to make a broak with tho 
unitory loyalties of the nineteenth century, this attempt was by 
no means entirely successful. 
The creation of the internal staff associations reflected 
and amplified the less militant bank clerk's perception of his 
individual bank as a unitory system. The staff associations 
stressed the uniqueness of each individual bank and arauod 
thank the specific problems of the employees of particular 
banks should be handled by people who know 'how the bank worked' 
and not by 'outsiders' who might 'interfere' with the internal 
workings of the bank for purposes which might undermine the 
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bank's well--being. The creation of internal staff 
associations then fed upon and ultimately fostered the unitory 
ideology then prevalent in banking among the less militant 
bank clerks, making it increasingly necessary for the Guild 
to pander to unitory sentiments despite its overtly 
'national' position. 
The sources of this unitory ideolocy among bank clerks 
are not difficult to find. It was impossible for clerks to 
move from the employ of one bank to another during this 
period. The banks had, and still largely have, an internally 
open system of promotion through which clerks may aspire to 
the highest positions within the bank and expect that these 
positions will not be filled by persons coming from outside 
the bank. Correlatively, the managers at all levels will have 
been promoted from within and will not believe, nor expect 
others to believe, that they have different or conflicting aims 
from their subordinates even though they represent the bank 
directorate to the average bank clerk and, during this period, 
exercised effective 'fate-control' over him. The career 
structure and the manner of its operation in banking then 
operated to promote a sense of identification and belonging 
with a particular bank, a sense moreover which is by no moans 
totally eroded today, and this sense was heightened by the 
sense of secrecy with which bank affairs wore and are normally 
surrounded. The non-transferability of pensions and job- 
skills acquired in banking during this period additionally 
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operated to 'lock in' even the most dissatisfied and 
frustrated bank clerk to his specific employer. 
(41) 
Finall Ys 
Blackburn notes that when the clerks of today enter banking, 
"they enter the service of a paternalistic 
employer, who expects them to be well 
dressed and at all times to uphold the 
good name of the bank by the respectability 
of their appearance and conduct. " (42) 
and these observations can only have hold a fortiori during the 
'twenties and 'thirties. In sum, as Allen and Williams argue, 
the creation of the internal staff associations 
"accorded with significant elements in 
the work and social situations of bank 
clerks" (43) 
with this unitory ideology mediating such elements and the staff 
associations. 
The unitory ideology was naturally most clearly held by 
the bank employers. We have already seen that they were 
responsible for the creation of the internal staff associations 
which, inter alia, fostered the unitory viewpoint among bank 
staffs. The bank directorates were deeply hostile to the 
Guild with its overtones of conflict and dissension cutting 
across the orderly hierarchies of branch structure, and they 
were fundamentally opposed to the idea of bilateral job 
roaulation in the banking industry and the concept of industry- 
wide nogdtiations over salaries and conditions of work. Thus 
the Chairman of the British Bankers Association stated the 
- 17Y- 
intornalist position in particularly blunt terms when he 
wrote that, 
"It is the opinion of the Association 
that the formation of 'internal 
associations' democratically elected 
and representative of directors, manage- 
ment, and all sections of the staff, yet 
personal to each bank, does form the 
best safeguard for the interests of all, 
and moreover continues the spirit of 
clannish pride that each bankman feels 
towards his own bank". (44) 
The letter added that the Association was opposed to external 
interference in matters of promotion which should be made on 
merit. 
(45) 
The letter which initiated the formation of the 
Midland Bank Staff Association struck a similar not©, 
"We have further 
steps to form an 
or Guild, as we 
that any persons 
should interfere 
bank". (46) 
decided to take immediate 
Internal Staff Association 
3o not consider it right 
other than our own officers 
in the affairs of this 
In sum, the unitory ideology prevalent in banking during this 
period was a key factor in the events following the formation 
of the Dank Officers Guild, informing both the strength of the 
employers' reaction and its direction and thrust. Thus in 
fine, 
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"The bank employers responded quickly 
and firmly to the formation of the 
flank Officers' Guild. They did nothing 
which was likely to intimidate or anta- 
gonise bank clerks to the extent of 
uniting them against their employers. 
The Guild was not proscribed, nor were 
its members victimised openly. The 
employers simply consistently refused to 
recognise the Guild and set up their own 
associations through which they could 
channel concessions after a semblance of 
consultation with staff representatives". 
(47) 
As a result of these tactics and against a background of a dec- 
lining cost of living and rising unemployment, the BOG began 
to experience a pattern of falling membership whilst the 
internal staff associations became the recognised and normal 
staff organisations for bank staffs to join. 
These events of the early 'twenties and the configuration 
of attitudes and membership which resulted from them 
effectively established the pattern of staff representation 
in banking for the next thirty five years. During the 
'thirties, membership of the unrecognised Guild continued to 
decline whilst the staff associations grew in numbers in spite 
of their failure to establish credible bilateral job regulation 
in the industry. The security and relative prosperity of 
the banking industry during a period of severe economic 
depression effectively quelled the major dissatisfactions of 
bank clerks, and rumours that membership of the voiceless 
Guild could damage promotion opportunities did nothing to 
enhance its attractiveness during a period characterised by 
(48) 
intense competition for promotion. 
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This state of affairs persisted until the Second World 
War when, once again, the governmont of the day sought the 
cooperation of the union movement in running the economy. 
The Condition of Employment and National Arbitration Order (Order 
1305) which resulted, banned strikes and lockouts and established 
the National Arbitration Tribunal (NAT) to resolve industrial 
disputes on a peaceful basis. Once again then the exigencies 
of the war period shifted the mechanisms for the resolution 
of disputes from a piecemeal local basis to a national one and 
hence tended to favour the 'national' negotiating outlook of 
the BOG and its cherished aim of national negotiating machinery 
for the banking industry. Order 1305 enabled any union, 
recognized or unrecognized, to request a reference to the NAT 
for a binding award. In this situation the recognition 
of unrecognised unions was favoured by two trends. Firstly, 
any unrecognised union which succeeded in obtaining a 
reference would be achieving tacit recognition by virtue of 
its involvement in the determination of the award established 
by the tribunal. Secondly, overt recognition of trade 
unions was at one point envisaged as part of the quid pro cluo 
for the institution of Order 1305, and discussions took place 
on the feasibility of legislation to compel employers to 
recognize trade unions between the Ministry of Labour and the 
TUC. 
(49) 
This context Generated a climate which favoured 
recognition, for, as Bain points out, 
- 180 - 
"when faced with the possibility of 
having a wage structure imposed on them 
by a third party, many employers felt 
it was better to recognise the union and 
determine the firm's wage structure by 
collective bargaining". (50) 
The Guild was not slow in rocognising those trends and 
additionally strengthened its position by affiliating 
with the TUC in 1940. It now had the support of the TUC 
whichtook up the union's claim for recognition with the 
Ministry of Labour. The Guild was also among the first 
bodies to apply for arbitration through the new machinery, and 
its claims against seven of the clearing banks were heard before 
the NAT in September 1940. 
The banks and their staff associations wore now in a 
difficult position. Four of the staff associations had failed 
to qualify to represent bank staffs under Order 1305 because of 
their failure to charge subscriptions and thus demonstrate their 
independence from the bank employers. In these banks (Martins, 
District, Lloyds and Barclays) the union therefore had a straight- 
forward option to force tacit recognition before the NAT, hence 
establishing itself as the sole body representative of 
staffs in those banks. In response to this situation the banks 
and staff associations took two stops, Firstly, the 
disqualified staff associations hastily reconstituted thomsolves, 
with bank assistance, so as to qualify to represent staff 
under the now order, Secondly, the banks, who wore threatened 
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with regular arraignment and negotiation before the NAT 
in conjunction with the 'external' and unrocognised DOG, 
set about the construction of the national negotiating machinery 
for banking which they now anticipated was inevitable. The 
outline machinery which was developed by April 1941 contained 
proposals for an Employers' Federation and a 'staff-side' of 
Guild and staff association representatives constructed in 
proportion to the membership of the constituent organisations. 
Since the Guild's membership was relatively weak at this point, 
there was a widespread fear that it would become dependent 
on the staff associations to gain support far its proposals, 
The long period of competition between the two typos of 
organisation and the policy and ideological gulfs between them 
Generated a series of deadlocked negotiations between the Guild 
and the staff associations culminating in the Guild's rejection 
of the proposals. 
Once again, faced with difficult government pressures, 
the bank employers were able to use the staff associations, 
which had failed to impinge on the unilateral job regulation 
characteristic of the banking industry during this period, 
as a buffer in their negotiations with the more aggressive 
Guild. Nonetheless, the banks' offer of national negotiating 
machinery did involve a substantial increase in the degree of 
recognition to both the Guild and the staff associations(51) 
who, it will be recalled, had been recently forced into a 
greater degree of independence by the requirements of Order 
1305. Thus in retrospect the Guild appears to have boon 
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shortsighted in its rejection of the proposals for 
negotiating machinery especially as it is possible that 
the increasingly independent staff associations might have 
merged with the union in the now national context of negot- 
iations which would have emerged during the 'forties and 
, fifties. It is clear that the ideological rivalry between 
the union and the staff associations -a rivalry exacerbated 
by two decades of competition for membership - prevented the 
union from grasping the long-term advantages of the employers' 
offer though, as Price 
52 
has pointed out, a contributory 
factor may have been the Guild's success in achieving 
independent recognition from Barclays Dank in 1941. 
A similar pattern of union/staff association competition 
emerged during the 1950's. In General, the Guild - now NUDE 
after its merger with the Scottish Bankers' Association in 
1945 - Gained membership rapidly during periods of staff 
discontent over salaries, during 1951 and 1955 for instance. 
These periods were normally followed by the provision of increases 
in salary scales by the banks as in 1952 whon the 1946 scale was 
revised and 1955. During this period the staff associations 
themselves became more vigorous and independent. Thus in 1951 
the Midland Dank. Staff Association dissolved itself after 
persistent opposition to its proposals from the Midland Bank 
Board, and it was only reconstituted after it had been offered 
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an agreement in 1953 which afforded it recourse to 
independent arbitration. Similar agreements with the other 
staff associations gave thorn new 1tooth' to match their 
growing independence of attitude. In this more militant 
climate, some staff associations, alarmed at the increasing 
collusion between the banks in the formation and revision 
of salary scales, began to favour the formation of national 
negotiating machinery. Similarly the union, whose monopoly 
on 'independence' had boon eroded by the arbitration agree- 
ments of 1953, began to reverse its policy of non-cooperation 
with the staff associations. Agreement on national machinery 
was reached between the union and the Central Council of Bank 
Staff Associations (CCBSA) in 1956, This agreement was under- 
mined by the opposition and ultimate withdrawal of Lloyds Bank 
Staff Association and the National Provincial Bank Staff 
Association and this in turn enabled the banks who had 
remained negative in their attitude to the new development 
to withdraw from the negotiations. Once again the banks had 
been able to evade the formation of national negotiating 
machinery by the hostility and rivalry among the staff 
organisations in banking, and the efficacy of their 'divide 
and rule' policy was reconfirmed 37 years after its 
inception. 
The picture up to 1960 then was ono of steady growth 
in bank employment and a correlative increase in the numbers 
of bank staff in staff orCanisations, with that momborship's 
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distribution fluctuating between NUDE and the staff 
associations and a balance in favour of the staff associations. 
Both the union and the staff associations were now becoming 
more militant in character and, shortly after 1960, the 
union engaged in the first strike actions in its history and 
the staff associations at last invoked their rights to 
independent arbitration. Certain of the staff associations 
were now positively interosted in national negotiating machinery 
although competition between the union and the staff 
associations for membership vas still a very significant 
factor. Since we have now reached the period selected for 
closer scrutiny, it is instructive to look at the outlooks and 
ideologies of the two types of organisation and examine the 
character of their appeal to bank staffs. 
3.4 The Character of NUBS and the Staff Associations 
In the case of NUDE, the situation as to character and 
outlook is reasonably clear. As we have seen, the DOG was 
established with broad trade union objectives. It was 
registered as a trade union in 1920 and affiliated to the TUC 
in 1940. Its rule book has always contained a strike clause 
and, although the terms of the original clause virtually 
precluded strike action, those terms were modified in 1960 to 
allow small scale regional strikes in a move which marked an 
increase in the militant stanco of the union. 
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By and large however the union has eschewed both verbal 
expressions of militancy and their physical expression in 
strike action. The strike clause has been a source of 
controversy within the union in the past and industrial 
militancy was believed by many - including the leadership - 
to exert a dampening effect on recruitment, though this 
belief was not confirmed in 1963. From the outset then, 
the union's approach has been moderate and reasonable. It 
has aimed to rely on the 'good sense) of all sections in 
banking in the hope that its own constructive approach to 
bank problems would be reciprocated by the bank employers and 
appreciated by the general public. The unionism of NUDE is, 
in short, impeccably moderate and, in keeping with the 
diversity of political views within the union, it is apolitical. 
As far as staff representation in banking is concerned, 
NUBS has always insisted that bank staffs should be represented 
by a single, industry-wide union catering for all levels of 
staff including both non-clerical staff on the one hand and 
senior managerial staff on the other. It is opposed to the 
incipient parochialism fostered by the banks and argues that 
the responsible bank clerk should view his situation in the 
context of the industry as a whole. Above all, NUDE stresses 
its industry-wide basis as the symbol of its iridopondonco 
from tho bank employers either singly or collectively, and it is 
this independence which is at the core of its appeal. However 
. C'UBE's independence from bank control and its industry-wide 
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approach to collective bargaining and job regulation has 
laid it open to charges of 'externality' which, as we have 
seen, wore an aspect of the difficulties which the union 
found in recruiting during the 'twenties and 'thirties. 
The union's perennial answer to this charge that its structure and 
its full-time officials are 'external' to the banking system is 
to argue that, whilst the union is 'external' to banking in the 
sense that its full-time officials are not employed by the 
banks and so are beyond the influence of the banking diroctorates, 
this 'externality' does not imply that the union is beyond 
the control of its membership. In support of this latter 
claim, the union points to the governing role of the Annual 
Delegate Meeting whose representatives are elected by the 
Crass roots membership at the branches. 
Whilst NUBE has always pursued moderato and conciliatory 
policies, it has always remained quite rocognisablo as a trade 
union; the staff associations by contrast were not, until at 
least 1960, rocognisable in those terms. Founded in most 
cases only through the cooperation of the banks themselves, 
many of the staff association were not funded through 
subscriptions but were instead subsidisod by the banks. In 
some cases, membership of the staff association has boon 
automatic and cotorminous with bank employment, At their 
outset, in contrast to the BOG, the staff associations did 
not seek to organise all bank staffs. Most of the original 
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staff associations did not include non-clerical staff and 
they often excluded women. Non-clerical staffs wore still, 
excluded by 1960 and were confined to their own organisations, 
whilst women were eventually admitted to the staff associations 
except in the case of the National Provincial Dank where women 
have a separate association. 
In 1923, the staff associations aGreed on the constitution 
of the Central Council of Bank Staff Associations as a central 
coordinating body. However whilst this organisation could 
have formed the basis of a more militant and collective 
approach to negotiation in the banking industry, it in fact 
remained a largely quiescent meeting point for discussions 
except on the two occasions where it was instrumental in 
the rejection of national negotiating machinery. The quiescence 
of the CCBSA is partly due to the determinedly anti-'national' 
character of its member organisations, and partly because the 
diversity of origins and character among the member associations 
is normally reflected in difficulties in achieving unanimity 
about both the desirability of collective action and its 
direction. As Blackburn points out, the staff associations 
"prefer to act independently and 
institutionally rather than colloctivoly 
and natianally". (53) 
The inactivity of the CCBSA however is merely a facet of the more 
general inactivity of its member associations. During the 
first thirty years of thoir e. cistonce, tho staff associations 
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were able to mobilise no sanctions whatsoever and it is 
dubious whether they over contemplated this problem since 
they predominantly acted in various degrees of collusion with 
the bank directorates. This inactivity continued even where, 
as with the provisions of Order 1306, the government furnished 
them with the 'teeth' to take an independent line. During 
the decade which ended in 1960 when the staff associations were 
Granted recourse to independent arbitration, no organisation 
availed itself of this opportunity. In short, throughout the 
forty years of their existence until 1960, the staff associations 
remained largely inactive both individually and collectively 
and diilittle to alter the unilateral character of job 
regulation in the banking industry. 
At the level of ideoloGy, the staff associations represent 
the spirit of internalism, 
"a system by which the staff of any particular 
business house negotiate with their own 
management on all matters concerning staff 
conditions with an emphasis on the common 
interest of employer and employed", (514) 
By the 'sixties the staff associations were pursuing broadly 
trade union aims and in fact sovoral took stops to alter their 
constitutions so as to be capable of registering as such. 
(55) 
However the staff associations remain anxious to avoid any taint 
of trade unionism. Their aim by the 'sixties was effectiveness 
and, in keeping with the spirit of internalisrn, they argue that bank 
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staffs' interests are best served by people within the bank 
who know the terrain and have an linsidol view of the lone- 
term problems of the bank and its staff. 
The staff associations' opposition to the union was 
based on the argument that banking is not like other industries 
where employers and employees can be assumed to have divergent 
interests. On the contrary in banking where male staff tend to 
enter for life and are likely to rise into the ranks of branch 
management or above, there can be no room for the divisive 
cleavage between labour and capital, management and workers. 
With respect to these views, Blackburn comments that 
"we are now at the ideological heart of 
internalism, Banking is different from 
other occupations; in banking there is 
no split between labour and capital; no 
'us' and lthemlq for everyone is one of 
gust. Therefore we can best settle our 
problems amongst ourselves without inter- 
ference from outsiders who do not under- 
stand us", (56) 
Whilst these views undoubtedly continue to resonate with the 
middle class values of numbers of bank clerks and to harmonise 
with their perceptions of themselves as identified with a 
career within the hierarchy of a particular b ankt the staff 
associations have nonetheless had difficulties in recent 
years in persuading even their own members that they are 
sufficiently independent of the employers to provide a erodible 
alternative to NUDE and that they are capable of GottinG 
results. Over 25 per cent of the staff association members 
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interviewed by Blackburn criticised the staff associations' 
lack of independence from the bank employers - especially the 
fact that staff association officers are employed by the banks - 
using such terms as 'a farce' and 'a nice set up for the bank' 
to describe the situation* 
(57) 
Doubts about the effectiveness 
of the staff associations tend to follow naturally from doubts 
as to their independence, and to a lesser extent from their 
past history and performance insofar as this is kno'in to bank 
staffs. 
.5 Respectability, Recognition and Effectiveness 
Despite their reputation for caution, probity, 
respectability, an obsession with social status and even 
pusillanimity, bank clerics have clearly been willing to join 
the staff organisations available to them in very large numbers. 
The unrecognised union has rarely attracted less than 20,000 
members throughout its long history as an 'outsider' in banking, 
and during the post-war era to 1960 has attracted an average 
membership of 35,000. Similarly the staff associations have 
continuously attracted numbers in excess of the union throughout 
their existence, and during the period from 1948 to 1960 have 
numbered approximately 45,000 on average. Blackburn estimated 
that the density of union membership in banking, taking the 
combined membership of the union and the staff associations, 
was approximately 71 per cent during the early sixties. 
(58) 
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The respectability and caution of bank clerks then has hardly 
caused them to eschew staff orGanisations, indeed as these 
figures indicate bank clerks were more highly organised 
during the early 'sixties than their colleacuos in National 
or Local Goverment. 
(59) 
Against these figures however must be set the relatively 
low level of industrial aggression displayed by bank clerks in 
either the union or the staff associations. No organisation of 
bank clerics in England and Wales had threatened industrial action 
in the forty years of their existence up to 1960, and few 
attempts have been made to tale the bank employers to arbitration. 
The majority of bank clerks throughout this period belonged 
to passive organisations (the staff associations) which were 
set up as a part of the banks' policy of 'peaceful competition' 
with NUM-, and only under eircumstancos of Grave staff 
discontent as in the 1951-55 period when the Midland Bank 
Staff Association dissolved itself and negotiations proceeded 
on national negotiating machinery have the staff associations 
displayed any genuinely independent action or initiative. 
It may warrantably be said that the thematic contrast 
underlying the history of the staff organisations in banking 
during the forty years from 1920 to 1960 is to be located in 
the lone and tortuous conflict between the active, but 
unrecognised union and the passive, but rocounisod staff 
associations. The 'divide and rule' policy established 
by the bank employers during the 'twenties was, of course, 
_. 192 - 
instrumental in undercutting the development of a powerful 
and autonomous form of labour organisation in banking during 
that period. However the value of this dual system has 
proved to lie in the character of the intor-organisational 
hostilities which werd generated in the competition for 
membership which ensued. Those hostilities wore fundamental 
in ensuring the stability of the dual system, which left bank 
staffs without effective representation, at those points when 
this stability was threatened. Thus on the occasions when 
the formation of a unified 'staff-side' which could have altered 
the unilateral nature of job regulation in banking became a 
real possibility, the suspicion of the union (in 1942) and 
inter-staff association disagreements (in 1956) were sufficient 
to forestall the development of national negotiating machinery. 
On these occasions then, the interests of the bank directorates 
wore served without any need for direct intervention from the 
bam. It is in this sense that the dual system has served 
the banks long and well for, as events have turned out, it 
has been no less than a self-stabilising device for fore- 
stalling the formation of a unified staff organisation in 
banking. 
The inter-organisational hostilities of the dual system 
were also significant in preventinC the translation of staff 
discontent into coherent orGanisational policies. There 
were two periods during the tfifti©s when acuto staff discontent 
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came to the surface in 1950-2 and again in 1955. During both 
periods the union seems to have acted as a safety valve for 
staff frustrations, as during both periods the staff joined 
the union in increasing numbers. During neither period 
however was there a sustained demand for more militant policies 
within the staff associations, bank clerks simply 'voted with 
their feet' by joining the union. By the time the staff 
associations wore prepared to become more militant - both as 
a response to the discontent and as a means to compote with 
the union - the banks were able to step in with salary incroasos 
which short-circuited the discontont, and prevented it from 
crystallising into new institutional arrangements for salary 
negotiations. 
Finally, the continuing presence of the staff associations 
as the recognised and concrete embodiments of respectable 
internalism have made the union's problems of balancing 
militancy and effectiveness on the one hand with membership on 
the other more difficult. The union is continually faced with 
the problem of maintaining a membership who may grow weary of 
paying high subscriptions to an organisation which lacks 
negotiating rights and is less than fully effective. At the 
same time, the union is award that the militancy which could 
result in recognition and enhanced effectiveness may drive 
its membership into the moro respectable staff associations. 
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During the period in question, the union was effective 
only insofar as the 'moral' sanction of its increasing 
membership provoked the employers to increase salaries 
and improve conditions of work. Since these increases 
were normally attributed to 'discussions' with the staff 
associations, the union was prevented from achieving 
even propaganda victories from the limited effectiveness 
which it developed. 
In sum, the bank employers were able to rely on 
the dual system of staff representation in banking not 
only to forestall the emergence of a coherent and unified 
negotiating body for bank staffs, but also to prevent 
both the growth of militancy in the staff associations 
and significant membership growth in the union. 
-3,6 
Conclusion 
We now have a general picture of the development 
of the banking industry during the decade 1960-70, and a 
broad understanding of the opportunities and work situation 
of bank staffs during this period. We also have a general 
view of the history and character of the staff organisations 
which seek to represent the men and women who work in 
banking. In order to understand the developments which 
took place during the decade between 1960 and 1970, we now 
need to establish the characteristic orientations of bank 
workers to their work, employment and to the staff 
organisations in banking. Only then can we fit these 
theoretical discussions to the historical pattern of 
events which' occurred during the decade under investigation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CLERICAL ORIENTATIONS AND STAFF ORGANISATION MEMBERSHIP 
IN BANKING: A MODEL FOR THE I SIXTIES 
4#1 Introduction 
One of the major legacies of Max Weber's methodolo- 
gical writings is the view that the statistical correlation 
of sociological variables to establish. the validity of 
causal relationships in sociology, or what Weber terms 
'causal adequacy', is insufficient on its own to constitute 
sufficient or adequate support for the causal efficiency 
of such variables. In order to establish such 'causal 
adequacy', Weber argues, it must be supplemented by what 
he terms 'adequacy on the level of meaning'. As he puts 
it, 
"If adequacy in respect to meaning is 
lacking, then no matter how high the 
degree of uniformity and how precisely 
its probability can be numerically 
determined, it is still an incompre- 
hensible statistical probability, 
whether we deal with overt or subjective 
processes". (1) 
This Weberian view holds a fortiori when we are involved 
with historical analysis, in which we attempt to utilise 
sociological concepts and generalisations°-to illuminate 
temporally dynamic processes, Of course there is a 
clear sense in which the variables described in Chapter 
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2 contain their own 'adequacy at the level of meaning', 
The impact of inflation, unemployment or bureaucratisa- 
tion on groups of workers is intrinsically intelligible 
at the level of meaning 'according to our habitual modes 
of thought and feeling'. 
(2) 
Nonetheless this adequacy 
is still not quite sufficient for our purposes. Thus 
we still do not know how to 'weight' the various factors, 
or how to assess their cumulative impact in an historically 
dynamic situation, nor are we in a position to grasp 
their combined significance for individuals in concretely 
differing situations. In order to assess these dimensions 
of the factors involved, we require some reference to the 
social actors who are engaged in the events under review 
as well as to the aims and goals which informed their 
activities and the ways in which their activities were 
conceived as relating to such aims and goals. Only with 
this knowledge can we proceed to conceptualise the ways 
in which the various structural and institutional factors 
both inside and outside banking exerted their influence 
on the pattern of events which developed. 
This is not a new problem for either historians 
or sociologists and their response to it has normally been 
to attempt to guage the typical reactions of the groups 
under study to the social events and social pressures 
which are believed to be significant. On the whole 
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sociologists have tended to be more explicit and thorough- 
going in their attempts to conceptualise the typical 
responses of social groups to social events and pressures 
than their historian counterparts, and in this respect 
they have been influenced by the tradition of attitude and 
public opinion research which has been a staple feature of 
descriptive social science for the past thirty or forty 
years, 
The study of the typical outlooks and goals of social 
actors only really developed in industrial sociology, 
however, when it was realised that the outlooks and goals 
of both industrial workers on the one hand and clerical and 
managerial workers on the other were crucial in mediating 
the responses of these workers to their industrial and 
organisational environments and were not simply the 
'epiphenomenal' products of work environments. That is, 
only when it was realised that workers take their goals 
and aspirations, their hopes and fears into work with them 
and respond to industrial situations in terms of them, 
Whilst this view was the 'stock-in-trade' of such classic 
sociologists as Marx, Weber, Znaniecki and the Chicago 
school', its emergence in the field of industrial sociology 
was hampered by the dominance of the 'human relations' 
school during the 'forties and 'fifties, The theoretical 
perspective of this school was so dominated by a tacit 
allegiance to formal managerial objectives, that its 
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proponents rarely paused to consider that ordinary workers 
might have goals of their own, or indeed, that managers might 
have goals which were divergent from the goals of the organi- 
sation as a whole. It is thus no surprise that the study 
of typical goals and outlooks of industrial workers emerged 
within industrial sociology as part of a critique of the 
blanket assumptions of the 'human relations' approach. 
Thus in 1956, Dubin(3) attacked the major assumption 
of the 'human relations' approach to industrial sociology 
namely, that 'high morale' - which was thought necessary to 
ensure high output - among industrial workers could be 
engineered by a single method of employee supervision. 
Dubin's study distinguished between three types of industrial 
worker on the basis of general 'life interests', whom Dubin 
termed 'work centred', 'community centred' and 'indifferent' 
respectively. 'Work centred' individuals are those who 
are committed to work as a positive and significant aspect 
of their lives and who, according to Dubin, therefore 
become excellent employees but remain correlatively sensitive 
to the inadequacies of their work environments. These men 
and women, Dubin argues, tended to be highly competent and 
conscientious workers and hence require relatively little 
technical supervision but, because their commitment to work 
is high, supervisors 
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"have to confirm actually and symbolically 
(the workers) wisdom in choosing this 
work as the central interest in his life". 
(4) 
The 'community centred' worker, by contrast, is relatively 
uninterested in work. As Dubin puts it, 
"To such people, the real centre of 
life is to be found in areas other 
than work, perhaps the family, the 
church, a hobby or recreation". (5) 
Workers who are 'community centred' in orientation therefore 
can tolerate poor working conditions and 'heavy handed' 
supervision, but tend to need a considerable degree of 
technical assistance and supervision. The 'indifferent' 
person who, apparently, has no central life interests should, 
according to Dubin, have 'impersonal and cüstodiall 
supervision. 
Whilst Dubin did not extend his analysis of employee 
goals and interests beyond the question of 'supervisory 
styles', two important and partly complementary Dritish 
studies of the early 'sixties did begin to demonstrate that 
such goals and interests pervade organisational and 
industrial activity. Thus Burns and Stalker 
(6) 
were 
able to demonstrate and document the impact of executive 
competition for power, influence and status on the inter- 
departmental relationships within companies in the electro- 
nics industry. In particular they found that established 
executives tended to view the establishment of Research 
and Development departments in their companies as threatening 
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the existing distribution of power and authority within 
the firm. Hence, in order to counter the potential 
power of these newly established centres of expertise, the 
executives in established departments simply minimised 
communications with the R and D departments as far as 
possible, thus minimising both the influence and the utility 
of the latter. 
Similarly, in a more traditional area of industrial 
sociology, Goldthorpe et al's Affluent Worker studies(7) 
have effectively demonstrated that the goals and aspirations 
which industrial workers take with them from the outside 
world into the work situation crucially mediate between 
their experiences of various aspects of their work situation 
on the one hand and the courses of action through which 
they responded to these experiences on the other. In 
particular, the fact that these unskilled workers' central 
goals and interests lay outside their work situation and 
their involvement with work was fundamentally instrumental 
ramified through many aspects of their activities at work. 
For instance, Goldthorpe et al found a clear connection 
between the calculative involvement of the workers with 
their firm on the one hand and a relatively low degree of 
discontent concerning the very low levels of job satisfaction 
associated with their job tasks and work roles. This same 
'instrumentalism' was associated with the character of the 
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affluent workers' unionism. In general, this unionism 
was predominantly geared to 'bread and butter' issues 
which were 'local' and 'economic' in character, and 
contrasted with the 'national' and 'ideological' unionism 
which is perhaps the sustaining core of the trade union 
movement. '1'he'instrumental collectivism' of the 
unskilled workers involved, in parallel with Chi. noy's(8) 
auto-workers, a collective effort to realise private and 
individual ends which were essentially located outside the 
workplace. By contrast with the unskilled workers, the 
craftsmen in the Affluent Worker studies were much less 
instrumentally involved in work and tended to display a 
much broader ideological commitment to the union movement 
as a whole. Goldthorpe et al. summarised these results 
by arguing that 
"to the extent that the individual's 
involvement in his work is more than 
a merely calculative one, the less 
we would expect him to view his union 
in an affectively neutral way". 
(9) 
The Affluent Worker studies then provided powerful evidence 
for the existence of a wide range of orientations to work 
which had either been ignored or treated as epiphenomenal 
in previous studies of industrial organisations. They 
were also able to indicate the wide-ranging scope and 
significance of these orientations in mediating shop-floor 
experience and, more generally, in influencing work-placo 
activity. Goldthorpe et al elaborated this point by 
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suggesting that the i. nadequact©s of approaches which ignore 
the workers' own goals and structures of relevances 
"become most marked when it is 
empi. ricall): _the 
case that the indivi- 
duals in the enterprise under analysis 
are not simply a random collection but 
share rather in certain values and goals 
to which their involvement may be 
attributed in the first place, and whose 
sources must then clearly be sought 
externally to the enterprise". (10) 
They go on to plead for an action frame of reference in 
industrial sociology in which actors' own definitions of 
the situations in which they are engaged would be a 
starting point for the explanation of social behaviour, 
and which would 
"direct attention systematically 
to the variety of meanings which 
work may come to have for indus- 
trial employees. And this in 
turn would then compel recognition 
of the fact that in modern indus- 
trial society the members of the 
industrial labour force form a 
highly differentiated collectivity 
- in terms, for example, of the 
positions and roles they occupy in 
their non-working lives, in their 
sub-cultural characteristics, and 
in the pattern of their life 
histories and objectives for the 
future". (11) 
These arguments for the action frame of roference received 
more general theoretical elaboration by Dawe(12) in 1970, 
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"the language of social action begins 
with the subjective dimension of action; 
conceptualises it as the definition of 
the situation; spells this out in terms 
of actors defining situations on the basis 
of ends, moans and conditions; and posits 
action as process over time, i. o, as 
history". (13) 
The action approach then solves two problems in our attempt 
to understand the role played by the various sociological 
factors, firstly by supplying us with criteria - the actors' 
goals and orientations - on the basis of which we can. begin 
to evaluate the relative importance of the various factors 
as mediated by these goals etc., and secondly by enabling 
us to use social actors' goals to supply a link between 
the operation of sociological variables on the one hand 
and the actors' courses of action on the other. Thus Dawo 
argues that the concept of 'central meaning' crucially 
mediates between the situations in which the actor may 
find himself and his on-going projects in such situations. 
In sum, 
"definitions of the different 
situations of everyday life - 
work situation, family situation, 
political situation and so on - 
can be understood by moans of a 
concept of central meaning.... 
(The actor) is conceptualised 
as integrating his different 
situations and biographical 
episodes in terms of an overall 
life-meaning, from which he derives 
his situationally-specific goals and 
definitions". (14) 
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Finally, the action approach involves a perspective which 
sees social institutions as the product of on-going striving: 
"In such a perspective, action 
constitutes an unceasing attempt to 
exert control over existing situa- 
tions, relationships and institutions 
in such a way as to bring them into 
line with human constructions of their 
ideal meanings". (15) 
The concept of central meaning then enables us to integrate 
our sociological variables in a way which sets them in a 
context of historicity, striving and power. Moreover, 
since the attempt to establish a trade union in banking is, 
at bottom, an attempt to substitute bilateral job regulation 
by both employers and employees for unilateral job 
regulation by employers alone, the topic with its historicity 
and its overt 'control' content is eminently suitable for 
the integration of the relevant variables around the 
concept of central meaning. Additionally, such an approach 
has been pioneered in a small way with respect to banking 
by Mumford and Banks. 
(16) 
The Mumford and Banks study of the computerisation 
of white collar work included a substantial analysis of 
the changeover to electronic data processing (EDP) 
techniques in a group of bank branches. 
07) 
A pervading, 
if slightly submerged, theme in this study is the difficulty 
of assessing how bank clerics will react to the changeover 
to EDP using sociological variables alone without the 
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benefit of some kind of action approach which tak©s into 
account the goals and interests of bank employees. Thus, 
in the course of their attempt to locate factors which 
influenced the clerks' expectations concerning the 
changeover, Mumford and Banks compared their results to 
those of Faunce(18) who had discovered that positive 
attitudes to change were positively correlated with 
higher class background, better levels of education and 
higher status job occupancy. By contrast, Mumford and 
Banks could locate no relationship between class background 
and attitudes to the changeover.. They did discover 
however that the better qualified female clerks, i. e., 
girls with GCE, were more likely to see the change as 
unfavourable, a tendency which was the reverse of that 
established by Faunce. This anomaly was quite intelligible 
however when it was related to the goals and aspirations of 
the girls on the one hand, and their view of the likely 
effects of automation on the other. As Mumford and 
Banks comment, 
"These girls had entered the bank with 
good' scholastic qualifications and 
probably higher aspirations than the 
unqualified or lesser qualified girls, 
and they therefore had more to lose 
from a system which increased the 
mechanical and routine nature of 
work". (19) 
Similarly, although Mumford and Banks study found that 
male clerks were more pro-change than their female counter- 
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parts, this again failed to provide convincing support 
for the Faunce results, for as they comment with respect 
to the men, 
"it seemed likely that their favourable 
attitudes were due more to the fact 
that they believed themselves to be less 
threatened by the change than to their 
position in the status hierarchy". (20) 
Additionally, 
"men who believed their promotion 
chances to be good were very likely 
to see the general effects of auto- 
mation as favourable. These men 
believed that their future was secure. 
They had a reasonably high job satis- 
faction, they were identified with 
the bank's interest, and had confi- 
dence in bank policy, and they did 
not feel threatened by the computer". 
(21) 
After the changeover to EDP however, it was found that 
this type of man's attitude to automation had changed to 
one of hostility and that this change was associated 
with the widespread impact of automation on bank practices. 
Indeed after the changeover only very young men who had not 
fully settled down in banking remained favourable to 
EDP. With respect to these findings, Mumford and Banks 
comment that, 
- 210 - 
"The young man has little to lose, 
he is only at the beginning of his 
career and, as yet, not particularly 
interested in it. The rather more 
mature man is in a more vulnerable 
position. He has given around ten 
years service to the bank; he 
probably has acquired domestic 
responsibilities; he is approaching 
the age when managerial posts are 
becoming attainable, and he believes 
he has a good chance of obtaining one 
of these. Any alteration in a hither- 
to almost entirely predictable future 
introduces uncertainty and is therefore 
threatening to his objectives". (22) 
The work of Burns and Stalker on the one hand and of Mumford 
and Banks on the other converge in the view that responses 
to organizational change are mediated by the goals and 
outlooks of the different organizational participants. 
The central insight of Mumford and Banks' study, which 
parallels that of the Affluent Workers study, is that white 
collar workers within the same industry (banking), the same 
firm and even the same branch may differ substantially and 
systematically in their orientations to work. And these 
orientations, which derive from different goals and interests, 
in turn mediate the differentiated reactions of the bank 
workers to technical change. The insight of the Affluent 
Worker studies was that the central meanings which industrial 
workers give their lives, which derive from sources nutsi_de 
the work situation, crucially mediate the workers' responses 
to all aspects of the work situation from job-content to 
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unionisation. Goldthorpe et al. were able to establish 
moreover that the distribution of these central meanings 
among the 'affluent workers' was not random. Our view is 
that by investigating the central meanings which bank 
workers give their lives, we may find substantial and 
systematic differences among such central meanings, and 
that these systematic differences may mediate crucially 
different responses to the various factors which impinge 
on clerical life in general and unionisation in particular. 
We may also expect that the distribution of these central 
meanings will be crucially affected by bank employment 
and staff policies even though the central meanings 
themselves originate outside the banking system.. 
4.2 The Central Meanings of Bank Clerks 
There are good reasons to suppose that the differential 
access of white collar workers to a 'career' may be a crucial 
distinguishing factor in locating differentiations among 
the central meanings and life-goals of this group of 
workers. Firstly since it is generally understood which 
posts are 'career' posts and which are 'routine' in bureau- 
cratic organisations, it may safely be assumed that those 
who have taken the posts in question have, in taking them, 
'opted' in some sense for either a 'career' involvement or 
a 'non-career' involvement with the organisation - though 
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this is not to suggest that those who take up 'routine' 
posts have the same array of options as those who take up 
the 'career' posts. It is possible then to go on to 
suggest that the selection among these options is made 
on the basis of goals and meanings which are necessarily 
derived from the-world outside the workplace, and that 
these goals and meanings will continue, to a greater or 
lesser degree, to be sustained by that world although the 
world of work will also subsequently exercise a greater 
or lesser degree of influence, which in its turn will 
depend on the orientation to work sustained. To make 
this point is to say something significant but not very 
startling. The point is significant because it 
guarantees both the independence, in the first instance, 
of clerical goals and central meanings from the workplace 
and equally guarantees their non-random distribution among 
clerical workers. The point is unstartling because, after 
all, it is hardly 'news' to realise that the person who 
applies for a typist's post has different goals and 
outlooks from the person who applies to become a 'trainee 
executive', 
We can build on this first point by noticing, 
secondly, that a 'career' in a bureaucratic organisation 
is in most instances(23) a temporally organised series of 
hierarchically graded positions through which individuals 
will pass. Given this point, we may assume that the 
prospect (and the retrospect) of such a series will differ. en- 
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tiate 'career' workers responses to almost all aspects 
of their organisational environment from those of 'routine' 
workers. For instance, we may expect that the attitude 
of 'career' workers to superiors will be influenced by 
the knowledge that the worker may or will, one day, 
occupy that self-same post, and by the knowledge that how 
quickly this occupancy will come to pass may depend on that 
very superior. Similarly, to the extent that the 'career' 
worker becomes 'ego-involved' with his work, all factors 
relating to job-content and the work situation will tend 
to have a relatively high degree of salience which they will 
not have for the 'routine' worker. Again, as noted in 
Chapter 2, the prospect of promotion encourages 'career' 
workers to adopt an individualistic rather than collective 
approach to wage bargaining both within the individual 
enterprise and more generally in society at large. By 
the same token, 'routine' workers may be expected to adopt 
more 'collecti. vistic'approaches. Finally, since the 
prosecution of a career involves a considerable investment 
of effort and involvements, we may assume that 'career' 
goals for 'career' workers form a very considerable portion 
of their overall 'life-goals', whilst for 'routine' workers 
in bureaucratic organisations we may expect 'life-goals' 
to lie outside the organisation. 
These considerations are only amplified when we look 
at the. specific case of banking. For here there is 
a relatively sharp distinction between 'career' and 
'non-career' posts. This distinction is preserved in 
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the banks recruiting literature and policies(24) and 
hence in clerks' self-selection for the two types 
of posts at the point of intake. Additionally, the 
distinction is publically preserved at the point of 
qualification for 'career' posts. Access to 'career' 
posts requires study and success in the Institute of 
Bankers' examinations and we may safely assume that 
those who finally do not elect to study for these 
examinations in effect elect to occupy routine posts. 
This assumption holds even with respect to those who 
may initially have entered banking with a career in mind. 
In short, the indicators of 'career work' and 'career 
orientation' and 'routine work' and 'routine orienta- 
tion' are so well established in banking that they are 
publically available and publically oriented to. As 
such, they may be expected to constitute a part of 
clerical self-images. The public availability of 
these orientations and their indicators in banking has 
the additional advantage, for the sociologist, of 
relieving us of the necessity of constructing complex 
indicators of 'career' orientation with their inherent 
ambiguities and difficulties. 
In sum, both the theoretical considerations already 
raised and the empirical evidence of Chapter 3 indicate 
that we may be able to generate important insights in 
understanding the relationship between the situation of 
bank workers and their unionisation by basing our ideal 
types of clerical workers on the distinction between 
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central meanings and life-goals which incorporate a 
substantial 'career' orientation to work with its 
associated connotations on the one hand, and central 
meanings which are centred outside the work situation 
and, within which, work is regarded as a relatively 
insignificant and routine element. 
Under this assumption then, clerical workers do 
not present themselves as a single homogeneous group, 
but are divided into two major ideal typical groups based 
on two sets of fundamental concerns: (1) those with 
career-oriented, work-centred, bureaucratic life 
interests - to be called 'work centred' and (2) those 
with consumption-oriented, non-work-centred life interests 
which are associated with a broadly instrumental 
orientation to work - to be called 'home centred'. The 
following characterisations of these central life interests 
is conceived in broad parallel with Goldthorpe et al. 's 
descriptions of the 'bureaucratic' and 'instrumental' 
orientations to work(25) with the exception that the 
Goldthorpe et al. description of the 'instrumental' 
orientation is modified to take account of the possibility 
that 'home centred' clerical workers still find work a source 
of significant and pleasant social contacts. 
Work Centred Central Meanings 
1. The primary meaning of work is as a service to an 
organisation in return for steadily increasing income and 
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social status, and for long term security, that is, in 
return for a career. Economic rewards are not regarded 
as payments for particular amounts of work done or of labour 
expended, but rather as emoluments appropriate to a 
particular grade and function or to a certain length of 
service. 
2. Arising from this, the involvement of workers in 
their organisation contains definite moral elements rather 
than-deriving from a purely market relationship. To 
paraphrase Max Weber, it entails an acceptance of a 
specific obligation of faithful administration in return 
for a relatively secure and privileged existence. It is 
unlikely, thus, that in this case involvement can be 
neutral: it will tend normally to be positive, where moral 
obligations are being faithfully met, or perhaps strongly 
negative if it is felt that that commitments of a moral 
kind are not being honoured. 
3. Since, in this case, work is associated with progres- 
sive economic and status advancement in the form of a career, 
it inevitably plays an important part in determining the 
worker's conception of himself and of his future; his 
'position' and 'prospects' are significant sources of his 
identity. Thus, in this sense, ego-involvement in work 
is strong. Work represents a central life interest, 
insofar as the individual's career is crucial to his 'life- 
fate'. 
- 217 - 
4. Consequently, workers' lives cannot be sharply 
divided into work and non-work. Their organisation and 
their colleagues may or may not continue to form the 
basis of their social lives outside of work; but self 
concepts and social aspirations formed through work 
necessarily carry over into non-work activities and 
relationships; and the same is also likely to be true 
of organisational status. 
Home Centred Central Meanings 
1. The primary meaning of work is as a means to an 
end or ends external to the work situation; that is, 
work is regarded as a means of acquiring income to 
support a valued way of life, of which work itself is 
not a very significant part. At best, work is a source 
of pleasant social relationships which remain centred on 
the workplace and terminate with employment. 
2. The worker's involvement with the employing 
organisation is primarily cal4culative, although this is 
mitigated by affective concern for some fellow employees. 
Involvement with the employing organisation will be 
maintained for so long as the economic return for effort 
is perceived as adequate. 
3. Since work is defined as a mandatory and instrumental 
activity, rather than as an activity valued for itself, 
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ego-invoilvement in work is low. Work does not form a 
part of the worker's central life interests and work is not 
a source of emotionally significant experiences. Work 
content is not a source of personal growth or 
development. 
4. Workers' lives tend to become dichotomised into work 
and non-work dimensions. Roles and role relationships 
derived in the work situation are rarely carried into 
the home. 
Like Goldthorpe et al., we would emphasise that these types 
do not stand in total contrast to one another. All work 
in industrial society, for instance, has an instrumental 
component. Similarly, we stress that these central 
meaning constructs are ideal typical: it is thus not our 
suggestion that elements of one orientation will not be 
found in association with elements of the other among 
sections of clerical workers, 
The Distribution of Clerical Orientations to Work 
On the basis of the evidence assembled thus far, the 
most obvious basis for the differentiation of clerical 
orientations to work within banking is likely to be a sexual 
one with male clerks adopting a 'work centred' orientation 
and female clerks adopting a 'home centred' orientation. 
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Studies by Blackburn 
(26) 
and, more recently, by 
Graham and Llewellyn, 
(27) 
indicate that female bank 
employees come from lower socio-economic backgrounds, 
as measured by fathers occupation, than their male 
counterparts and that thei. r educational experiences and 
occupational aspirations are also more limited in scope. 
(28) 
Few women achieve career grades in banking(29) and few 
equip themselves to achieve such career grades by under- 
taking the work for the banking qualifications which are 
essential for promotion beyond routine clerical tasks. 
(30) 
Moreover the wastage rate among female bank employees is 
very much higher than among male staff and is broadly 
associated with marital expectations and related expectations 
concerning projected domestic commitments. 
(31) 
The high 
wastage rates among female staff underline the fact that 
female rates of participation in the labour force fall 
substantially with marriage for the age-groups (15-24 and 
25-34 years) under primary consideration(32) and point to 
decisive difficulties for women pursuing a career in banking 
beyond marriage. 
(33) 
In short, it would not by any means 
stretch the facts to suggest that there is likely to be a 
low level of commitment among women to a career in banking 
and that an orientation to work which we'have described 
as 'home centred' should prevail within the ranks of female 
bank employees. 
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Overall, we hypothosise that the vast majority of 
female bank workers (at least 90 per cent) broadly adopt 
a 'home centred' orientation to work. That this may be 
so overwhelming the case will be in large part a result of 
the sex-role socialisation characteristic of our society(34) 
and, in this respect, female orientations to work would 
clearly be very largely independent of experience in the 
work situation. At the same time however the banks have 
done little to discourage such orientations to work among 
their female employees. Until recently different recruiting 
literature was prepared for the consumption of prospective 
male and female employees(35) and, as we have already seen(36) 
the banks have gained decided advantages, both financial and 
in the management of the labour force, from the orientation 
of their recruitment policies to such orientations to work. 
In a most important sense, the banks have responded to the 
requirements of the expansion of their services and the 
bureaucratisation of their organisations by the creation 
of a 'feminised' separate clerical class with an orientation 
to work which would enable it to perform routine and 'dead- 
end' jobs without prejudice to the industrial relations 
system operative in banking throughout the 'fifties and 
'sixties, 
(37) 
Turning now to the male bank staff, it is of course 
true that, for the vast majority of such staff, an inverse 
set of characteristics are operative both with respect to 
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subjective career aspirations and objective career 
possibilities. Male clerks are, by and large, drawn 
from superior socio-economic backgrounds as compared to 
their female colleagues and they have had superior 
educational experiences and hold superior educational 
qualifications. Male clerks have higher occupational 
aspirations(33) and are more likely to equip themselves 
for occupational success by taking the relevant banking 
examinations. Men have very much lower wastage rates, 
(39) 
occupy the vast majority of career posts in banking and 
receive cultural support not merely to remain in employment 
after marriage but also to assume the role of chief bread- 
winner. The obstacles to female career success associated 
with growing domestic commitments and the necessity for 
geographical mobility do not apply with the same force to 
men. 
Whilst the upshot of the discussion of male staff thus 
far would seem to be that male clerks are, in contrast to 
their female colleagues, overwhelmingly 'work centred', such 
a conclusion would be simplistic. For although the majority 
of male clerks may, ab initio, be expected to bring a 
'work centred' orientation with them to bank employment, 
a consideration of some aspects of a career in banking may 
go some way to indicating the possible sources of change in 
such an orientation which derive from within the work 
situation within which the men, in contrast to the women, 
may remain for the majority of their lives. 
(40) 
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Firstly, we can note that whilst the majority of 
men who begin work in the banking industry may be 
expected to entertain a 'career orientation' to their 
work, the expectations engendered by such a 'career 
orientation' can by no means be satisfied in all cases. 
In one large clearing bank, clerks who are not appointed 
to 'career' grades outnumber their 'appointed' colleagues 
at every age up to 43 years, and for all ages above this 
point unappointed male clerks still constitute 44 per cent 
of the total male staff. There is then a real sense in 
which a 'full' career in banking, i. e. a career involving 
the achievement of some kind of 'appointed' post, can only 
be achieved by approximately 50 per cent of the men and 
this is against a background of almost continuous expansion 
in the industry in which over half the labour force is 
radically ineligible for 'career' posts and where, as 
noted previously, the banks are restricting the growth of 
the male labour force. 
(41) 
In short, there is a substantial 
proportion of male clerks who will never achieve 'career' 
grades in banking. - 
On the basis of this evidence, we may begin to 
construct two ideal typical careers in banking for male 
clerks. In the first type of career, the clerk begins 
his career with 'work centred' orientations, completes his 
examinations and gains promotion through the various cleri- 
cal grades ultimately reaching 'appointed' status between 
the ages of thirty and forty. In trooping with our model 
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and numerous sociological observations, this man is likely 
to remain 'work centred' and individualistic in orientation. 
He is in fundamental agreement with bank. management decisions 
and hopes to participate in making them in the not-too- 
distant future. With some allowance for personal 
vicissitude, his outlook throughout is perhaps typified by 
the clerk who, in the context of a discussion about automa- 
tion, commented to Mumford and Banks: 
"it must be the right thing to do. 
I have a high opinion of bank 
planning. They wouldn't overthrow 
the present system without a better 
one". (42) 
The man on this kind of career track, in short, remains 
normatively identified with the banking 'system'. 
Our second ideal typical male career is perhaps more 
typical of the 40-50 per cent of male clerks whose 
careers somehow 'fell by the wayside' during the 'fifties 
and 'sixties. Perhaps this man had an unsuitable outlook 
or accent, or he failed some part of his Institute of 
Bankers' examinations, or passed them but lacked the 'drive' 
or 'initiative' to go on the courses or make the moves from 
branch to branch which are vital to gain the wide experience 
of banking which is essential for promotion. Perhaps he 
was simply bogged down by a family and children or by 
illness at the point when his career should have been 
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'taking off'. Banking is a relatively small world and, 
until recently, bank clerks were prevented by unofficial 
agreements among the employers from moving banks and hence 
enjoying the kind of 'between firms' mobility which is 
available to other white collar employees. In such 
situations, bank clerks become 'locked into' static 
careers in which their stationary status is understood and 
appreciated by all. The static nature of their careers is 
hardly lost upon the men themselves, since they are faced with 
younger men 'passing them by' and are themselves overlooked 
for promotion or given 'lateral', ' promotions to small, out of 
the way branches or conversely 'buried' in the large 
departments of the largest branches. Under such circum- 
stances, men lose their dreams of careers and status. 
Instead they become interested in their gardens, religion, 
amateur dramatics and, above all, in their houses and 
children. In short locked into a lifetime of routine 
clerical work, whose mechanics they 'know backwards', by 
the possession of skills which are not transferable to other 
banks let alone other walks of life and by cheap mortgages 
for property they could not hope to afford without bank 
assistance, such men become 'home centred'. Yet they 
remain breadwinners. Work may no longer be the place to 
satisfy the ambitions of a lifetime but it is the source 
of income on which other ambitions may rest - to pile up 
consumer durables or send a child to university. The male 
bank clerk then becomes instrumentally oriented to work. 
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It is not easy to hypothesise the extent to which the 
'home centred' male bank clerk exists. It is, however, 
certain that he exists. 
In summary, our hypothesis is that two broad 
orientations to work exist within banking which we have 
identified as 'work centred' and 'home centred'. It is, 
we believe, highly probable, that the vast majority of 
female bank employees bring a 'home centred' orientation to 
work with them into the concrete work situation in banking. 
Similarly, the majority of male entrants to banking may 
arrive bearing a 'work centred' orientation to work. 
However, whereas the female employees leave banking 
relatively rapidly with their attitudes to work unchanged, 
the male clerks may change their orientation to work as a 
direct result of their work experience and career contingen- 
cies experienced over a number of years. Such changes 
may result in the formation of 'home centred' orientations 
to work among a substantial proportion of male clerks. 
Although the hypothesised orientations to work described 
above are, with the exception of the male 'home centred' 
orientation, viewed as derivativo from experiences outside 
the work situation, it would be wholly inappropriate - as 
Brown has argued 
(43) 
- to view them as pristine and 
independent of experiences gained at the workplace. On 
the contrary, it is clear that both the maintainance of 
these orientations and the dtstrib«tion of their bearers is 
dependent on factors which are operative within the workplace. 
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The maintainance of specific orientations to work 
developed outside the workplace is, self-evidently, 
dependent on experiences within the workplace. As our 
discussion of male 'home centred' orientations to work 
implied, a man who enters banking with the expectation of 
a progressive 'career' cannot maintain such'expectations 
indefinitely in a context in which these expectations are 
frustrated. We have already noted the degree of 'trans- 
parency' which attaches to career progress in banking and 
it is clear that the maintenance of a 'work centred' 
orientation to work must ultimately depend upon the 
capacity or the banks, as organisations, to generate satis- 
factory and public indications of career development for 
their 'work centred' employees. By the same token, whilst 
female 'home centred' orientations to work may derive from 
highly general cultural norms which define the significance 
and prospective rewards of work among the range of 'life 
cycle' roles, 
(44) 
nonetheless such 'home centred' orientations 
are inevitably reinforced and strengthened by the perceived 
sexual inequalities surrounding access to a 'career' 
within the banks. Faced with -the overwhelming dominance 
of men within the occupational structure of banking, female 
bank employees may be expected, for example, to locate 
their hopes and aspirations for the future well outside the 
ambit of the routine, if socially satisfactory, world of 
the bank branch. 
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The distribution of the bearers of the various 
orientations to work within the workplace is, of course, 
less determined by the distribution of such bearers 
within the population at large than it is determined by 
specific staff policy decisions. Thus the expansion 
in the numbers of female 'home centred' clerks in the 
banks' labour forces during the 'sixties was a product 
of a reasoned policy decision made in the light of 
knowledge of conditions in the labour market then 
prevailing. An indirect effect of this decision was, 
as has already been noted, to diminish the numbers of 
male 'home centred' clerks by expanding the promotion 
opportunities available to men. This does not alter 
our basic contention however. Such decisions initiate and 
stimulate sociological processes, for example bureaucrati- 
sation and feminisation, which are themselves important 
causal influences on white collar unionisation. We now 
turn therefore, to examine the possible impact of the 
orientations to work outlined above on tendencies towards 
unionisation. - 
4.4 Clerical Orientations to Work and Unionisation 
Many of the studies cited in Chapter 2 indicated that 
general orientations to work influence attitudes towards 
trade unions and, in certain cases, the process of unionisa- 
tion itself. The Goldthorpe of al. 
(45) 
study of Luton 
workers is perhaps the locus classicus for this observation 
but, in their different ways, studies as diverse as those 
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of Roberts et ai. 
(46) 
and Sykes 
(47) 
have clearly indicated 
that orientations to work may profoundly affect untonisatton. 
In this section, we seek to estimate the possible efrects 
of the hypothesised orientations to work of the different 
groups of bank clerks on unionisation within banking. We 
begin, once again, with the women. 
As soon as we look at the female clerical staff, we 
run up against the extraordinary fact that whilst, as 
Blackburn has pointed out, 
(48) 
there is nothing intrinsic 
about women to make them apathetic towards unions, it none- 
theless remains difficult to find immediate incentives for 
women to join them. Young female bank workers tend to live 
at home, earn 'pocket money' and look forward to leaving 
work within a relatively short period of time. For these 
reasons alone perhaps, they may be expectably less susceptible 
to the concrete economic advantages which unionl_sation 
promises. Moreover female bank workers are similarly likely 
to be uninterested in job security and to care little about 
the affairs of the bank and less about the staff organisations 
operating in the field, 
(49) 
These considerations operate 
for recognised organisations which can deliver advantages. 
They apply a fortiori in respect of unrecognised organisations 
which cannot so deliver. Given these considerations, it is 
surprising that the staff organisations in banking have 
succeeded in recruiting as many women as they have. 
However, in this connection, it is worth recalling that, as 
previously noted, 
00 
women are especially amenable to join 
such organisations in response to social, pressures. This 
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fact, in its turn', further testifies to the low levels 
of salience which female bank employees attach to staff 
organisations. 
Although she is instrumentally oriented to work, 
the female clerical worker does not derive her sole work 
satisfaction from her income. As many studies have 
documented, 
(51) 
she also gains considerable satisfaction 
from the social life and related activities associated with 
work. Altl3ough her income is bureaucratically regulated, 
the female bank clerk may not seek collective means for 
income advancement both because such advancement is not 
overwhelmingly salient to her and because, during the 
early years of bank employment at least, her real income 
may rise rapidly through the provision of birthday 
increments. 
However, if the female worker is not, a priori, 
powerfully motivated towards union membership, it is also 
the case that her situation is not one that may be expected 
to militate against union membership either. In particular, 
since she lacks 'career' expectations, the female cleric is 
unlikely to identify with bank management decisions. 
Similarly, the lack of 'career' expectations cushions the 
female staff from the effects of hostility to untlonisation 
from the bank employers. Unlike her male counterparts, the 
female clerk can easily move out of bank employment, whilst 
her lack of promotion opportunities will also weaken the 
influence which employer hostility to trade unionism may 
exert, 
(52) 
0 
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In summary, women form a relatively isolated section 
of the banks' labour force whose prospects are tied to 
routine clerical work. We have argued that female 
clerical workers in banking are predominantly 'home centred' 
in orientation, adopting a stance in which the world of work 
is relatively non-salient. fay and large, such employees 
have few major sources of dissatisfaction with bank 
employment and, indeed, do not bring very high expectations 
to such employment. The low salience of employment issues 
per se may well contribute to the relatively lower levels 
of organisational membership among women in banking, as 
compared to their male counterparts, whilst the susceptibility 
to persuasion in connection with such membership, itself 
associated with the low salience of employment issues, may 
well be associated with the volatility of female organisational 
membership. 
(53) 
We arrive, therefore, at the followi. ng 
paradoxical conclusion that whilst the feminisation of the 
banks' labour force has probably diminished the degree of 
'work centredness' among their employees, this diminution 
in 'work centredness' by no means translates itself easily 
into unionisation. 
Turning now to the male 'home centred' clerk, it will 
be recalled that our hypothetical proposal was that this type 
of employee commences with a 'work centred' orientation and 
gradually builds up a 'home centred' orientation as a result 
of frustrating experiences in the work environment. The 
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growth of a 'home centred' orientation involves an 
increasingly instrumental outlook towards work, in the 
process of which the worker becomes decreasingly committed 
to work as a source of his social identity and increasingly 
conceptualises it as a source of income. 
There are a number of reasons for supposing that 
this change in orientation may be associated with an 
increasing tendency towards unionisation. As his promo- 
tion opportunities perceivedly recede, the 'home centred' 
bank worker may become increasingly oriented to collectivistic, 
as opposed to individualistic, means of economic advancement. 
Like Ch-inoy's automobile workers,. the 'home centred' bank 
worker may turn to more realistic goals than, for example, 
the achievement of a branch managership, and he may turn to 
collectivistic approaches to their achievement. Moreover, 
the male 'home centred' bank worker is likely to be the most 
sensitive to declining levels of real earnings. This is not 
merely because, by comparison with 'work centred' males and 
'home centred' females, the 'home centred'male clerk 
attaches most significance to income, but also because, in 
contrast to 'work centred' males, he will occupy a relatively 
stationary position in the bank hierarchy and, by comparison 
with the younger 'home centred' females, he wtll no longer 
experience large, age-related and automatic increases in, 
salary which were operative throughout the 'sixties, 
(54) 
In short, it is the male 'home centred' clerk who is most 
likely to experience dissatisfaction with his earnings. 
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At the same time, factors associated with his career 
path may render male 'home centred' clerks more likely to 
unionise in response to economic dissatisfaction. As 
noted above, the 'home centred' clerk has taken up this 
orientation precisely because of the frustration of his 
hopes for personal advancement. Collective means thus 
become, if only by default, a major avenue for economic 4- 
advancement in the future. In itself, of course this implies 
a tendency towards unionisation and this tendency is likely 
to be enhanced by a relative lack of obstacles to unionisa- 
tion which may continue to exist for the 'work centred' 
bank worker. Firstly, the weakening of career opportunities 
for the 'home centred' clerk may promote a normative de- 
identification with the aims, objectives and decisions of 
management and encourage the 'home centred' man to oppose 
both local and national managerial decisions. Throughout 
this century, promotion in the clearing banks has depended, 
inter alia, upon recommendation from the branch manager. 
The belief that his career has lost its momentum may act 
as a powerful solvent to a male clerk's commitment to the 
conventional wisdom of 'work centred' branch life, and indeed 
encourage opposition to it. Moreover, secondly, in this 
situation the opposition to more unionate varieties of 
collective organisation from the bank employers may cease 
to weigh heavily with the 'home centred' male employee, who 
may increasingly be prepared to join organisations which 
are actively opposed by the bank management even where such 
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organisations, as was the case with NUDE for many years, 
can offer few short term advantages. 
In sum, the 'home centred' male bank worker has 
both the motivation to join collective organisations 
(which is lacked by the female 'home centred' employee), 
whilst, at the same time, he is not inhibited from member- 
ship of such collective organisations by the countervailing 
attractions of individualistic modes of advancement or by the 
opposition of the bank employers to the same extent as the 
male 'work centred' bank worker. The 'home centred' man 
is most likely to join the collective organisation which he 
believes will be effective in achieving better salaries and 
conditions of work. He is likely to be at the focus of 
competition between NUDE and the staff associations for 
'instrumental' membership. The 'home centred' male 
unionist is the kind of man who, as one union organiser put 
it to me, feels that 'life has passed him by'. This same 
organiser did not feel that such men made good union members, 
and the phrase 'penny in the slot unionist' has also been 
used to characterise this type of member. In short, 
our male 'home centred' union member is likely to have an 
instrumental orientation towards his union. He will join 
in order to get results rather than as a matter of conscience 
or ideological commitment and he will change his allegiance 
if results do not seem to be forthcoming. 
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By contrast, the 'work centred' male bank worker is, 
in most respects, the least likely to unionise. Although, 
as a bread-winner, he may be sensitive to declining levels 
of real earnings, the resulting dissatisfaction may not 
propel him towards collective organisation membership and 
is even less likely to push him into militant trade 
unionism. Not only is it likely that the 'work centred' 
man will attach less significance to income (and to 
temporary setbacks in real earnings growth), but also his 
commitment to more individualistic solutions to problems 
associated with income will have been nourished by his career 
successes. Moreover, his commitment to militant collective 
policies will be likely to be vitiated by his continuing 
identification with the managerial cadre and managerial 
decision-making. Finally, his commitment to the career 
structure of banking will intensify the effects of 
hostility towards collective organisations from the bank 
employers. In short, the 'work centred' bank worker is 
perhaps least likely to become a member of militant 
collective organisations. 
moderate and conciliatory. 
His unionism is likely to be 
From his point of view, the 
banking system is fulfilling, to a greater or lesser extent, 
his demands for a career and with it his demands for economic 
advancement. The 'work centred' male bank worker has least 
to gain and most to lose from 'rocking the boat' with aggres- 
sive trade unionism. 
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At the same time however, the expansion, amalgamation 
and bureaucratisation characteristic of banking during the 
past two decades may have created a potential awareness 
among 'work centred' men that the positions to which they 
aspire are undergoing a subtle downgrading from a 'high' 
to a 'low' trust situation. 
(55) 
In this connection, a 
study by Weir of industrial managers may provide an apt 
parallel. 
(56) 
Weir found that although the middle 
managers he surveyed were quite strongly identified with 
the company for which they worked, they exhibited a large 
measure of dissatisfaction with the levels of communication 
and consultation between themselves and top management. 
In this context, an internal staff association was the 
preferred choice for a majority of the managers, most of 
whom were seeking more formal consultative methods. If 
Weir's argument is extendable to the banking situation, 
it is likely that the 'work centred' men will not only be 
least committed to militant trade unionism, he may also be 
more interested in formal consultation procedures than 
more 'unionate' negotiations over rates of pay and working 
conditions. 
11 1'- Unionisation and Patterns of Orientational Conflict 
If the hypotheses concerning the patterns of clerical 
orientations to work are accepted than, I behave, they shed 
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a new light both on the nature of the historical 
competition for membership between NUDE and its staff asso- 
ciation rivals and on the conflict between NUDE and the bank 
employers. Put at its most basic, the bank employers could 
avert the process of unionisation with the least difficulty 
by fulfilling the 'career' expectations of the bulk of their 
male staff. Prior to World War IT, the overwhelming pre- 
dominance of men in the industry and the relative shortage 
of 'career' posts resulted in the banks failure to fulfil 
this condition, in default of which the banks were forced 
to resort to the strategies of 'peaceful competition' 
and 'forcible opposition' in order to stem the growth of 
unionisation. After World {dar II however, the progressive 
creation of a feminised 'separate clerical class' with low, 
short term expectations of employment enabled the banks to 
whittle away their 'hard core' of male, 'home centred' 
potential trade unionists. The expansion of feminine 
labour in banking enabled the banks to achieve this objective 
both by reducing the 'pool' of work centred men . who would 
require career advancement in order to remain 'worlc centred' 
in competition for a broadly expanding quantity of 'career' 
posts, and by increasing the numbers of women working in 
routine clerical tasks which had previously been performed 
by 'home centred' men. The overall effect of the feminisa- 
tion of clerical labour in banking therefore has been to 
substitute short term 'home centred' female labour for long 
term 'home centred' male labour. This in turn has, if the 
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analysis of the previous section is correct, weakened the 
overall trend towards unionisation in the industry(57) and 
enabled the bank employers to rely, during the 'fifties and 
early 'si. xties, on inter-organisational rivalries between 
the union and the staff associations to undermine efforts 
to establish truly bilateral collective bargaining in the 
industry. 
At the end of Chapter 3, we suggested that the bank 
employers had been able to rely on the dual system of 
representation in the industry, not only to forestall the 
growth of a coherent and unified 'staff side' in banking, 
but also to prevent the growth of staff association mili- 
tancy and membership growth in the union. It is now possible 
to suggest that this reliance was itself dependent upon 
complex patterns of non-aligned and partially conflicting 
orientations and objectives among workers in the banking 
industry. Moreover, it was this pattern of orientations, 
rather than for example a widespread 'status ideology', 
which in all probability underlies the union's difficulties 
in balancing militancy and effectiveness on the one hand 
with respectability on the other. 
Specifically, it may be plausibly suggested that the 
internal bank staff associations have, throughout their 
existence, been more attractive than the union to male 'work 
centred' staff. This is probable for several reasons. 
Firstly the bank staff associations have not adopted a 
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conflictual stance towards the bank employers and their 
broad support for the objectives of the latter is consonant 
with the ideological stance and career objectives of 'work 
centred' men. Secondly the staff associations were formed 
with, and have maintained, the support of the bank employers. 
In this context, membership of the associations could not 
be held to engender hostility from the banks which might 
inhibit career opportunities. Thirdly, the staff 
associations did pursue discussions on salaries and conditions 
of work and could be held to be effective in achieving the 
limited objectives of men whose fundamental belief lay in 
their individual abilities to secure their own economic 
advancement. In this context, the staff associations could 
be viewed as a moderate, and moderately effective, 'safety 
net' which could prove useful, for example, in securing 
redress against the impact of inflation on the salaries of 
a group whose members, though in this respect responding 
as a collectivity, view themselves primarily as individuals. 
The organisational allegiances of 'home centred' male 
staff are more difficult to theorise about with any degree 
of confidence. Much here would depend on the degree of 
alienation from managerial objectives sustained by 'homo 
centred' men as a result of the frustration of their 'work 
centred' hopes. There can be little doubt that, as the 
responses to Blackburn's questionnaire indicated, 
(58) 
there has existed a considerable degree both of cynicism 
and of ideological. opposition to the staff associations and 
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their connections-with the bank employers among male bank 
staff. However, as was suggested in the previous section, 
the male 'home centred' clerk's decision to join a staff 
organisation in banking may be most centrally premissed on 
considerations of effectiveness. In this connection, he 
will be faced (during the 'fifties and 'sixties) with a 
choice between the numerically stronger, recognised but 
pacific staff association and the weaker, unrecognised but 
potentially militant union. Whilst many 'home centred' 
males may have opted for the union, it is possible that 
an almost equal number may have vacillated between the 
two types of organisation, thus creating considerable shifts 
in the distribution of men between the two organisations 
from time to time. 
(59) 
Finally, as suggested earlier, the female 'home 
centred' clerk may not have had powerful reasons for joining 
either organisation. In this context, the decision to join 
or not join an organisation and as to the appropriate 
organisation to join may have frequently depended on the 
balance of opinion within the branch. 
(60) 
The prevailing 
'branch norms' in turn may well have depended on the extent 
to which 'home centred' male dissatisfaction with the 
performance of the relevant staff association was sufficient 
to overcome the prevailing preference for the staff associa- 
tion and result in a widespread shift of allegiance. Such 
shifts of allegiance were, as the post-war figures indicate, 
ý61ý 
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sudden and episodic in character and wore 'multiplied' by 
consequential female shifts. In subsequent years, such 
shifts tended to reverse themselves gradually. 
In sum, the 'respectability-effectiveness' dilemma 
experienced by NUDE during the 'fifties and early 'sixties 
was composed of the following basic elements: firstly, a 
built-in majority for staff association membership among 
'work centred' male staff which would, secondly, influence 
the perceptions of 'home centred' male staff as to the 
relative effectiveness of the two types of organisation in 
favour of the staff associations. Thirdly, the 'hard core' 
of male union membership was probably made up of 'home 
centred' clerks. The union would not be capable of 
attracting a large proportion of 'work centred' men by 
militant policies whilst, at the same time, the 'home 
centred' male staff association members could only be 
attracted away from the staff associations by such policies. 
This policy dilemma would, fourthly, be 'multiplied' by the 
female tendency to opt for the organisation with the local 
or branch-level majority. In this context, the union could 
only make gains by the default of the staff associations. 
Under conditions when the staff associations were manifestly 
ineffective, however, the banks could pursue their 
strategies of 'peaceful competition' in, for example, 
awarding salary increases in which the staff associations' 
role was affirmed. This, I submit, is the most likely 
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structure for the 'stalemate' situation in which the 
union found itself throughout the 'fifties. 
4.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, the process of theorising has far 
outrun the data available in the literature. The discussion 
of bank workers orientations to work contained in this 
chapter therefore, remains entirely hypothetical - even if 
it is granted that it contains elements of plausibility. 
Thus initially it is, perhaps, worth recalling the basis on 
which the 'central meanings' approach was espoused. 
The value of the 'central meanings' approach is 
proposed to be fourfold. Firstly, it is doubly integrative 
in the sense that, if pursued in sufficient detail, it can 
give an indication of (a) the hierarchic integration of 
social actors' goals and relevances and hence, (b) can 
provide the verstehende resources with which the relative 
salience and significance of the social processes which 
influence social actors may be assessed. Secondly, the 
approach may assist the sociologist in aligning a series of 
historically dynamic events or factors in terms of their 
dynamic salience and impact upon the various groupings 
and interests which are represented in the historical 
process under investigation. Thirdly, the approach may 
help in enabling us to gain a meaningful appreciation of the 
operational effects of complex sociological factors such 
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as bureaucratisation and, by the same token, to clarify the 
operation of heterogeneous factors which have similar effects. 
Thus, whilst both bureaucratisation and an increase in the 
cost of living may stimulate unionisation in banking, the 
'central meanings' approach enables us to suggest that the 
former operates by increasing the incidence of 'home centred' 
central meanings among the personnel of an organisation, 
whilst the latter operates in and through the 'home centred' 
orientations thus created. Finally, where there is a non- 
random distribution of several central meanings in an 
industry, the approach enables us to develop an understanding 
of the differential impact of the various sociological 
factors involved in a social process in a theoretically 
satisfying way, 
In the substantive part of this chapter, we distinguished 
between 'work centred' and 'home centred' clerics (this latter 
category being sub-divided into male and female on grounds 
of the different saliency of economic rewards to the two 
groups), and it was suggested that the bureaucratisation and 
feminisation of clerical work which has been widespread in 
banking has had the effect of enlarging the proportion of 
'home centred' (and particularly female 'home centred') clerks 
in the industry. Although, in a general sense, the growth 
of 'home centredness' is likely to be associated with 
unionisation, it was argued that the femintsation of bank 
employment might offset the tendency for 'home centred' 
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clerks to unionise because of the relatively low saliency 
of traditional trade union objectives to female 'home 
centred' clerks. At the core of the unionisation process 
in banking is a proportionately shrinking section of 
male 'home centred' clerks. This group is most 
significantly influenced by declining levels of real 
earnings and least influenced by the factor of employer 
hostility to unionisation. Male 'work centred' clerks, 
by contrast, seemed the least likely to unionise in 
response to rising prices and the most likely to be dis- 
suaded from militant trade unionism by employer hostility. 
Finally, female 'home centred' clerks are the most likely 
of the three groupings to be relatively inert, In the 
absence of strong forces in any direction, this group 
would be most likely to join the dominant or favoured 
staff organisation (or not to join at all) largely in 
response to staff opinion at the local level. 
If this analysis is correct, it establishes a 
significant source of instability with respect to the 
process of white collar unionisation in banking and, if 
extendable to other fields of white collar employment, 
this source of instability may go some way towards 
explaining the periodic upsurges of white collar militancy. 
For, whilst the male white collar employee's attitudes and 
objectives may remain stable as a result of constraints 
deriving from his work and market situations (e. g. 
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occupational immobility, career aspirations and anxiety 
about the attitudes of his employer towards trade unionism), 
the orientations and objectives of his white bloused 
colleague may prove to be essentially unconstrained by 
such factors. With the growth and feminisation of 
routine white collar occupations, employers may thus be 
faced with a female labour force whose orientations and 
objectives are increasingly volatile. Under specific.; 
circumstances, in particular where the objectives of the 
female labour force coincide with those of their male 
colleagues, there thus arises the possibility that the 
female labour force may provide the requisite component 
of industrial aggression necessary for the militant pursuit 
of industrial policies. 
It is the task of the next three chapters, firstly, 
to establish the validity or otherwise of these theoretical 
generalisations and to impose qualifications upon them on the 
basis of empirical evidence and, secondly, to show how these 
generalisations, if valid, can illuminate an historically 
dynamic situation in the unionisation of bank workers - 
the decade 1960-1970. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
BANK WORKERS' ORIENTATIONS TO WORK AND EMPLOYMENT: 
THE SURVEY 
r1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we sought to stress the 
significance of the role of central-life interests in 
mediating the responses of clerical workers to a variety 
of aspects of the world of work. In particular, we 
stressed the possibility that sharp differences of outlook, 
aspiration and response to bank affairs might exist 
between those clerks identified as 'work centred' and 
those identified as 'home centred'. We further claimed, 
and indeed entered into detailed speculation, that these 
hypothesised orientations might further inform the 
clerks' attitudes to trade unionism and its alternatives 
in banking, 
In the next two chapters, we report the results of 
a survey of bank clerks' orientations carried out during 
1972 and 1973. This chapter will be concerned with 
orientations towards work and employment, whilst the 
subsequent chapter will address the relationship between 
these orientations and attitudes towards, and membership 
of, the organisations seeking to recruit and represent 
bank staffs. 
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The results of the survey will be presented in a 
general way in the sections which follow, but attention 
will subsequently be focused on three basic areas which are 
of outstanding interest in the light of our analysis of the 
previous chapter. Firstly, since the distinction between 
'work centredness' and 'home centredness' is, we argue, in 
the first instance a sexual one, we shall be particularly 
interested in any systematic differences which may appear 
between the goals and demands which male and female bank 
workers bring to the work situation. Secondly, during our 
discussion of the careers of male clerks we distinguished a 
set of contingencies, centred on promotion opportunities, 
which might tend to differentiate a sub-group of male clerks 
who, having given up their 'career' aspirations, would display 
a more 'home centred' orientation to the various aspects 
of their work situation and would display a more collective 
approach to salary negotiation and job regulation than their 
more 'work centred' colleagues. We shall be concerned to 
determine whether such a group of 'home centred' men is 
isolable on the basis of our survey data, Thirdly, we shall 
be interested in the extent to which common norms operative 
at the workplace moderate the impact of those divergent 
orientations to work and thus create a degree of local 
concensus. 
. 
L2. Procedure. 
The 'Big Four' banks (Barclays, Midland, National 
Westminster and Lloyds) were contacted and invited to 
allow a sample of their staffs to be interviewed in 
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connection with a doctoral study of clerical orientations 
to work. In the event, two of the banks proved willing 
to provide interviewing facilities in selected branches 
to be determined by themselves in consultation with the 
researcher. 
Two conditions were imposed on the researcher by the 
banks in question. Firstly, the sample of interviewees 
would be established on an entirely voluntary basis as a 
result of an internal canvass by branch officials within 
the branches selected. Secondly, the interviewing would 
be conducted within the branch during office hours. 
The possibility of 'follow-up' interviews outside the bank 
branches was explicitly ruled out on security grounds. 
These conditions generated two major sources of uncontroi- 
lable bias in the sample. 
, 
The first is that the sample 
is the product of the interaction of interviewee self. 
selection together with whatever elements of selection 
which were generated by the banks' internal canvassing 
operations. Unfortunately, it was impossible to determine 
the extent to which informal pressures were brought to 
bear on prospective interviewees although assurances were given 
that there were no such pressures. Neither was it possible 
to ascertain the precise characteristics of those clerks 
who had refused to be interviewed. The second source of 
bias arose from the practical necessity to interview in the 
larger city centre bank branches. Since the interviews 
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took place in the banks' time, it was thought advisable 
to interview in the larger branches as the continual 
diversion of staff away from their normal duties would tend 
to disrupt the activities of smaller branches. The number 
of staff in the branches at which interviews took place 
varied between 50 and 116 persons and the proportion of 
staff interviewed varied between 25 and 40 per cent. These 
branches are, of course, very much larger than the average 
(approximately 10 persons) and the responses of the bank 
staff may be expected to reflect the greater than average 
size of these branches. 
Given these conditions, the sample interviewed cannot 
of course be regarded as a random one and this in turn means 
that the tests of statistical association which are premissed 
on the assumption of randomness cannot be utilised with any 
degree of assurance. Hence the results of the survey data 
to be reported below can, at best, only be regarded as 
descriptive and illustrative in character and will be treated 
as such below. ' In order to assess the strength of the 
survey data as illustrative material, the data will, 
whenever it is possible and relevant, be compared with the 
data from other samples of bank workers and with known 
statistics relating to the parameters of the population of 
bank employees. Thus, whilst it is possible to place 
considerable weight on some of the inferences from the sample 
to the banking population as a whole, such inferences must 
and will be treated with the maximum caution. 
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The banks' conditions imposed an additional 
constraint which affected the setting of the interviews. 
Clearly the interviews were conducted on branch promises 
and in bank time and on two occasions the interviewer was 
furnished with a manager's office in which to conduct the 
interviews. There was thus a distinct possibility that 
the interviewer might become closely identified with the 
management of the bank and thus that responses to the 
interview might become inhibited. In order to fore- 
stall this possibility, each interviewee was sent a letter 
in advance of his or her interview. The letter explained 
the aims of the research and stressed the independent 
organisational identification of the interviewer. This 
procedure was repeated verbally prior to each interview and 
was supported by props, such as badges and desk plaques, 
which identified the interviewer and his organisational 
affiliation. Overall, this procedure was felt1to be 
successful in distanciating the interviewer from the banks 
and in calming any inhibitions which might have been aroused 
thereby. However, in the case of Bank B at Leeds, there 
remained a tendency to regard the interviewer as connected 
with the bank due to contingencies beyond the interviewer's 
control. 
Samples of staff from 'A' and 'B' banks were Inter- 
viewed in two large town centre branches in Leeds during 
August and September 1972. Two further samples from 'A' 
and 'n' banks were interviewed in two large town centre 
branches in Coventry during August and September 1973 
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using the same questionnaire in all cases. In all, 88 
clerks were interviewed in the four branches in the 
following proportions: 
Bank 'A' - Leeds 22 
Bank 'B' - Leeds : 16 
Bank 'A' - Coventry : 30 
Bank I BI - Coventry : 20 
Approximately 400 hours were spent in bank branches in 
interviewing the clerks, looking at the workings of the 
branch and discussing aspects of branch activity with 
higher managers and regional head office staff. 
r., 2 The Sample 
Although it had been hoped to interview equal numbers 
of men and women, the necessity to interview volunteers, 
together with the exigencies of branch life, resulted in a 
larger proportion of female interviewees (58 per cent) than 
anticipated. This proportion marginally exceeds the 
proportion of women in banking as a whole. As anticipated, 
the male and female samples displayed marked disparities. 
Thus there was a significant difference between the ago 
distibutions of the male and female samples: 
r 
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Table 5.1 
Age Distribution of Male and Female Clerks 
Age 
Below 20 years 
20-29 years 
30-39 years 
40-49 years 
50+ years 
Sex 
Male (%) Female (%) 
8 (10.2) 33.3 (35.5) 
46 (28.9) 56.9 (45.3) 
21.6 (26.9) 9.8 (9.2) 
19 (21.9) 0 (7.3) 
5.4 (12.1) 0 (2.5) 
100 (100) 100 (100) 
(Bracketed figures display the age distribution of men 
and women in one large clearing bank in 1970). 
As can be seen from Table 5.1, the female sample is sub- 
stantially concentrated in the two lowest age groups, whilst 
the male staff were more evenly distributed over the whole 
age spectrum. Although both samples were over-concentrated 
in the 20-29 age group, this tendency was particularly 
pronounced in the male sample although in this group the 
correlative under-representation of the other age groups 
is more evenly distributed than in the female sample where 
the two upper age-groups are unrepresented. 
This differential age distribution of the male and 
female samples is associated with certain other related 
differences between the male and female clerks. Thus 72.5 
per cent of the female sample was unmarried as compared with 
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only 22 per cent of the male sample. Put crudely, this 
means that whilst roughly 3 out of 4 women were single, 3 
out of 4 men were married. Similarly 
65 per cent of the 
female sample (89 per cent of single females) were domiciled 
with their parents, whilst only 22 per cent of the male 
sample (100 per cent of single males) were so domiciled. 
To a marked degree then, the female sample was unburdened 
with domestic or financial responsibilities. Of the 
married men (78 per cent of the male sample , all but one 
were house-owners. 
Finally, as the age distributions would lead us to 
expect, there was a significant disparity in the levels 
of earnings achieved by men and women. Thus, as Table 
5.2 indicates, the men were distributed over the higher 
earnings levels, whilst the women were concentrated at the 
lower levels. 
Table 5.2 
Distribution of Net Earnings of Male and 
Female Clerks as of 1972 
Monthly Net Earnings Males Females 
Under X60 2.7 21.6 
£6o-92 10.8 45.1 
£92-120 35.2 27.4 
£124-160 32.4 5.9 
z16o+ 18.9 0 
100 100 
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It F3ac ound Characteristics of the Samplo 
As might be expected from the banks' recruiting 
policies, there were substantial differences in the 
educational backgrounds of the male and female clerks. 
The men had overwhelmingly (67.6 per cent) received a 
grammar school education, whilst the women were more 
evenly distributed over the full gamut of educational 
institutions. 
Table 5.3 
Type of School Attended by Male and 
Female ClerI. s 
Type of School Males Females 
Secondary Modern 2.7 31.2 
Comprehensive 8.1 23.3 
Secondary Technical 2.7 1.9 
Grammar 67.6 31.2 
Public/Private 8.1 5.9 
Other 7.8 3.7 
None given 0 1.9 
100 100 
Similarly, whilst the majority of male clerks had remained 
at school until the ages of 17 or 18, the majority of the 
female staff had left school at 16 years or earlier. 
(') 
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Table 5.4 
Ape on Leaving School of Female and 
Male Clerks 
Age on Leaving School Male 
14 years or less 5.4 
15 years 5.4 
16 years 27.0 
17 years 24.4 
18 years 37.8 
100 
Female 
1.9 
11.7 
58.8 
13.8 
13.8 
100 
This differential educational experience was paralleled 
by a tendency for the female clerks to have come from 
manual backgrounds to a greater-extent than their male 
counterparts. 
' sable 5.5 
Manual or Non-Manual Backgrounds of 
Male and Female Clerks 
Background Male Female 
Manual 35 1+5 
Non-Manual 65 55 
100 100 
10 
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These figures' show a marked increase in the numbers of 
both male and female clerks having manual backgrounds 
when compared with Blackburn's sample of the early 
'sixties, 
(2) 
in which only 6 per cent of male clerks 
and 27 per cent of female clerks had come into banking 
from manual backgrounds. At the same time, the trend they 
suggest is also supported by the composition of a more 
recent sample of bank clerks from Oxford in which 38 per 
cent of the men and 46 per cent of the women came from 
manual backgrounds. 
(3) 
Over half the men (57 per cent) and nearly three 
quarters of the women had entered banking immediately 
after leaving school. About 35 per cent of the men and 
22 per cent of the women had worked in another industry 
or occupation before joining the banks. Of these, most 
of the women and approximately half of the men had moved 
to the banks from other forms of clerical and secretarial 
work in pursuit of better rewards. Of the men who had 
been engaged in a different occupation prior to joining 
the banks, approximately half had tended to 'come in from 
the cold' from demanding and poorly paid jobs (such as the 
ambulance and child care services) or from small businesses 
which had proved unrewarding or commercial failures. 
Although there was no direct attempt to elicit 
information on the early occupational aspirations of the 
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clerks, indirect evidence indicates that the occupational 
aspirations of the male clerics had, in general, been 
higher than those of their female colleagues. Nearly 50 
per cent of the men indicated that, given the choice, they 
would not elect for a career in banking a second time. 
In this connection, a high proportion of the men cited 
thwarted ambitions for either a university training or a 
career in one of the professions. By contrast, only a 
quarter of the women indicated that they would not choose 
a career in banking for a second time and, of these, only 
one indicated a desire to enter higher education and a 
further two would have sought a professional career (in 
teaching and journalism). The sample of bank clerks 
interviewed by Graham and Llewellyn yielded evidence 
that, whereas banking was the first choice for the female 
clerks who, by and large, tended to have low occupational 
aspirations, it was more likely to be a 'second choice' 
occupation among the male clerks. 
4 
Similarly, the 
evidence cited above is not incompatible with this 
interpretation. 
A majority of the clerks (61t per cent) had 
considered leaving the banks at some point during their 
employment with them. Clerks who had been employed by 
other organisations prior to joining the banks were just 
as likely to have considered leaving the banks as their 
colleagues who had joined them straight from school. The 
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tendency to have considered leaving was, however, more 
pronounced among the men, 76 per cent of whom had 
considered leaving, whilst only 50 per cent of the female 
clerks had considered doing so. Men and women also 
tended to cite rather different sets of reasons for 
wanting to leave bank employment. Almost half the men 
had wanted to leave for reasons connected with their 
promotion chances, the bulk of them complaining that their 
rate of promotion had been too slow and a minority having 
experienced specific career difficulties with, for example, 
the Institute of Bankers examinations or the requirement 
that they move from branch to branch. Of the remaining 
men, 25 per cent had been dissatisfied with the work-role 
in which they had been engaged, while a further 16 per 
cent had been dissatisfied with their level of pay. In 
the case of the women however, -sheer boredom had impelled 
the largest group (nearly 25 per cent) to consider leaving 
the banks and a further 20 per cent cited low job satisfac- 
tion. The women also mentioned the nature of banking hours 
as a reason for leaving -a factor which was not mentioned 
by the men at all. In general then, the women were more 
prone to mention transitory irritations with work as a basis 
for leaving, whilst the men tended to stress more long 
term and all-encompassing reasons for seeking alternative 
employment. This difference is consistent both with the 
hypothesis of a longer term 'career' orientation to work 
among the male clerks and with the more widespread incidence 
of banking as a 'second choice' career among their ranks. 
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In keeping with the transitory nature of their 
dissatisfactions, nearly half the women had done nothing 
to follow up their desire to leave the banks, and only a 
quarter had got as far as being interviewed for another 
job. By contrast, over half the dissatisfied men had 
applied for jobs elsewhere and 10 per cent of them had 
actually been offered jobs by other employers. Of those 
men who had made some kind of effort to leave, the largest 
group (35 per cent) had remained in the banks because a 
change in their situation had eliminated the source of 
their discontent, whilst a significant proportion (20 per 
cent) were persuaded to remain with the banks by their 
manager or regional staff manager. 
In summary, it is clear that the male bank staff are 
more likely to have come from a non-manual social'backgroundp 
to have attendedsekctive schools and to have attended 
school for a longer period than their female counterparts. 
They generally hold higher occupational aspirations and 
are both more sensitive toi and anxious in relation toi the 
apparent non-fulfilment of their aspirations. As a result, 
they are more likely to have entered into concrete efforts 
to change jobs when faced with career difficulties. 
These findings are by no means surprising and are consistent 
with the hypothesis that the male staff attach a higher 
degree of salience to the world of work than their female 
colleagues. 
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Work Experience in the Dank 
As expected, the sample was sharply differentiated 
by sex with respect to work-roles in the bank. Although 
a minority of young men were still in the process of working 
their way through the junior posts, the majority of men in 
the sample (70 per cent) were concentrated in the specialised 
areas of banking (such as the 'Foreign' and 'Securities' 
departments) or in supervisory and administrative work. 
By contrast, the women were concentrated in routine 
'general office' work, in the 'shop window' of the bank as 
counter clerks, or in the branch 'machine room' processing 
data for the computer. A substantial additional minority 
of the women were employed as secretaries and typists. 
Since 92 per cent of the male clerical staff had 
either passed their Institute of Danks examinations or were 
in the process of doing so, whilst only 8 per cent of the 
female sample had done so, it is not surprising to find 
this distribution of work roles. Thus, as Table 5.6 shows, 
only three women were employed in the more specialised areas 
of banking and only one women held an appointed post. 
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Table 5,6 
Distribution of Work-Roles among Male and 
Female Clerks 
Work-role Male Female 
Machine Room/Junior 1 It 
Secretary/Typist 0 7 
General Office 2 15 
Cashier/Junior Supervisor 5 18 
Other (non-clerical) 1 0 
Securities and Foreign 18 3 
Assistants/Higher Supervisory 4 3 
Appointed Staff 6 1 
37 51 
rib 
Total: 88 
With the exception of the most junior staff, a security 
man and three of the secretarial staff, the entire sample 
had participated in the majority of the routine junior 
posts in banking, though the men who had joined the bank 
since the late 'fifties had tended to progress through 
these junior posts more quickly than either the women or 
their older male colleagues. By and large, the men had 
also worked in more branches than their female counterparts. 
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Table 5.7 
Number of Branches Worked at by Male and 
Female Clerks 
Number of Branches Mate Female 
17 37 
29 11 
353 
460 
5u0 
6+ 6o 
37 51 
As noted previously, this tendency for men to work in more 
branches than their female counterparts is a product of 
bank policy towards their male staff, though the age 
disparity between the male and female clerks in the sample 
is also a major contributory factor. 
Since, In general, the most junior posts in banking 
are the least interesting, it was not surprising to find 
that an overwhelming majority of the sample (95 per cent) 
preferred their current work-role to the previous ones 
they had undertaken. Here a substantial proportion of 
the clerks (23 per cent) simply preferred the additional 
interest and variation that the jobs requiring more 
experience involved. This preference was equally 
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distributed among the men and the women. Beyond this 
area of agreement however, sex and role-specific grounds 
for the preferences make their appearance, Thus female 
cashiers tended to say that they enjoyed meeting 
customers; women working in general office roles tended 
to welcome their improved capacity to control the pace at 
which they worked, whilst those women who had recently 
passed through the machine room liked the relative autonomy 
and lack of supervision characteristic of their latest 
jobs. The men, by contrast, tended to stress the 'career' 
aspects of their current posts as the basis for preferring 
them, citing in particular their new responsibilities as a 
central factor in their preferences for some current post. 
Both men and women were asked to evaluate the 
responsibility and initiative associated with their current 
posts on a four point scai. e. The distribution of the 
answers to these questions are set out in Table 5.8 below. 
Table 5.8 
Degree of Responsibility and Initiative Indicated 
by Male and Female Clerks 
How Much Responsibility Male Female 
'A Great Deal' or 'Some' 840 76% 
'Little' or 'None' 16% 24% 
How Much Initiative 
'A Great Deal' or 'Some' 76% 59% 
'Little' or 'None' 24% 1$1% 
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Both the men and'"the women felt that they were doing jobs 
which demanded the exercise of an appreciable amount of 
responsibility. That this feeling was so widespread is 
possibly the result of the secrecy with which banking 
activities are surrounded. Moreover, the sums of money 
dealt with by even the most junior staff are large enough 
to engender a sense of responsibility as a corollary of 
the caution -. against both error and theft - associated 
with bank transactions. It is significant that, despite 
the widespread bureaucratisation of banking practices, a 
majority of both sexes felt that they were working in jobs 
which allowed them to exercise 'a great deal' or 'some' 
initiative, Here however it is not surprising, given 
the sexual division of labour in banking, that the female 
clerks were less persuaded on this latter point than their 
male colleagues. 
The entire sample was additionally asked to select 
what they regarded as being 'important in a job' from a 
forced-choice list of eight alternatives and additionally 
to select a second preference from the same list. Given 
two choices, the sample as a whole endorsed the options 
presented to them in the following order: (1) 'Interest 
and Variety' (endorsed by 53 per cent of all clerks), (2) 
'Good Salary' (L2 per cent), (3) 'Good Promotion Opportu- 
nities' (36 per cent), (It) 'Pleasant Social Atmosphere' 
(26 per cent), (5) 'Security' (20 per cent), (6) 'Convenient 
Working Hours' (13 per cent), (7) 'A Chance to Take 
Responsible Decisions' (8 per cent) and (8) 'A Strong Union' 
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(not endorsed). These results are strongly convergent with 
the results of a survey of 44,000 employees of Barclays 
Bank in which the first six 'most important' factors in a 
job were identified as follows: (1) 'Interesting Work' (72 
per cent),, (2) 'Pay' (71 per cent), (3) 'Working with People 
You Like' (56 per cent), (Li) 'Being Treated with Respect' 
(52 per cent), (5) 'Opportunity for Advancement' (46 per 
cent) and (6) 'Physical Work Conditions' (45 per cent). 
These basic results also show parallels with other 
groups of clerical workers. Thus Walker's(5) study of clerks 
in two industrial enterprises revealed that the most 
attractive aspect of their job was 'interest of work' and 
this item was third rated by his sample of civil service 
clerks. Dufty's(6) study of Australian railway clerks 
also showed that work content was second only to security 
as a job satisfaction factor. The bank clerks were some- 
what more interested in salary levels than the clerics in 
either of the above mentioned studies, where pay was third 
rated by Walker's industrial clerks and fifth rated by his 
civil service clerks and third rated by Dufty's railway 
clerks. 
However, whilst the bank clerks display some overall 
similarities with other groups of clerical workers when 
the data i_s set out in aggregated form, when the sample is 
broken down by sex substantial differences in the patterns 
of preference begin to appear. In fact, as Table 5.9 indL. 
cater, men and women in banking bring quite different 
collections of desiderata to work. 
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Table 5.9. 
Preferred Aspects of Jobs Amoni Male and 
Female Clerks 
Male Female 
First First + First 
Item Pref. second Pref. 
Interest and 
Variety 
Promotion 
Opportunities 
Social Atmos- 
phere 
Salary 
Hours 
Chance to take 
Responsible 
Decisions 
12 (1) 
9 (2) 20 (1) : 3(5) 
First + 
second. 
32 (i),. 
12 (4) 
2 (5) 5 (5) 9 (2) 18 (3) 
8 (3) 16 (2) 9 (2) 21 (2) 
o (6) 0 (7) 6 (4) 12 (k) 
o (6) It (6) 1 (7) 3 (7) 
15 (3) 21 (1) 
Security 6 (4) 14 (4) 2 (6) 4 (6) 
37 74 51 102 
(Bracketed figures indicate rank order of preference). 
Thus the men wanted jobs with good promotion possibilities 
and salaries together with intrinsically interesting work 
and a degree of job security. In particular, the men 
were very largely uninterested in the 'social atmosphere' 
of the office or the question of office hours. The pattern 
of male preferences is clearly consistent with a 'career' 
orientation to bank employment involvingý-. a long period of 
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employment in the bank and personal mobility within the sphere 
of employment. The women, by contrast, were considerably 
more interested in the 'social atmosphere' of the office 
and the nature of office hours; they wore as interested as 
the men in salary levels and were more interested than their 
male counterparts in the intrinsic interest of the work. 
The pattern of female preferences is, by contrast with the 
men, indicative of a short-run orientation to clerical work 
in which job-security is totally under-valued and the more 
immediate aspects of office employment - such as social 
atmosphere and hours - are more strongly valued. 
The clerks were further asked to evaluate their 
current job with the bank in terms of the items they had 
specified, with results that are set out in Table 5.10. 
Table 5.10. 
Rating of Current Job in terms of General Preferences 
by Male and Female Clerks 
Males 
Ttem % rating 'First 
Rate' or 'Pretty 
Good'. 
Promotion 65% 
Salary 50% 
Interest and 87% 
Variety 
Security 93% 
Females 
Ttem % rating 'First 
Rate' or 'Pretty 
Good'. 
Interest and 819; 
Variety 
Salary 86% 
Social Atmos- 100% 
phere 
Hours 75% 
Promotion 58% 
(Only the four most popular items for each sax are included 
in this tablo). 
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On the whole, both sexes appear to be getting what they want 
out of bank employment. However the women are noticeably 
more satisfied with their highest preferences than their 
male counterparts and in particular with their salary levels. 
Once again, the contrast between the 'career' involvement 
of male bank clerks and the 'short run' involvement of 
female blerk with work may lie behind these evaluations. 
Thus the men with a career commitment to banking are likely 
to have higher standards of requirement than women, and are 
hence more likely to feel dissatisfied with the levels of 
satisfaction offered by banking. In this connection it is 
worth recalling that the men were more likely than the women 
to have considered leaving the bank and to have taken 
concrete steps to do so. 
A degree of confirmation for this line of thinking comes 
from the pattern of male and female responses to two additional 
questions which were aimed at locating what the clerks 'liked 
most' and 'liked least' about their jobs. When asked 'What 
do you like most about your job? ', the following pattern 
of responses emerged: 
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Table 5.11 
Aspects of Work liked most by Male and Female Clerks 
Item Males Females 
Nothing/D. K. 16 27 
Meeting People 24 18 
Variety of Work 14 20 
Control over Work 3 8 
Social Atmosphere 11 14 
Intrinsic Interest of Work 16 6 
Easy going nature of work 3 6 
Money 3 0 
Other 11 2 
101 101 
Table 5.12 below sets out the pattern of responses to the 
question, 'What do you like least about your , 
job? '. 
" 
Table 5.12 
Aspects of Work liked Least by Male and Female Clerks 
Item Males Females 
Nothing/D. K. 27 47 
Boredom 22 20 
Banking Hours 8 18 
Flow of Work 11 6 
Bank Traditions 5 0 
Other 27 10 
100 101 
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Whilst the results set out in Tables 5.11 and 5.12 broadly 
parallel the responses of Table 5.9, the consistent tendency 
for female clerks to respond in terms of 'not likes or 
dislikes relating to their job more than their male counter- 
parts seems: to indicate a reduced saliency of job satisfaction 
and dissatisfaction generally, rather than a tendency towards 
extremes of job satisfaction or dissatisfaction. 
(7) 
In addition to these general questions on job satisfac- 
Lion, the bank clerks were asked about their reactions to 
two major changes in bank practices which had occurred since 
the late 'sixties - the closure of the banks on Saturdays 
and the changeover, to the new system of clerical grading 
which occurred in 1971. On the latter issue, the clerks 
were asked: 'Do you think that, on the whole, the switch 
to the new clerical grades has been a good thing or a bad 
thing? '. The responses to this question are set out in 
Table 5.13. 
Table 5.13. 
Responses of Male and Female Clerks to the New 
Clerical Grading System 
Males Females Total 
Good 12 21 33 
Bad 18 18 36 
D. K. 3 9 12 
33 1,8 81 
(Table excludes those who had not worked in the banks prior 
to the introduction of the now grading system and malo non- 
clerical staff). 
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As can be seen from Table 5.13, there was a substantial div- 
ergence of view between the men and the women on the question 
of the new clerical grading system. This divergence of 
view is, moreover, understated in this table. For, of the 
male staff who favoured the new system of clerical grades, 
no less than six already occupied 'appointed' posts and were 
thus unaffected by the changeover. Of the men who still 
held clerical posts and were directly affected by the, change- 
over, only six (22 per cent) actually favoured the new 
system whilst 18 (67 per cent) were opposed to it. By 
contrast, 44 per cent of the female sample favoured the new 
system whilst 38 per cent saw it in an unfavourable light. 
Since the regrading of clerical posts was, in part, 
an exercise in creating equal pay for women as well as a 
project to rationalise the pay structure in banking, this 
pattern of' responses - with the women adopting a positive 
and the men a negative attitude to the changes - is not 
unexpected. However some further aspects of these attitudes 
can be unpacked by considering the reasons which the clerks 
gave for their reactions to the new system of grades. 
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Table 5.111 
Reasons for Favouring the New System of Male 
and Female Clerks 
Reasons Males Females Total. 
Salaries fairer/better 7 12 19 
Promotion fairer/better 2 5 7 
Personal Advantage 1 2 3 
Other 2 1 3 
D. K. 0 1 1 
12 21 33 
Table 5.15 
Reasons for Disliking the New System of Male 
and Female Clerks 
Reasons 
Slows promotion/pay 
rises 
Transfer Difficulties 
Loss of 'Birthday 
Increments' 
System Unfairly 
Introduced 
Personal Disadvantages 
Personal Merit Ignored 
Other 
Males Females Total, 
6 7 13 
1 0 1 
1 2 3 
2 u 6 
2 3 5 
5 1 6 
2 
18 18 36 
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As we noted above, the clerical regrading scheme implemented 
sexual equality in pay in a thorough-going way for the first 
time in banking, It also established a formal system of 
grades for posts within which each grade attracts a 
definite and circumscribed pay scale, The system therefore, 
in addition to establishing equality of pay, also eliminated 
various anomalous situations in which low-paid females 
performed more complex or senior work than their better- 
paid male colleagues. In this context, it is unsurprising 
that - as Table 5.14 indicates - the majority of women who 
favoured the new system stressed the now fairness of their 
pay and the advantages which the system had brought to 
women in banking, By contrast, the men were not inclined 
to stress these aspects of the new grading system. Although 
a number of men did point to the increased fairness of the 
system, two thirds of them were already promoted beyond the 
clerical grades and could, as it were, afford to take a 
dispassionate view of the new system. If these six men 
are eliminated from consideration, we find that only three 
men were persuaded of the increased fairness of the new 
system and saw it as an advantage. Quite clearly then, 
the clerks evaluated the new system from a largely 
personal, instrumental and self-interested point of view. 
At the same time as providing for equal pay however, 
the new clerical grading system was also an exercise in the 
bureaucratisation of the clerical salary structure which 
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involved the elimination of the kinds of particularism for 
which there was room under the old system of 'birthday 
increments' and 'merit increases'. In particular, the 
new system involves the allocation to each branch of a 
fixed number of posts of each grade. This procedure has 
two consequences: (1) no clerk can be promoted to a post 
involving a new (higher) grade and appropriate rate of pay 
until such a post falls vacant within the branch, and (2) 
clerks can be involved in work, elements of which are 
appropriate to a higher grade without such work being 
recognised in the rate of pay. The previous, more parti- 
cularistic, system had been more successful in handling these 
anomalies and in enabling able clerks to display ability and 
initiative. By and large these new difficulties were 
identified by those clerks who disliked the new system, over 
half of them stressing the new obstacles in the way of promo- 
tion or arguing that the new system was inflexible and failed 
to discriminate individual merit. A further group (30 per 
cent) had disliked the way in which the new system was 
introduced. All regrading systems involve a measure of 
'rough justice' where 'cut-off' points are established. 
However the implementation of the bank system with the fixed 
number of grades per branch meant the downgrading of certain 
personnel and the fixing of certain persons at the top of a 
grade with no possibility of salary increases. In general 
then, whilst many of the younger women welcomed the new 
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grading system, the older female clerks recognised that the 
system brought them few advantages, whilst the men were 
generally opposed to the brake the new system might 
impose on their promotion opportunities. 
On the issue of Saturday working, which was abolished 
in 1969, all clerks were asked: 'If the bank were to ask 
you to work on a Saturday, how happy would you feel about 
it? ' Here the general response was unequivocal. Although 
the male clerks were markedly less likely to mention 
banking hours in connection with questions about their 
jobs than their female counterparts, both male and female 
clerks were united in their opposition to any renewal of 
Saturday working as Table 5.16 demonstrates. 
Table 5.16 
Reactions to the Renewal of Saturday Opening by 
Male and Female Clerks 
Reaction Males Females 
Would not mind a bit, or 
Would mind but would do it for 
overtime 38 29 
Would mind a great deal 
Would be disgusted 62 71 
100 100 
Here again, however the female sample was somewhat more 
opposed to Saturday working than the male group. 
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We have now accumulated a certain amount of data on 
the orientations to work and the work experiences of our 
sample of male and female bank clerks. This evidence 
indicates a generally consistent pattern of differentiation 
between a short run 'non-career' orientation to work on the 
one hand and a more long run 'career' orientation on the 
other; these two orientations being associated with women 
and men in banking respectively. In the first instance 
we can note the different recruiting policies pursued by the 
banks with respect to men and women which are reflected in 
the shorter period of time spent at school by the female 
sample. Additionally, whereas 92 per cent of the male 
clerks had prepared for a career in banking by undertaking 
work for the Institute of Bankers examinations, 92 per cent 
of the female sample had not done so. Secondly, men and 
women appeared to want different things from bank employment; 
the women stressed short-term aspects of employment such as 
the 'social atmosphere' and the 'hours of work' which 
remained unstressed by the men, whilst the men stressed 
such long-term aspects of employment as 'promotion 
opportunities' and 'security' which received relatively 
little attention from the women. Whilst both groups agreed 
on the importance of 'good salaries' this is unremarkable 
in the present context for, as Goldthorpe et al, have 
pointed out, all employment contains a certain instrumental 
element. On the other point of agreement - the desirability 
of 'interest and variety' - the female sample was much more 
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emphatic than their male counterparts, and whilst this item 
is clearly related to job satisfaction it is by no means 
clear that it indicates a concern with long-term job satis- 
faction. Thirdly, we found that whereas the female sample 
generally tended to welcome the short-term advantages of 
the new clerical grading system, the majority of the men 
who were affected by the system were worried about its 
effects on their long term promotion opportunities. 
Fourthly there were some indications that the female 
sample was less interested in the world of work as a whole 
than the male sample. Finally, we found that of those who 
had considered leaving the bank, the men tended to cite more 
deep seated dissatisfactions with bank employment, whilst 
the women tended to cite short-term irritations with aspects 
of their work-roles. Overall then, we have begun to locate 
a distinction between 'work centred' male clerks and 'home 
centred' female clerks, though the latter by no means 
display the kind of 'instrumental' involvement with work 
found among the Affluent Worker(8) sample. Thus female 
clerks cited many sources of job satisfaction other- than 
money, and-salary considerations were by no means an over- 
riding factor in their job-selections or job-evaluations. 
5.6 Perceptions of the Bankas an Employer 
In the Affluent Worker studies(9) there were clear 
indications that, although the character of the workers' 
job-tasks were intrinsically stressful, the kind of stress 
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experienced on the shop-floor was not translated into a more 
widespread form of hostility to the firm as a whole. Instead 
the Affluent Worker respondents tended to relate to the mana- 
gements of their companies in ways which indicated that 
both were part of a 'team' in which the role of management 
was to maintain an overall situation in which workers could 
retain their well-paid jobs. Thus, although the manual 
sample was hardly more likely to interpret management-worker 
relationships in 'oppositional' terms than the white collar 
sample(10), their interpretation of management-worker 
relationships tended to indicate a contractual rather than 
a normative or task-based involvement with the company. 
By contrast, we might expect bank employees to display a 
more task-based or normative involvement with the bank, 
although contractually based involvements may emerge among 
the female clerks. 
In order to get at the character of clerical involve- 
ment with work, all interviewees were asked to compare 
working for the bank with other firms they might know of 
as a firm to work for. The results are set out in Table 
5.17. 
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Table 5.17 
Assessment of the Bank as a Firm to Work For. 
Males Females All 
Better than most 62 51 56 
About average 22 43 34 
Worse than most 6 4 5 
D. K. 11 2 5 
100 100 100 
It is clear from Table 5.17 that despite the tendency noted 
in the previous section for men to be more dissatisfied 
with aspects of bank employment than their female counter- 
parts, the men had a greater tendency to be positively 
satisfied with the banks as employers whilst the female 
sample was less clear on this point. This result strengthens 
our view that male dissatisfaction with bank employment may 
be the product of a higher level of involvement with work 
generally and a higher level of expectations of the rewards 
from bank employment. Both men and women thus appear to be 
aware that the satisfactions and frustrations which they 
experience at work are likely to be duplicated elsewhere 
and thus the men's disatisfactions are not, by and large, 
translated into low evaluations of bank employment; whilst, 
on the other hand, female job satisfactions are not 
translated into strongly positive evaluations of bank 
employment since female expectations of work are not 
particularly demanding and could probably be as easily met 
elsewhere. 
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In order to get at the 'images' held by clerks of 
clerk-management relations, the now classic 'teamwork' 
question was put to all clerks. This question was as 
follows: 'Hero are two opposing views about industry 
generally: I'd like you to tell me which you agree with 
more. Some people say that a firm is like a football 
side - because good team-work means success and success 
is to everyone's advantage. Others say that team-work 
in industry is impossible - because employers and men are 
really on opposite sides. Whichview do you agree with 
more? The results of this question are set out in Table 
5.18. 
Table 5.18 
Males 
I... teamwork means 
success and is to every- 
one's advantage' 92 
'.... teamwork is 
impossible because 
employers and men are on 
opposito sides' 8 
D. K. 0 
100 
Females All 
92 92 
88 
00 
100 100 
Here the bank clerks were noticeably more likely to view 
management-worker relations in a non-antagonistic light than 
either the manual or the clerical Affluent Worker samples. 
The Dank staffs' evaluation also contrasts sharply with 
the Mercer and Weir 
(11) 
samples of male white collar 
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workers (clerks, public employees, professional/technical 
workers and draughtsmen) all of whom endorsed the 'team- 
work' conception of management-worker relationships at 
around the 60 per cent level, In part, the relatively 
high level of 'team-work' endorsements by bank clerks.. may 
reflect their lack of contact with manual workers; however, 
there are also special factors in banking which may also 
contribute towards this result. 
In the first instance, we may note that bank work is 
an intrinsically co-operative enterprise. Very few 
bank clerks conduct their work in isolation from their 
fellows, and in this respect the work conducted in banks 
differs sharply from many types of factory employment. 
In their answers to the 'teamwork' question, many clerks 
stressed that 'pulling together' was the only way to get 
the work done - thus tending to view the question in terms 
of concrete work-tasks rather than management-worker 
relationships as a whole. Banking is also a special 
case in that, whilst few bank clerks have any real contact 
with the upper echelons of bank management, they do have a 
great deal of contact with the branch manager. There 
was thus a tendency for the branch manager to constitute the 
horizon of the bank clerks conception of 'management', and 
this is not surprising since the branch manager both mediates 
'management' decisions downwards within the branch, and acts 
as a kind of 'shop-window' and personnel 'trouble-shooter' 
for the management of the bank. 
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The vital role of branch managers in stabilising 
industrial relations in banking which has been documented 
by Blackburn(12) was strikingly illustrated by the clerks' 
responses to a further question which was put to the clerks: 
'It has been said that banking is characterised by very good 
relations between employers and staff. Do you agree? ' 
Once again, this statement was strongly endorsed by clerks 
of both sexes as Table 5,19 indicates. 
Table 5.19 
'Good Relations' Males Females 
Agree 78 86 
Disagree 19 12 
D. K. 32 
100 100 
When asked why they agreed or disagreed with the statement, 
the responses were as follows: 
Reasons 
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Table 5.20 
Males 
Manager's Accessibility 
Lack of Differentiation 
between Manager and Staff 
'Necessity' of Good Rels. 
Atmosphere of branch/type 
of person in banking 
Weakness of Staff 
Poor Management 
Other 
D. K. 
19 
16 
8 
13 
5 
5 
19 
15 
100 
35% 
Females. 
23 
39% 
16 
2 
14 
6 
2 
14 
23 
100 
As Table 5.20 indicates, there was considerable agreement 
among men and women on the reasons for good management-staff 
relations in banking, and a substantial proportion of these 
reasons focused on the role of the manager, Similarly, 
the role of the manager was also the only coherent category 
which emerged from those who had disagreed with the statement 
that banking was characterised by good management-staff 
relations. Large proportions of the staff argued that 
the manager was accessible and interested in staff views 
and feelings, whilst a further group stressed that bank 
clerks shared a common situation with the manager, that 
they did not think of him as a 'boss' and that since all 
managers had worked their way up the bank from the bottom 
they were aware of the problems faced by junior staff and 
it was pointless to view them in an 'us and them' way. 
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The pattern of responses exhibited in Table 5.20 once 
again diverges sharply from the pattern of responses to a 
similar question in the Affluent Worker sample where the 
provision of negotiating machinery and economic rewards 
constituted the bulk of the reasons cited for the firms' 
'good industrial relations record'. 
(13) 
Clearly the bank 
clerks identified the basis of 'good relations' at work 
with the - somewhat paternalistic - character of staff 
relationships at branch level and saw such relationships 
in an individualistic and particularistic light whilst 
the Affluent Worker manual sample tended to see the source 
of 'good work relationships' in bureaucratic arrangements 
and instrumental financial rewards. To this extent then, 
at least, the particularisms of office life are surviving 
in banking and continue to exert an influence. Since all 
the bank branches in which interviewing took place were . 
large, this point probably holds a fortiori in the smaller 
branches, 
We have already noted that there was a tendency for 
questions which were designed to address a more general 
orientation to the banks as employers to be answered in 
'local' and branch-specific terms. One theme of these 
responses was the co-operative nature of bank work and, 
in this connection, we introduce data from a series of 
questions designed to gain information on the degree and 
type of social interaction within the branch. 
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The sample was first asked about how often they talked 
to their colleagues at work. The pattern of thetr responses 
is set out in Table 5.21. 
Table 5.21 
quantity of Contact with Colleagues by Sex. 
Contact Males Females 
'A Good Deal' 89 86 
'Occasional' 5 12 
', Tardly at all' 52 
99 100 
Subsequently, the sample was asked when they talked with their 
colleagues in a fixed-choice question designed to establish 
the quantity of inter-personal contact in the course of, 
bank work. Here, as Table 5.22 shows, few of the staff 
indicated that the majority of their talking was done during 
break periods. 
Table 5,22 
Location of Contact with Colleamies by Sex 
Location Males Females 
'Mainly in the Office' 49 gg 
'Mainly during breaks' 5 10 
'During both' 46 57 
100 100 
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Finally, the sample was asked about the topics or their 
conversations. Table 5.23 displays the pattern of 
responses. 
Table 5.23 
Topics of Conversation with Colleagues by Sex 
Topics 
'Mainly work' 
'Mainly non-work' 
'Both' 
Males Females 
29 6 
14 42 
57 52 
100 1 o') 
The picture which emerges from these responses is one 
which suggests high levels of social interaction both in and 
out of the banks' time. Since clerical work essentially 
involves a flow of documents and information between 
individuals and sections and much of the banks' clerical work 
is done in small departments, this picture is by no means 
surprising, At the same time, it is clear that the 
ordinary demands of functional co-operation in the small- 
scale bureaucracy of the branch by no means exclude a 
considerable quantity of casual chit-chat. There is thus 
an important sense in which functional co-operation and 
casual social interaction co-exist within the branch setting 
and, in this context, responses to questions about relation- 
ships between the bank employers and staff which stress 
the 'atmosphere of the branch' or the 'type of person in 
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banking' become more intelligible. It is possible too 
that this intermingling of functional and social relation- 
ships contributes to the formation and continuity of the 
'branch no-ms' discussed extensively by Blackburn. 
For most bank workers however, this pattern of quasi_- 
social interaction is broadly confined to the work-place. 
Only 24 per cent of the men and 31 per cent of the women 
stated that they met their colleagues 'often' outside 
banking hours. 
Finally a series of questions were asked about the 
levels of pay in banking. Almost all the bank clerks 
believed that the bank could afford to pay them more (87.5 
per cent), soae citing the high levels of bank profits 
recorded in 1971 and 1972. However when they were asked 
comparative questions about their levels of inr'ome, the 
picture became somewhat more confused. Two questions 
were put to the clerks with the aim of disambiguating 
their feelings about their own pay as compared with other 
groups of workers. Firstly, the sample was asked: 
'What do you think about the pay of men in industry generally 
as opposed to your own? Would you say that in general 
they earned too little, too much or about right? ' Here, 
as Table 5.24 indicates, there was a clear-cut sexual 
division. 
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Table 5.24 
Attitudes to the Pay of Men in Industry of Male 
and Female Clerks 
Response Males Females 
Too Little 8 22 
About Right 46 51 
Too Much 35 16 
D. K. 11 12 
100 101 
Whilst a majority of both sexes felt that the pay of men 
in industry was 'too little' or 'about right', a substantial 
minority of the male bank clerks were prepared to endorse 
the view that they were paid 'too much'. A similar 
pattern came out when the sample was asked: 'How do you 
feel about your own earnings compared to other people's? 
Do you think that they are good, about average, not very 
good? ' The sexual dichotomy was even more pronounced in 
relation to this question. 
Table 5.25 
Comparison of pay with 'other people's1 by male and 
female clerks 
Evaluation Males Females 
Good 19 54 
About Average 29 35 
Not so good 48 11 
D. K. 30 
99 100 
(Percentage calculations based on a reduced sample of 68 
respondents). 
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There are several ways of interpreting this quite clear-cut 
pattern of responses. Firstly, it may be that the intro- 
duction of 'equal pay' into banking had made the women 
feel relatively better off and the men relatively worse 
off. Secondly, it may be that the men had spent a longer 
period in banking and were therefore more attuned to 
declining relativities over a longer period of time, whilst 
the female respondents whose period in the bank had been 
relatively short were not so oriented. This latter inter- 
pretation is supported by several of the men's statements 
which referred to declining relativities over periods which 
varied from three to thirty five years. A third possibility 
is that the male and female samples had different reference 
groups. Thus the younger women, who were more likely to 
come from manual backgrounds and to live at home, may have 
compared themselves with lower paid peers in factory or other 
clerical employment, whilst the men who had been enabled to 
buy 'middle-range' housing through the banks' cheap mortgage 
schemes may have compared themselves to their neighbours. 
This interpretation was also supported - to a lesser degree- 
by the spontaneous statements of the male clerks. Finally, 
it should be noted that the responses of male and female 
clerks to these two questions on relative pay are consistent 
with the responses to enquiries about salaries in the 
context of the first section of the interviews. 
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It should be noted however that responses to questions 
on such issues as pay comparisons are likely to be highly 
sensitive to the current state of local pay negotiations 
in the industry concerned. Thus when the Barclays sample 
was interviewed in the early months of 1974 -a period 
during which pay negotiations were hampered by Phase III of 
the Conservative government's incomes policy, 43 per cent 
said that their level of pay was 'poor' and only 14 per 
cent rated it as 'good'. Pay issues also tended to spill 
over into responses to other questions. This example 
highlights the fact that responses to a questionnaire can 
only represent a 'snapshot' of opinions on issues that may 
vary in intensity and saliency, Such responses must, 
therefore, be treated with caution. 
In summary, it is clear that the clerks' commitment 
to the banks as employers is by no means narrowly economic 
or contractual in character. Thus despite their perceptions 
of a relatively low level of pay compared to men in other 
occupations, a majority of the men believed that the banks 
were better than most employers and very few believed that 
they were worse than most. Equally, despite the fact that 
a majority of the women felt that their pay was good, they 
were less likely than the men to believe that the bank was 
better than most employers. 
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This pattern of attitudes is most easily explicable 
by reference to the different commitments and demands 
which the. clerks brought with them to the work situation. 
As we have seen, for the male clerks salaries were a 
significant, but not over-riding component of their demands 
from work. The men also sought promotion opportunities, 
intrinsically interesting work and security and these latter 
demands were perceived by the men as having been more 
successfully met by the banks. The women's failure to 
translate their satisfaction with their pay into more positive 
satisfaction with the banks as employers is rendered even 
more puzzling by the fact that they were equally satisfied 
with the other dimensions of employment which they considered 
important. However it is noteworthy that the women had 
generally lower expectations from employment and the results 
indicate that they believed that these expectations could 
be as easily satisfied elsewhere. 
For both men and women, employment in banking 
satisfies 'baskets' of needs which differ between the sexes. 
In this context, it appears that the non-satisfaction of one 
element of the basket does not immediately translate itself 
into dissatisfaction with bank employment per so. Equally, 
the satisfaction of one or more elements of the basket of 
desiderata is not necessarily associated with a decisively 
positive attitude towards bank employment. 
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Finally, the fact that the clerks' demands from 
bank employment are not exclusively economic but are 
scattered over a range of elements may play a role in 
diminishing the level of economic conflict within the 
industry. Not only will certain of the demands of each 
individual from his or her employment have a probability 
of being satisfied at any one time, but also the range 
of demands from employment creates the possibility that 
only under exceptional circumstances will there be a 
concensus of dissatisfaction among bank staffs. Certainly, 
as noted above, responses to the 'teamwork' question were not 
organised in terms of any one dimension of bank employment 
and most certainly not in terms of purely economic co-opera- 
tion or competition. On the contrary, as in the case of 
the Mercer and Weir study, 
(14) 
it was difficult to 
distinguish the many images underlying responses to the 
'teamwork' question. This very confusion of images however, 
testifies to the complex nature of the demands and expectations 
which bank employees bring to the work situation and the 
complicated network of co-operative relationships which 
exists within the work situation and involves elements of 
both functional and social co-operation. The small scale 
structure of the branch, the co-operative relationships 
operative at branch level and the role of the branch manager 
all contribute to the perception of the branch as a hierarchic 
but non-conflictual organisation. This perception of the 
branch, in its turn, is in many cases not detached from 
the perception of the bank 'as a whole'. As a result, 
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perceptions of the bank are to a certain extent intertwined 
with the perception of the local work situation. 
.Z Security and Prospects 
Our consideration of previous research in Chapter 2 
led us to point to the availability of promotion opportunities 
as a key factor in discriminating 'work centred' from 'home 
centred' clerks in banking. This argument in Chapter 4 
was based on the view that different kinds of opportunities 
have been held out to male and female applicants for jobs in 
banking and hence application for such posts is indicative 
of prior orientations to 'career' or 'non-career' posts. 
Additionally, we saw that orientations towards promotion 
are sustained in a relatively 'public' fashion in banking and 
are displayed through the decision to study for the 
Institute of Bankers examinations. Pursuing this line of 
thought we discriminated between two major types of 'home 
centred' clerks: (1) those, predominantly female, clerks who 
had not sought a 'career' in banking from the outset and who 
tended to see their employment with the bank in predominantly 
short-run terms, and (2) those, predominantly male, clerks 
who had originally set out with a 'career' in banking in 
view but when this, for one reason or another, had failed 
to materialise had tended to concentrate on more genoral 
'home centred' ambitions, In this section wo set out our 
data on the views of bank clorks on 'careers' in banking in 
a prelimLnary way. 
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Most clerks saw the business of 'getting on in the 
world' as a relatively 'open' affair. All clerks wore 
asked the following question: 'Here is a list of things 
which might help someone to get on in the world. Which 
do you think would help most? .... And next? ' The clerks 
responses are set out in Table 5.26. 
Table 5.26 
Evaluation of Items which would help someone get on in 
the world by male and female clerks. 
Item Males 
1st 1st + 
Pref. 2nd. 
8 13 
7 15 
7 11 
5 13. 
Females All 
Ist Ist + 
Pref. 2nd. 
19 36 
17 35 
21 32 
9 26 
Ambition 
Hard Work 
Character 
Intelligence 
Knowing the 
Right People 
Education 
Luck 
Ist Ist + 
Pref. 2nd. 
11 23 
10 20 
14 21 
4 13 
3 8 7 13 10 21 
5 10 5 10 10 20 
2 l4 0 226 
37 714 51 102 88 176 
As Table 5.26 demonstrates, the clerks tended to endorse a 
'contest' rather than a 'sponsorship' conception of mobility 
and they also tended not to endorse those factors which indi- 
cated any hint of 'ascription' in determining social mobility. 
I 
- 298 - 
Even the factor of 'education' which Ls effectively 
'ascribed' at the poi-it of employment remains low on the list. 
Thus the clerks tended to endorse a view of worldly success 
which stressed the role of individual motivation and effort 
in 'getting on'. This view accords with the established 
pattern of 'internal' promotions within the clearing banks 
and with the fact that advancement is still not, in 
general, overtly associated with the possession of non- 
commercial qualifications. Thus the clerks saw the process 
of 'getting on' as an 'open' affair and, to the extent that 
this view was applied to banking and by implication at least, 
saw the bank hierarchy as the legitimate outcome of a 
relatively egalitarian contest. 
In order to get at the extent to which the clerks 
believed that the pattern of promotion in banking was both 
'internal' and 'open', the sample was asked; 'If a person 
of ability really made the effort, how far up the bank do' 
you think he could rise in the end? '. The interviewees' 
responses are set out in Table 5.27. 
Table 5.27 
Extent of Promotion Opportunities for a person of ability 
Ma1o Females Overall 
An Appointed Post 0 20 11 
Managerial Post 5 33 22 
Above Managerial 92 41 62.5 
D. K. 3 6 4.5 
100 100 100 
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As Table 5.27 shows, male clerks are considerably more aware 
of the extent of the internal promotion system in the banks 
than their female colleagues whose horizons tended to be 
limited to branch level. This is hardly surprising in 
view of the fact that the men have, by and large, been working 
in the bank for longer periods of time and are in any case 
more 'promotion oriented' than their female counterparts. 
We have seen that a large majority of the male sample 
had equipped themselves for promotion by working for the 
Institute of Bankers examinations (only 3 of the thirty six 
male clerks having not done so) and that the men also tended 
to stress 'good promotion opportunities' as a factor they 
would look for in a job. We now proceed to examine the data 
on how bank clerks view their own promotion opportunities in 
concrete terms. Thus all staff (except the male non- 
clerical staff) were asked: 'How far up the bank do you 
expect to be when you leave? ' The responses to this 
question are set out in Table 5,28. 
Table .. 28 
Expected Position on leaving of Male and Female Clerks 
Position Males Females 
General Office 0 5 
Cashier/Junior Supervisor 1 19 
Securities/Foreign 2 10 
Assistants/Higher Supervisor 1 4 
Secretarial 0 6 
Appointed Posts 3 2 
Manager 21 0 
Above Manager 2 0 
D. K. 6 5 
36 51 
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(Table does not include 1 male non-clerical staff) 
A large proportion of the male staff (64 per cent) expected 
to reach managerial status or above and only 11 per cent of 
this group concretely expected to remain in clerical posts. 
By contrast, only one woman expected to rise from the ranks 
of the clerks into an appointed post, and the one appointed 
woman in the sample did not expect to rise further. 
When asked: 'How would you estimate your chances of 
reaching an Appointed Post? 'f once again a large majority 
of the men estimated their chances as 'good' or 'fairly 
good', 
Table 5.29 
Estimate of chances of reaching an Appointed Post by 
Male and Female 'Clerks 
Estimate Males Females 
'Good' 12 1 
'Fairly Good' 13 1 
'Not too Good' 1 6 
'Poor' 3 38 
D. IC. 1 lt 
30 50 
(Table does not include six males and one female who 
already hold appointed posts, nor one male non-clerical 
staff). 
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A similar pattern of responses appeared when the same question 
was asked with respect to managerial status. 
Table 5.30 
Estimate of chances of reaching a Managership by 
Male and Female Clerks 
Estimate Males Females 
'Good' 14 0 
'Fairly Good' 13 0 
'Not too Good' 22 
'Poor' 6 46 
D. K. 13 
36 51 
Table does not include responses of one male non-clerical 
staff). 
Whilst the evident pattern of these responses by male and 
female clerks might seem self-explanatory in the light of 
our knowledge of the banking scene, some additional light on 
them is cast by the clerks responses to further questioning 
as to the reasons for their respective estimates. These 
responses are set out in Tables 5.31 and 5.32. 
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Table 5.31 
Reasons for estimate of chances of reaching an 
Appointed Post 
Reason Males Females 
No Exams 3 8 
Will Leave Bank 0 13 
Does not want post 1 6 
Bank prejudice against Women 0 8 
Nos. of men and women in posts 3 3 
Past Performance 11 0 
Other 6 7 
D. K. /No Reason given 6 5 
30 50 
(Table does not include six male and one female appointed 
staff, or one male non-clerical staff). 
Table 5.32 
Reasons given for estimate of chances of reaching 
a managerial post 
Reason Males Females 
No Exams 3 8 
Will Leave Bank 0 13 
Does not want Post 1 8 
Bank Prejudice against Women 0 6 
Nos, of men and women in posts 9 5 
Past Performance 11 0 
Other It LI 
D. K. /No answer 8 7 
36 51 
I 
(Table does not include one male non-clerical staff) 
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The patterns of reasons of the clerks's estimates were 
similar for both types of post. This is not surprising as 
both types of posts constitute part of the same career chain 
in banking. With the exception of three men who had not 
undertaken the work for their Institute of Bankers examina- 
tions and one man who, on his own account, was not seeking 
promotion, a large proportion of the men who were confident 
of reaching 'career' posts either saw their career as a 
relatively natural and automatic progression which was, at 
least in part, guaranteed by the number of posts which would 
fall vacant, or saw their career as simply prospering in virtue 
of their banking experience. In both the male and the female 
samples, broadly 'voluntaristic' and personal reasons wore 
given for the estimates. Thus in respect of both questions, 
a majority of the female sample cited straightforward personal 
and biographical reasons for their lack of 'career' possibi- 
lities, for instance, that they would be leaving bank 
employment in the foreseeable future, that they hadn't 
taken the exams or that simply they were not interested in 
obtaining 'career' posts. A significant minority however 
(16 per cent for appointed posts and 12 per cent for managerial 
posts) claimed that the banks were prejudiced against women 
with respect to the more senior branch posts. This latter 
response is amplified by the clerks' responses to two more 
generalised questions about promotion for men and women in 
banking, 
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All clerks were asked: 'In general, what sort of a 
chance do you think a man has of reaching a branch 
managership? ', and 'How about a woman? What sort of a 
chance do you think a woman has of reaching a branch 
managership? '. The gross pattern of responses to these 
two questions is set out in Table 5.33. 
Table 5.33 
Probability of 
Male Managershius 
Probability of Female 
Managerships 
Estimate Males Females Males Females 
'Good' 14 21 1 2 
'Fairly Good' 19 21 4 7 
'Not So Good' 3 6 7 16 
'Poor' 1 0 25 26 
D. K. 0 3 0 0 
37 51 37 51 
Once again, men and women very largely agree that whilst 
men's chances of getting to be bank managers are either 
'good' or 'fairly good', women's chances are either 'not so 
good' or 'poor'. Again, this hardly is a surprising result. 
However interesting divergencies of view emerge when we look 
at the reasons given for the estimates. Table 5.34 sets out 
the clerks reasons for believing that men have good or fairly 
good chances of reaching managerships. 
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Table 5.34 
Reasons for 'Good' or 'Fairly Good' Estimates of 
Probability of Male Managerships 
Reason Males Females 
Shortage of Men/Proportion 
of Men to Managerships/ 
Statistical Statements, 16 8 
General Statements of 
85% 71% 
Opportunities for men. 12 22 
Prejudice against Women 1' 4 
Other 23 
D. K. /No reason given 25 
33 42 
As Table 5.34 indicates, the widespread belief that men have 
good opportunities of becoming managers was treated by the 
respondents as simply a fact of life: when asked why this 
was the case, they simply stressed that it was simply a 
statistical fact. By contrast, low opportunities for 
'careers' for women were linked to a wide variety of factors 
lying, so to speak, 'behind' the facts of the matter. 
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Table 5.35- 
Reasons Given for 'Not So Good' or 'Poor' Estimates 
of Probability of Female Managerships. 
Reasons Males Females 
Banks prefer Men 1 10 
Banks prejudiced against 
Women 6 28% 9 48% 
Customers do not want female 
Managers 21 
Women do not stay long enough 
to become Managers 22 
Women do not want Managerships 65 
Women leave to get married 4 
44% 
3 
36% 
Women will not do Exams 25 
Statistical statements 67 
Other 30 
32 42 
What emerges from this group of questions is that both men 
and women are relatively well aware of the statu of their 
own personal 'career' possibilities. Similarly, they 
tend to correctly grasp the significance of sexual distinc- 
tions for the successful pursuit of a 'career' in banking, 
However while both men and women tend to explain their 
descriptions of their own career chances in a relatively 
personal way, and both sexes tend to see male promotion 
opportunities as a fact of life or a statistical probability, 
both groups invoke generalised complexes of motivation to 
explain the relative dearth of female 'career' opportunities 
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the women tending to see the matter primarily as structured 
by bank expectations and prejudices, and the men tending 
to invoke special forms of feminine motivation (or more 
specifically, the lack of it). Only a small percentage 
of clerks explicitly grasped the fact that low promotion 
opportunities for women were associated with high levels 
of opportunity for men. 
Summing up, we can say that a large majority of the 
men clearly saw that their promotion opportunities were 
good and that these basic opportunities were, at least in 
part, held in common with their male colleagues. This 
view co-existed with a generally held 'contest' view of 
mobility. By contrast, the women had few career expecta- 
tions and, by and large, had not equipped themselves for 
promotion by undertaking study for the Institute of 
Bankers examinations. They were also aware that their 
'career' situation was held in common with the majority 
of their sex. When asked about their own expectations, 
they tended to explain their lack of career prospects in 
individualistic terms, but when questioned*in a more 
general way, they recognised that their promotion opportu- 
nities were limited by more general forces operative in 
the banking scene. These views also co-existed with a 
'contest' view of mobility. 
A possibility which was entertained in Chapter 2 
was the notion that the mechanisation of clerical work may 
act to curtail the normal patterns of mobility inside an 
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occupation and in Chapter 3 we noted that a National Board 
for Prices and Incomes report`". had stressed the need for 
special training for short-term female staff rather than the 
traditional 'all round' training given by the banks to both 
men and women, Since all four branches had been 
furnished with computer terminals in the recent past, all 
clerks who had worked in the bank prior to mechanisation were 
asked: 'Do you think that the changeover to the computer 
has affected clerical work as a career for men? flow about 
for women? '. 
Table 5.36 
Responses to Question on the Changeover to the 
Computer 
For Men For Women 
Males Females Males Females 
Has affected 
clerical work 54 30 73 61 
Has not affected 
clerical work 32,5 41 13.5 10 
D. K. 13.5 25 13.5 25 
Did not ask 0 4 0 4 
100 100 100 100 
A clear majority of both sexes clearly felt that the change- 
over to the computer had affected clerical work for women 
though, as we shall see, significant numbers of both sexes 
did not address the question in 'career' terms. There was 
tý 15) 
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rather more doubt about the men, with a small majority of 
men suggesting that the computer had altered matters for men 
and a minority of women concurring with this view. All 
clerks who said that the computer had altered matters 
were asked, in respect of each sex, a supplementary 
question: 'In what way? ' 
Table 5.37 
Ways in which the Computer had affected Clerical 
Work for Men 
Suggested Ways Males Females 
Men bypass Machine work 
Get quicker promotion 30 40 
Facilitated men's 
technical work 15 7 
Work now easier 15 33 
Work less boring 40 0 
Work more boring 0 13 
D. K. 7 
100 100 
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Table 5.38 
Ways to which the computer had affected clerical 
work for women 
Suggested ways Males Females. 
Quicker promotion 4 0 
Easier work 37 118 
Improved hours 0 6 
Created jobs 4 6 
Reduced female jobs 4 3 
Work less boring 30 6 
Work more boring 11 23 
Other 11 8 
101 100 
There was general agreement that the introduction of EDP had 
resulted in the further 'feminisation' of routine work in the 
branches. In fact, the vast majority of clerks of both 
sexes who thought that the computer had affected clerical 
work for men pointed to the ways in which it had benefitted 
them. Thus the women were even more aware than the men of 
the ways in which men now bypassed the 'machine room! where 
the routine work was done or paid it a merely cursory intro- 
ductory visit. A large proportion of men additionally 
alluded to the way in which the advent of the computer had 
cut out long stretches of boring ledger work which had 
previously had to be done by hand, and commented on the ways 
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in which their jobs had been made easier by the computer. 
Interestingly, they also tended to 'project' these benefits 
on to female staff as well. As far as the women were 
concerned, there was a clear agreement by all that the 
'women's jobs' had been made easier by the computer, but at 
the same time many women thought that their jobs had become 
more routinised and boring - the women also tended to 'project' 
their disadvantages on to the men. A few women also noted 
that the computer had made banking hours more predictable 
and saw this is a considerable benefit. Putting-the 
whole pattern of responses together, there was a widespread 
view that the computer had been of absolute and unalloyed 
benefit to men in banking. Its advent had resulted in 
more rapid promotion, aid correlatively, less time spent 
in tedious and unrewarding ledger activities. For the 
women, the computer was a more ambiguous thing. On the 
one hand, many women alluded to the tedious ledger work 
which they had been routinely involved in before the advent 
of the computer and which had now been made a good deal 
easier. On the other hand, there were some indications 
that the computer had eliminated all the intrinsLc interest 
which ledger work had previously contained, and so work - 
although easier - was now more boring. There was no sense 
from the sample that the women felt that the computer had 
trapped them into routine work for rood. As wo have 
seen, most female clerks lind progressed out of the '-ma-hitze 
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room', and all the clerks expected to progress in similar 
fashion. No clerk, for instance, expected to be in the 
'machine room' by the time they left the bank. In contrast 
to the NBPI report alluded to above, we would argue that 
the prospect of progressing beyond the simple routine 
jobs is an important component of job satisfaction for 
women, even though few of them expect to make a full-scale 
'career' in banking. 
In sum, both the male and the female clerks had 
definite views and, by and large, veridical ones about the 
nature of promotion opportunities and careers in banking and 
about the factors influencing the achievement of them. 
Against a background of confidence about job security, 
there was a clear understanding of the requirements to be 
fulfilled in order to qualify for promotion and, among the 
males at least, a willingness to undertake the effort to 
fulfil such requirements. Among the men too, there existed 
a definite expectation on the part of the majority that they 
would ultimately achieve managerial positions. Moreover, 
both the men and the women shared in an objective understan- 
ding of each other's opportunities and the factors influencing 
them. Thus both the men and the women were able to specify 
the organisational factors an(1 contingencies affecting 
each others careers with a considerable degree of conceosus 
and objectivity. In this context, it was significant 
that both the men and the women wore able to describe the 
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ways in which not only their own jobs but also those of the 
opposite sex had been affected by computeri"ation. 
The world of banking is, in short, a well understood 
and highly predictable world. Weir 
(16) 
has suggested that 
the predictability of an organisational environment is an 
important factor determining whether white collar employees 
will identify with their employers on the one hand or their 
work group or union on the other. In a predictable org'ani- 
sational environment, he argues, in which the means and 
opportunities for promotion are available and well understood, 
employees will tend to view the managerial structure as 
legitimate and will be more prone to identify with It. 
The evidence presented above supports this contention. In 
this context, the fact that a substantial proportion of the 
female staff clearly viewed the banks' policies as in various 
ways detrimental to them and yet failed to express strong 
opposition to them is significant both in supporting Weir's 
hypothesis and in indicating that the banks' policies were 
not strongly discrepant with the «aluo and low level 
'career' expectations which the women brought with them into 
the work situation. 
r. ß`3 Summary and Conclusions 
At the beginning of this chapter we stressed our 
interest in three aspects of bank workers' orientations to 
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work and employment: (1) the possible existence of a 
sexually ascribed basis for a primary partit;. on of the 
sample into 'work re itred' and 'ho-ne co ttred' orientations; 
(2) the possibility of a. 'career cont1ngency' basis for n 
seco-. idary partition of the male sample into 'work re, itred' 
and 'home centred' orientations, and (3) the extent to which 
common norms operative at the workplace moderate the impact 
of divergent orientations to work. We now have sufficient 
data to comment on these areas of interest. 
8.1. The Sexual Differentiation of Orientations to Work 
In Chapters 3 and 4 we presented a good deal of evidence 
to support the view that whereas male central life interests 
would, in all probability, be centred on the world of 
work, female central life interests would more probably be 
. centred elsewhere. This evidence related to the sexual 
distribution of 'career' posts in banking, the differential 
'wastage' rates among male and female clerks, the age 
distribution of men and women in the banks, marriage 
patterns, the rates of employment of married and unmarried 
female workers together with more impressionistic evidence. 
A central component of these differing orientations, we 
argued, would be the contrast between long-term 'career' 
orientations to banking taken up by male staff and the 
short-term 'non-career' orientations to bank employment 
taken up by the female staff. Wo further argued that 
these orientations would be derived from sources outside 
the banks - the different life cycles of men and women, 
- 315 - 
their different educational experionces, social backgrounds 
and the like - but that these different orientations would 
be confirmed by work experience within the banks. Our view 
that these orientations had external sources was consolidated 
by the knowledge that the banks pursued different recruiting 
policies for men and women respectively and held out different 
patterns of expectations to them. We additionally argued 
that these external sources of orientations to work were 
complemented and reinforced by staff policies operational 
within the banks and the resultant occupational structure 
of banking. Thus the differential encouragement given to 
men and women to gain the qualifications for, and pursue, 
a career in banking is institutionally realised in the sexual 
division of labour in banking and, if perceived as such, 
this institutional structure would in all probability 
reinforce 'home centred' orientations among women. In 
short, we argued that the field of banking employment is 
characterised by a 'dual' labour force and that this is 
matched by 'dual' orientations to work and employment within 
the labour force. 
The investigation of our samplo of bank clerks has 
broadly confirmed this hypothesis. As expected, male and 
female bank clerks had different age distributions, different 
locations in the occupational structure or banking and differ- 
ent domestic responsii. bili. ties. Male clerks wore more likely 
to have had a grammar school education, to have attended 
school for a longer period and to have come from a non.. 
manual background. 
- 316 - 
In conformity with their different social and educational 
experiences prior to work, the men tended to have higher 
expectations of employment than their female counterparts 
and they were more likely to view their commitment to bank 
employment in a 'long term' time perspective. Thus despite 
their higher rates of pay and infinitely superior promotion 
prospects (both perceived and actual), the men were less 
satisfied with bank employment in terms of the items which 
they rated 'important in a job' and were more likely to 
have considered leaving bank employment and to have taken 
active steps to do so than their female colleagues. The 
men were also more likely to express frustrated ambitions 
for careers in other occupations (especially the professions )v 
and, as Table 5.39 shows, to indicate that, given the 
opportunity, they would not choose a career in banking 
again. 
Trabte 5.39 
Choice of a Career in Th nki. n again by Sex 
Mon Women 
Would choose Banking again 48 73 
Would not chooso Banking again 46 27 
D. R. 60 
100 100 
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The higher expectations which the men brought to the world 
of work were also evident when the clerks were asked about 
the relative advantages of working for the bank as opposed 
to other employers. Here the men tended to view the bank 
as 'better than most' employers, while the women were more 
inclined to rate the banks as 'about the same'. In neither 
case dial the relative dissatisfaction of the men or the 
satisfaction of the women with bank employment translate 
itself into criticism or approval of the banks themselves 
as employers. Indeed the reverse was the case. The dis- 
satisfied men tended to rate the banks as 'better than most' 
whilst the relatively satisfied women tended to rate them 
as 'about the same'. Underlying both sets of evaluations 
therefore, there seems to be an element of generalised 
fatalism about the prospects of satisfaction from employment. 
Thus although the men exhibited a variety or dissatisfactions 
with bank employment, many or them seemed to believe that they 
would experience the same kinds of frustration - perhaps 
to a greater degree - with other kinds of employer. The 
women, on the other hand, were broadly satisfied with 
bank employment but believed that most jobs would approximate 
to bank employment in terms of tho (limited) demands 
which they had of work. 
ir the men had hir , hor expectations or work than 
their female counterparts, they were also more likely to 
display a longer term 'careers orierºtatton to work as well. 
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When asked the question: 'LookLng at the years ahead, What 
kind of improvemort or change in your life are you most 
expecting? ', the total sample produced 127 separable 
responses which are classified in Table 5.10. 
Table 5.40 
'Improvements or Changes' cited by sex 
Maa1eS FA7_ 0S 
Promotion 25 7 
'Work' Earning more money 13 1 
Getting more consumer items 25 10 
Getting married 8 115 
Having children 8 111 
'Non- Leaving the Bank 6 12 
work' Hopes for children 20 
Travel/Move from area 68 
No change 10 
103 
iN= 53) 
14 
101 
ýN = 71&) 
As Table 5.40 clearly demonstrates, the mon were twice as 
likely to cite an expected change in their lives in 'work' 
terms than in 'non-work' terms, By contrast, the women 
were four times as likely to 'ito future changes in 'non- 
work' terms than i, n 'work' terms, Thus whilst the men 
constructed their 'stgntfinant t'uturos' within the banks, 
the women constructed theirs outside them. 
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This pattern of responses is, of course, in striking 
congruence with the clerks' expectations of, and commitments 
to, a 'career' in banking. Thus, whilst only one woman 
(2 per cent of the female sample) expected to achieve an 
'appointed' post, 72 per cent of the male sample (excluding 
non-clerical staff) expected to achieve this position or 
above and 64 per cent expected to exceed it. Similarly, 
whilst 92 per cent of the male clerical staff had undertaken 
work for the Institute of Bankers examinations, 92 per 
cent of the female staff interviewed had not done so. 
Since promotion beyond the most routine clerical posts 
cannot take place without some degree of certification by 
the Institute of Bankers, these figures reinforce the 
subjective estimates of promotion opportunity. In sum, 
whereas the men saw their lives and futures in-terms of 
a career 'with the bank and made this identification publi- 
cally visible through their participation in courses 
for, the Institute of bankers examinations, the female 
staff did not perceive themselves as having a long-term 
'career' or even a long-term 'future' with the bank and 
made this judgement both effective and visible through 
their non-participation in 'career' training. Instead 
the female staff conceptualised their employment with the 
bank as essentially a short-term 'job' and visualised their 
futures in terms which were largely unconnected with the 
banks. This then is the main line of cleavage within bank 
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staffs and it is associated with a number of other 
differentiations in orientations to work and employment 
between the two groups. 
Firstly, as we have already seen, male and female 
clerks bring different collections of desiderata to the 
work situation. Whilst both groups are, in common with the 
vast majority of the workforce, in the market for well-paid 
and interesting jobs, the male staff were more interested 
in those aspects of occupations - for instance, 'good 
promotion opportunities' and 'security' - which have long- 
term career significance. By contrast, the female staff 
eschewed these aspects of work in favour of on-the-job 
aspects of their work situation such as the 'social atmosphere' 
of the office and 'convenient working hours' - this latter, 
it will be recalled, being ranked equally with 'good 
promotion opportunities'. These patterns of desiderata 
are again consistent with our basic contention that, whereas 
male clerks have a long-run ! career' orientation to work and 
employment, the female staff tend to hold a short-run 'jobs 
orientation. 
Secondly, although, as we have seen, 'good promotion 
opportunities' were relevant to the female clerks (albeit to 
a somewhat lesser extent than their male counterparts), we 
have good reason to suppose that the female staff understood 
the notion of 'good promotion opportuniti©s' in a rather 
different way from their male colleagues. Thus although 12 
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per cent of the female sample cited 'good promotion 
opportunities' as important in a job and nearly 60 per 
cent of this group rated their job as 'first rate' or 
'pretty good' with respect to such promotion opportunities, 
no female clerk estimated her chances of reaching a manager- 
ship as either 'good' or 'fairly good'. It seems likely 
therefore that the female sample saw 'promotion' within 
the more restricted frame of reference of the clerical 
grades. Thus 'promotion' would be construed, for instance, 
as a move from the machine room to the counter, This view 
is confirmed by the finding that, in terms of concrete 
expectations, 53 per cent of the female sample did not 
expect to progress beyond a grade two clerical position and 
a further 22 per cent did not expect to move beyond a grade 
three clerical pos-ition, 
(17) 
whilst only one female clerk 
concretely expe'ted to achieve an appointed post. Additional 
corroborative evidence for the low level of promotional 
'horizons' of the female staff emerged when the clerks were 
asked how far a 'person of ability' could expect to progress 
up the bank hierarchy. Whereas 92 per cent of the male 
staff answered this question by citing a post beyond the 
branch level (e. g., general manager, regional manager etc. ), 
only 1E1 per cent of the female staff'cited such posts. There 
is thus a real sense in which the upper echelons in banking 
appear to be less visible to the female staff, for whom the 
branch manager is more likely to eonstituto a hort on of 
their perception of the bank as an organisational structure. 
I 
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Thirdly, a similar contrast between long-run and 
short-run goals appeared when the clerks were questioned 
about their orientations to the new system of clerical 
grades introduced in 1970 which, as we have seen, was in part 
an exercise in creating sexual equality in clerical pay and 
in part an exercise in rationalising the pay structure in 
banking. Of the male clerks who were directly subject to 
these changes, those who were hostile to the new system 
outnumbered those who were in favour of it by a ratio of 
three to one. Of the males who were opposed to the new 
system, two thirds justified their hostility to it by citing 
reasons related to their prospects of organisational 
advancement within the bank, complaining in particular 
about the inflexibility and rigidity of the new system and 
its insensitivity to displays of initiative and personal 
responsibility. Among the female staff, by contrast, there 
was a small majority in favour of the new system. Within 
this majority group, the predominant view stressed the value 
of the equalisation of pay operationalised under the now 
system as its central advantage, whilst a rather smaller 
group cited the superior promotion opportunities afforded 
by the new system. Among the women who disliked the new 
system, a substantial minority saw disadvantages in its 
rigidity, but an almost equal number disliked the system 
because of contingent disadvantages which emerged with the 
introduction of the system. In sum, whereas half the men 
directly affected by tho introduction of the system were 
opposed to tt on the grounds that its rigidit! es would 
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impede their advancement, only a fifth of the female staff 
saw this as a disadvantage. By contrast, the female staffs' 
favourable evaluation of the new system was preominantly 
based (66 per cent) on an assessment of its short-run 
advantages, whilst negative evaluations were also extensively 
(50 per cent) based on perceptions of short-run disadvantages. 
Among the men, short-run disadvantages of the system were 
cited by only a quarter of those opposed to the new system. 
Finally, whilst we have so far concentred on differences 
in orientations towards concrete issues as evidence of the 
di r'ferentiation between long-term male o-"i. entations 
towards work as a 'career' and short-term female or! e. ztations 
towards work as a 'job', a further aspect of this differentia- 
Lion might be expected to emerge in the sheer degree of 
saliency and significance which the world of work holds for 
the two groups. We have already seen that the male staff 
have considerably higher expoctatio, is of the satisfactions 
to be gained from employment and a predictable correlate of 
this differentiation in expectations would be that issues 
relating to the world of work would be more sigiiificant to 
the 'career minded' men than to their short-run female 
colleagues. As we have already seen, this was in fact the 
case. As Tables 5,11 and 5.12 show, when asked questions 
directed at eliciting sources of job satisfaction and dCs- 
satisfaction, the female clerks were nearly twice as likely 
as their male counterparts to cite neitbor positive nor 
negative aspects of their work. This finding is 
consistent, not only with the hypothesis that for short- 
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term female employees job satisfaction does not have the 
same centrality or salience which it has for male colleagues 
who are committed to a lifetime of bank employment, but also 
with the kernel of the notion of 'home centred' central life 
interests: that work itself is not a source of significant 
personal experiences or personal growth. 
Whilst there can be little doubt that these differen- 
tiated orientations to work derive from sources outside 
the workplace, it is equally the case that they were not 
contradicted by the concrete experience of bank employment. 
In particular, it is clear that both the men and the women 
had a clear and veridical perception of their own future 
prospects with the banks and of the prospects of their sex 
as a whole (Tables 5.29,5.30,5.33 and 5.34). In 
responding to questions about the promotion prospects of 
their sex as a whole, a majority of both the men and the 
women expressed the view that the good promotion prospects 
for men were simply a statistical 'fact of life' and few 
sought to justify their ascription of good promotion 
prospects for men by other means. Similarly, nearly 20 
per cent of the responses to the question of why promotion 
prospects of women to managerial roles were so poor consisted 
of simple statistical statements presented as the 'facts 
of life'. The remainder of the sample however, was evenly 
divided between those who believed that the banks and their 
customers wore opposed to the concept of female managers 
(39 per cent) -a view endorsed by the largest proportion 
or women, and those who believed that the women themsolves, 
for a variety of reasons, were not motivated to become 
managers (39 per cent) -a view endorsed by the largest 
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proportion of men. 
Thus, in sum, the men come into banking - perhaps 
as a 'second choice' occupation - seeking a secure, well- 
paid job with real prospects of personal promotion. 
These expectations are very strongly confirmed by the 
personnel policies of the banks and by the perceived 
statistical facts of branch life which overwhelmingly confirm 
the probability of promotion to the 'career' grades in 
banking within the foreseeable future. The women, by 
contrast, enter banking with predominantly short-term 
employment objectives and this orientation is confirmed by 
the banks' self-evidently sexually assymetrical promotion 
systems which very many of the women perceive as a matter 
of bank policy. Under these circumstances it is scarcely 
surprising that the vast majority of female bank employees 
should look to a future whose major landmarks lie outside 
the realm of bank employment altogether. The orientations 
to work of both the men and the women are thus derived 
outside the workplace, but are confirmed and maintained 
within it, 
5.8.2. The Secondary Differentiation of Male Ori. entations 
to Work. 
Turning now to our second question of whether a second 
partition can be made within the male sample, it will be 
recalled that we hypothesized the existence of a sub-sot. 
of male 'home centred' clerks whose orientation had arisen 
as a result of career contingencies which had vitiated 
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their prospects of promotion. There can be little doubt 
that the responses of the male clerks within the sample failed 
to indicate the presence of this 'home centred' orientation. 
In particular, far too few male respondents indicated that 
their expectations of promotion were weak to make this aspect 
of the investigation a serious possibility. Thus, when 
asked to estimate their position on leaving the bank, only 
four male clerks gave an estimate below the 'appointed' career 
grades and only this same four believed that their chances 
of reaching an appointed post were 'not so good', or 'poor'. 
Of these men, two had entered the British banking system under 
special circumstances and in middle age whilst the other two 
men were the only members of the male sample who expressed a 
lack of ambition, Similarly, only eight men (including the 
four above) estimated that their chances of reaching a 
managership were 'not so good' or 'poor' and it is clearly 
inappropriate to attempt to generalise from so small a 
group. It is probably the case both that the male sample 
was too small to contain a substantial number of 'home 
centred' clerks and that the latter failed to come forward 
for interview, In respect of the 'homo centred' men, the 
sample is therefore too small and biased through the 
effects of self-selection. Since older men, among 
whose numbers 'home centred' clerks may be expected to be 
concentrated, were under-represented in the sample, the 
failure of 'home centred' male clerks to appear in substantial 
numbers among the male sample is not surprising, 
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5.8. 
-3-. 
The Role of the Branch in Consolidating Common 
Attitudes to work and Em ployment. 
Although, as we have seen, male and female bank 
employees display striking divergences in their orientations 
to work and employment, it would be a mistake to deduce from 
this that the two groups of clerks exhibit divergent outlooks 
on every aspect of bank employment. Blackburn's observations 
on the significance of norms operative at branch level(18) 
and the evidence already reported in this chapter should 
be sufficient to forestall any attempt to jump to such a 
premature conclusion. 
As we have seen, large proportions of both men and 
women in the sample reported that they had 'a good deal' of 
contact with their colleagues at work and that this contact 
was by no means restricted to periods out of bank time nor 
was this contact exclusively 'about' work-related matters. 
Since the work of a branch is largely devoted to the 
processing of paper data, such work necessarily involves a 
considerable quantity of intra- and inter-group communication. 
It is clear from the responses of the sample that the basic 
functional co-operation of the branch does not oxclude a 
considerable quantity of ordinary casual talk, in the course 
of which opinions are aired and concensual judgements may 
be reached on matters of common concern. 
Our data reveal several areas where such common 
judgements characterise the responses of the male and female 
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samples despite substantially divergent objective features 
of their employment situations which would seem, to an 
outsider, to militate in the direction of dissensus rather 
than concensus. Thus both male and female clerks 
stressed the responsibility of their jobs (Table 5.8) 
despite the fact that, in any objective sense, the level 
of responsibility attaching to the men's posts was far 
greater than that attaching to those of their female 
colleagues. There was additionally a substantial conver- 
gence among men and women that their jobs involved a 
considerable element of scope for the exercise of 
initiative - again despite marked differences in the 
objective job specifications of the male and female 
samples. Similarly, both the men and the wome-i were 
united in overwhelmingly viewing management-worker 
relations in a nol-antagonistic ILght (Table 5.18) despite 
their rather different objective relationships - both 
current and prospective - to management and there was 
considerable agreement over the 'good industrial relatiois' 
prevailing in. banking (Table 5.19. 
Whilst these kinds of responses seem reasonable 
enough in young male bank clerks who already occupy the 
senior clerical positions and perceive themselves as having 
solid promotion opportunities in the future, they seem rather 
less expectable ii young women who are the 'proletariat' 
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of banking and will continue to remain so during their 
brief (careers' in the industry. 
Two sets of factors interlock to create the considerable 
degree of concensus characteristic of branch life in the 
face of the divergent occupational experiences and 
potentially divergent interests of the two groups of 
clerks. The first set of factors derives from the organi- 
sation of the branch itself. The small site of branches 
and the character of branch work permits, and indeed 
demands, a high level of corinuni"ation between employees 
at all levels in the branch hierarchy 'hilst, at the same 
time ensuring that this communication will be characterised 
by strong elements of particularism. Additioially, the 
transparency and predictability of the organisational 
environment of banking and the widely held 'contest' view 
of promotion within it conduces towards a perception of 
the branch and its hierarchic relationships of seniority 
as a legitimate structure of power. This in turn, enhances 
the capacity of the branch manager and the senior male 
staff to influence opinion formation within the branch. 
The second set of factors derive from the 'home 
centrednoss' of the female staff. Entering the branch 
as projectedly short-term employees, the women have 
relatively low expectations of employment and, as we have 
seen, a relatively low level of commitment to the banks. 
Lacking strong opinions about, or expectations of, bank 
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employment and working in a context in which those with 
long-term experience of banking are predominantly men, 
the women's opinions are centrally shaped by the 'climate 
of opinion' which exists at branch level and indeed their 
perceptions of the bank 'as a whole' are frequently confined 
to the features of branch life. Thus, although they enter 
banking with orientations to work and employment which are 
quite distinct from those of their male colleagues and 
with interests which potentially conflict with those of the 
men, the female staff lack the motivation, commitment and 
continuity of experience, both as individuals and as a crnl- 
lectivity, which would enable them to articulate a 
perspective on branch life which is significantly distanciated 
from branch mores which are predominantly formed and articu- 
lated by their male colleagues. One might say therefore, 
that women in banking form a class in themselves but not 
for themselves -a fact which is of considerable significance 
not merely in the maintainance of concensus at the workplace 
but also in influencing. unionisation. 
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NOTES 
1. The broad pattern of these results is replicated in 
other samples of bank clerks. Thus in a sample of 
bank clerks interviewed in connection with Mumford 
and Banks' study of mechanisatio, t, a very high pro- 
portion of the male clerks had attended granmar, 
independent or public schools. By contrast, less 
than 50 per cent of the female clerks had attended 
such schools (E. Mumford and O. Banks, The Com ute7' and 
the Clerk, (Routledge and Kogan Paul, 1967), p. 66). 
In a more recent sample of bank clerks interviewed by 
Graham and Llewellyn in 1975, half the sample of 
female clerks had come from secondary modern schools 
whereas none of the male staff had attended this type 
of school. Similarly, 85 per cent of the male staff 
had attended selective secondary schools whereas only 
46 per cent of the females had done so (S. Graham and 
C. Llewellyn, Women in the Occupational Structure: A 
Case Study of Banking, Unpublished mimeo, Nuffield 
College, Oxford, 1976, p. 18). 
2. R. M. Blackburn, Union Character and Social Class, 
(Bats. ford, 1967), p. 198. 
3. Graham and Llewellyn, op. cit. p. 16. 
4. Graham and Llewellyn, op. cit. p. 19. 
5. N. Walker, Morale in the Civil Servier: A Stud of 
the De-; lc Worker, (Edinburgh, 1961). p. 199-203. 
6. N. F. Dufty, White Collar Contrasts, International 
Journal of Comparative Sociology, Vol. 14,19639 
pp. 64-73" 
7. Once again, Mumford and Danks record similar results. 
Thus, when asked what they liked most about their 
jobs, 14 per cent of the men and 30 per cent of the 
women answered 'nothing at all' or 'nothing in 
particular'. When asked what they liked least about 
their jobs, 12 per cent of the men and 29 per cent of 
the women again answered 'nothing at all' or 'nothing 
in particular' (Mumford and Danks, op. cit., p. 68-9). 
8. J. H. Goldthorpe et al., The Affluent Worker, Vol. 1 
and 3, (Cambridge University Press, 19689 1969). 
9. Tbid, 
10. J. H. Goldthorpe et al., The Affluent Worker: Tndiistrio1 
Attitudes and Behaviour, (Cambridge University Press, 
1968), P. 7/4. 
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11. D. Mercer and D. T. H. Weir, Orientations to Work Among 
White Collar Workers, in M. Mann (ed, ), Social Strati- 
fication and Industrial Relations, (SSRC, 19691, p, 
120-1. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
BANK WORKERS' ORIENTATIONS TO COLLECTIVE ORGANISATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we continue our report of the results 
of the survey of bank workers' orientations. In 
particular, we will be concentrating on the relationship 
between the clerical orientations to work and employment 
discussed in the previous chapter and attitudes towards, 
and membership of, the various collective-organisations 
seeking to represent bank staffs. 
It will be recalled that the major conclusions of 
the previous chapter were mixed with respect to the model 
set out in chapter It and, in certain respects, it would 
not be an exaggeration to suggest that the model of the 
relationship between clerical orientations and unionisation 
presented in chapter 4 has already foundered, In 
particular, the argument of chapter 4 proposed that it would 
be the 'home centred' male clerks whose motivation to 
unionise would be strongest, whilst the 'work centred' 
male clerks would be less inclined to unionise. A corollary 
of this proposal was that 'home centred' male clerks 
would be more commonly found to be NUDE members, whilst 
the 'work centred' male clerks would be more inclined 
towards the loss unionate staff associations. The female 
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bank employees, it was argued, who would tend to lack any 
powerful intrinsic. motivation to join either type of 
collective organisation, would tend to join the organisa- 
tion favoured by the 'local' climate of opinion. 
On the basis of the results reported in chapter 5 
(assuming the male 'home centred' clerks to be truly absent 
and not merely under-represented) and the argumentation of 
chapter 4 therefore, we should expect a majority of our 
'work centred' male sample to be staff association members 
and that a majority of the female staff would be influenced 
in that direction also. Accordingly, we should expect 
staff association membership to predominate within the 
sample. As we shall see however, this was very far from 
being the case: indeed union membership exceeded staff 
association membership within both the male and the 
female samples. Accordingly, in this chapter we will 
rethink, with the aid of our data, the relationship between 
the orientations to work which are already securely esta- 
blished and the choice between the staff organisations in 
banking. In particular, we shall be interested in the 
extent to which male and female bank employees exhibit 
distinctive patterns of collective Organisation membership 
and distinctive attitudes and motivations with respect 
to their membership of such organisations. 
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6.2. The Membership of the Staff Organisations 
A large proportion (81 per cent) of the clerks inter- 
viewed had joined some kind of staff organisation in the 
banks during their period of employment with them. 
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 give an overall summary of 'all time' 
membership of the organisations available (which includes 
members who have subsequently 'lapsed' from the various 
organisations), and a summary of the 'current' members of 
the organisations. 
Table 6.1 
'All Time' Staff Organisation Membership of the Sample 
NUDE 
Staff Member Non-Member Total 
Associations 
Member 27 10 37 
Non-Member 34 17 51 
Total 61 27 88 
Table 6.2 
'Current' Staff Organisation Membership of the Sample 
NIJB 
Staff Member Non-Member Total 
Associations 
Member 4 20 214 
Non-Member 33 31 64 
Total 37 51 88 
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As Table 6.1 shows, 69 per cent of tho'sample had been 
members of NUDE at some point during their banking career, 
whilst 42 per cent had been members of their appropriate 
bank staff association. A substantial group of clerks 
(31 per cent) had been involved in moves from one organi- 
sation to another, and a minority (5 per cent) were members 
of both organisations at the time of interview. 
Overall, and for each sex, NUDE membership predomina- 
ted both among the 'all time' and the 'current' memberships 
of the staff organisations as Table 6.3 shows. 
Table 6,3 
'All Time' and 'Current' Memberships of the Staff 
Organisations By Sex 
Sex 'All Time' 'Current' 'All Time' 'Current' 
S. A. S. A. NUDE NUDE 
Male 22 (59%) 15 (1+1 0) 28 (76%) 16 (43%) 
Female 15 (29%) 9 (18%) 33 (65%) 21 (41%) 
Moreover, in each branch the number of clerks who had 
joined NUDE at some point ('all tithe' joiners) exceeded 
the numbers joining the relevant bank staff associatf. on. 
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Table It 
'All Time' Membership of Staff Organisations by Dank 
Branches 
Bank Branch S. A. NUDE Neither Total 
Nos. 
- 
Nos. Inter- 
viewed 
Bank 'A' Leeds 9 13 7 22 
Bank 'B' Leeds 793 16 
Bank 'A' Coventry 16 22 5 -30 
Bank 'B' Coventry 5 17 2 20 
37 61 17 88 
Whilst, given these -figures, it would appear that Bank 'B' 
Coventry is a 'committed' branch in Blackburn's(1) terms, 
in fact the majority of 'current' NUDE members was reduced 
from 17 to 5 to 9 to 5 as Table 6.5 (below) demonstrates. 
At the same time, a large fall out of staff association 
membership in Bank 'A' Leeds makes this the most 'committed' 
branch interviewed. 
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Bank clerks of both sexes in the sample had a relatively 
high rate of joining the staff organisations in banking, 
the men joining at a rate of 1.35 organisations per person 
and the women joining at a rate of 0.94 organisations per 
person. In 'current' terms, 76 per cent of the men and 57 
per cent of the women were members of one or both organisa- 
tions. These figures repeat a pattern found by Blackburn 
(2) 
though at a slightly lower rate of overall density for both 
men and women. During their careers 76 per cent of the 
men and 65 per cent of the women had been members of NUDE, 
whilst 59 per cent of the men and 29 per cent of the 
women had joined the relevant staff associations. In terms 
of 'current membership', the men were evenly balanced between 
the union and the staff associations (43% NUKE and 41% BSA's) 
whilst the women were more predominantly union members 
(41% NUBE and 18% BSA's). The NUBE density figures of 
the sample were typical of national density figures for 
NUDE: in 1970 male density in NUDE was 42.6 per cent and 
female density was 36 per cent. However both male and 
female staff association members were under-represented in 
the sample: in 1970 male density in the staff associations 
as a whole was 54 per cent and female density was 25 per 
cent. 
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Primarily because of the low rate of staff associa- 
tion membership among the women, the overall 'current' 
density of NUDE membership was considerably higher at 42 
per cent than the comparable 'current' membership of the 
staff associations (27 per cent). In this respect, Bank 
'B's staff association had made a particularly weak impact 
on the female staff although its male membership was 
higher than that of Bank 'A'. 
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As Table 6.6 shows, Bank '13' was more unionised overall 
than Bank 'A' having higher membership levels among both 
men and women. However, whilst in Dank 'A' NUKE member- 
ship was more widespread among both sexes than staff 
association membership, in Dank 'B' the men tended to join 
the staff association rather than the union. 
Six clerks in the sample (four men and two women) had 
taken up official positions in the staff associations. 
Five of these had been branch representatives whilst a 
sixth had been a member of the staff association committee 
for his local area. Additionally, two clerks (one man and 
one woman) had been branch representatives for the union. 
A surprising proportion of the clerks had attended public 
meetings conducted by the staff organisations of which 
they were members. Thus 40 per cent of the male members 
of both the union and the staff associations stated that they 
had attendalthese organisations' public meetings. Somewhat 
lower proportions of the female memberships (13 per cent in 
the case of the staff associations and 18 per cent in the 
case of the union) had attended such meetings. Although 
these numbers are substantial, rather few of the clerics 
described their attendance at the public meetings as 
'regular' and nearly 50 per cent stated that they had only 
attended these meetings once. 
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Both organisations had suffered high levels of lapsed 
memberships. Thus 39 per cent of the 'all time' NUDE 
members had lapsed, while 35 per cent of the 'all time' 
staff association members had done so. Whilst the women 
had tended to lapse from both organisations at similar 
rates (39% S. A. 's and 40% NUBE) the men had tended to lapse 
at a faster rate from NUDE (43%) than from the staff 
associations (32%). Here again however there was 
substantial regional variation; thus a large proportion of 
male and female staff association members were lost in the 
Leeds sample, whilst the vast majority of NUBE members 
(83%) had been lost in Coventry. Of the thirteen men and 
women who had left the staff association, seven (54 per 
cent) were 'current' members of NUBE - these switches of 
allegiance being concentrated in Leeds. Similarly of 
the twenty four men and women who had left NUBE, eleven 
(46 per cent) were 'current' members of the staff associa- 
tion. The remaining nineteen lapses were now not in any 
organisation, though five of them had joined both organisa- 
tions during their period in the banks but had lapsed from 
both. 
Looking at the features of lapsed membership, we find 
that very similar proportions of both men (38 per cent) and 
women (37.5 per cent) lapsed from the staff organisations. 
However, the men tended to remain in the staff organisations 
for longer periods before lapsing than their female colleagues. 
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Thus men remained in the staff organisations for an average 
of nearly seven years before lapsing, whilst the women 
retained their memberships for an average of 4.5 years. 
Staff association members tended to retain their membership 
for longer periods (averaging 6.4 years) than NUBE members 
who averaged 4.2 years membership before lapsing. Of all 
those lapsing from membership of the staff organisations, 
the most rapid turnover was among female NUDE members who 
remained with the union for an average of slightly less 
than three years. On the whole, the female memberships 
of both organisations tended to lapse after shorter periods 
than their corresponding male colleagues and this is a 
problem which both the union and the staff associations 
face in securing female membership growth which stands over 
and above the organisational problems posed by the 
higher turnover of women in the banks. 
Comparative Features of Union and Staff Association 
Membership 
All those who had been members of any staff organisation 
were asked, in respect of each organisation they had joined, 
how they had come to join the organisation and their 
reasons for joining it. Table 6.7 summarises their 
responses on how they came to join the organisations. 
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Table 6.7 
Responses to question: 'How did you come to , 
join? ' 
by sex and staff organisation of Joinee. 
Response 
Response to 
Leaflet 
Asked 
Canvassed 
Other 
D. K. /No 
Answer 
SA NUBS 
Males Females All Males Females All 
14 27 19 7 9 8 
59 L&7 54 68 85- 77 
1lj 7 11 0 0 0 
14 
101 
20 16 25 
101 100 100 
6 
100 
15 
100 
Staff association members had a greater tendency to join 
simply as a response to the recruiting literature circulated 
by the associations than NUDE members, and it seems likely 
that the semi-official nature of the staff association 
literature, was influential in this respect. By contrast, 
the union had had to work harder for its membership: thus 
41 per cent of the NUDE members specifically indicated that 
they had been canvassed during the course of organised 
recruiting drives and had joined in this context. This 
kind of situation was not mentioned by staff association 
members. 
When asked for specific reasons why they had joined 
the various staff organisations, the overall pattern of 
responses indicated a general lack of clearly directed 
involvement with the organisations. 
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Table 6.8 
Reasons Cited for joining Staff Organisations by sex 
and organisation 
Reasons SA NUBE 
Males Females All Males Females All 
No reason 
given 23 40 29 26 36 31 
Everyone 
in it 4 50% 0 40% 2 7 33% 27 63% 18 
Believed 
Compulsory 23 0 14 0 0 0 
Practical 18 27 22 26 21 25 
Ideological 0 13 5 18 9 13 
Financial 23 13 19 0 0 0 
Other 9 7 8 23 7 13 
100 100 99 100 100 100 
As Table 6.8 indicates, there was a reasonably clear cut 
pattern of reasons for joining the organisations. With 
respect to both organisations, the men were more likely to 
cite some reason for joining the organisation than the 
women, although in each organisation there were large groups 
of both men and women who could offer. no reason for 
joining the organisation other than citing the mechanism 
of how they came to join, or saying that they joined because 
'everyone else' had joined or was joining. Evidence for 
the more 'official' character of the staff organisations' 
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approaches to recruiting, besides showing up in the extra 
effort required to generate NUBE members 
(see Table 6.7), 
is also apparent in that 23 per cent of the male sample 
of staff association members had joined because they had 
believed that membership was compulsory. There was also 
a strong tendency for staff association members of both 
sexes who had been 'asked' to join, to indicate the rank 
of the person who had asked them to join. The ranks 
cited in these instances were uniformly high. 
Approximately a quarter of each organisation's member- 
ship gave practical reasons for joining. However NUDE 
members were much more likely to indicate the specific 
issues on which they had felt that the union would have 
an impact, whilst the staff association members tended to 
make general statements about the capacity of the staff 
associations to 'do something' for them whilst leaving the 
precise character of this 'something' unspecified. Specific 
issues which NUBE members cited wore banking hours, the union 
campaign to improve bank security and staff regrading as 
well more general issues such as salary negotiation. The 
female NUDE members had a particular tendency to deal in 
specifics vis a vis both their male colleagues in NUDE and 
their female colleagues in the staff associations, Finally, 
whilst the staff associations had a monopoly over the 
financial reasons for membership - which predominantly 
concerned low cost car insurance, union members were some- 
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what more likely to give ideological reasons for membership. 
In sum, membership of both organisations is a rather 
undramatic affair in which over 40 per cent of each 
organisations' members could give no real reason for 
membership. 
Members of both organisations were additionally asked 
two questions (one topen-ended' and one 'fixed choice' 
question) about the kinds of functions which they 
expected the organisations of which they were (or had been) 
members to perform. On the 'open-ended' question: 'What 
do you feel is the most important function of the staff 
association/union? ', there was again a tendency for staff 
association members' responses to be less clear-cut than 
those of union members. 
Table 6.9 
Most Important Function of Union/Staff Association Cited 
by Males and Females 
Function SA NTJJ3T 
Males Females Males Females 
No function cited 10 14 03 
Protect interests/ 
negotiate 62 29 85 73 
Look after individual 
cases 0 29 0 3 
Communicate Staff Views 0 0 7 3 
Maintain Dank Staffs status 4 0 4 3 
Provide discounts 9 0 0 0 
Look after Staff Welfare 5 7 0 10 
Other 9 21 4 3 
99 100 100 98 
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Two features stand out from Table 6.9. Firstly, whilst 
union members tended to have a very definite conception of 
union functions focused on the basic trade union functions 
of protecting members' interests and negotiating over 
salaries and conditions of work, the staff association 
members were less clear as to the associations' role. In 
particular, whilst a majority of male staff association 
members endorsed basic union functions for the staff 
associations, less than a third of the female membership 
did so. The second feature is that whilst the female NUBE 
members could cite clear-cut union objectives for NUDE, 
female staff association members tended to cite rather 
diffuse functions for the staff association, a large group 
simply interpreting the staff associations' functions in 
rather individualised 'internalist' fashion by suggesting 
that the staff association could sort out any individual 
problems which they might have in the bank. In sum, 
whilst the men of both organisations tended to see them 
in broadly trade union terms, the female members of NUBE 
had a clearer notion of what the union stood for and why 
they had joined its than female staff association members 
who were more unclear about why they had joined and what 
the organisation was for. 
A similar pattern emerged *hen the clerks were given 
a list of staff organisation activities and asked to indtcato 
which activity they thought it was most important for the 
staff association/union to do. Table 6.10 summarisos 
their responses, 
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Table 6.10 
Response to Fixed Choice QuQstion of 'Most Important' 
Activity of NUDE/Staff Association 
Activity 
Negotiate on salaries 
Represent staff opinion 
Prevent unfairness 
Assist members in 
difficulty 
Consult with employers 
on Company operations 
Promote the Good Name 
and status of members 
SA NUDE 
Males Females Males Females 
63 33 57 45 
18 60 25 45 
9 8 It 3 
5 0 3 6 
0 0 8 0 
5 0 3 0 
100 101 102 99 
Once again, a majority of men endorsed the traditional'trade 
union function for both organisations. The women, on the 
other hand, tended to see the staff organisations as means 
of making the employers aware of staff opinion -a trend 
which was particularly marked among staff association 
members. Only a small proportion of the clerks (male NUDE 
members only) considered that the organisations (in this 
case the union) should have some kind of role beyond simple 
salary negotiations in influencing general company policy. 
Taking these results together, it is clear that NUDE 
members had a more distinct perception of the role and 
function of the union than the staff association members 
had of their organisations. This perception was focused 
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on relatively orthodox trade union functions. However, 
whilst the male staff tended to adopt a generalised trade 
union orientation to both of the organisations operating 
in banking, the women tended to adopt different approaches 
to the two organisations. Thus the women who had joined 
the union were more likely than the men to specify particular 
practical reasons for joining, these reasons normally being 
associated with some issue in which they had a relatively 
concrete interest such as banking hours or bank security. 
By contrast, the women who had joined the staff associations 
tended to cite rather diffuse but once again individual 
reasons for joining, and tended to see the staff associations' 
functions in rather diffuse terms. In addition to having 
a tendency to cite more specific reasons for joining the 
union, the female union membership tended to have a relatively 
clear idea of its functions, whilst female staff association 
members seemed to have little idea of what they wanted from 
the association and no real conception of what the activities 
of a successful staff association could consist of. Whilst 
it would clearly be foolish to under-estimate the extent to 
which the female membership of both the union and the staff 
associations had been 'roped into' becoming relatively 
passive members of these organisations, it seems likely that 
the tendency for women to cite specific aspects of union 
activity, or personally significant functions of the staff 
associations as bases for membership is linked with their 
relatively short-term engagement with the banking scene. 
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Thus the male memberships of both types of organisation 
tended to view the organisations as long-term 'investments' 
whose immediate utility was not particularly significant. 
The fact that the female membership of the staff associa- 
tions were unclear about their role would, if generalised, 
explaining 
go some way towards/their relative lack of appeal to women 
whose interests would primarily be of a short-run character. 
As we have seen, a substantial proportion of men and 
women in the sample had left both the union and the staff 
associations. Their reasons for leaving the two organisa- 
tions however, were quite different as tables 6.11 and 6.12 
indicate. 
Table 6.11 
Reasons for Leaving the Staff Associations 
Reasons Males Females 
To join union 23 25 
Need ors representative 
negotiating body 23 12 
Staff association not 
separate from banks 38 38 
Staff association policy/ 
effectiveness 16 0 
Subscriptions 0 25 
100 100 
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Table 6.12 
Reasons for Leaving NUBE 
Reasons 
NUBE ineffective 
Subscriptions 
No need to continue membership 
Poor communications 
Ideological 
Equal Pay 
Other 
Males Females 
29 13 
36 47 
o 13 
7 13 
21 7 
7 0 
0 7 
100 100 
A large majority of both men and women had left the 
staff associations for reasons associated with doubts 
about their efficacy or about theirconnections with the 
bank employers which were believed to militate against 
its effectiveness. By contrast, the largest group of 
both men and women leaving NUDE had done so because they 
had not cared to maintain the level of subscriptions which 
would sustain an independent negotiating body. These 
results highlight one aspect of the clerks overall 
orientations to trade unions. On the one hand there was 
a widespread desire for effective bodies which could got 
results for staff, yet at the same time there was not a 
great deal of long-term commitment to either body. The 
female clerics in particular tended to see staff organisa- 
tions as bodies to be supported only as long as they were 
yielding results, and within this view subscriptions were 
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seen as investments which should pay off in the short run. 
This orientation accords with their short run approach to 
employment generally. Table 6.12 also illustrates another 
problem faced by NUBE in gaining results. Thus 29 per 
cent of the male staff had left NUBE because it had failed 
to get results, whilst a further 21 per cent had left 
because they objected to the means used by the union in wage 
and salary negotiations: this latter group complained 
about the union's lack of maturity or moderation in salary 
claims or more generally about its 'extremism'. As the 
responses of the male clerks indicate, the union is very 
often caught between two stools in which adequate pressure 
in pursuit of its demands will alienate one section of the 
membership, whilst failure to exert such pressure will 
alienate another section. 
In order to determine the general character of the 
bank workers' outlooks towards the staff organisations in 
banking, all clerks were asked in respect of each organisa- 
tion: 'Is there anything you particularly like about the 
(union /staff association)? '9 and 'Is there anything you 
particularly dislike or would want to change about it? ', 
As even a cursory glance at Tables 6.13 k, 6.16 will 
demonstrate, those questions did not evoke particularly 
positive responses -a large proportion of both men and 
women answering them in a primarily negative fashion, 
Thus, on average, 47 per cent of the men and 78 per cent 
of the women in the sample indicated that there was nothing 
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that they either liked or disliked about the staff 
organisations. Overall, NUBE attracted more definite 
responses than the staff associations and in general attracted 
more favourable than unfavourable comment. By contrast, 
the staff associations tended not to attract definite 
comment and where they did this comment was more likely to 
be unfavourable than favourable, Doth the general nature 
of the comments, and the ratios of favourable to unfavourable 
comment between the two organisations were consistent with 
the pattern of staff organisation membership in the sample 
as a whole, which, it will be recalled, was concentrated 
in NUDE. In all cases the female staff could find less 
reasons than their male colleagues for liking or dis- 
liking the staff organisations irrespective of whether 
they were members of them or not, In general, however, 
the members of staff organisations were considerably more 
likely to find something definite to like about the staff 
organisation they had joined than was the overall sample, 
but were roughly as likely to find some source of 
criticism as the sample as a whole. Turning to the 
specific organisations, we find that the overall sample 
was most indifferent with respect to the virtues of the 
staff associations, 63 per cent of the men and 84 per cent 
of the women finding nothing that they particularly liked 
about them. Of the men and women in the overall sample 
who indicated a specific virtue of the staff associations, 
a majority cited the financial benefits - in the form of 
- 357 - 
Table 6.13 
Responses to question: Is there anything you particularly 
like about the Staff Association? by sex and staff 
association membership (current) 
Item Males Females 
All SA All SA 
Nothing/D. K. 63 33 84+ l4 
Insurance/Financial Benefit 24 40 12 33 
Looks after individual cases 5 13 4 22 
Effectiveness 3 7 0 0 
Communication 5 7 0 0 
Other 0 0 0 0 
100 100 100 99 
cheap insurance schemes, commercial discounts and the like - 
of membership. These benefits were also predominantly 
cited by the 'current' memberships of the staff associations. 
The predominance of this class of benefits of the 
associations together with the large scale absence of 
enthusiasm for the organisations means in turn that neither 
the overall sample nor the staff association members found 
a great deal to enthuse about with respect to the staff 
associations' work in representing bank staffs in negotia- 
tions with the employers or their other more 'unionate' 
functions. Thus in the overall sample, only 13 per cent 
of the men and 4 per cent of the women cited virtues of 
the staff associations which were connected with their 
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basic functions, and only 27 per cent of male staff 
association members and 22 per cent of female membership 
also cited virtues of the staff association which were 
connected with the staff associations' basic functions. 
Moreover only 7 per cent of the male membership of the 
staff associations (and none of the female membership) cited 
the 'effectiveness' of the associations as a benefit, although 
a substantial proportion of the female membership (22 per 
cent) and a minority of the male membership (13 per cent) 
did suggest that the staff associations would look after 
individual cases, 
On the negative side, the overall sample was bettor able 
to cite aspects of the associations which were not approved 
oft though the staff associations' members evinced a 
slightly greater degree of satisfaction than the sample as 
a whole. 
Table 6.14 
Responses to question: Is there anything you particularly 
dislike or would like to change about the staff association? 
by sex and current staff association membership, 
Item 
Nothing/D. K. 
Connection with Banks/Bank 
Policy/Bank Finance 
ineffectiveness 
Impersonality 
Anti-NUßn role 
Single Bank Basis 
Poor Communication 
Mains Females 
All SA All SA 
Z3 47 82 78 
32 140 8 0 
8 0 2 0 
0 0 2 0 
8 0 0 0 
3 0 2 0 
5 13 4 22 
101 100 100 100 
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A substantial proportion of the male clerks (32 per cent) 
disliked the staff associations' connections with the banks, 
whilst small proportions complained of their ineffectiveness, 
their role in undermining the position of NUDE and their 
poor communications. As before, the female staff could find 
little to criticise in the staff associations, a small 
proportion (8 per cent) objecting to their connections 
with the banks and a few others indicating other types of 
criticism. Among the staff association members themselves, 
the men had a greater tendency to criticise the staff 
associations' connections with the bank than the overall 
male sample, but the female membership, by contrast, failed 
to mention this criticism at all. Predictably, the criticism 
that the staff associations are too closely connected with 
the banks was most powerfully voiced by those clerks who 
had left them. Thus 46 per cent of those who had left the 
staff association indicated this source of criticism. Both 
the male (13 per cent) and the female (22 per cent) member- 
ship of the staff associations were also critical of the 
state of communications between the staff associations 
and their memberships. 
Turning now to views about NUDE, both the men and the 
women in the overall sample were more able to locate positive 
virtues in the union than they had been with respect to the 
staff associations. 
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Table 6.1 
Responses to question: Is there anything you particularly 
like about NUBS? by sex and current NUBS membership. 
Item Males 
All NUt3E 
33 25 
Females 
All NUDE 
70 48 Nothing/D. K. 
Efficacy/Achieves 
wage increases 
Independence 
Will assist in solving 
individual problems 
Good Communications 
Insurance/Financial 
Registered under 
Industrial Relations Act 
Other 
30 25 22 38 
16 25 0 0 
5 0 4 4+ 
8 19 0 0 
0 0 4 10 
5 6 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
100 100 100 100 
With respect to the overall sample, the men were decisively 
more able to identify the specific virtues of the union, 
though more women were specific with respect to this question 
than any of the others. This pattern was repeated among 
the current union members, where the men were half as likely 
to indicate no specific virtue of the union than their 
female counterparts. In the overall sample, both sexes 
agreed In considerable numbers that the union was effective 
in pursuing its policies and achieving wage and salary 
increases. It was notable that nearly a quarter of those 
staff who had never joined the union (22 per cent) cited 
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the union's effectiveness as a positive feature: this 
figure may be compared with the 92 per cent of staff 
citing 'nothing' in favour of the staff associations of 
the total who had never joined them. A further substantial 
proportion of male bank staffs also mentioned the union's 
independence from the bank employers as a factor in its 
favour, though this view - as might be expected - was 
concentrated among NUBE members. Amongst the membership 
of the union, there was a tendency for the two sexes to 
cite different virtues of the union. The men tended to 
cite the more 'structural' features of the union as 
virtues such as its independence from the employers and 
its 'good communications', whilst the female staff tended 
to endorse the union's more short term benefits - its 
capacity to generate wage increases and its financial 
benefits. 
In contrast to the staff associations, criticism of 
the union were somewhat diffused and lacking in focus in 
both the overall sample and the union membership. In 
the overall sample, small proportions of the men expressed 
a dislike of the union's 'extremism', its poor communications 
and its weakness. A similarly small proportion of the 
female staff (some of them union members) voiced their 
dislike of unions and strikes in general. Amongst the 
union membership there was agreement among; a minority of 
both sexes that union communications wore poor, and nearly 
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Table 6.16 
Responses to question: Is there anything you particularly 
dislike or would want to change about NUDE? by sex and 
current membership. 
Item Males Females 
All NUDE All NU13E 
Nothing/D. K. b9 44 75 76 
Union Extremism, 11 6 4 5 
Extension of recruitment 
to non-Bank staff 3 0 0 0 
Poor communications 11 13 8 10 
Dislike unions 0 0 8 5 
Dislike strikes 0 0 4 5 
Union's weakness 11 19 2 0 
Basis in all banks 3 0 0 0 
Other 13 19 0 0 
101 101 101 101 
20 per cent of the male membership complained that the union 
was too weak and lacked punch and effectiveness. Of those 
who had left the union, the largest proportion who indicated 
a specific 'dislike' vis a vis the union complained of 
its poor communications (17 per cent), whilst a substantial 
group of male ex-NUI3E members (25 per cunt) criticised 
its extremism. 
In sum, perhaps the most striking feature of the 
various points raised in this section is the contrast between 
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the willingness of both men and women to join the staff 
organisations in banking on the one hand and the rather 
low level of significance which is attached to their 
membership of these organisations on the other. Thus,, 
although the bank clerks joined the staff organisations 
with apparent readiness, many of them could give no 
particular reason for joining and a substantial proportion 
of both the men and the women were unable to give any 
serious indication of the advantages or disadvantages of 
the organisations of which they were members. 
Within the generally low level of significance which 
the staff attached to staff organisational matters, there 
were some differentiating features, On the whole the men 
were more opinionated than the women about the staff 
organisations of which they were members. This iss of 
course, consistent with the longer periods which they had 
spent in banking and their tendency to remain within the 
various staff organisations for longer periods. Equally, 
there was a tendency for their responses to questions 
regarding organisational issues to be rather more 'principled' 
than those of the female staff for whom short term practical 
questions were of greater significance. Again the samplo 
as a whole was more definite in its views about the union 
than the staff associations. Isere, although the comparative 
under-representation of staff association members is likely 
to have influenced this result, the rather lower profile 
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kept by the staff associations is evidenced by the fact 
that those who had never joined the union were more likely 
to hold opinions about it (both positive and negative) 
than those who had never joined the staff associations 
were to hold opinions about them. 
Although striking, the low level of general significance 
attached to matters connected with the staff organisations 
by the bank staff is not surprising. Rather, it is 
consistent with the orientations to work among the bank 
staff. Thus, for men with long-term career objectives 
the union or staff association is a rather unimportant 
'safety-net' which is available in the background as a 
means of exercising a staff influence over overall salary 
levels whilst the male staff, as individuals, compete for 
the rewards of a career, For the women, on the other 
hand, for whom work per so has a generally lower salience, 
the union or staff association is far from being of abstract 
or 'background' significance. On the contrary, when it has 
any significance at all, the union or staff association 
is significant in terms of the most immediate and concrete 
'bread and butter' issues. For the woman who expects to 
work for two to four years, the union or staff association 
cannot be expected to be an issue of long-torm, principled 
or ideological significance. On the contrary, the staff 
organisation is a weekly or monthly expense and, as such, 
a weekly or monthly irritant which is normally devoid of 
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immediate benefit. When it is joined, the staff 
organisation is thus seen in terms of its relevance 
(or 
otherwise) to specific objectives rather than abstract, 
long-term issues. Thus the female sample tended to be 
highly specific when describing the functions of the 
staff organisations or, in default of specificity, to 
cite no functions at all. 
6,4, Staff. Organisation Membership and Orientations 
to Work. 
In this section we report a number of, predominantly 
negative, findings relating to the association of staff 
organisation membership with various types of attitude 
expressed by the bank staffs on the one hand and aspects 
of their social experience on the other. 
(i) No relationship was established, for either sex, 
between 'current membership' of either type of staff 
organisation and class background (as indexed by parental 
occupation). A similarly negative result was obtained, 
for both sexes, in respect of the overall rate of joining 
the staff organisations. Both men and women joined the 
two organisations in proportion to the overall membership 
distributions of the organisations irrespective of social 
class background. 
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(ii) No relationship was established, for either sex, 
between 'current membership' of either staff organisation 
and the position occupied in branch hierarchy. In 
particular, it was not the case that senior male bank 
staff were less likely to be NUF3E members, or more likely 
to have lapsed from NUBE membership, 'or more likely to 
have joined the staff association than their junior male 
colleagues. 
(iii) Similarly, no relationship was established 
between staff organisation membership and subjective estimates 
of future success within the bank, In particular, it was 
not the case that those men who believed that they would 
be promoted to manager or above were less likely to be 
NUDE members or more likely to be staff association 
members than their colleagues who believed their chances of 
promotion to be more limited in scope. 
(iv) In the main questionnaire two questions seemed pre. 
eminently to tap fundamental levels of job satisfaction 
and identification with the banking world as an arena 
within which a degree of personal fulfilment could be 
achieved. These questions were; (1) 'If you had your 
opportunities over again, would you choose a career in 
banking? ', and (2) 'Have you ever thought of leaving the 
bank? ', With respect to the first question, which was 
believed to tap a more 'global' dimension of job 
satisfaction, it will be recalled that nearly equal numbers 
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of men expressed positive and negative views, whilst 
three quarters of the female sample suggested that they 
would choose banking again. In this context, we noted 
that the male staffs' demands of banking were considerably 
greater and that the failure of banking to live up to 
these expectations was not translated into other forms 
of rejection of the firm as an employer. Similarly, 
whilst female bank staffs were apparently a good deal more 
satisfied with banking 'as a career', this satisfaction 
seemed to mask a general pattern of expectations which 
was much lower than that for the male staff and this was 
associated with a reduced saliency, for the women, of all 
aspects of bank work and was not translated into approval 
for the firm as an employer. In the light of the above, 
it is not surprising that no association could be established, 
for either men or women, between staff organisation member- 
ship and responses to the question concerning the choice 
of banking again. In particular, it was not the case, 
for either men or women, that NUDE membership was 
associated with a tendency to suggest that a career in 
banking would not be undertaken with the advantage of 
hindsight. 
With respect to the second question: 'Have you 
over thought of leaving the bank? ', there was a clear- 
cut division between the sexes. Among the men, those 
who had joined the union were more likely to have 
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considered leaving the bank than those who had never joined 
it. This association did not hold among those men who 
had joined the staff association. Since joining LAUBE 
seems historically to have been a general way of expressing 
dissatisfaction with local aspects of bank employment and 
the reasons cited by the men for considering leaving bank 
employment were predominantly 'short-run' in character 
this association would appear reasonable. Amongst the 
women, by contrast, there was no association between 
membership or non-membership of either type of organisation 
and expressed consideration of leaving bank employment. 
Table 6.17 
Responses to Question: 'Have you ever thought of. leaving 
Zc c ?1 by sex and staff organisation membership. 
MALES 
Yes No Total N 
Overall 76 21 100 37 
Never BSA members 67 33 100 15 
Current BSA members 73 27 100 15 
Lapsed BSA members 100 0 100 7 
Never NUDE members 44 56 100 9 
Current NUBE members 87.5 12,5 100 16 
Lapsed NUBE members 83 17 100 12 
FEMALES 
Overall 55 h5 100 51 
Never BSA members 56 44 100 36 
Current BSA members 56 44 100 9 
Lapsed BSA members 50 50 100 6 
Never NUDE members 50 50 100 18 
Current NUDE members 52 48 100 21 
Lapsed NUBE members 67 33 100 12 
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The sole clear-cut discrimination in Table 6.17 is that 
between the current male membership of NUDE (87.5% of whom 
have considered leaving the bank) and those men who have 
never joined NUDE of whom only t4% have considered leaving. 
The absence of a comparable discrimination among female 
bank staffs is consistent with their generally lower and 
more transient experience of dissatisfaction with bank 
employment and with the generally less 'motivated' character 
of their membership of staff organisations. 
(v) As we have already seen, few bank clerks endorsed a 
'conflict' view of employer-employee relationships or stated 
that staff/employer relations in the bank were not 'very 
good' and correspondingly little in the way of inference can 
be attached to the organisational affiliations of these 
clerics. Thus of the seven men and women who had said that 
employers and employees were 'really on opposite sides', two 
were current NUDE members and one was a current staff 
association member; and five had had NUDE affiliations, 
whilst three had had staff association affiliations. 
Similarly, of the 7 men and 6 women who had denied that the 
relationship between employers and employees was 'very good', 
ten persons (six men, four women) had been members of NUDE 
whilst six (three men, three women) had boon staff 
association members. 
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Thus whilst there is a balance towards NUBE here, it 
could hardly be described as significant. Similarly of 
the ten persons who said that 'unions are for manual 
workers' (three men, seven women), all three men had been 
members of LAUBE and one was a current member whilst the 
women were slightly more consistent in that five of them 
had never joined NUBE and the other two had left the 
union. We note these findings, but can male little in 
the way of comment as to their significance. 
(vi) Two questions relating to comparative evaluation of 
incomes were asked of all clerks. The first ('What do you 
think about the pay of men in industry generally as opposed 
to your own? ') in inviting clerks to evaluate the pay of 
other groups of workers in relation to their own, was designed 
to induce clerks to reflect on the 'social justice' aspect 
of the question of earnings differentials. The second 
question by contrast ('How do you feel about your earnings 
compared with other people's? ')v was designed to induce the 
clerks to reflect on the 'relative deprivation' aspect of 
the earnings comparison. As we have already reported, the 
male clerks were a great deal loss satisfied with their own 
pay relative to 'other people's' and somewhat more critical 
of the pay of 'men in industry' than their female colleagues. 
On the whole, it seemed that the women felt that they were 
well paid and, in some cases, their class background was 
sufficiently strong to prevent them from making disparaging 
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comments about the pay of 'men in industry'. By 
contrast, it appeared that the male staff felt relatively 
poorly paid and were more prone, in virtue of their more 
predominantly non-manual backgrounds to criticise the levels 
of pay in industry. Table 6.18 sets out the pattern of 
responses of men and women to the question of their own 
earnings classified by organisational membership. 
Table 6,18 
Responses to questions ºHow do you feel about your earnings 
compared to other people's? ' by sex and staff organisation 
membership. 
MALES 
Good About Not D, K, Total N 
average very 
good 
Overall 19 29 48 3 99 31 
Never BSA members 9 27 55 9 100 11 
Current BSA members 20 33 47 0 100 15 
Lapsed BSA members 40 20 40 0 100 5 
Never NUDE members 43 43 14 0 100 7 
Current NUDE members 8 31 62 0 101 13 
Lapsed NUKE members 18 18 54 9 99 11 
FEMALES 
Overall 54+ 35 11 0 100 37 
Never BSA members 46 42 12 0 100 24 
Current BSA members 62.5 25 12.5 0 100 8 
Lapsed BSA members 80 20 0 0 100 5 
Never NUDE members 50 42 8 0 100 12 
Current NU13E members 53 33 13 0 100 1; 
Lapsed NUDE members 60 30 10 0 100 1C 
(Reduced sample of 68 respondents) 
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Table 6.18 demonstrates that, whilst there was a generally 
uniform attitude to pay among the female bank staffs regardless 
of organisational affiliation, among the male clerks there 
was a striking tendency for union members to characterise 
their pay as 'not so good' by comparison with those who had 
never joined NUBE, whilst the'latter had a greater tendency 
to characterise their pay as 'good'. Turning to the 
question of 'other people's pay'. Table 6.19 sets out a 
parallel classification. 
Table 6.19 
Resp onses to Question: What do you think about the pay of 
men in industry generally as opp osed to your own? Would you 
say that in general they earned: too much. too little or 
about right? ' by sex and staff organisation membership 
MALES 
Too Too About DK Total N 
Much Little right 
Overall 35 8 46 11 100 37 
Never BSA members 40 0 33 27 100 15 
Current BSA members 'to 13 47 0 100 15 
Lapsed BSA members 14 14 72 0 100 7 
Never LAUBE members 33 11 44 11 100 9 
Current NUDE members 37.5 6 44 12.5 100 16 
Lapsed NUDE members 33 8 42 17 100 12 
FEMALES 
Overall 16 22 51 12 101 51 
Never BSA members 11 25 56 8 100 36 
Current BSA members 44 11 44 0 99 9 
Lapsed BSA members 0 16 33 50 99 6 
Never NUDE members 6 22 67 6 101 18 
Current NUDE members 144 29 43 14 100 21 
Lapsed NUKE members 33 8 42 17 100 12 
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As Table 6.19 demonstrates, there was substantial uniformity 
in response to the question of 'other people's pay' among 
male clerks regardless of staff organisation membership. 
Among the female clerks, by contrast, current NUDE members 
were more likely to say that men in industry earned ttoo 
little' and less likely to say that they earned 'too much' 
than the current staff association members. 
We thus find union membership to be associated with 
feelings of 'relative deprivation' among male bank clerks, 
and possibly with a more vague commitment to general 
egalitarianism with respect to wage differentials among 
female bank clerks. In turn this differentiation in 
responses is not inconsistent with the differences in class 
background among men and women in banking. 
(vii) Given the different historical backgrounds and 
characteristics of the staff organisations operative in 
banlcing, one would undoubtedly expect to find differing 
orientations to the stance which should be taken by the 
organisations in representing members' viewpoints to the 
bank employers and more generally to the question of 
industrial action. To assess whether this expectation 
is a reasonable one, the clerks' responses to two 
questions were cross-tabulated by staff organisation member- 
ship. The first question, which was designed to establish 
the extent to which clerks saw their representation by the 
organisations to the employers as a competitive or 
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inherently conflictual process, was: 'Some people say that 
the union/staff association should consider the interests 
of the Bank when representing the opinions of its members, 
whilst others say that it should not. What do you think? ' 
The distribution of responses to this question among the 
'current' membership of the two organisations is set out 
in Table 6.20 below, 
Table 6.20 
Responses to the question of considering 'Bank Interests' 
when representing the opinions of the membership, by sex 
and 'current' organisational affiliation, 
MALES Dank interests Bank interests 'It Total N 
Should be Should Not be depends' 
considered. considered, or DK, * 
Current 
BSA 60 33 7 100 15 
Current 
NUKE 62.5 37.5 0 100 16 
FEMALES 
Current 
BSA 67 22 11* 100 9 
Current 
NUBE 81 19 0 100 21 
As Table 6.20 indicates, the female membership of both 
organisations tended to be somewhat more conciliatory than 
the male membership in its conceptualisation of how opinions 
should be 'represented' to employers, the men tending to 
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indicate - regardless of organisation - that bank interests 
should not be considered during such representations to a 
greater extent than their female counterparts. Among the 
men, answers to this question were not differentiated by 
staff organisation membership. Although there is an 
apparent discrimination among the female staffs with respect 
to this question by organisation - the union members 
appearing more conciliatory - little reliance can be placed 
on this result. There is substantial uniformity of response 
on the negative side of the question, whilst the level of 
affirmative answers to the question would be raised to 78% 
by the movement of a single respondent from the 'don't know' 
category to the affirmative. In general, it would appear 
that bank clerks would expect their representatives to 
adopt a 'reasonable', 'realistic' or even 'conciliatory' 
approach to join discussions with management and that this 
expectation holds almost irrespective of the staff organisa- 
tion joined with the female staffs adopting a somewhat more 
conciliatory position than their male counterparts. 
Ultimately however, the strength of any kind of 
employee organisation rests upon the willingness of its 
members to withdraw their labour in pursuit of their aims. 
In order to assess the willingness of the memberships of 
the two organisations to undertake industrial action, the 
following question was put to all those who had been 
members of either organisation: 'If the staff association/ 
union was ever to recommend some form of industrial action 
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to you (e. g., a letter of protest, not doing paperwork, 
or even a one day strike), how acceptable do you think you 
would find this recommendation? '. Table 6.21 sets out the 
clerks responses to this question. 
Table 6.21 
Responses to the question of 'Industrial Action' by sex and 
'current' organisational affiliation. 
MALES Acceptable Unacceptable 'It depends/ Total 
rN D. K. * 
Current BSA 0 33 67 100 15 
Current NUBE 19 31 50 100 16 
FEMALES 
Current BSA 11 56 11/22* 100 9 
Current NTJ}3E 14 33 52 99 21 
Whilst the specifics of table 6.21 are difficult to interpret, 
it is clear that - for both men and women - union members 
are somewhat more aggressive in terms of their willingness 
to undertake industrial action than their staff association' 
counterparts. Thus among the men, a similar proportion 
of both organisations' members would find industrial action 
an 'unacceptable' recommendation, however of the remainder 
the NUDE sample had a tendency to be more affirmative in 
their response to the question. Similarly, among the 
women, roughly equal proportions of both organisations' 
members would find a recommendation of industrial action 
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'acceptable', but of the remainder a rather higher percentage 
of staff association members said that the recommendation 
would be 'unacceptable', In what must necessarily be a 
rough gloss of the situation, we might say that among the 
males, NUBE members are less equivocal about the possibility 
of strike action given a common proportion of dislike for 
industrial action with the staff associations. Whilst 
among the females, NUBE members are more equivocal about 
strike action given a common proportion of members finding 
industrial action 'acceptable' with the staff associations. 
For both sexes then, it is the case that NUDE members are 
somewhat more 'militant'. 
In sum, the staff organisational memberships of both 
male and female bank clerks are not associated with their 
class background, position in the branch hierarchy, subjective 
estimates of promotion prospects or a 'conflict' view of 
industrial relations. Overall, both maL. e and female 
bank staffs adopted broadly similar attitudes towards 
questions relating to industrial conflict and, although 
union members tended to be marginally more aggressive in 
their approach towards industrial relations issues, there 
was an impressive degree of unanimity over such questions 
between same sox members of the different organisations. 
The only exceptions to this remarkably negative picture 
are the marked associations among male staff between NUDE 
membership (either current or lapsed) and the desire to leavo 
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the bank and frustration over pay, Those men who had never 
joined NUDE were very much less likely to have considered 
leaving the banks or to be dissatisfied over their levels 
of pay. 
At first sight these results are rather surprising. 
As we have already seen, men and women in banking have 
very different orientations to work and it, would be 
reasonable to expect some equivalent differentiation between 
their respective attitudes to the staff organisations in 
banking. Moreover, it might be expected that these 
differing orientations to work, in mediating the clerks' 
responses to trade unionism and its internalist alternatives 
in banking, might influence the relationships between 
organisational membership and the various sociological 
'background' factors. As it is, the association between 
male union membership and dissatisfactions with bank 
employment in general and pay in particular suggests only 
that men may tend to join the union in a more definite spirit 
of protest and alienation than they do the staff associations, 
This, of course, contrasts with the female sample who 
exhibited a greater degree of satisfaction with bank 
employment and their pay and who did not apparently enter 
either type of staff organisation under the impact of feelings 
of disaffection. 
However, if the predominantly negative tone of these 
results is at first surprising, it is less so upon closor 
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inspection of the data. For, although men and women 
in banking have substantially different orientations to 
work, these differing orientations converge in assigning 
a low level of significance to staff organisation membership 
per se. For their different reasons, neither the male 
nor the female staff see trade union or staff association 
membership as occupying a central role in their occupational 
environment and, given this low level of significance, we 
should expect that the choice of staff organisation 
membership may not involve high levels of anxiety or 
weighty consideration. 
0) 
This latter point is borne out 
to some extent by the frequency with which clerks of both 
sexes lapsed from the staff organisations or transferred 
their allegiances from one to the other, Moreover the 
functional and social co-operation which is characteristic 
of branch life is conducive to the formation of common 
attitudes and orientations towards the institutions of 
banking, including of course its collective organisations, 
whilst the small scale and particularisms of the branch mili- 
tate against the formation of powerful collective : ideologies. 
Under these conditions, it would indeed be surprising to 
find that the memberships of the two types of organisation 
were sharply differentiated in their attitudes towards 
industrial relations issues or that they werd differentiated 
with respect to sociological variables. This is not to 
say, of course, that the members of the rival organisations 
do not hold beliefs and ideologies which are, in important 
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respects, conflictual. Such views did, on the contrary, 
appear in responses to various of the questions which were 
put. It is to say however, that, when viewed against the 
background of branch life as a whole, these views were 
not especially signi'fican±. They . do not divide bank 
clerk against bank clerk and, although they were in some 
important respects tied to specific types of staff 
organisation and indeed reflected the ideologies of these 
organisations, they were not systematically distributed 
among the bank staffs on any other basis. 
6.5 Clerical Orientations to Politics 
In order to establish the general saliency of political 
and staff organisational issues for the sample, the clerks 
were asked to identify a number of public figures inside 
and outside the world of banking, Each interviewee was 
asked to name six personalities who were identified by their 
public role. The personalities who the clerks were asked 
to name were as follows: the foreign secretary (Sir Alec 
Douglas Home), the Chairman of the Dank employing them, 
the general secretary of the TUC (Vic Feather), the general 
secretary of NUDE (Brooks/Mills), the general secretary of 
the employing bank's staff association, and the democratic 
candidate for the Presidency of the USA in 1971 (McGovern), 
Table 6.22 indicates the frequency of correct replies for 
male and female clerks. 
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Table 6.22 
Level of 'General Knowledge' of public and banking 
personalities by sex, 
Personalities Percentage Frequency of Correct 
responses 
Males Females 
Foreign Secretary 97% 451 
TUC General Secretary 89% 65% 
Chairman of the Bank 73% 29% 
Democratic candidate for 
U. S. A. 57% 31% 
NUBE General Secretary 49% 10 
Staff Association 
General Secretary 38% 12% 
Both male and female clerks were rather more poorly informed 
about banking figures than 'public' figures, the only 
exception to this trend being the relatively high level 
of male knowledge concerning the chairman of the bank. 
It is noticeable that the lowest levels of knowledge were 
displayed in relation to major figures in the bank staff 
organisations. The female sample displayed a remarkably 
low level of knowledge in this regard. Thus, although 
65 per cent of the female sample had been members of NUDE 
and 41 per cent were currently members of it, only 10 per 
cent could correctly identify its general secretary despite 
the fact that two names were allowed as correct responses 
to the question. An equally low level of information was 
displayed in relation to the leadership of the staff 
associations. Among the men, the proportions identifying 
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the leaders of the staff organisations were lower than 
the proportions who had, at some time, been members of 
the organisation but were roughly equal to the proportions 
who were current members of the relevant organisations. 
Neither the male nor the female clerks seemed, at 
the time of interview, to believe in the efficacy of the 
ballot box. Thus when the clerks were asked: 'In the 
event of an election, do you think that it will make a 
great deal of difference whether the Conservatives or 
Labour win. Or do you feel that it won't make much 
difference who wins? ', only 49 per cent of the men and 
27 per cent of the women felt that the election result 
would make a difference. As Table 6.23 indicates, there 
was a slight tendency for the belief that the election 
would make 'no difference' to be associated with union 
membership. 
Table 6.23 
Responses to the question of whether the result of the 
election will 'make a difference' by sex and staff 
organisation membership 
MASS Will make No DK Total N 
a difference difference 
Overall 49 1ºG 5 100 37 
Never BSA 46.5 46.5 7 100 15 
Current BSA 53 40 7 100 15 
Lapsed BSA 113 57 0 100 7 
Never NUDE 33 55 22 99 9 
Current NUBE 31 69 0 100 16 
Lapsed NUDE 83 17 0 100 12 
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FEMALES 
Table 6.23 (continued) 
'Difference' Difference DK Total N 
Overall 27 73 0 100 51 
Never BSA 19 81 0 100 36 
Current BSA 44 56 0 100 9 
Lapsed BSA 50 50 0 100 6 
Never NUBE 28 72 0 100 18 
Current NUBE 24 76 0 100 21 
Lapsed NUBE 33 67 0 100 12 
Within the sample, both the men and the women who were 
'current' members of NUBE were less likely to indicate that 
the results of the election twould make a difference' than 
their counterparts who were 'current' members of the staff 
associations. At the same time however, repponses to this 
question were not differentiated in respect of 'current', 
versus 'never' members of these organisations except in the 
case of female staff association members, The relationship 
between union membership and the belief that the result of 
the election would not 'make a difference' took different 
forms in the male and female samples. Thus male 'current' 
staff association members' responses were similar to those 
of the sample as a whole whilst male 'current' union 
members were less likely to indicate that the results of the 
election would 'make a difference' than the sample as a 
whole. In the female sample, by contrast, 'current' union 
members responses were similar to those for the sample 
as a whole, whilst 'current' staff association members 
formed a small deviant minority who were more likely 
to indicate that the election would 'make a difference'4, 
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On a further question as to the voting intention of 
the sample 'when the election comes', there was, as Table 
6.211 shows, no discernable association among the men between 
voting intention and current organisational membership. 
Table 6.24 
Responses to the question 'When the Election comes, how do 
you think you will vote? ' by sex and organidational affiliation 
MALES Wz not not l ---l Cons, Lab. Lib. Refused Total N n Vo 
Overall 11 38 14 27 11 101 37 
Never BSA 7 33 27 20 13 100 15 
Current BSA 20 33 7 33 7 100 15 
Lapsed BSA 14 57 0 29 0 100 7 
Never NUKE 33 22 22 11 11 99 9 
Current NUDE 12.5 37.5 12.5 37.5 0 100 16 
Lapsed NUBE 8 50 8 25 8 99 12 
FEMALES 
Overall 14 33 20 25 8 100 51 
Never BSA 11 28 25 28 8 100 36 
Current BSA 11 44 11 22 11 99 9 
Lapsed BSA 33 50 0 17 0 100 6 
Never NUBE 6 39 11 33 11 100 18 
Current NUBE 24 24 29 24 0 101 21 
Lapsed LAUBE 8 42 17 17 17 101 12 
Among the women however, there was a slight tendency for 
intending Conservative voters to be over-represented within 
the staff associations and under-reprosented in the union, 
while Labour voters tended to be under-reprosontod in the 
staff association and over-represented in the union. There 
was no association between a Liberal voting intention and 
'current' membership of either type of' organisation among 
either men or women. 
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The question of voting intention was, however, quite 
strikingly associated with the class background of the clerks 
as indexed by father's occupation. 
Table 6,2$ 
Responses to the question 'When the Election comes. how do 
you think you will vote? ' by sex and father's occupation 
MALS 
Will not Cons. Lab. Lib. Total N 
Vote .. 
Overall 12 42 15 30 99 33 
Professional 0 100 0 0 100 2 
Intermediate 8 50 17 25 100 12 
Skilled 0 38 8 54 100 13 
Semi-Skilled 50 17 33 0 100 6 
FEMALES 
Overall 15 37- 22 26 100 46 
Professional 0 0 0 100 100 1 
Intermediate 0 73 13 13 99 15 
Skilled 21 21 21 37 100 19 
Semi-Skilled 27 18 36 18 99 11 
(Reduced sample of 79 persons, achieved by eliminating those 
who refused to answer the question) 
Among the male sample, Conservative voting intentions 
progressively declined with declining categories of parental 
occupation, whilst Labour voting intentions increased with the 
exception of those clerks coming from 'skilled' occupational 
backgrounds amongst whom the Liberal vote 'peaked' (during 
a period of high Liberal popularity) at 54 per cent. Among 
female sample a classic pattern emerged of declining 
Conservative voting intentions and rising labour voting 
intentions associated with declining categories of parental 
occupation. The Liberal voting intention pattern 'peaks', 
once again, among those female clerks having ! skilled' 
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occupational backgrounds and the intention not to vote 
rises with declining occupational background. 
In addition to questions about the clerks party 
political preferences, a series of four questions of 
general political significance were put to the entire 
sample. These questions concerned the 'excessive' power 
wielded by trade unions and 'big business' respectively, 
the fairness of the Conservatives' Industrial Relations 
Act and the association between the Labour party and the 
trade union movement. As we might expect from the 
'conservatism with a small 'c'/liberalism' of the male 
clerks, there was a majority for both the view that the 
'trade unions have too much power in this country' and 
the 'big business have too much power in the country', where 
the majority for the former view (78%) was greater than for 
the latter (57%). A large majority of the men felt that 
the Conservatives' Industrial Relations Act was fair to the 
unions (78%) and a majority (69%) disapproved of the 
connection between the trade union movement and the Labour 
party. Turning to the female sample, we find that despite 
the greater degree of support for the Labour party among 
this group the general pattern of attitudes is marginally 
to the 'right' of the male sample. Thus the women were 
equally prone to agree that the trade unions had too much 
power (78%) but were rather less persuaded of the equivalent 
proposition for 'big businessmen' (51%) and were marginally 
L43 
prone to disapprove of the association between the 
union movement and the abour party (61%). A majority of 
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the female sample (51%) were unable to express a view on 
the Industrial Relations Act, but of those who did express 
a view 89 per cent viewed it as 'fair' to the trade unions. 
When these views were broken down by organisational 
affiliation, the male sample remained fairly uniform in 
spite of differences in organisational membership, Thus 
both union members and staff association members agreed in 
approximately equal proportions that the Industrial Relations 
Act was fair (81%/80%), that 'big businessmen' held too much 
power (50n/53ä), Union members had a greater tendency to 
object to union support for the Labour party (65%/53%) - 
possibly because qua union members, the issue had greater 
salience for them - and were markedly less prone to agree 
that trade unions held too much power (69%/93%), Among 
the female sample however, union membership had a less 
ambiguous and more powerful discriminating association with 
the pattern of responses to the questions, Thus female 
union members were more likely to avow that big businessmen 
had too much power (67%/44%), less likely to agree that 
trade unions have too much power (81%/89%)p and were more 
prone to approve of union support for the Labour party than 
their staff association counterparts (43%/22%), The 
large category of female clerks who were unable to express 
a view on the Industrial Relations Act vitiates any attempt 
at interpreting the differential response to this question. 
Taken as a whole, these results strikingly demonstrate 
the apolitical character of collective organisation membership 
in banking. Neither union nor staff association membership 
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was significantly associated with the voting intentions of 
either men or women. This finding, we believe, points to 
the highly local and instrumental nature of the clerks' 
choice of, and commitment to, membership of the staff 
organisations and also reflects the agnostic approach to 
party politics adopted by both the union and the staff 
associations. Moreover these results perhaps confirm the 
wisdom of this approach. For, if these results are 
typical, the bank staff organisations are recruiting 
for membership within a constituency containing many shades 
of political opinion with a balance which is, if anything, 
to the right of centre. 
It is among the men in particular that the lack of 
association between political attitudes and staff 
organisation membership is manifest. This lack of 
association is complemented by an absence of association 
between male staff organisational membership and father's 
occupation. Since there is, by contrast, an association 
between the men's voting intentions and their fathers' 
occupation, these facts further confirm our view that 
the staff organisations are joined independently both of 
political orientation and of occupational (class) background. 
In this sense, it is realistic to think of organisational 
affiliation as determined primarily by instrumental 
considerations operative solely within the world of work. 
Thus although Lockwood has suggested that the trade union 
movement is 'the traditional vehicle of working class 
consciousness'(4), our evidence indicates that there is 
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little or no association between the instrumental trade 
unionism of the male bank worker and the most limited 
form of connection with working class objectives -a 
Labour vote, 
Among the female sample the picture is very 
similar. Here again there is a striking association between 
father's occupation and voting intention in the expected 
direction which, perhaps, testifies to the significance of 
the fact that the majority of the female sample still live 
at home. In this context, the absence of a strong 
association between organisational membership and voting 
intention is the more significant and further consolidates 
our sense of the local and instrumental criteria which 
determine the women's organisational affiliations. 
6.6 Summary-and-Analysis 
Almost all the evidence of this chapter 
bears out Blackburn's contention that bank clerks join 
unions quite readily. 
(5) 
As we have already seen, 81 
per cent of the sample had joined either one or both of 
the staff organisations in banking and this figure can only 
be regarded as substantial by any standards. The overall 
'rate of joining' of staff organisations "" at 1.35 organ- 
isations per male clerk and 0.911 organisations per female 
clerk - was also high and testifies to a persistent 
interest in collective organisation among bank clerks which 
survives temporary setbacks and periods of disillusionment. 
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Similarly, the evidence shows that bank clerks are no 
longer 'snobbish' in their attitudes to trade union 
organisation and do not identify trade unions with manual 
workers or non-white collar occupations. On the other 
hand, this endorsement of trade unionism by the clerks 
as expressed in their clear willingness to join negotiating 
bodies was not associated with any kind of 'oppositional' 
conception of employer-employee relationships in the 
banking industry for, as we have seen, 92 per cent of 
bank clerks endorsed a 'teamwork' conception of their 
relationship to their employers. This low level of 
'oppositional' conceptualisation of industrial relations 
in banking is almost certainly associated with the 
instability of union membership and, more generally, 
with the less 'unionate' character of bank unions which, 
as Blackburn has argued, 
(6) 
contributes in large 
degree to the somewhat lowered level of unionisation in 
banking as opposed to other areas of white collar employment 
such as local government. 
In general, staff organisation membership in banking 
turned out to be a good deal less stable than expected. 
Here the male clerics proved to be rather more stable staff 
organisation members than their female counterparts. It 
is worth noting in this connection that bank clerks were 
apparently choosing, as during the period before the union 
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recognition, 
(7) 
in a relatively on-going way between the 
high subscriptions and associated leffectiveness' offered 
by NUBE and the low subscriptions, concrete financial 
attractions and relatively low effectiveness of the staff 
associations (see Tables 6.8 and 6.9). It seems 
reasonable to suppose that their decisions were broadly 
contingent upon prevailing conditions within the industry 
and associated levels of generalised staff dissatisfaction. 
We may also note that the levels of lapses among the female 
membership of both types of staff organisation, together with 
the high rate of turnover for female staff, pose considerable 
problems for the organisers of staff bodies who are concerned 
with maintaining overall levels of membership. 
Certain differences between the memberships of the 
union and the staff association were clearly apparent. 
There was a general tendency for staff association members 
to have been more easily recruited than their union 
counterparts. Associated with this phenomenon, was a 
tendency for staff association members to be somewhat vague 
as to the reasons for their joining. NUDE members, by 
contrast, tended to be more likely to cite specific 
issues or sources of dissatisfaction as the basis of their 
decisions to join and this tendency, in its turn, articulates 
with the more concrete, issue-based stance of NUDE as an 
organisation which is expressed by its recruiters and 
its recruiting literature. In this connection, it was 
noticeable that among the female clerks, who tended to be 
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vaguer than their male counterparts in citing reasons 
for joining the organisations, the union members tended 
to be more concrete in their responses than staff 
association members. 
As to the concrete merits and faults of the two 
organisations, the clerks were rather more apathetic 
towards the positive virtues of the staff association 
than those of NUI3E, whilst apathy towards the faults 
of the two organisations was approximately evenly 
distributed. In each case, the female sample was 
decisively less opinionated about the merits and demerits 
of the organisations than the male sample. Overall, the 
responses of the clerks to these questions (Tables 6.13, 
6.149 6.15 and 6.16) were indicative of a low degree 
of saliency which attached to the clerks orientations 
towards the staff organisations as a whole. This 
phenomenon was also attested to by the low levels of 
knowledge about the identities of major staff organisation 
figures, who were less well known than 'public figures' in 
the U. K., the chairmen of the banks in question and even 
the hapless Senator McGovern of the United States. Thus 
less than 50 per cent of the male staff could identify the 
general secretaries of NUDE or the appropriate staff 
association and among the female staff approximately 90 per 
cent failed to identify either man. It may thus fairly 
be stated that, if knowledge and opinion on a matter are 
indicators of itssaliency, the stuff 'organisations were 
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relatively insignificant aspects of the 'institutional 
furniture' of the banking scene for the majority of the 
sample and have a low level of 'genoralised saliency'; 
though this conclusion by no means rules out the potential 
of the staff organisations for increased saliency during 
periods characterised by staff dissatisfaction with the 
banks' performance as employers. 
Within this general 'frame' of low saliency and 
consonant with the low profile of the staff organisations 
as foci of institutional identification and loyalty, the 
clerks took a broadly 'instrumental' stance towards the 
organisations seeking to represent them, For the majority, 
the decision to initiate or maintain their membership of 
the organisations appeared to be construed as a function 
of the gains achieved and the losses incurred by membership. 
Thus the relatively low costs of staff association 
membership were balanced against the savings in car insurance 
etc, obtainable through membership. Equally, the relatively 
high union subscriptions tended to result in outfiuxes from 
the union when immediate and obvious gains from its salary 
negotiations were not forthcoming - this trend being 
particularly marked among the female membership, By contrast, 
the more ideological statements about the organisations 
(from both the left and the right) tended to be furnished 
as reasons for leaving them, 
9Thus upwards of 
50 per cent 
of those who had lapsed from the staff associations cited 
'ideological' (as opposed to strictly tinstrumental') reasons 
concerned, for instance, with the staff associations' 
connections with the banks, their retrograde role in 
preventing the development of national pay negotiations and 
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so on. Similarly some 20 per cent of the men and a small 
proportion of women had left NUBE because of what they 
perceived as its extremism. 
Related to these trends is a clear tendency for the 
sample's, membership of the various staff organisations to 
be fluctuating, unstable and, to some degree at least, 
informed by poorly defined motives. Whilst this 
tendency is undoubtedly accentuated by the existence of 
competing organisations (with different ideologies) for each 
bank, the generally 'non-oppositional' conceptualisation 
of industrial relations in banking and the low saliency 
of the organisations in question, it is also congruent with 
the overall work orientations of both male and female bank 
staffs. Thus, for the male clerks, collective salary 
advances are not the exclusive means of economic advancement 
but co-exist with the more traditional individualistic 
modes of promotional advancement within the bank hierarchy. 
For the women too, the low level of saliency of work in 
general and the absence of a long-term commitment to 
bank employment also militates against long-term 
committed membership of staff organisations and the female 
membership which, under different circumstances, might have 
provided 'ballast' in terms of stable organisational 
affiliations, instead provides an additional, independent 
contribution to the fluctuating character of organisational 
membership. 
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On the negative side, the data does not reveal any 
connection between organisational membership on the one 
hand and the more usual sociological variables on the 
other. Thus organisational affiliations were not 
associated, for either male or female clerks, with a 
clerk's position within the branch hierarchy nor with 
the clerks' subjective estimates of future promotions. 
These findings deal a further blow to 
the hypothesis which differentiated male 'home centred' 
and male 'work centred' clerks and predicted differing 
proclivities to join NUBE and the staff associations on 
that basis'. Whilst we can enter two caveats with respect 
to this conclusion: (a) that the union was recognised by 
the time of interviewing and hence that a decision to 
join the union during the late 'sixties and early 'seventies 
could not be equivalent to a similar decision taken in 
previous decades, and (b) that those believing their 
promotion chances to be 'poor' were under-represented in 
the sample, nonetheless it was indubitably the case that 
NUDE membership co-existed easily with 'career' orientations 
to work. Given that 'good' promotion prospects are 
currently the norm for men in the banking industry, this 
finding is certainly a significant one which augurs well 
for the future of orthodox unionism in banking. At the 
same time, the influence of general levels of inflation 
during this period cannot be discounted as a factor stimulating 
continued membership among the 'up and coming', and the 
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male membership may have been purchased at the cost of 
developing a less tunionatel character (e. g, the decision 
to register under the 1970 Industrial Relations Act). 
Moreover the generally low salience of union membership 
is itself consistent with the continued membership of 
those who might have come to feel that they could not 
identify with a more militant organisation. 
Among the male clerks, there was a clear association 
between union membership (as opposed to staff association 
membership) on the one hand and a previous experience of 
dissatisfaction sufficient to have caused the clerks to 
contemplate leaving bank employment. As we have already 
noted, union membership has historically been an avenue 
through which dissatisfaction with personal circumstances 
and bank policies has been expressed and the association 
noted above indicates that this practice is by no moans 
dead. The association also indicates that the reasoning 
behind the hypothesis which associated union membership 
with 'home centredness' may not be entirely wide of the 
mark, Since nearly 50 per cent of the males who had 
contemplated leaving the bank had done so as a result of 
frustration with their career prospects, it is perhaps not 
far fetched to suggest that this dissatisfaction with 
individual prospects may have load a number of the male 
sample to take up a more collectivistic approach to their 
market situation. 
} 
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Finally, there were intimations - especially 
among the female sample - of an association between union 
membership and political orientations towards the left of 
the bank spectrum on a variety of issues. There was also 
a further possibility, for the female clerks, that these 
political attitudes were themselves associated with 
the class backgrounds of the clerks. This latter possibility 
was consistent with the fact that the majority of the female 
clerks still lived with their parents and hence that their 
class backgrounds could be conceived as on-goingly operative 
in their interpretation of political events and social 
conflicts. The nature of the data, however, is such that 
no 'strong' interpretation of these results is possible. 
6 Conclusions: Choosing Among Organisations 
6.7.1. The background to the Choice 
In assessing the degree of unionisation in 
banking in 1964, Blackburn concluded that whilst bank 
clerks exhibited a readiness to join collective organisa- 
tions their level of 'unionisation' was comparatively 
low because the organisations recruiting bank workers 
were less 'unionate' than other comparable white collar 
trade unions. This observation can now perhaps be placed 
in a fuller perspective, 
There can be little question that the growth of 
collective organisations in banking has boon considerably 
stimulated by the bureaucratisation of the industry. By 
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the 'fifties its concentration had resulted in the 
oligopolistic domination of banking by five major banks 
and, as a result the majority of bank clerks were employed 
by a few large employers. This concentration of ownership 
and control in the industry did not result in the physical 
concentration of employees in large units because of the 
special kind of consumer service which banks supply. It 
did however result in a situation in which large numbers 
of bank employees were administered under centralised and 
bureaucratic rules which have exerted, and continue to 
exert, powerfully cohesive effects on the collective market 
situation of bank clerks. Thus, although the rules were 
constructed so as to provide opportunities for clerks 
to advance as individuals, they nonetheless represented 
a steady bureaucratisation of the parameters of the 
clerical market situation and constituted a powerful 
stimulus to membership of the collective organisations. 
With the expansion of banking services during the 
'sixties and the increased recruitment of young women, 
this bureaucratisation of the parameters of the clerks' 
market situation became, for the increasing proportions 
of the 'non-promotable' female clerks, a do facto 
bureaucratisation of their market situation as a whole 
with very little scope being afforded for individualistic 
modes of advancement. This differentiation of the bank 
clerics has now become very marked and it is reflected in 
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the differing orientations to work of the men and women 
in our sample noted above. In short, the bureaucratisation 
of the bank clerks' market situation has been favourable 
to the growth of collective organisations, although the 
progressive creation of two classes of clerical workers 
may have militated against their overall cohesiveness. 
The bureaucratisation of the market situation of 
the bank clerk is not, however, matched by an equivalent 
bureaucratisation of his or her work situation. Bank 
branches still remain small units characterised by 
functional and social co-operation of a high order. The 
clerical staff expect, and are expected, to progress 
through a variety of branch activities which vary in 
skill, responsibility and autonomy. They are also expected 
to maintain the flexibility to take up new work roles at 
short notice. Their activities are undertaken within 
small work groups within which, and between which, there 
is a very substantial quantity of communication. The 
branch hierarchy is perceived as legitimate even by those 
who, de facto if not do ! re, have no opportunity to 
progress up it beyond the first few steps. The branch is 
therefore rarely characterised in divisive terms. Finally 
mechanisation, though well advanced, is not perceived as 
a serious threat to the quality of work experience or 
work relationships. 
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Thus whilst the bureaucratisation of the clerical 
market situation is such as to promote the numerical 
growth of collective organisations in banking, the 
characteristic features of the work situation of the 
branch promote a perception of the bank as a predictable 
and legitimate hierarchy in which strong distinctions 
between managemgnt and workers cannot easily be 
maintained. The normative structure of the branch thus 
tends to be characterised by a measure of concensus on 
a variety of issues. Hence, although bringing quite 
distinctive orientations to work with them into the 
work situation, male and female clerks diverged little in 
their assessments of a variety of aspects of banking. 
This convergence of viewpoint within the branch 
involves, among other features, a convergence upon a 
broadly concensual viewpoint on industrial relations 
issues and collective roles which centres on an image of 
the branch as a 'team' of workers within which work 
relationships are both legitimate and harmonious. In 
this environment there is little scope for the maintenance 
and growth of 'oppositional' ideologies and neither the 
work-group nor the collective organisations are likely to 
become alternatives to the branch itself as a focus for 
individual or collective loyalties. Collective 
organisations in this context tend, as our data 
indicates, to assume a relatively low level of significance. 
Conflicts of ideology are not intense despite the long-' 
standing competition for membership between the union and 
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staff associations. The characteristics of the branch 
work situation, in short, militate against the growth 
of organisations with strongly 'unionate' policies and 
ideologies and the competition between the staff 
organisations tends, on the contrary, to focus as 
much on the issue of legitimacy as on the question of 
militancy. In a climate of reduced saliency, this 
competition centres largely on the thread and butter' 
issues of the benefits to be gained from membership 
of the various organisations. 
The influence of the work situation in maintaining 
collective organisational membership at a low level of 
significance is complemented by the orientations which 
the clerics bring to the work situation. For the male 
clerks, preoccupied with and, in the main, assured of a 
career in the banking system, collective means of economic 
advancement are a poor substitute for the individualistic 
means which are regarded as central. This is not, of 
course, to say that collective means are shunned, but it 
is to say that such collective approaches to salary 
advancement are regarded as a background to a career and 
are accorded only a small modicum of significance as such. 
Turning to the female clerks, we find that their 
low levels of expectation concerning the rewards from 
work ensure that they find banking largely satisfactory as 
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an occupation. Similarly, their short-run commitment to 
work ensures that they will not, by and large, commit 
themselves to long-term collective objectives which may 
come to fruition only long after they have left bank 
employment nor make sacrifices in pursuit of such ends. 
In this context, their unionism tends to be decidedly 
instrumental and this instrumentalism - when articulated - 
tends to be decidedly specific in character. As a result, 
when the collective organisations of which they are 
members have achieved the relevant objectives, the female 
clerks tend to lapse on the basis that the subscriptions 
are no longer worth paying, that it is no longer 'necessary' 
to be a member or that the organisation is no longer 
getting results. 'Credit effects', in short, appear to 
be attenuated with respect to the female membership. 
In sum, the central feature of the choice between 
collective organisations in banking is its low salience. 
This low salience is documented by the volatility of both 
the male and the female memberships of both organisations, 
the comparative ignorance displayed by a majority of the 
sample about elementary facts concerning the organisations, 
the low level of definite opinion about their functions, 
merits and drawbacks and the character of the reasoning 
reported as informing decisions both to join and leave the 
organisations. The orientations to work and employment 
of the male and female samples, although different, converge 
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in assigning collective organisation membership a low 
degree of salience and in this convergence the particularistic 
and non-conflictual character of the work situation also 
plays a major role. 
6.7.2. The Choice Between Organisations 
In their study of attitudes to work and trade 
unionism among white collar workers, Mercer and Weir 
characterised their sample of male white collar workers 
as displaying an attitude of 'conditional assent' to 
collective organisations: 
.., while not especially enthusiastic, they were 
neither as apathetic nor as hostile as we had 
expected, It would perhaps be accurate to 
characterise them as displaying a limited 
instrumentalism, a 'conditional assent' not to 
the values necessarily, but to the possible 
efficacy of trade unions in obtaining tangible 
benefits for their members. ý8) 
This notion of conditional assent, we believe, best 
characterises the attitudes of the male sample of bank 
clerks towards the collective organisations operating in 
banking, In choosing between the union and the staff 
associations, the men apparently sought to balance and 
reconcile three separable dimensions of collective rep- 
resentation: (i) the 'friendly society' role 
concerned with individual problems and grievances within 
the banks; (2) the 'representation of opinion' role 
associated with the desire to 'bridge the gap' between 
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potential and junior managers on the one hand and top 
management on the other, and (3) the more orthodox 
trade union role of negotiating over salaries and 
conditions of work. The male bank clerks thus tended 
to join the organisation which they perceived as 
providing the optimum 'mix' of these roles. 
Although this determinant of their choice is not 
very clearly evident from their characterisfttions of the 
functions of the union and the staff associations, it is 
very strongly suggested by the association between male 
union membership and dissatisfaction with salary levels 
- an association which was not present for male staff 
association members, nor for the female sample with 
respect to either organisation. Significantly, Weir(9) 
has found a similar association among a sample of middle 
managers who, in common with our sample of bank clerks, 
also have the prospect of considerable promotion 
opportunities. 
The significance of this association is confirmed 
by the history of white collar unionism in banking, in 
which periods of substantial male dissatisfaction with 
salary levels are normally associated with union growth 
among male clerks, whilst intervening periods are 
characterised by a steady restoration of staff association 
membership levels. The available evidence indicates 
therefore that, given the choice botwen organisations 
- 405 - 
that exists in banking, the male staff choose between 
them in a relatively on-going way. The stabler choice 
however is towards the more moderate and 'consultative' 
staff associations and it is only during periods of real 
dissatisfaction over salaries that the balance of 
commitment tilts towards the union. It is noteworthy 
here that the men's commitment to the organisations of 
their choice tended to be more abstract, principled and 
long-term than the commitment of their female counterparts. 
The female staff were also faced with a similar 
choice of balance in the 'basket' of collective organisational 
roles. Thus staff association members tended to stress 
the 'friendly society' and 'consultative' roles of their 
organisations more then union members. However the short 
term commitment to work characteristic of the female 
sample structured the choice of preferred organisational 
membership rather differently for them. Thus the world 
of work and the associated role of collective organisations 
were clearly less significant for the female samplo and 
they tended to be less well informed and opinionated about 
them than the male sample. Given this orientation, together 
with the short-run instrumentalism of the female approach 
to collective organisation which it engendered, the shadowy 
role and 'low profile' of tho staff associations failed 
to make a definite impression on all but a few of the 
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female sample. At the same time, membership of the 
union tended to be associated with the pursuit of 
specific objectives whose achievement paradoxically, 
as noted above, tended to tilt the balance of costs 
and benefits in favour of abandoning union membership. 
To retain its female membership, it is almost as if 
the union has to remain permanently on the brink of a 
(relevant) breakthrough on salaries and conditions of 
work. 
It is perhaps a little too easy to stress the 
element of conscious choice and deliberation entering 
into the decisions of women to join the staff organisations 
in banking. Much of our evidence points to the unchosen, 
barely motivated, semi-considered and almost random 
character of female staff organisation membership. Our 
evidence also indicates the strong element of long-term 
instability of female commitment to such organisations. 
At the same time, it is possible to suggest on the 
basis of our evidence that, in respect of union membership 
in particular, women will organise quickly and vigorously 
when salient, concrete objectives are hold out to them. 
It is this factor which, we suggest, renders female bank 
staff a potentially disturbing factor in an otherwise 
rather stable and cyclical competition for membership 
between the union and the staff association. 
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In the last analysis, both NUBE and the staff 
associations are basically fishing in the same pond for 
membership. Although men tend to be more stable members 
of the collective organisations and are more likely to be 
staff association-; members than their female colleagues, 
their were few attitudinal features differentiating 
the staff association members in the sample from the union 
members. Both types of organisation are seeking to 
recruit members from a population of clerics which regards 
them as being of low significance, and will elect between 
them largely on instrumental grounds. Thus, as Blackburn 
has documented, 
(io) 
the outcome of the competition between 
the organisations has in recent years been determined by 
their relative vigour and apparent effectiveness rather 
than by ideological considerations. 
However if the staff organisations are competing 
for a membership which displays little internal ideological 
differentiation, there remains the possibility that the 
concrete interests of the bank clerks will exhibit internal 
differentiation as between 'work centred' and 'home centred' 
staff, Such a conflict of interest was clearly discernable 
in the data from the sample which addressed the now 
clerical grading system. Isere we found that this system 
was viewed as harmful by the male 'work aontred' clerks 
who regarded it as deleterious to their long-term career 
interests whilst tho short term female labour force tended 
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on balance to view it as advantageous. Insofar as 
conflicts and divergencies of interest of this type are 
widespread in banking, the pressures will develop for each 
collective organisation to formulate a 'package' of 
policies which will appeal to the various sections of 
the labour force without alienating the remainder. As 
we shall see in the next chapter, the growth in the 
female bank labour force compelled the staff organisations 
to develop such packages. On the whole, the clerks responses 
to the survey indicate that such a package would be 
relatively easy to develop for the more stable and principled 
male membership. The allegiance of the female labour 
force is not, as we have seen, so easily won and maintained. 
Here the lack of commitment to long-run objectives implies 
that the loyalty of the female labour force to collective 
organisations can only be maintained by the pursuit of 
a series of specific, short-run objectives, in default of 
which the female membership will tend to become destabilised. 
Insofar as they are applicable retrospectively(l1)0 
the results of this survey indicate that if NUDE was to 
achieve recognition, it would be necessary for it to 
maintain a salient, effective and responsible presence 
which harmonises the potentially discrepant aims of 
bank clerks who differed considerably in their orientations 
to work. Moreover these objectives have to be achieved in 
the face of competition from the recognised and legitimate 
staff associations which cover very similar around. In 
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the face of such obstacles, it is not difficult to see why 
NUDE remained unrecognised for so long a period. 
6.8 The Secondary Differentiation of Male Orientations to 
1Torlc and Staff Organisation Membership 
As we noted at the beginning of this chapter, the 
male 'home centred' clerk has, as far as the survey data 
can tell us, turned out to be a somewhat mythical figure. 
In part, this may be a result of the characteristics of 
the sample itself. For reasons beyond our control (see 
section 5.2), male clerics over the age of 40 years were 
distinctly under-represented in the sample. This may have 
been the case for a variety of reasons. The bank may have 
been less inclined to persuade senior male clerks to take 
part in the study, either because these persons could be 
less easily spared for interviewing purposes during banking 
hours than their junior colleagues, or because the senior 
clerks might present a less positive image of banking as a 
career for men. Alternatively, senior male clerks may have 
proved more difficult to persuade to come forward to take 
part in the study, possibly because having 'failed' in 
career terms a man may be less willing to display his 
experiences to an outside researcher. In any event, the 
net result is that our data simply does not reveal any 
trend towards 'home centredness' among the male sample and 
hence the hypothesis must, at minimum, be suspended. 
With respect to our hypothesis which related male 
'home centredness' to NUDE (as opposed to staff association) 
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membership, a number of comments are in order. Firstly, 
the hypothesis gains its major credence through consideration 
of the period before NUDE was recognised and hence became 
'respectable'. In a 'pre-recognition' climate of opinion, 
we argued, male staff would be more prone to join the 
non-respectable union if their chances of promotion were 
already perceived as minimal since collective salary 
advances would prove increasingly attractive, and employer 
disapproval of the union would lack the effective sanction 
of blocking promotion opportunities. Clearly, this 
situation no longer prevailed in 1972 and 1973, when the 
union had already been recognised for some five years. 
Additionally, we should note that the manpower' structure 
in banking is now such that a very large proporfion of 
male employees may reasonably expect a 'career' in the 
industry in a more or less traditional sense. As Table 
5.28 demonstrates, these reasonable expectations were 
in fact operative among the male staff interviewed, only 
12 per cent of whom concretely expected not to hold 'career' 
posts by the time they left the bank. Given that, in line 
with the now climate of opinion in which NUDE is now 
recognised and respectable, no relationship was established 
between those concrete expectations (or the expectations 
expressed in Tables 5.29 and 5.30) and NUDE or staff 
association membership, and that NUDE and staff association 
membership were not associated with positions occupied in 
the bank hierarchy by male staff, we feel justified in 
abandoning the second hypothesis concerning the secondary 
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differentiation of male orientations to work as a sign- 
ificant hypothesis in accounting for the pattern of 
unionisation in banking. We are made more confident 
in this decision by the following further consideration. 
Firstly, it is clear that even 100 per cent NUDE membership 
by male 'home centred' clerks (defined as males over 
40 years of age holding clerical posts) could only yield 
a relatively low level of male density (between 15 and 20 
per cent). By contrast, we found a 43 per cent male density 
for NUBE (Table 6.5) in our sample of male clerks among 
whom, as we have seen, 'home centredness' and indeed males 
over 40 years who were 'unappointed' men were distinctly 
under-represented. Since, as we have already noted, 
this figure is almost identical with the national figure 
for NUBE male density, there is some reason to suppose 
that NUBE membership is not disproportionately drawn from 
among those male staff whose promotion opportunities are 
tenuous or non-existent. 
(12) 
With this said, the association between dissatisfaction 
over salaries on the one hand and union membership on the 
other indicates that the hypothesis which related the 
'home centred' male clerk to unionisation should not be 
entirely discounted as an explanation for the historical 
growth and persistence of NUDE during periods when promotion 
opportunities were loss widespread than they are today and 
employer opposition to the union was greater. Under these 
- 412 - 
circumstances, the partial insulation of the male 'home 
centred' clerk from the effects of employer hostility 
may have been essential for the translation of his 
dissatisfaction over salaries and conditions of work 
into a viable union. 
6,9 Concluding Obsei^vations 
In the light of the findings of this chapter, tae 
are now forced to revise certain of the conclusions 
reached at the end of Chapter 4. Firstly, with respect 
to the male clerks, we have established no evidence of 
a 'hard core' of male 'home centred' NUIF members. 
What we have found instead is an on-going pattern of 
fluctuating allegiances to the staff organisations in 
banking, which is liable to a certain measure, of issue- 
based destabilisation but which is not subject to system- 
atic variation with respect to career expectations or 
location within the clerical and 'appointed' zones of 
the bank hierarchy. 
Among the men, we found a predominantly individualistic, 
'career' orientation to work within which both staff organ- 
isations are viewed as collective 'safety nets' to be 
evaluated in a predominantly calculative and instrumental 
fashion and not as foci of collective or institutional 
loyalties. This pattern of male unionisation, sot within 
a context of competing organisations, sharply constrains 
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the character and strength of negotiating stances available 
to NUBE negotiators, allowing them to take up strong 
positions only during periods of widespread staff unrest. 
Additionally, the low level of 'unionateness' of NUBE 
discussed by Blackburn and further lowered by the union's 
'registration' under the Industrial Relations Act in the 
early 'seventies and its subsequent expulsion from the 
TUC, resonate with the predominatly conservative/liberal 
politics of the majority of bank clerks and of the male 
staff in particular. 
The female sample was, by and large, less of a 
surprise. We consider the 'short-run' character of the 
female commitment to bank employment to be securely 
established and to be articulated in a variety of the 
facets of the orientation to work by the female sample. 
Whilst a minority of the female staff showed evidence 
of a rather more 'collectivistic' orientation to their 
market situation and towards wider political questions, 
this overall short-run commitment to bank employment - 
mediated by the prevailing style and saliency of trade 
unionism in the banking sector - is likely to be 
responsible for the fluctuating nature of female 
organisational affiliations which, in turn, plays its 
part in preventing a more solidly based and coherent union 
participation in the joint regulation of the banking 
industry. 
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With these revisions in view, we now move towards 
an account of the growth and recognition of NUDE during 
the decade 1960-1970. 
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Perceptions of Collective Bargaining, British Journal 
of Industrial Relations, 1976, Volume 14, No. 3, 
pp. 330-333. 
10, R. M. Blackburn, oR. cit,, p, 251-2. 
11, The question of whether, or to what extent, the results 
of survey data gathered in 1972-3 can be held to be 
retrospectively applicable to workers during a previous 
period (for instance, 1966-8) and hence to shed light on 
events during that period is an extremely difficult one 
to answer with any degree of security, However 
reasonable confidence can, we believe, be placed in the 
retrospective applicability of the data relating to the 
orientations to work of male and female clerks. This 
confidence derives from two sources: firstly, the 
stability and continuity both of data and its inter- 
pretation which relates to the attitudes and orienta- 
tions of bank clerks deriving from Mumford and Banks 
(1967) and Blackburn (1967) where the clerks were 
interviewed in 1963 and 1965, the present study and 
Graham and Llewellyn's study of bank clerks interviewed 
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11. 
contd. in 1975. Secondly, the objective characteristics 
of the banks' recruiting, job allocation and promotion 
policies which correspond to these subjective orienta- 
tions to work have also remain broadly constant during 
the same period. 
Less confidence can, however, be placed in the existence 
of continuities in orientation towards the staff 
organisations in banking. Here attitudes have changed 
since the union's recognition in 1968. In particular, 
it is likely that post-recognition NUDE members will 
be less clearly attitudinally distinguishable from their 
counterparts in the staff associations than was the case 
prior to the union's recognition. Similarly the issues 
that bank clerks connect with the staff organisations 
are clearly fluctuating in significance and conceptuali- 
sation and, as a result, the reasons which the clerks 
give for joining and leaving the staff organisations 
(and for preferring one to another) will also vary. 
On the other hand, the general level of salience attaching 
to the staff organisations and the very general differences 
between men and women in the way in which they decide to 
join or leave such organisations are, we believe, 
associated with general orientations to work and here 
rather more confidence can be placed in their continuity. 
12. It is impossible to secure this observation without 
fuller information on the representativeness of the 
sample than is available. Whilst it is indeed 
significant that the male sample was comparable in 
male NUBE membership density to the national level 
even though it lacked male 'home centred' clerks, 
Blackburn has pointed out that NUI3E density tends to 
be-higher in the larger branches. Hence it is possible 
that the sample over-represents NUBE membership because 
it was drawn from large bank branches. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE GROWTH OF TRADE UNIONISM IN THE LONDON CLEARING 
BANKS: 1960-1970 
1 Introduction 
We have now reached the point at which we are able to 
strike at the central objective of this thesis: a 
sociological interpretation of the growth of trade 
unionism in banking during the 'sixties. 
The central datum to be explained is set out in 
tables 7.1 and 7.2. 
Table 7.1 
Aggregate Membership of NUBE and the Combined Staff 
Associations in the London Clearing Danks: 1960-1970 
by sex. 
Combined Staff Associations NUBE 
Year Male Female All Male Female All 
1960 39,964 20,035 59,999 27,091 13,004 40,095 
1961 40,431 21,144 61,575 28,078 15,113 13,191 
1962 41,205 20,955 62,160 28,801 16,596 45,397 
1963 41,620 23,077 64,697 28.979 17,448 116,427 
1964 44,146 25,229 69.375 26,964 14,796 41,760 
1965 45,495 26,971 72,466 27,661s 16,057 43,721 
1966 46t323 27,134 73,457 26t998 16,1117 1i3,135 
1967 45,325 25,473 70,798 32,800 25,970 58,778 
1968 44t212 24,649 689861 34t771 29072 64,493 
1969 44,279 23,812 68,091 35,229 32,620 67,8199 
1970 45,155 23,290 68,4145 FIGURES UNAVAILABLE 68,749 
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Table 7.1 exhibits the following significant features. 
Aggregate staff association membership rose continuously 
among both men and women in the London clearing banks up to 
the end of 1966. Aggregate staff association membership 
then declined among both men and women during 1967 and 1968. 
Subsequently, whilst there was a recovery in male staff 
association membership during 1969 and 1970, female staff 
association membership continued to decline. 
During the same period, NUDE membership grew continuously 
among both men and women until the end of 1963. In 1964, 
there was a sharp fall in aggregate membership which 
reflected falls in both the male and female memberships of 
the union. This fall was counterbalanced by a sharp rise in 
staff association membership among both men and women. 
Subsequently, there was a gradual recovery in NUTE membership, 
which accelerated very rapidly during 1967 when the union 
entered into dispute with the bank employers. Following 
the resolution of this dispute in favour of the union and 
the recognition of the union for negotiating purposes, there 
was a further continuous growth in union membership among 
both men and women, although for both men and women, the 
rate of growth falls away continuously in each succeeding 
year after 1967. 
Throughout the decade, the staff associations maintained 
their dominanco in aggregate male membership terms. In 1960 
their male membership exceeded the union's male membership 
l 
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by approximately 13,000. This majority rose to a maximum 
of approximately 20,000 in 1966, but subsequently fell 
away to approximately 10,000 in 1969-70. During this 
period the union deficit in female membership of 7,000 in 
1960 was converted to a majority of some 9,000 in 1969. 
The female bank staff effectively transferred their majority 
allegiance from the staff associations to the union during 
the second half of the decade. 
In the majority of the years under review, the 
aggregate female membership of both types of organistion 
displayed greater volatility than the aggregate male 
membership. This volatility was particularly marked in 
1961E when it operated in favour of the staff associations and 
again in 1967 when it operated in favour of the union during 
the dispute period. 
When these changes are viewed against the background of 
the changing pattern of bank employment, these observations 
require a certain amount of modification. 
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Table 7.2 
Membership Densities of NUBS and the Combined Staff 
Associations in the London Clearing Banks: 1960-1970, 
by Sex. 
Combined Staff Associations NUBE. 
Year Male Female All Male Female All 
1960 60.7 41.1 52,3 41.1 26.6 35,0 
1961 59.1+ 39.7 50.8 41.2 28.4 35.6 
1962 58.7 36.3 48.6 41.0 28.7 35.1+ 
1963 58.0 37.9 48.8 Ito. 4 28.7 35.0 
1964 59.8 38.4 49,8 36.6 22.5 30.0 
1965 59.9 39.1 50.0 36.5 23.3 30.2 
1966 59.6 37.7 49.1 34.8 22,4 28.8 
1967 57.7 33.3 45.6 41.7 33.9 37.9 
1968 55.8 30.3 42.7 43.5 36.5 40,0 
1969 53.8 26.5 39.5 42.8 36.2 39.4 
1970 54.3 24.8 38.7 FIGURES UNAVAILABLE 38.9 
In general the growth of bank employment during the 
'sixties - which was particularly marked among the female 
staff - has the effect of depressing levels of aggregate 
staff organisation membership growth expressed in density 
terms. Similarly, declining aggregate staff organisation 
membership tends to be more strongly marked in the density 
context. When viewed in density terms, it is apparent that 
the continuous growth of aggregate staff association member- 
ship up to 1966 was insufficient to maintain the density levels 
of 1960 among either men or women. After 1966, combined 
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staff association density levels fell away precipitously among 
female bank employees from nearly 40 per cent to below 25 
per cent, whilst density levels among men fell substantially, 
although less sharply, until 1969 after which a small 
recovery began. 
Viewed through the density perspective, the changes 
in LAUBE membership also take on different characteristics. 
In the years up to 1963, the aggregate growth of the union 
merely kept pace with the overall growth of employment in 
the London clearing banks, whilst the fall in density 
occasioned by the membership reverses of 1964 was very 
striking. Similarly, the density growth which developed with 
the expansion in membership in 1967 and 1968 was not main- 
tained despite continuing, if falling, aggregate member- 
ship growth. 
The generally greater volatility of female staff 
organisational membership which was observed with respect 
to aggregate membership is generally preserved in density 
terms. This volatility is particularly marked in 1967 - 
the year of the union's dispute with the bank employers. 
Behind these figures, the facts of the dispute year 
have themselves to be explained, In particular, we 
seek to explain (1) the preparedness of the union to enter 
into an industrial dispute with the clearing bank employers 
after a fifty year history of avoidance of such disputes; 
(2) the preparedness of bank staffs to back their union 
in its dispute both by rallying to the strike call and 
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by joining the union in large numbers during the dispute 
year, and (3) the ultimate outcome of the dispute which 
was the recognition of the union and agreement to the 
majority of its demands. All three questions ultimately 
turn on the willingness. of bank staffs to join and support 
their union in the dispute situation. 
From one point of view, what is striking about the 
events of 1967 and the patterns of organisational 
membership change surrounding them is their de a vi 
quality, their similarity to the events of a decade previously. 
In 1955, following considerable staff unrest over pay, NUDE 
membership grew dramatically from 27,700 (density: 30.5 per 
cent) in 1954 to 36,700 (density: 39.1 per cent) in 1955. 
In this upsurge, aggregate male NUBE membership rose by 5,500 
(a density rise of 8.1 per cent), whilst female membership 
rose by 3,500 (a density rise of 8.7 per cent). By compari- 
son with the 1955 level of overall density growth, the 1967 
upsurge was marginally weaker - the overall density of 
NUDE membership rising to only 37.9 per cent by the end of 
1967. 
However the 1967 upsurge was differentiated from its 
equivalent in 1955 in four major respects. Firstly, whilst 
male NUDE membership rose by an almost identical aggregate 
figure of 5,800 (a density rise of 6.9 per cent), the 
aggregate female membership growth was nearly three times 
the 1955 figure of 9,800 (a density rise of 11.5 per cent). 
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Secondly, as noted above, 1967 was the year in which female 
bank staffs transferred their majority allegiance from the 
staff associations to the union. This transfer was set 
against a background of an almost continuous fall in the 
density of female staff association membership from 47.6 
per cent in 1954 to 37.7 per cent in 1966. Moreover, 
this fall in female density in the staff associations and 
ultimately the transfer of majority membership to the 
union occurred despite the fact that the staff associations 
were, in general, more effective representatives of their 
memberships during the 'sixties than they had been during 
the 'fifties. Thirdly, the numbers of female bank 
employees had more than doubled from 33,000 in 1955 to 
76,000 in 1967. Of itself, this growth made the ultimate 
shift in female majority allegiance a weightier matter 
than it would have been in 1955. Moreover, its significance 
was increased by the fact that, whereas female bank 
employees were only half as numerous as their male 
counterparts in 1955, men and women were employed in equal 
numbers in banking by 1967. The shift in female majority 
allegiance was, in short, a shift in majority allegiance of 
half of the total bank staff occupying an increasingly 
distinctive position as a 'separate clerical class'. 
Finally ,, NUDE took industrial action in pursuit of its 
objectives in 1967, whereas this course of action was 
constitutionally difficult and motivationally impossible 
to achieve in 1955, 
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It is our contention that these four factors differen- 
tiating the events of 1955 from those of 1967 are fundamentally 
and demonstrably inter-related and that they constitute the 
core elements of an adequate sociological explanation of 
the growth of unionisation in the London clearing banks 
during the 'sixties. Taken together, this complex of 
inter-related factors which, we believe, differentiate 
the 1967 events from those of 1955 in a causally significant 
way, point to the decisive role of the growth of female 
employment in banking and of the disenchantment of female 
employees with 'internalism' in the growth and recognition 
of the National Union of Bank Employees. 
What resources are available to us in establishing 
the inter-relationship between these factors on the one 
hand and their (combined) significance in explaining the 
events of 1967, the patterns of organisational membership 
distribution which surround these events and, more 
generally, the growth of trade unionism in banking? In 
fact, these resources have been steadily accumulating 
over the last several chapters. 
In chapter 2, we suggested that the ambiguity of the 
evidence about the propensity of women to unionise could 
be resolved by considering the degree of unionisation 
among their male colleagues and the degree of recognition 
accorded to the organising union(s). There we argued 
that, under conditions in which high proportions of the 
- 425 - 
men in an industry are unionised and the union is 
recognised (e. g. education, national and local government), 
women will join unions in even higher proportions than 
their male colleagues. By contrast in settings in which, 
as a result of the prevalence of promotion opportunities 
for men and/or employer hostility to white collar unions, 
male unionisation is inhibited and trade unions remain 
unrecognised, women are likely to join trade unions in 
smaller proportions than their male colleagues. It is 
this latter situation which, of course, obtained in banking 
throughout the 'fifties and most of the 'sixties. 
The key to this pattern of female organisational 
affiliation, we argued, was the short-run and generally low 
level of female commitment to the world of work. In this 
context, women would tend to orient to all aspects of the 
work situation (including trade unions) as having a 
relatively low degree of salience and would tend to be less 
opinionated about all aspects of the work situation than 
their male colleagues. As a result, in contexts in which 
there was a high degree of male unionisation, the women 
would tend to be easily persuaded to take up union member- 
ship and levels of female unionisation would be high. 
However, in contexts where the level of male unionisation was 
low and/or the union remained unrecognised, the tendency would 
be for women to be less likely to be persuaded to join the 
trade union and for them to be less likely to join it 
autonomously. Women would be less likely to be 'persuaded' 
to join the union because there would be less union members 
to make the effort to persuade them to join (i. e., less 
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efforts would be made to persuade them), the union itself 
would be less attractive and concrete efforts might be 
made to dissuade them from membership by employees opposed 
to unionisation, Women would be less likely to join the 
union autonomously if the union remained unrecognised, 
because the union would be unable to hold out the promise 
of concrete short-term benefits which short-term female 
employees tend to demand. Thus, under circumstances where 
there is a low-level of unionisation among the male work- 
force and/or the union isjrecognised, women will tend to 
have a lower propensity to unionise than even their male 
colleagues. 
When in chapter 3, we came to look in detail at the 
banks, their staffs and the collective organisations in 
banking, we found that there were indeed two 'clerical 
classes' in banking differentiated on sexual lines and 
having quite different market situations. Male bank 
staff, we found, have objectively good individual 
promotion chances which are achieved at the expense of 
their female colleagues who enter banking for relatively 
short periods of time and undertake the routine clerical 
work. Both groups of clerks are the objects of a member- 
ship competition between the relatively ineffective, 
pacific, but recognised, staff associations and the 
comparatively aggressive, but unrecognised, union. In 
the banking environment of small work groups and particulari- 
stic social relationships, the membership competition between 
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the two types of collective organisation has historically 
operated primarily at the workplace level. In this context, 
'branch norms' have been an important determinant of the 
individual clerk's election to join a specific collective 
organisation and, because of their transitory engagement in 
bank employment and the low level of saliency they conseq- 
uently attach to the world of work, women have been especially 
subject to branch norm influence in their election to join 
a collective organisation. Moreover, because of their 
numerical dominance within the branch and their longer 
experience of banking, men have tended to exert a dispropor- 
tionate influence in opinion formation at branch level. As 
a result, women have historically tended to join the 
collective organisations favoured by their male colleagues 
in the branch regardless of whether the collective organisa- 
tion in question has had major advantages to offer its female 
membership. 
In chapter 4 we hypothesised that promotion-oriented 
male bank employees would tend to favour the less unionate, 
'consultative' staff bodies (the staff associations) whilst 
women, whose interests might in the long run be better served 
by the more unionate, but unrocognised, union and who were 
not so strongly identified with the bank employers or the 
promotion system as to join the staff associations out of 
deference, might nevertheless be influenced to join them 
by the strength of male opinion at branch level. By and 
large, the historical and sociological record supports this, 
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with women joining both the staff associations and the 
union in lesser proportions than their male colleagues 
under the influence of branch norms relating to the choice 
of organisational membership. As a result the staff 
associations - aided by recognition, favourable recruiting 
facilities and their organisation of the majority of 
male bank employees - have historically organised 
relatively high proportions of women despite the fact 
that they have delivered relatively little in terms of 
benefits to women and clearly see themselves as catering 
primarily for their male, long-term membership. 
Thus, although women might be described as a class 
in itself in banking, they by no means constitute a class 
for itself. In this respect, women have been inhibited 
by the numerical dominance of men in the industry, their 
subordinate role in the division of labour, their short- 
term involvement in the world of work and by a relative 
dearth of issues, relevant to female employees with their 
low-level expectations of the world of work, which 
might have crystallised female aspirations sufficiently to 
influence them to give militant support to collective 
organisations espousing such issues. The progressive 
erosion of male numerical dominance in banking during the 
'sixties is, we believe, a crucial factor enabling female 
bank employees to take a more independent outlook towards 
the collective organisations in banking. The growth of 
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this more independent outlook is, we believe, reflected 
in the falling proportions of female staff association member- 
ship which is exhibited from the mid-fifties onwards. 
These judgements about male and female bank staffs 
were broadly confirmed by the results of the survey into 
clerical attitudes and orientations towards work and employ- 
ment reported in the previous two chapters, Here we found 
that male staff had a strong long-term commitment to work 
as a 'career'; Although this commitment engendered a 
number of sources of dissatisfaction with work and employ- 
ment among the male staff, this dissatisfaction was not 
translated into de-identification with or opposition to 
the bank employers, neither was it the case that the work- 
group or the collective organisation were strong alternative 
loci of commitment or identification among the men. In 
this context, the men saw collective organisations as 
fulfilling a collection of functions which included the 
provision of a channel of communication and consultation 
with the bank employers and the provision of a 'safety net' 
for overall salary levels beyond which the men could pursue 
their careers and individual means to salary advancement. 
Although the female staff were more satisfied with 
bank employment than their male colleagues, there was 
substantial evidence that this satisfaction was itself a 
function of the low-level demands which they brought to 
bank employment. For the women, the world of work ehr so 
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was not strongly salient and, in this context, the women did 
not identify strongly with either the bank employers or the 
collective organisations seeking to represent them, As a 
result, their interest in collective organisations was low 
and their allegiance to them was fluctuating and unstable. 
By comparison with the men, the women were generally far 
less interested in the 'bread and butter' issues of bank 
employment. Much of their satisfaction in work derived 
from the social components of work-place activity and, 
given the incremental pay structure in banking and the 
general level of female satisfaction with their pay in 
banking, it is difficult to see any sources of strong 
female dissatisfaction with bank employment. 'Apathetic' 
is the wrong word to describe the female sample. Rather, 
they were generally satisfied with their lot. Despite 
their low levels of aspiration and the low significance 
they accorded to the world of work, the female sample did 
exhibit a willingness to join collective organisations 
in pursuit of issues which they cared about although these 
issues, together with the women's commitment to the collective 
organisations, tended to be of only temporary duration and 
significance. This willingness to join collective' 
organisations is, we believe, at least in part a product 
of the female independence of the bank employers which 
is engendered by their lack of a career commitment. 
- 43 1- 
In sum, the male bank staff form the stable nucleus not 
only of bank employment as a whole, but also of the member- 
ship of the collective organisations. They take a long- 
term view both of banking and of collective organisation 
membership. Since they expect to make a career in the 
banks, their demands of their collective organisations 
are not great. They expect collective organisations to 
fulfil a collection of functions, and they elect to join 
the collective organisation which provides the 'mix' of 
functions appropriate to their current station and prospects. 
For many years, a majority of the male staff have opted 
for the less unionate, more consultative staff associations 
even though few men regard them as effective. Since 
male demands of collective organisations are not generally 
extensive, this lack of effectiveness does not greatly 
inhibit male membership of the staff associations and 
indeed only becomes problematic during periods of widespread 
staff unrest. 
By contrast, female membership of collective organisa- 
tions tends on the whole to be less motivated and more 
transitory. It is substantially influenced by branch 
norms. The growth of female bank staff in proportion to 
their male colleagues is eroding the tendency for male 
opinions to pre-dominate in the formation of branch norms 
and the independence of the female 'clerical class' from the 
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bank employers implies that women will be prepared to join 
the collective organisation which pursues issues salient to 
them and to give active support to such an organisation if 
such support becomes necessary. Thus, our conclusion is 
that women's orientations and propensities to unionise 
constitute the independent factor which was central to 
the breaking of the dead-lock in the competition between 
the staff associations and the union during the 'sixties. 
Thus far however, we have only indicated a variety 
of factors which will not inhibit female union membership 
under appropriate circumstances. By contrast, we have 
failed to indicate the positive factors which might influenc 
them to join and support collective organisations. The 
transient character of female employment and the even more 
transient character of their commitment to collective 
organisations indicates that we can seek for these positive 
factors only by looking at the concrete issues and circum- 
stances facing bank employees during the 'sixties in 
their historical context. We now proceed to sat out these 
concrete issues and circumstances in the remainder of this 
chapter. 
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7s 2 The Period 1960-1965: Militancy and Retrenchment 
The period between 1960 and 1965 was marked by a sharp 
growth in the militancy of bank staffs in almost all the 
major sectors of banking. Moreover this mood of militancy 
was not confined to the membership of NUDE but also extended 
to the staff associations whose leadership began to approach 
negotiations with the bank employers in a more aggressive 
and accomplished manner. 
Perhaps the earliest indication of bank staffs new-found 
militancy was the growing tendency among the staff associations 
to make recourse to the arbitration agreements which had been 
established during the mid-'fifties and which, with minor 
exceptions, had remained unactivated until the beginning of 
the decade under consideration. Thus in 1959 an Extraordinary 
General Meeting of Martins Bank Staff Association authorised 
the serving of a notice of arbitration on the Martins 
management although this notice was subsequently not given, 
and again in 1960 the staff association served notice of 
arbitration on the management but subsequently withdrew it. 
(') 
Both the Midland and Lloyds Banks Staff Associations referred 
their 1961 salary claims to arbitration and in 1963 the 
Westminster Bank Guild also went to arbitration, 
The Staff associations' increased readiness to go to 
arbitration was paralleled by a more aggressive negotiating 
stance. In contrast to the rather passive negotiating 
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roles of the staff associations during the 'fifties which, 
in the words of one commentator, 
"seem to have involved little more than 
the revision of the age based salary 
scales to offset increases in the cost 
of living", (2) 
the staff associations now began to demand salary increases 
that were in excess of current cost of living increases and, 
against a background of expanded bank business and rising 
profits, to back these claims by references to increased 
productivity and to the decline in differentials between 
bank clerks and other groups of workers since the war. 
Thus the 1959 Martins Bank Staff Association claim Was 
for a5 per cent increase for 1958 and a further 6 per cent 
increase for 1959. The 1960 Midland Bank Staff Association 
claim sought a 20 per cent increase for overscale salaries and 
its 1961 claim sought an 8 per cent across the board increase 
with more for overscale staff. 
(3) 
Similarly the 1961 Lloyds 
Bank Staff Association claim was for 4-5 per cent across the 
board with extra improvements for senior staff. These claims 
exhibited considerable strategic skill as the banks, whose 
demand for younger staff was growing rapidly, were increasingly 
forced to compete directly with other areas of white collar 
employment for staff and were hence more prepared to raise 
the levels of salaries at the junior and of the scale. In 
this context, the staff associations' pressure on the senior 
end of the scales was a logical move and it was intelligently 
supported by references to the contributions of senior staff 
to the growth of productivity in the banks. 
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Whilst the 1962 staff association claims were supported 
by a reversion to the cost of living argument and wore agreed 
at low levels (3 per cent), this deflection of staff 
association militancy was a more or loss direct result of the 
government's pay restraint policy and, in 1963, the Westminster 
Bank Guild's claim renewed the staff associations' aggressive 
policies in a demand for an increase of 7 per cent across 
the board, an additional 3 per cent to give a real increase 
in the standard of living for bank staffs and an 
additional differential increase for appointed officers. 
The Westminster Bank's offer of 31- per cent, made in line 
with the National Incomes Commission's guidelines, was 
rejected and the claim finally went to arbitration in 1964 
with the result that, in addition to the 31 per cent paid by 
the bank in August 1963, Westminster Bank staff were awarded 
an additional 3 per cent across the board and appointed 
staff were awarded an additional 2 per cent backdated to 
January 1961. 
This Westminster Dank Guild success in turn spurred the 
other staff associations to press for larger salary awards 
in 1964. The claims presented varied between 6 and 10 per 
cent and resulted in awards of 7 per cent of which 3 per 
cent was backdated to 1963 in order to bring the staff of 
the other clearing banks into line with the Westminster 
award. These 1964 awards were notable in that, for the 
first time, the clearing banks publically announced that 
they were 'jointly agreed'. Despite the size of the 1964 
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awards however, continuing inflationary pressures led to 
increased staff association demands. A Midland Bank Staff 
Association demand for-an immediate increase of 10 per cent 
in January 1965 was turned down by the bank's management and, 
as a result, the association increased its demand for the 
1965 'pay round' to 12f per cent. In this instance however, 
the Midland Bank Staff Association settled for 5 per cent and, 
as the staff association was the pacemaker for the industry 
during this negotiation , the settlement was referred 
to the 
newly formed National Board for Prices and Incomes 
(NBPI) 
which allowed the settlement on the condition that no further 
increases in bank salaries were made until 1967. This 
condition was subsequently complied with. 
By contrast with the staff associations whose 
increasingly aggressive outlook is clearly visible in the 
character of their negotiating relationships with the bank 
employers, the 'propÄganda' role of NUDE during this period 
inevitably makes any assessment of its growth in militancy 
more problematic. Nonetheless the development of a more 
aggressive approach to industrial relations in banking by 
the union may be conveniently dated from its 1960 Annual 
Delegate Meeting (ADM) where, after failures at the 1952, 
1953 and 1959 ADM's, pressure from the floor finally 
resulted in the abolition of the union's highly restrictive 
strike clause. This clause had required that strike 
action be preceded by a national ballot at which a five 
eighths majority would be required before industrial action 
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could be undertaken. By contrast, the new strike clause 
allowed that a strike could be called after a ballot of 
only those members who would be involved in the action 
and that a simple majority of such members would be 
sufficient to empower the action. The new clause 
therefore, opened up the possibility of flexible and 'demon- 
strative' strike actions in contrast to the cumbersome and 
effectively impossible national actions to which the old 
clause was geared. Its adoption was particularly 
significant in an industry made up of small scale units 
in which support for NUBE was patchy due to varying bank 
policies and branch outlooks. The new clause thus 
created the possibility of selective strikes against 
individual bank employers, enabling the union to advance - 
if necessary - on a piecemeal basis, and in fact it was 
this possibility which was the first to be realised. 
In terms of industrial policy, NUDE began to pursue a 
number of related strands, of which the most important 
were (1) the recognition question, (2) a rigourous salary 
campaign aimed at the restoration of pre-tfifties standards 
of living for bank clerks, (3) equal pay for women and (4) 
the introduction of the five day week for bank staff. 
These issues were to come together towards the end of the 
decade. 
In pursuit of its perennial objective of recognition, 
NUDE enternd the now decade in a position which had remained 
substantially unaltered since the 'forties when it was 
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recognised by Barclays Bank and the National Bank but not 
accorded full negotiating rights nor recourse to arbitration' 
by either. Relations with the remainder of the London 
Clearing Banks remained minimal; the banks acknowledging 
the union's written representations but maintaining a 
cool distance from its representatives. During the early 
part of the decade however, and in spite of a serious set- 
back occasioned by the destruction of Scottish national 
negotiating machinery only a few months after its inception, 
a certain thaw in union-bank relationships began. 
Thus in 1959 NUDE obtained the right to make periodic 
representations to the General Manager of the Midland Bank 
on pay and conditions and in 1960 a similar relationship 
was established with Williams Deacons Banks' Similarly, 
in 1961 the union gained right of access to the staff 
controller of the Westminster Bank to discuss matters other 
than pay and established the right to a personal interview 
with the Chairman of Lloyds Bank, Thus, by 1965, union 
officials were refused personal access only to representatives 
of the District and National Provincial Banks, 
(4) 
Whilst those developments undoubtedly represented an 
advance for the union, they constituted only a small step 
in the direction of recognition. The 'recognition' of 
the union which was achieved in the various banks involved 
no rights to negotiate over salaries and conditions of work 
nor, of course, recourse to arbitration, but was confined, 
- x+39, - 
as the union caustically put it, to the kind of 'recognition' 
one might give a man on the other side of the street. 
(5) 
Moreover these minimal concessions were made by the banks 
partly in response to what they correctly anticipated would 
be a spate of very poor publicity contingent upon the 
union's complaint to the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO. Indeed one bank, the Westminster Bank, which 
accorded the right of access to its staff controller in 1961, 
was included in the union's original draft of complaint to the 
ILO, but was omitted from that complaint in subsequent 
drafts. 
The origins of the complaint to the ILO go back, once 
again, to the 1960 ADM of the union at which the decision to 
go ahead in preparing the complaint was made. By early 1961, 
the TUC had decided to back the complaint (which was originally 
coupled with a similar complaint from the Guild of Insurance 
Officers) and indeed to proceed on NUBE's behalf, Despite 
joint representations to the Conservative Minister of Labour, 
Mr. John Hare, the government failed to make any kind of 
satisfactory intervention in the situation and the complaint 
went forward to the Committee of Experts of the ILO who 
requested the government to establish an inquiry into the 
complaint. This was headed by Lord Cameron. 
cý... 
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Although the complaint was admittedly made in pursuit 
of the union's objectives of recognition from the clearing 
banks and the development of national negotiating 
machinery, 
(6) 
it was founded on Article 2 of ILO Convention 
No. 98 Concerning the Application of the Principles of the 
Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively. 
(7) 
This 
article dealt specifically with the question of employer 
interference in workers' organisations particularly with 
the aim of domination or control of these organisations, and 
the union's decision to found its case on this article was 
designed as a frontal attack on the staff as-ociations. 
In its allegations, the union named four banks - National 
Provincial, Martins, District, and Yorkshire Banks - as 
practicing this kind of interference, claiming that the 
staff associations of those banks had been founded by the 
employers and were on-goingly in receipt of financial 
assistance from them for the purpose of competing with the 
union and excluding it from recognition despite its large 
numbers of members in the banks concerned. In spite of 
representations from Counsel for NUBE, Lord Cameron took a 
narrow interpretation of the union's complaint and refused 
to allow any sustained consideration of the union's claim 
for national recognition, concentrating instead on the 
question of the independence of the staff associations cited 
in the complaint from their respective bank employers. In 
the event, Lord Cameron concluded that the union's comphint 
was unsubstantiated with respect to all of the four banks on 
the 'narrow' question of employer control or domination of 
the staff associations. 
(8) 
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Specifically, Lord Cameron rejected the union's claim 
that the constitutions of the staff associations named in 
the complaint were dictated or influenced by their respec- 
tive bank employers and that the banks had sought to 
influence the selection of office holders in the staff 
associations. 
(9) 
He further concluded that financial 
supports and subsidies alleged by the union to have been 
paid by the banks to their staff associations were 
negligable and, as such, insufficient to support the 
inference that they were given in pursuit of the domination 
or control of the staff associations. 
(10) 
Neither was it 
accepted by Lord Cameron that the staff associations' lack 
of constitutional power to utilise the strike weapon was 
indicative of their acceptance of a 'permanent position of 
subjection to or domination by the Banks'. 
(h1) 
Here Lord 
Cameron cited the existence of provisions for arbitration in 
procedural agreements between the staff associations and their 
respective banks and the above mentioned conclusion concerning 
the independence of the staff associations' constitutions 
from the influence of the bank employers. Finally, Lord 
Cameron rejected the claim by the union that the staff 
associations' membership were loss effectively represented 
than the bank employees represented by the union together 
with the associated claim that this constituted evidence 
of the domination of the staff associations by their 
bank employers. 
(12) 
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However, although the concrete outcome of the complaint 
constituted a defeat for NUBE, the union did establish a 
number of more diffuse gains as a result of the complaint. 
At the level of 'propaganda', NUBE's credibility was not 
seriously undermined by the failure of its complaint and 
in this respect its credibility was . enhanced 
by the support 
of the TUC and the more limited approval of the ILO. 
Additionally, the case revealed a number of unsatisfactory 
practices in the field of bank-staff relationships and the 
union gained widespread support and sympathy from the press 
and public and from M. P's of all parties in the House of 
Commons. In this sense, the union achieved a moderate 
'propaganda' victory and, the subjection of bank-staff 
relationships to public scrutiny may have had an important 
effect in making the bank employers less inclined to push 
their future opposition to the union to a point at which 
staff policies would, once again, be exposed to the scrutiny 
of a public unconvinced of their virtues. 
The additional degree of representation with the 
clearing banks achieved, at least in part, as a result of 
the Cameron Inquiry has already been mentioned. More 
significantly however, although the findings of his inquiry 
were based on a 'narrow# interpretation of the union's 
complaint, Lord Cameron commented extensively(13) on the 
unsatisfactory relationships existing between the union on the 
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one hand and the banks and their staff associations on the 
other and, having noted the growth of de facto national 
negotiations in the industry, 
(14) 
he went on to suggest 
that the Ministry of Labour be approached by all parties to 
the dispute with a view to establishing procedures for 
industry-wide bargaining involving the combined staff 
associations and NUBE. Subsequently in 1964 such an approach 
was made to the Ministry and a working party involving 
three representatives each from NUDE, the staff associations 
and the clearing banks was established in February 1965 to 
construct the basis for a system of national negotiations. 
With this development, NUBE's advance towards national 
recognition was given renewed momentum. 
Although the union remained broadly unrecognised during 
this first half of the sixties and its industrial policies 
necessarily remained propaganda exercises, the effects of 
the union's policies were by no means entirely negligible. 
The union's pay claim for 15 per cent across the board in 
1960 and for 10 per cent in 1961 helped to underline the 
increased vigour with which the staff associations were 
pressing their more moderate claims during the same period 
and was probably a factor in ensuring the substantial level 
of settlements achieved by the staff associations during 
the early 'sixties. The banks, who had provad sensitive 
to NUDE growth during the 'fifties, may possibly have 
conceded larger increases in order to bolster the credibility 
of the staff associations and undermine NUDE growth which 
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was substantial over the first three years of the decade. 
During this period too, the union increasingly 
espoused the issues of-the five day week for bank staffs 
(involving closure of the banks on Saturdays) and equal pay 
for female staff on a 'rate for the job' basis. The NUDE 
leadership correctly grasped the fact that female employees 
were increasing rapidly in banking and would continue to do 
so for as long as the boom in bank services continued 
and perceived that the five day week and equal pay issues 
would prove significant in attracting female membership. 
During this period, the union bolstered the credibility of 
its claims on these issues by frequent international compari- 
sons which did in fact display quite clearly the degree to 
which British banks were falling behind their continental 
counterparts on these issues. 
In grasping these issues early in the 'sixties and 
locating their significance for female staff, the union 
displayed itself as significantly more progressive in out- 
look than its internalist rivals whose perspective remained 
more traditionally oriented towards 'career' (male) staff. 
When Counsel for the District Bank sought to undermine the 
significance of union membership figures before the Cameron 
Inquiry by suggesting that one-sixth of NUDE membership 
consisted of girls under 21 and that total female membership 
of the union amounted to approximately one-third, 
(15) 
he was 
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articulating an outlook which totally failed to grasp the 
future pattern of bank employment and of industrial relations 
in banking and which would ultimately cost the staff 
associations their monopoly of employer recognition in 
the field. 
We have already noted the new mood of militancy within 
NUBE which found expression in the revision of its strike 
clause at the 1960 ARM. The early 'sixties additionally 
saw a growth in the determination of the union - at both 
headquarters and grassroots levels - to invoke the new clause 
which culminated in industrial action outside the London 
Clearing Banks. Thus in 1960 a dispute with Derby Trustee 
Savings Bank over managers' salaries was backed by a ban on 
overtime and on balance work. Subsequently, after threats 
of dismissal had been issued by the TSB management, the union 
called a strike after a secret ballot of its TSB membership 
in Derby and industrial action was averted only after the 
employers agreed to renewed negotiations which had satisfactory 
results. Similarly in 1963, after unsatisfactory negotiations 
with the TSB's during the 1962 pay round, a unilateral manage- 
ment announcement of salary increases amounting to 31 per cent 
was rejected by NUDE who additionally demanded the institution 
of an arbitration agreement to operate in the event of future 
disputes. These demands wore subsequently backed by strike 
action in TSD's in four areas of the country on three 
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successive Saturdays and resulted in the formulation of a 
satisfactory arbitration agreement and its use to increase 
salaries in the TSB's towards parity with those in the 
clearing banks. A similar strike was also called in the 
Habib Bank of Pakistan during 1963 with similar satisfactory 
results. 
The significance of these events for NUBE cannot be 
underestimated. For the first time in forty six years of 
existence, the union had broken through the barrier consti- 
tuted by the 'effectiveness-respectability' dilemma and the 
new strike clause had proved its worth by enabling the union 
to undertake effective selective strike action. Bank 
staffs responded enthusiastically to these developments and 
membership reached a high point for the first half of the 
decade. In the conflict area, the TSB's, membership rose 
by 16 per cent during 1963 alone and the union had effectively 
proved that, so far from alienating potential members, 
successful industrial action could result in increased support 
for its policies and outlook among bank staff. Additionally, 
the LAUBE leadership had gained vital experience in organising 
and sustaining industrial action and had gained an important 
negotiation and arbitration agreement which took the union 
into concrete salary bargaining activities for the first time 
and freed its executive from its exclusively propaganda 
role. 
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In sum, the first half of the 'sixties witnessed a 
distinct growth in the degree of militancy of bank staffs. 
It also saw solid, if unspectacular, progress towards true 
collective bargaining and bilateral determination of salaries 
and conditions in the industry evidenced in the staff 
associations' increased readiness to take the bank employers 
to arbitration and the union's success in establishing an 
arbitration agreement in the TSB's. Similarly, NUDE had 
been relatively successful in developing increased pressure 
for recognition which had resulted in limited success in 
the clearing banks and which held considerable promise for 
the future. How were these developments reflected in the 
memberships of the organisations involved? 
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Whilst the interpretation of the membership figures sum- 
marised in Table 7.3 (above) and Table 7,4 (below) is 
complicated by two factors (the large growth in the numbers 
of bank staff during this period and their high and 
increasing rate of turnover), it is clear that the response 
of bank staffs to the growth of militancy in their staff 
organisations was a disappointing one. Thus although there 
were substantial aggregate increases in the memberships of 
both the union and the staff associations during this 
period, these increases were insufficient to keep pace with 
the rapid growth in bank staffs during the pertid and both 
the union and the staff associations suffered falls in 
density. 
The pattern of NUDE membership over this period, set 
out in Table 7.4 (below) is relatively clear-cut. Between 
1960 and 1963 total union membership in the clearing banks 
grew at a fairly rapid pace and was sufficient to maintain 
the overall level of density of union membership in the banks. 
NUDE membership grew more rapidly among female bank staff, 
who were entering banking in rapidly increasing numbers during 
this period, and the level of density among female staff 
also grow. Among the male staff, growth was somewhat slower 
and in fact only just kept pace with the growth in male staff 
in the banks. By 1964 however, the momentum of NUDE's 
militant campaigns against the TSB's for arbitration and 
against the clearing banks for recognition was beginning to 
falter. The majority of the clearing banks had blocked the 
- 450 - 
ww 
". ý ýO CO CO 00 N tr1 
Ga NNNNNN 
AÜ 
a 
4A cli ý. o co 
öz 
g 03 
(d 0 
O a)- QwU 
U) .. W %D A 
Ö : N 0 - .b uA 
VD .q N Q ý 
U) -t -. r . f' e 1 
cD 
gn. AU 
., r 
N 
IN 
a 
E 
! 
(d 
uW 0 m 0 
t E V) M " " " to 
°1 8 ö ' a) W s .dz 
ö ö CA 0 2 v) ., ri .. r4 4.4 p7 
A 0m ° 
z z , 
0 
U) 
U 4J 
. 2 10 Ut 2. %O 0 0 N 
N ÄV LA M 0 
rr r, e c ý 
0) 
cz ti N co 4-4 0 CýW 
Out 8 ö ö ö 
V4 C) 
a, 44 CS 0 
a 
tD 
N 
.O 
ti rr .4 
O N 
r+ 
H 
o)z 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
ON (7% 
r4 114 W4 T-( V4 W4 
- 451 - 
union's claims for recognition by admitting oral 
representations from the union but refusing negotiating 
rights. Similarly, the Cameron Report had found against 
the union and had given a clean bill of union health to the 
staff associations, and, whilst the inquiry had recommended 
the setting up of national negotiating machinery, this 
recommendation remained rather distant from the majority of 
the membership. , 
In short, the union still found itself 
in the wilderness and perceived as such. Moreover a 
financial crisis forced the union to make substantial 
rises in subscriptions early in 1964 and it is clear that, 
for many of the more instrumentally oriented union members, 
this rise in subscription levels had a substantially negative 
effect. Membership of an increasingly expensive and, to 
all intents and purposes, unrecognised trade union began 
to seem increasingly unattractive when set against the 
gains achieved in 1963-4 by the recognised and comparatively 
cheap staff associations. A large drop in NUBE membership 
ensued and density levels dropped to a point not seen in 
banking since the early 'fifties prior to a previous large 
scale 'push' in membership during the middle of that decade. 
This major fall in NUBE membership testifies to the sensi- 
tivity of bank workers, whose orientations towards collective 
organisations are, as wo have seen, primarily instrumental in 
character, to levels of subscription rates within a context 
in which union affectiveness remains unproven. The fall 
also testifies to the instability of union membership during 
a period when lapses of membership wore running at approximately 
_1452_ 
10,000 persons (20 per cent of membership) per annum. 
Against a context of, rapidly increasing labour turnover in 
the banks, NUBE was forced to prove its efficacy on a yearly 
basis to ever increasing numbers of instrumentally oriented 
staff in an occupational culture unfavourable to trade union 
principles and in competition with cheaper organisations 
which were currently experiencing negotiating successes. 
In such an environment, a fall in union membership was the 
inevitable consequence of the rise in subscription rates. 
If progress during the first half of the decade was 
frustrating for union organisers, it must have been even more 
so for staff association workers. Although this most militant 
period in the staff associations' histories had resulted in 
large gains in membership, these gains proved insufficient 
to maintain density levels at the point reached in 1960. 
Throughout the period, the staff associations maintained 
their popularity with male bank staff and by 1965 their 
combined 'male membership in the clearing banks was nearly 
twice that of NUPE, They proved less successful however 
with the rapidly expanding numbers of female staff, and 
the density of female staff association membership fell by 
nearly five percentage points between 1960 and 1962, In 
the event, the growth in bank salaries between 1963 and 1965 
(see Table 7.5 below) which exceeded the rate of inflation and 
which was largely attributable to the efforts of the staff 
associations resulted in substantial staff association growth 
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among both male and female staff, whilst the results of 
the Cameron Inquiry contributed ideolori. cal support to the 
staff association stance. By the same token, the rise in 
NUBE' subscriptions discouraged both potential and actual 
union members and increased the attractiveness of the 
staff associations to bank workers who wished to join 
collective organisations. 
Table 7.5 
Indices of Retail Prices and Basic Salary Scales in the 
Clearing Banks, 
Retail Prices Basic Bank Salaries 
1960 100 100 
1961 103.4 102.0 
1962 107.8 105.1 
1963 110 108.8 
1964 113.6 116.6 
1965 119.0 122.2 
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As can be seen from Table 7.6, union growth in the 
large clearing banks was very substantial up to 1963 and 
especially so in Barclays, Lloyds and Westminster Banks. 
In 1964 however, there was a spectacular growth in staff 
association membership (particularly in the Westminster 
Bank whose staff association had achieved the important 
1963 arbitration award) and an equally spectacular decline 
(concentrated in the more volatile female membership) in 
NUDE strength in the individual banks. Table 7.6 also 
exhibits some significant 'local' factors in relative 
memberships in the individual banks. Thus the reverses 
sustained by NUKE in 1964 were subsequently overcome 
quickly and effectively in Barclays Bank where rivalry 
between the union and the staff association has historically 
been at a minimum. Union reverses were largest (and 
staff association gains were greatest) in the Westminster 
Bank whose Guild was responsible for the 1963 arbitration 
award and at the Midland Bank where hostility to the union 
from both the bank management and the staff association was 
greatest. 
(19) 
Finally union losses during 1964 were not 
paralleled by staff association gains at either Lloyds 
Bank or at the National Provincial Bank. In the case of 
the latter, where staff association gains were bettor. 
established prior to 1964, it is tempting to infer that the 
staff association had already made substantial inroads into 
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its potential membership as a result of its active response 
to the NUBE complaint to the ILO in 1963 and as a result of 
Lord Cameron's judgement at that inquiry. 
The first half of the decade saw substantial rivalry 
between NUBE and the staff associations and a growth of 
militancy in both organisations, However by 1965 the 
staff associations had effectively gained the initiative 
in this competition. They had achieved a good record in 
increasing both the money salaries and real living standards 
of their members and had developed a sophisticated approach 
to pay bargaining, 
(20) 
Moreover, they had been judged by 
Lord Cameron as independent of the bank employers and as 
'bodies capable of responsibly representing banking 
employees in their membership'. 
(21) 
By contrast, the union 
was nearly 10 per cent weaker in density terms than it had 
been a decade earlier in 1955. 
However although the staff associations had undoubtedly 
achieved a dominant position in the representation of bank 
staffs by 1965, underlying developments + both within the 
banking industry and outside it - were not favourable to the 
maintenance of this position, 
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Firstly, although even the most superficial observation 
of the banking scene would have exposed the existence of an 
informal salary cartel among the clearing banks throughout 
the 'fifties and early 'sixtiesq 
(22) 
this fact was becoming 
increasingly obvious to bank staffs and this, in turn, 
powerfully reinforced the NUBE argument for setting up 
machinery for national salary determination. The question 
was explicitly addressed in the Cameron Inquiry. Thus in 
relation to the contention 'that the Committee of London 
Clearing Bankers represented in a very real sense an 
'employer's, ' organisation of national character and quality' 
Lord Cameron commented: 
"It would appear from evidence already 
given in the, Inquiry that, at least in 
the matter of basic pay scales, when an 
increase has been granted by negotiation 
or as a result of arbitration (e. g., the 
'Birkett' award in the case of Lloyds 
Dank) to the staff of one of the larger 
clearing banks - particularly those which 
form the Committee of London Clearing 
Bankers - the increase is rapidly and almost 
automatically implemented without further 
negotiation by other banks in similar cir- 
cumstances, so that to a considerable degree 
in the matter of basic pay scales at least, a 
wide measure of uniformity is already achieved 
in England and Wales from the use of existing 
machinery and from the relations which exist 
among the larger clearing banks, " (23) 
Lord Cameron further wont on to base his argument for the 
formation of a committee to negotiate terms for national 
negotiating machinery on the existence of NUBEt the CCBSA 
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and the CLCß. 
(24) 
Similar intimations as to the joint 
nature of salary agreements were furnished by the 1965 
NBPI report on Midland Dank &alaries, 
(25) 
and evidence 
of joint policy making in the industry was also furnished 
in the written evidence of the CLCI to the Donovan Commission, 
(26 
By this point, the banks had ceased to attempt to conceal 
the 'national' character of salary awards in the industry 
and, as we have seent the 1964 salary award was announced 
as 'jointly agreed'. This increasing transparency of the 
nature of salary determination in the industry cannot but 
have played some part in strengthening the NUDE case for 
staff representation on a national, rather than an 
institutional, basis. 
A second factor which militated against the continued 
dominance of the staff associations in the field was, 
paradoxically, their very successes during the first half 
of the decade. The growth of the staff associations' 
aggression and sophistication in institutional salary 
negotiations was paralleled by an increasing tendency for the 
CCBSA to act as a medium for the exchange of views on 
salary negotiations and, more importantly, for the 
co-ordination of 'leap-frogging' salary campaigns. 
(27) 
Although this development was a most significant one for 
the growth of staff salaries, it had consequences that uroro 
less than fully favourable to the staff associations' 
position. On the one hand, the increasing co-ordination 
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of staff association policy tended to undermine the 
internalist ideological under-pinnings of the associations, 
whilst on the other it placed considerable strain on the 
banks' informal salary cartel. The reluctance of the bank 
employers to compete for staff on a salary basis in a 
situation of real competition within an expanding industry 
for extra labour meant that any staff association which 
could successfully take its bank to arbitration would 
effectively achieve a national award for the industry as a 
whole. in turn, this implied that a majority of the 
banks would, for the first time in many years, be forced 
to pay salaries which were difficult to anticipate in advance 
and which they played little or no role in determining. 
This development was particularly significant for the 
smaller clearing banks which began to favour national 
salary determination in which an employer's side would face 
a unified and disciplined 'staff side'. In sum, as Price 
has argued, the very success of the staff associations' 
bargaining techniques had a pawrful educational effect on 
the bank employers and rendered them more amenable to the 
possibility of national negotiating machinery (including the 
troublesome union) than could have been envisaged in 1960. 
(28) 
A third factor which was favourable to NUDE recognition 
in the long-term was the increased level of government 
intervention in industrial relations generally and collective 
bargaining in particular. This intervention had a dual 
aspect: firstly an increasing government interest in the 
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instituional machinery of industrial relations which 
culminated in the formation of the Donovan Commission in 
April 1965, and secondly a growing level of government 
intervention in concrete pay awards, These trends 
impinged on the banking scene in several different ways. 
With respect to the institutional aspects, NUDE was able, 
after a failed Ministry of Labour intervention in 1961, to 
generategovernment interest in its recognition problem 
through the medium of the Cameron Inquiry in 1963. The 
upshot of the Inquiry was to recommend, 'beyond the immediate 
purview of the Inquiry', a joint initiative by the clearing 
banks, staff associations and union to establish joint 
national negotiating machinery for the industry in which 
an employees' side would contain representatives of both 
NUDE and the staff associations. In July 1964, the 
CLCB did initiate this development and a joint working 
party began a series of meetings in February 1965. Here 
then the government, as a signatory to the ILO Convention 
No. 98, had initiated a set of proceedings which were to 
contribute towards the recasting of industrial relations in 
banking. 
On the national level, the Labour government which was 
returned in 1964 established the Donovan Commission. A 
part of the Commission's investigations concerned the 
extension of collective bargaining and, in particular, the 
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Commission concerned itself with the question of the law 
and other factors relating to union recognition, 
(29) 
The 
Commission accepted the central thrust of Bain's research 
report(30) namely, that the attitudes of employers would 
be 
"especially important for the organisation 
of white collar workers, since most groups 
of white collar workers are traditionally 
reluctant to strike or otherwise coerce 
their employers into granting recognition"9 
(31) 
and suggested that the proposed Industrial Relations Commission 
should be empowered to deal with recognition disputes. Since 
John Thomson (the Chairman of Barclays Banic) was a member of 
the commission, it seems likely that the progress of its 
deliberations and the development of a climate of opinion 
favourable to union recognition was not without some influence 
on the other members of the CLCB. We may also surmise that 
the members of the CLCB, with the experience of the Cameron 
Inquiry behind them, would be unenthusiastic about appearing 
before the projected CIR in a recognition dispute. 
The increasing level of government interest in the 
institutional infrastructure of industrial relations however 
was far exceeded by the degree of significance attached to 
controlling the increase of prices and incomes during the 
period. The weak performance of the Dritish economy during 
the 'fifties and the failures of 'stop-go' demand management 
policy during the same period lod, as Fels has pointed 
out, 
(32) 
to 'attempts to develop more interventionist styles 
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of managing the economy, and to the emergence of a "planning 
mood"'. 
(33) 
This change in outlook led to the formation 
of the National Economic Development Council 
(NEDC) and 
the National Incomes Commission (NIC) during 1962. Whilst 
Selwyn Lloyd's 1961 'pay pause' was introduced too late to 
have any substantial effects on bank pay settlements during 
1961, the February 1962 White Pappr (Incomes Policy: The 
Next Step), 
(34) 
which recommended that pay increases should 
not exceed a figure of 2-21 per cent, did result in the 
reluctant acceptance of relatively low settlements 
(3 per 
cent) by the staff associations in 1962. In March 1963, 
following the NEDC report on The Growth of the United 
Kingdom to 1966, the 1962 'guiding light' figure underwent 
an upward revision to 3-34- per cent aid this figure, in turn, 
formed the basis of the virtually unilateral 31 per cent award 
to bank staffs in 1963 which was revised retrospectively 
following the Westminster Bank Guild's successful recourse 
to arbitration in 1964. 
Finally, the election of the Labour government in 
October 1964 resulted in a further degree of emphasis on 
economic planning which was articulated in the formation of 
the Department of Economic Affairs, the National Board for 
Prices and Incomes (NBPI) and the publication of a White 
Paper on Prices and Incomes Policy(35) which again laid 
down norms for pay settlements of 3-3+ per cent. Although 
this first phase of the Labour government's prices and 
incomes policy was voluntary, the NIPI was not unsuccossful 
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in achieving acceptance for its recommendations and one of 
the first cases referred to it was the Midland Bank salary 
agreement of 5 per cent across the board backdated to January 
ist 1965, which became the norm for settlements in nine other 
clearing banks. 
(36 
The board's conclusion was that the 5 
per cent settlement could be made consistent with the White 
Papers provisions only by postponing further pay increases 
until early 1967.37) 
In sum then, by 1965 the staff associations had 
maintained their dominant position in representing bank 
staffs despite an energetic and aggressive challenge from 
NUBE against a context of growing staff militancy and power- 
ful inter-organisational competition, At the same time 
however, the ideological and institutional underpinnings 
of internalism were being eroded by the changing nature of 
bank pay negotiations which were becoming transparently 
'national' in character. Similarly, the increasing govern- 
ment emphasis on economic planning was setting up pressures 
towards increasing centralisation and uniformity in pay 
negotiations and the 'thaw' in the political climate with 
respect to trade unions, which occurred after the election of 
the Labour government in 1964 and was articulated in the 
formation of the Donovan Commission, augured well for the 
extension of collective bargaining in banking whore a working 
party was, once again, in the process of establishing draft 
national negotiating machinery, The confluence of those 
trends seemed to indicate that national collective bargaining 
machinery for banking might not be far off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.2 The Period 1965-68: Frustration and Explosion 
The second period under consideration, between 1965 and 
1968, was dominated by four issues: the introduction of the 
five day week into banking (involving the closure of'the 
banks on Saturdays), bank salary scales in the context of 
government policy, equal pay for women, and the vexed question 
of full recognition and negotiating rights on a ? national' 
basis for NUBE. All four issues were pursued with great 
energy by NUBE which took the lead in generating sufficient 
levels of institutional and grass-roots pressure to make 
these issues 'live? ones. 
NUBE had been committed to the concept of a five day 
week for banking since 1956, when its ADM passed a motion 
calling for its introduction. However during the late 
'fifties and early 'sixties both the bank employers and 
public opinion remained unreceptive to the idea. During 
this period, banks in North America, Australasia and the 
majority of European countries had adopted the five day 
week and by the end of 1963, when the concept had received 
its final imprimatur through its adoption by Swiss banks, 
the United Kingdom remained the only major industrialised 
country in the world whore banks continued to open on 
Saturdays. The international backwardness of the clearing 
banks on this issue was paralleled by increasing staff 
resistance to Saturday opening - articulated by both NUDE 
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and the staff associations - and was increasingly seen as 
an obstacle to the recruitment of short term female labour 
whom the rapidly expanding banks were seeking to employ 
in ever increasing numbers. 
The upshot of those developments was the creation of 
a special committee by the CLCD in February 1964 to 
investigate the question of banking hours. The researches 
of this committee however appear to have been inconclusive 
and the matter was referred back to it once again in 
February 1965, Finally in June 1965 the CLCB announced 
that legislation was being sought to make Saturday a non- 
business day, and in July 1966 a Private Member's Bill to 
permit Saturday closing was promoted. In the same month, 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer informed the banks that 
the government was unable to provide legislative facilities 
for the promotion of Saturday closing and that insufficient 
evidence had been produced to show that Saturday closing was 
an essential development for the introduction of a five day 
week for bank staffs. At this point the matter was referred 
to the NBPI9 which had been requested in the previous month 
to investigate the structure and levels of bank charges. 
The clearing banks now began to retreat once more from 
this issue and to canvass support for a shift system which 
would simultaneously maintain Saturday opening yet provide 
a five day week for bank staffs. This proposal for a 
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shift system was, in turn, rejected by the union's-1966 
ADM. At this point, the issue of Saturday closing had 
been Rivet for some two and a half years; no concrete 
advances had been made and the level of frustration among 
bank staffs in relation to the issue was remarkably high. 
When the report from the NHPI was published in 
February 1967(38) however, it contained no specific recom- 
mendations and merely enjoined the banks to abandon their 
system of uniform opening times in favour of a more flexible 
and cost-effective system involving the development of 
local arrangements to ensure that unnecessary bank services 
were not on offer to the public at unsuitable times. 
Finally, in October 1967, the CLCII produced proposals for 
banking hours which were broadly in line with the NBPI 
suggestions. Far from providing for Saturday closing, the 
proposals provided only for the half-day closure of banks 
on the local early closing day with an extra evening period 
of opening to compensate for this from 5 p. m, to 7 p. m. 
on the local late night shopping evening. As a concession 
to staff opinion on the Saturday closing issue, the banks 
proposed to introduce a five day accounting week to enable 
more staff to take Saturday as a rest day. 
Whilst it is clear that, in making these proposals, 
the bank employers sought both to follow the recommendations 
of the NBPI and to appease their frustrated staff, there can 
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be little doubt that their proposals were quite unrealistic 
in the developed climate of frustration that then existed 
among bank employees. Moreover the issue was clearly a 
national one in which the CLCB made decisions in a 
concerted fashion and in which there was no opportunity to 
present the proposals as the outcome of institutional 
deliberations. The response to the proposals by bank 
clerks was profoundly negative and, as during the previous 
upsurge of discontent in 1955, bank staff began to join 
NUBE in large numbers. Here then was an issue in which 
procrastination was succeeded by wholly inadequate proposals 
and in which NUBE, historically the institutional means 
through which bank clerks had registered their discontents, 
had an excellent record. There can be little doubt that, 
as we shall demonstrate,. this development on the question 
of banking hours was decisive for the growth of NUBE during 
this period. 
The issue of bank salary scales was also a vexed one 
during this period. As we have already seen, the first 
half of the decade saw a steady growth in the militancy and 
the bargaining skills of the staff associations so that, 
by 1965, basic salary levels (having lagged behind the cost 
of living during the early years of the decade) were now 
running marginally ahead of the cost of living (see Table 7.5 
above). The intervention by the NDPI over the 1965 salary 
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award however, which recommended a pay standstill in banking 
until early in 1967, placed the staff associations at a 
distinct disadvantage in subsequent salary negotiations. 
As a result only managerial and appointed staffs' salaries 
were negotiated during 1966, and the 3 per cent award achieved 
as a result of these negotiations was subsequently frozen 
as a consequence of the compulsory second phase of the 
Labour governments prices and incomes policy within which 
the Prices and Incomes Act 1966 gave the government powers 
to delay pay and price increases until August 1967, During 
this period, NUDE made a claim for the implementation of the 
3 per cent increases on the grounds that National Provincial 
Bank staff had beaten the freeze and were in receipt of the 
award.; Citing a similar situation in the Clyde shipyards 
where payments in some firms had also anticipated the freeze 
and had been used as a basis for a successful demand for 
implementation of the award to the remaining firms, the 
union argued that a comparable situation existed within the 
clearing banks. In rejecting the NUDE claim however, Mrs. 
Shirley Williams argued that the Clyde award had been the 
product of a general agreement, whereas in banking the 
awards, though similar, had been the products of separate 
institutional negotiations and that therefore the question 
of loss of parities engendered in banking could not be 
considered to fall within the scope of the Clyde , 
judgement. 
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The third phase of the Labour government's incomes 
policy ('the period of moderation') was voluntary in basis 
and commenced in July 1967 and ended in March 1968. This 
phase also adversely affected the process of salary negotia- 
tions in banking. The basis of the NBPI's approach to 
incomes determination during this third phase was a zero 
'norm' for incomes growth which was mitigated by the 
reintroduction of the pre-1966 criteria for exceptional 
increases, 
(39) 
the most relevant of which concerned 
contributions towards the growth of productivity. In 
this situation, the staff associations were obliged to 
base their case for salary increases on productivity grounds 
which were not of their own choosing and early in 1967 a 
24- per cent increase was negotiated to take effect from 
July Ist 1967, This increase was approved by the Minister 
of Labour on grounds'of 'the general reorganisation of banks 
in recent years, the introduction of computers and mechanical 
accounting in smaller branches, which have all received staff 
co-operation'. 
(40) 
Given that a3 per cent increase negotiated for the 
staff of the Westminster Dank was not approved and had to be 
reduced at this time, it seems clear that Robinson's claim 
that 
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"it is extremely doubtful if any greater 
increase could have been negotiated for 
bank staffs in the economic circumstances 
pertaining in 1967" (141) 
is substantially correct. However, the 24- per cent 
increase, which followed a 24- year 'pay pause' for bank 
staffs proved unpopular among bank employees who had 
seen a steady decline in the value of their earnings over 
the previous two years in a situation which their represen- 
tatives seemed powerless to alter. Once again then, 
NUBE stood to reap a harvest of the disgruntled and 
disaffected. 
The third major issue of this period con-erned the 
question of equal pay for women. During the late 'fifties 
and early 'sixties NUBS9 which was becoming increasingly 
aware of the significance of the growing proportions of 
female bank employees, began to highlight this issue as 
part of its 'propaganda' role in opposition to the bank 
employers and staff associations and, after 1962, the 
question of equal pay became a virtual fixture at the union's 
ADMIs. As part of its programme to attract female member- 
ship, the union had also set aside special women's seats 
on the National Executive Committee. The question of equal 
pay was a valuable and progrossivo issue for the union to take 
up. The numbers of women in banking were growing; and 
grass-roots opinion on this issue was steadily developing 
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away from the paternalistic attitudes adopted by bank 
managements since the introduction of female labour in the 
banks. Additionally the issue steadily increased in 
significance within the trade union movement as a whole 
during the 'sixties and provided NUBE propagandists with 
yet a further basis for ironic contrast between British 
and continental levels of pay and conditions of work in 
banking. 
Moreover the issue had a substantive as well as an 
ideological significance. Entry into the European 
Economic Community, over which successive British govern- 
ments vacillated during the 'sixties, would have required 
a national commitment to a timetable for the introduction 
of equal pay for women, which thus became a contingency which 
the bank employers could not ignore. Additionally, 
successive NBPI reports had criticised the cumbersome and 
expensive age-related salary scales which had been designed 
by the clearing banks to attract a predominantly permanent 
and male 'career' entry in earlier and pro-expansionist 
times. By 1965 however, this system appeared to be 
increasingly inappropriate to the prevalent banking conditions 
which involved, tho recruitment of increasing numbers of short- 
term female bank staff whose turnover was comparatively 
high. Thus the 1965 NBPI report on Salaries of Midland 
Bank Staff criticised the bank's salary structure and 
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broadly supported the proposals by NUDE and Darclays Dank 
Staff Association for a 'rate for the job' structure. 
Thus, whilst the question of equal pay was of 
considerable ideological value for the union in the cir- 
cumstances of increasing levels of female employment in 
banking, it was also a question in which the banks them- 
selves, under general government an3 specific NDPI direction, 
were taking an interest. Moreover, given the previous 
history of 'national' awards, it was clear that the new 
salary structures in banking would prove both inappropriate 
and difficult to negotiate on an institutional basis whilst 
NUDE would prove difficult to exclude from national 
negotiations. Thus, although the questions of equal pay 
and 'rates for the job' were repeatedly deferred during 
the decade, they remained questions which implied the 
relevance of union recognition and participation in salary 
determination, and implied this relevance a fortiori as 
the political climate in favour of such recognition 
progressively developed during the second half of the 
decade. 
Interwoven with these important questions of staff pay 
and conditions was the recognition question itself, As 
we have seen, a working party was sot up to re-examine the 
question of national negotiating machinery following the 
Cameron Report. However the decision to set up the working 
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party was not supported by the Midland Bank Staff 
Association or by the National Provincial Bank Staff 
Association and the managements of these two banks also took 
no part in the negotiations 'out of deference to the wishes 
of their associations'. The Midland Bank Staff Association's 
opposition to the formation of the working party, which was 
but a facet of its aggressive stance towards NUBE, 
(42) 
was 
so vehement that in 1965 it withdrew from the CCBSA in 
protest. 
Despite these difficulties, the 'rump' working party 
succeeded after fourteen sessions in producing a draft 
constitution for national negotiating machinery and 
this was submitted for approval to the banks, the CCBSA 
and the union in March 1967. The proposals envisaged the 
formation of three bodies: a Federation of Bank Employers, 
a Banking Staff Council and a Joint Negotiating Council for 
Banking. The Banking Staff Council was to be composed of 
2l members of whom not more than twelve would be from NUBE 
or the staff associations. The Joint Negotiating Council 
for Banking was to be composed of twelve members (in equal 
numbers from the Federation of Bank Employers and the Banking 
Staff Council) in which the six members from the staff 
side would be drawn equally from the union and the staff 
associations. The negotiations would be led from the 
staff side alternately by a union and a staff association 
representative. Not surprisingly, the subjects for national 
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negotiation were stiffly contested by the staff associations 
who were anxious to retain as many topics as possible for 
their own privileged internal negotiations. Ultimately 
however, the major subjects agreed for national negotiations 
with recourse to arbitration were: basic salary scales, 
basic retiring salaries, minimum managerial salaries and 
London allowances. Further subjects on which, it was 
agreed, the Council might make recommendations included 
questions of safety in banks, hours and overtime, territorial 
allowances and holidays, 
The proposals thus laboriously hammered out were 
rejected outright by two of the banks' managements 
(National Provincial and Westminster) and ignored by the 
management of the Midland Bank, A similar pattern of 
rejection emerged from the staff associations of those 
banks. Of all the institutions involved in the negotiations, 
only the National Bank, NUBE, Barclays Bank Staff Association 
and District Dank Staff Association were unreservedly in 
favour of the proposals. The remainder of the bank 
employers (Barclays, Lloyds, Martins, District, Glyn Mills 
and Williams Deacons) and the staff associations (Glyn 
Mills, Lloyds and Martins) withdrew from the arrangements 
because of lack of support from the larger clearing banks. 
As a result, in July the CLCD announced the collapse of the 
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machinery and stated that the draft constitutions would 
remain 'available for use in any future discussions if 
there should be a prospect of agreement'. 
The two years between 1965 and 1967 then constituted 
a period in which pay and conditions in banking were 
topics of almost continuous speculation and comment but 
also remained arenas of inaction. The obstructions of 
the government on pay and hours and the procrastination of 
the bank employers on these topics allied with the hostility 
of several of the larger staff associations to the 
proposals for national negotiating machinery resulted in a 
convergence of staff frustrations by late 1967. Within a 
period of three months, bank staffs were forced to accept a 
relatively poor pay award, saw the development of a more power- 
ful negotiating body embodying recognition for an organisation 
representing nearly 60,000 bank employees frustrated by 
the staff associations and the bank employers and were 
finally informed that, far from eliminating Saturday working, 
the banks proposed to introduce evening work in addition to 
the then current six day working week. Their reaction, 
as in 1955, was to join NUBS in large numbers, 
The coincidence of these three issues undoubtedly had 
a galvanising effect on bank staffs and the union, which 
had unsuccessfully canvassed the idea of strike action over 
the 'hours' issue during 1966, now began to achieve 
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considerable support for this line of conduct. In the 
event, strike action was initiated in South Wales during 
the 24th and 25th November and was continued in the North 
and Midlands (at Blackpool, Holton, Doncaster and Nottingham) 
on the 8th and 9th December. Considering that English 
clearing bank staffs were unused to industrial action, 
the strikes were remarkably successful. In the Welsh 
action, nearly 3000 bank staff withdrew their labour 
closing 100 branches entirely and rendering a further 110 
ineffective as trading units, whilst another 80 branches 
experienced substantial withdrawals of labour. During 
the second phase of industrial action in the North and 
Midlands, 186 branches were affected of which 83 were 
entirely closed and nearly 1500 bank clerks participated 
in the action. Moreover the strikes were attended by a 
remarkably favourable press reaction 
(43) 
and by support 
from the Union of Post Office Workers and even from the 
general public. Thus in incidents during the South Wales 
action, customers insisted on speaking in Welsh to the 
English clerks and inspectors who had been imported to 
maintain bank services during the strike, 
Although the strikes were not physically crippling to 
the banks in terms of numbers of clerks involved in the 
actions or their temporal duration, their psychological 
impact was very considerable. Almost immediately they 
prompted a referendum among Yorkshire Dank staff over the 
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question of representation which resulted in the dissolution 
of the Yorkshire Bank Staff Association. By the end of 
November one of the smaller clearing banks, Williams Deacons, 
had offered to recognise the union and the CCBSA had 
initiated proceedings to recast its constitution to pxovide 
that member institutions would be bound by majority 
decisions in order to fit itself for participation - as 
part of a 'staff side' - in joint national negotiating 
machinery. By the 19th December, nine of the eleven 
clearing banks (the dissenters being Coutts Bank and the 
Midland Bank) had indicated their willingness to recognise 
NUBE under the terms of the national negotiating machinery 
which had been rejected earlier in the year, but the union, 
which was planning further industrial action for the 29th 
and 30th December, now held out for further concessions - 
notably for the extension of the items to be included within 
the framework of national-negotiation and arbitration to 
include those items which had previously been designated 
for 'discussion' and 'recommendation' only under the earlier 
machinery. Finally, at an 'eleventh hour' meeting on 
December 28th, the nine banks and their staff associations 
acceeded to these demands and the union had won its fifty 
year struggle for national recognition. 
At this stage however, one major clearing bank, the 
Midland Dank, remained outside the machinery. This bank 
finally announced its decision to enter into the national 
arrangements four months later at the and of April 1968. 
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The decision was significant as the bank and its staff 
association were undoubtedly the most hostile to the union 
and its approach to industrial relations and this hostility 
was not moderated as either a cause or consequence of the 
decision. Moreover the decision was made by the bank 
irrespective of whether its staff association was 
prepared to participate in the machinery. The Midland 
Bank decision therefore was. undoubtedly influenced to a 
large extent by its isolated and effectively impotent 
position in relation to salary negotiations. 
(44) 
The 
formation of the National Westminster Group early in 1968 
and the projected merger between Barclays, Lloyds and 
Martins Bank which was announced shortly afterwards created 
a situation in which the Midland Bank seemed certain to 
become by far the smallest bank in a projected 'Big Three', 
In addition, the Midland Bank would have had no influence 
in the determination of salaries between two large banks, 
their staff associations and the union in a situation where 
its rivals would be achieving substantial economies of scale 
and would be pressed to pass on these gains to their 
staffs. In such a situation, the Midland Dank would be 
forced to pay rapidly rising salaries over the determination 
of which it would have no control, As the Chairman of the 
Midland Dank explained in a letter to shareholders, the number 
of nationally negotiated issues had been extended considerably 
beyond those of the June 1967 proposals and 
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"it would be unwise for the Midland to be 
left with no voice in the settlement of 
these matters, as we might well find our- 
selves obliged to accept decisions wholly 
arrived at by others". (1i5) 
Subsequently, the Midland Bank Staff Association was left 
with no choice but to participate in national negotiations 
since any other course of action would have eliminated its 
role entirely. 
The formation of the Joint Negotiating Council for 
Banking (JNC), which was formally established on the 22nd 
May 1968, by no means ended competition between the union 
and the staff associations. It will be recalled that the 
June 1967 proposals provided for a 24-man Banking Staff 
Council (BSC) of whom six members would represent the 
'staff side' in negotiations in the JNC. The BSC 
constituted in 1968 was made up of twelve representatives 
each from the union and the staff associations with the 
proviso that, in the event of tied votes, the issue would 
be decided through the operation of a poll vote based on 
the memberships of the union and combined staff associations 
respectively within the clearing banks. In the last analysis 
therefore control over the negotiating policies of the ISC 
depended upon organising a majority of bank staffs and the 
struggle for such control thus formed a now basis for 
competition for membership between the organisations. Nor 
was the 'poll vote' an academic and uninvoked aspect of the 
BSC constitution. At the second meeting of the BSC on July 
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2nd 1968, the staff associations' poll vote superiority 
was used to reduce the size of the pay claim to be put to 
the employers' federation from the 10-121 per cent claim 
proposed by the union side to an 8 per cent claim decided 
by the staff associations, In the event, the first 
national award to bank staffs achieved as a result of 
the new negotiating machinery was for approximately 7 per 
cent for male staff and 11 per cent for female staff on 
basic scales backdated to July 1st, 1968. The additional 
payments for women constituted a major and concrete move 
towards equal pay for women in the banking industry and a 
tangible expression of an 'in principle' agreement decided 
within the JNC to move progressively towards a salary 
structure embodying equal pay for men and women. 
However the situation was far from concluded, Despite 
the fact that this was the first national agreement achieved 
in banking and one which was designed both to bring basic 
pay levels within the various clearing banks into line with 
one another and to implement a progressive movement towards 
equal pay within the industry, the settlement once again 
fell foul of national incomes policy which had been tightened 
up following devaluation in November 1967. Somewhat belatedly 
in March 1968, the government had assumed powers to delay 
the implementation of pay settlements by a full eight months 
following an adverse report by the NHPI. Consequently, with 
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the referral of the 1968 settlement to the Prices and Incomes 
Board, only 32 per cent of the award was made payable 
immediately and the union, following some difficult and 
unsuccessful discussions in the Banking Staff Council 
designed to establish staff association support for its 
policies, began a unilateral campaign designed to persuade 
the government to allow payment of the settlement in full. 
This campaign culminated in a half-day strike in banks in the 
London area on the 30th January 1969 and a mass lobby of 
M. P's by 12,000 bank clerks on that day, followed by a 
further threat to 'black' government work in the banks. 
The union's campaign which, as we shall see, was ultimately 
successful, did not receive staff association support. 
Whilst there were important areas of friction and 
conflict within the Banking Staff Council between the union 
and the staff associations over such matters as the formation 
of salary demands and, subsequently, questions relating to 
the scope of the national negotiating machinery, there were 
also areas of agreement in which the combined staff side 
acted effectively in pursuit of its aims. In this 
connection, it is worth noting that the union and the staff 
associations acted in concert over an agreed objective of a 
5-day, 35-hour working week -a demand formulated almost 
unanimously in the very first meeting of the Banking Staff 
Council, For some time the bank employors, in all 
probability fearing public reaction to the abolition of 
Saturday opening and nervous of potential compotition from 
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the newly established Post Office GIRO system, refused to 
concede the five day week and the matter was referred to 
arbitration - the first issue to be so referred under the 
new machinery. However in September 1968, the banks 
abruptly conceded the claim and, without consulting the 
staff side, announced that Saturday closing would take 
effect from July 1st 1969. Although the timing of this 
announcement lends substance to the banks' public Justifi- 
cation for this decision namely, that the recruitment of 
school leavers of appropriate quality was suffering as a 
result of the 5--day week, 
(46) 
there can be little doubt 
that the banks also feared the reaction from a united 
staff side under union pressure if Saturday closing were 
not granted. 
The period between the beginning of 1967 and the end of 
1968 was perhaps the most hectic in the history of NUBE. 
Following a complex propaganda campaign culminating in 
the first clearing bank strikes in the union's history, 
the union - now recognised - was immediately plunged 
into complex initial negotiations with its staff association 
counterparts on the Banking Staff Council and with the bank 
employers in the JNC. It was involved in these negotiations, 
moreover, at the very point at which two major bank mergers 
wore projected and largely achieved in an upheaval unique in 
post-war British banking history which was coupled with a 
further major merger in the Scottish banks. Finally, the 
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first fruits of recognition in the form of a national 
pay settlement were, once again, referred to the NDPI 
and the union was compelled to contest government policy 
without the backing of the staff associations which had 
participated in the salary settlement. What was the 
impact of these changes in fortune on the memberships of 
the staff organisations? 
Tables 7.7 and 7.8 set out the broad trends in staff 
organisation membership in the clearing banks during this 
period, 
Table 7,7 
Indices of Combined Staff Association Membership in 
the English Clearing Banks 1960-1968. 
Aggre- Aggre- Aggre- 
gate Density gate Density gate Density 
Numbers Males Males Females Females 
1960 100 52.3 100 60.7 100 111 ,1 
1965 120,8 50.0 113.8 59.9 134.6 39.1 
1966 122,4 49.1 115.9 59.6 135.4 37.7 
1967 118.0 45,6 113.4 57.7 127.1 33.3 
1968 114.8 42,7 110.6 55.3 123.0 30.3 
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As can be seen from Tables 7.7 and 7.8, there was 
little change in the membership positions of either the 
union or the staff associations during 1966. This year 
was, of course, one in which salaries marked time following 
the NBPI report on Salaries in the Midland Danlc, the 'hours' 
issue remained unresolved and referred to the NBPI and 
negotiations over national negotiating machinery continued 
in an unpublicised way. In the industrial climate then 
prevailing it would be surprising to find any rapid changes 
in relative membership positions among the two sets of 
organisations and indeed 1966 membership trends were almost 
non-existent and hence bore little relationship to member- 
ship tendencies established earlier in the decade. Absolute 
numbers in the staff associations increased but rose 
insufficiently to maintain 1965 density levels particularly 
among female staff, whilst overall NUDE membership fell 
marginally thus contributing to the steady fall in density 
levels which had begun in 1964. 
During 1967, by contrast, the membership. pattern was 
substantially transformed. NUDE membership within the 
clearing banks - the focus of the triple dispute during 1967 - 
rose by over 36 per cent. This increase was nearly three 
times greater than tho union's growth outside the clearing 
banks. The density of NUDE membership rose by over nine 
percentage points during the year. Within those figures, 
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female membership of the union grow most rapidly by an 
aggregate increment of 60 per cent, yielding an increase 
in the density of female union membership in the clearing 
banks of 11.5 per cent. The growth of male membership 
of the union was also very considerable at an aggregate 
level of 21.5 per cent which translated into a density 
growth of 7 percentage points. During this same 
period, staff association membership among both sexes 
showed a slight aggregate decline which is accentuated in 
the density calculations by the growth in clearing bank 
staffs during the year. 
In interpreting this pattern of union growth (and 
correlative staff association stagnation), it seems clear 
that, with respect to both men and women, the union did not 
gain membership by causing staff association members to 
abandon their allegiances and transfer to the union in 
large numbers whilst resigning from their original organisa- 
tions. The drop in staff association membership is minimal 
by comparison with the large growth in union membership and 
is far too small to sustain such an interpretation. More- 
over although, as we shall see, the growth in NUDE membership 
was concentrated during the last three months of 1967, and it 
is hence possible that lapses in staff association memberships 
were not recorded until 1968, such a claim is defeated by 
two considerations. Firstly, staff association membership 
figures are extremely accurate in terms of a 'current' (i. e. 
'month by month') basis, 
(47) 
and secondly the recorded 
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drift away from the staff associations during 1968 was again 
not very substantial and was far outweighed by a further 
swing to NUDE during that year. 
If we now turn, firstly, to the pattern of male membership 
in the two types of organisation during 1966 and 1967, we find 
that it is likely that NUHE growth was achieved during 
1967 by an increase in the numbers of male staff holding 
'dual' membership of both organisations. Thus the combined 
density of male membership of both organisations in the 
London clearing banks rose from 94.4 per cent in 1966 to 
99,4 per cent in 1967. Given that the 1966 figure probably 
$) 
included approximately 5 per cent of 'dual' members, it 
seems likely that this figure increased when NUBE density 
rose without any parallel losses among staff association 
members. It is also probable that NUBE 'scooped the pool' 
of school leavers who entered banking during the summer of 
1967 and the union may additionally have induced a marginal 
number of male staff to withdraw from the staff associations 
altogether. 
Among the female staff, the picture is more clear-cut. 
The combined density of female organisational membership in 
1966 was 60.1 per cent and this figure had risen to 67.2 per 
cent by the end of 1967. There was thus clealy a good 
deal of 'slack' to be taken up by recruiting additional 
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'uncommitted' female staff to union membership during 1967 
and the growth of female union membership seems unlikely to 
have been a product of a growth in 'dual' memberships, 
Nor, of course, was it a product of widespread transfers 
of allegiance to the union. 
It is clear then that the growth of NUDE's female 
membership was greater - in both absolute and relative 
terms - than its growth in male membership. Given that 
female density levels remained below those for male staff, 
it might be tempting to assume that the 'slack' in the 
female membership figures basically accounts for the 
relatively high growth of unionisation among female bank 
staffs. Thus we could propose a scenario for NUDE growth 
during 1967 which stresses that male staff unrest was 
developing during the year and that an exceptionally large 
proportion of female members were sucked into the union at 
the same time as a product of 'bandwagon' or 'multiplier' 
effects (discussed in Chapter 2) operating on broadly 
uncommitted and instrumentally oriented women who, for a 
variety of reasons had remained under-unionised and were 
hence a ripe prospect for a rapid expansion in membership. 
Such an interpretation as the above rests for its 
plausibility on the notion of differential 'slack' in 
the membership potentialities of male and female clerks. 
However if female staff 
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had a lower propensity to unionise than their male colleagues 
in 1966, our task should be to explain why that propensity 
grow so rapidly during 1967. An explanation of union growth 
in terms of 'slack' thus puts the cart before the horse: 
a previously low propensity to unionise cannot, by any means, 
explain the existence of a subsequently high propensity to do 
so, Finally, our attempted interpretation signally fails 
to address the issues of NU]E's 1967 campaign and we will 
consider these before re-examining the question of the 
differential proclivities of men and women to join the union 
during this period. 
It will be recalled that the union's 1967 campaign was 
based on three 'planks' (the 1967 pay increase, national 
recognition for NUBE, and the five-day week issue), and that 
each of these came to a crisis point at a different time in 
the year. Thus the poor 2+ per cent pay settlements were 
negotiated and announced in the majority of the clearing 
banks by April 1967, subsequently the final breakdown in the 
talks on national negotiating machinery was announced in 
July 1967 and, following a number of rumours during September, 
the banks 'package' on hours was announced in October. Some 
guide to the gross effects of those events can be seen in the 
monthly pattern of recruitment to and lapses from NUDE during 
the year, which are set out in Table 7.9 below. 
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Table 7,9 ` 
'New' and 'Struck Off' Members of NU]3E distributed on a 
monthly basis for 1967. 
New Members Struck Off Members 
January 828-7 r-1453 
February 880 1381 
March 850, 577 
April 840 1187 
May 1166 954 
June -- 8850 1016 8271- 1117 
July 569 373 
August 1040 510 
September 1656 719 
October 61 19 t--576 
November 7050 H18782 1710- 534 
December 
. 
5618-- - 600 
Total 27632 9981 
Table 7.9 clearly demonstrates that, despite the low pay 
settlements in April and the breakdown of negotiations over 
national negotiating machinery in July, union recruitment 
during the first nine months of the year was barely sufficient 
to maintain NUx3E membership at 1966 levels. During the last 
three months of the year however, when the five-day week 
question was paramount, the union achieved a not gain of 
over 17,000 new members. Prima facie then, the 'hours' 
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question was the crucial issue generating now union member- 
ship as not only was recruitment abnormally high during the 
last three months of 1967, but also the rate of lapses from 
the union during this period was abnormally low at 
approximately half the average rate for the same three months 
during the previous four years. 
Turning to the early part of the year, we can see a 
slight but perceptible growth in the level of union recruit- 
ment during May and June - the two months following the 
announcements of the 2+ per cent pay awards. The rate 
of recruitment during these months was somewhat 
(approximately 
50 per cent) higher than the average levels of recruitment 
for these two months during the previous four years and 
may be held to reflect staff dissatisfaction with the 
salary awards. However the membership response was 
clearly not substantial and that it was not more significant 
can be traced to two major factors. Firstly, the lowness 
of the award was clearly a result of government, rather 
than bank, policy. The awards had to be approved by the 
Ministry of Labour and were clearly designed to be in step 
with the Labour government's incomes policy. Any doubts 
which bank staffs may have entertained on this score would 
have been eliminated by the downgrading of the Westminster 
Bank award from 3 per cent to 2- per cent. Dank staffs 
at this point were in no position to seek to challenge 
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government policy even assuming that they entertained the 
desire to do so, and under such circumstances to seek to 
respond to the pay award by joining NUDE would, perhaps, 
be perceived as less than realistic. Secondly, bank 
staffs on incremental scales were less directly and obviously 
subject to the erosion of real incomes through the operation 
of inflationary pressures than workers who were paid on a 
flat-rate basis. Between 1965 and 1967, the period between 
successive awards in banking, the cost of living rose by 
approximately 6.4 per cent. During the same period the 
basic salary of an unappointed male Midland Bank clerk, aged 
22 years in 1965, would have risen by 12.4 per cent and a 
similar man aged 25 years at the same date would have seen 
his salary rise by 18 per cent. A girl aged 19 years in 1965 
would have been earning 19 per cent more by her 21st birthday 
in 1967. Of all clerks on basic scales, only women aged 
22 years and over would have experienced a (marginal) fall 
in their real earnings between 1965 and 1967. 
(49 
For the 
majority of bank clerks on basic scales then, the erosion of 
the real value of their earnings was masked by the rapid age- 
related growth in their money earnings between 1965 and 1967 
and, under such circumstances, a strong impulse to counter 
this erosion, which would have involved an assault on 
government policy and the rejection of the staff associations 
which had performed relatively effectively on salaries in the 
recent past, was not to be expected. 
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Similarly, despite the. slight growth in recruitment to 
LAUBE during July and August over previous years, there is 
little to suggest that this increase bore any relationship 
to the breakdown of the proposals for national negotiating 
machinery early in July. One would not, in the normal way, 
expect to see an upsurge in membership of an-organisation 
whose negotiations for recognition by an employer have just 
resulted in failure. Moreover, in 1967 there was an 
abnormally high level of recruitment by the banks and the 
greater than normal increase of NUBS in these two months 
may as easily be explained by the above average influx of 
school leavers into the banks during this period assuming a 
broadly stable proportion of union recruitment. 
In sum, we come back to the five-day week issue as the 
crucial question influencing the growth of union members 
during this-period. Such an interpretation would be 
consistent with the most immediate explanation of the pre- 
ponderance of union growth among female bank staffs since, 
as we have already seen, female staff have a greater tendency 
to attach importance to hours of work and related issues 
than their male counterparts. The rapidity of the growth 
in the unionts female membership during this period is thus 
attributable not to some hypothesised 'slack' in female 
membership to be taken up, but to the fact that the union 
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had espoused an issue which was exceptionally salient to 
a 'home centred' potential female membership whose 
identification with trade unionism tended to be 
instrumental and issue-based rather than traditional and 
solidaristic. 
The pattern of industrial action taken by NUDE lends 
itself to a similar interpretation. During the middle'of 
August 1967, the NUBE leadership decided against undertaking 
a national referendum of bank staffs directed at establishing 
grass-roots opinion on the collapse of national negotiating 
machinery on the grounds that the enterprise carried too 
high a risk of failure, Instead it was decided to concen- 
trate on the possibility of selective strikes against the 
clearing banks in specified geographical areas. By late 
September, after soundings in the various areas has been 
taken, it was apparent that only North and South Wales - 
where three quarters of bank clerks were already union 
members - offered the possibility of credible industrial 
action. Once again, it is intuitively obvious that only 
in areas where NUDE had a majority of members would the 
breakdown of national negotiating machinery which would 
give that majority a voice in salary determination have the 
possibility of generating a sufficiently aggressive reaction 
to the bank employers and the staff associations. By 
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contrast, it was only in late October - after the hours 
package had been announced - that soundings in previously 
unencouraging areas began to return more positive results 
and the union began to lay the ground-work for the second 
and third phases of its industrial action within its more 
conservative English constituencies. 
There is then ample evidence to suggest that the 
union's aggressive espousal of the banking hours issue at 
its most controversial point was broadly responsible for 
(1) the rapid growth in membership at that time, (2) the 
distribution of that increased membership between men and 
women, (3) the overcoming of bank staffs inhibitions about 
strike action and (4) the establishment of a climate of 
opinion in which strike action was seen as the only effective 
means of countering bank policy. Even in connection with 
the industrial action itself, there is circumstantial 
evidence (such as photographs of the action and press 
releases)(50) to suggest that female staff played a crucial 
role in picketing bank offices. Once again, such a role 
would be consistent with female 'home centred' orientations 
established in the previous chapters. It would be unlikely 
indeed to see 'work centred' male bank staff as the backbone 
of a picket-line outside the bank in which they planned to 
make a career and in full view of the customers with whom} 
the banks encourage them to believe, they will soon be 
dealing on terms of equality or superiority. 
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In Chapter 4 we noted a crucial paradox for the growth 
of trade unionism in banking and for the overcoming of the 
union's difficulties in reconciling their membership's 
contradictory demands for both 'effectiveness' and 'respecta- 
bility'. This paradox was that the progressive creation of 
a 'separate clerical class' in banking as a result of bureau- 
cratic and expansionist pressures within the industry was 
not being translated into unionisation because the 'separate 
clerical class' was itself undergoing rapid feminisation. 
The young women employed in banking, we argued and the 
results summarised in Chapters 5 and 6 confirmed, had a 
predominantly short-run, instrumental orientation to work 
and to trade unionism. Cushioned against inflation by an 
incremental salary structure and, in substantial part 
attached to banking employment by non-economic factors, 
this separate clerical class - although substantially 
independent by virtue of its non-career orientation from 
the direct effects of employer attitudes and the traditional 
means of control over bank employees - would, nonetheless, 
be difficult to attract and maintain within a trade union 
framework, Since the obverse of the creation of this 
'separate clerical class' would be the renewal of the 
strength of male 'career' orientations intrinsically 
unsympathetic to militant industrial action if not trade 
unionism per so, this development contained the possibility 
of heightening the paradoxical situation within which the union 
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found itself devoid of a coherent constituency on either 
side of the career/non-career divide and in which bank 
workers were doubly segmented both by sex and by collective 
organisational affiliation. It is our central contention 
that the five-day week issue catalysed the potential union 
membership in the feminine clerical class by furnishing the 
union with a highly salient issue for female workers whose 
central life interests lay outside the world of work and 
whose structures of relevances were crucially touched by the 
question of the balance between work and leisure which that 
issue articulated. Moreover the five-day week issue was 
sufficiently broad and generative to cut across the various 
segments of the bank population and motivate a sufficiently 
unified body of bank staffs to challenge the unilateral control 
over hours and conditions of work which had been the pre- 
rogative of bank employers for the previous fifty years 
of the union's existence. 
If we now turn to the pattern of organisational membership 
in 1968, we find a continuation of the fall in staff 
association membership which began in 1967 and a similar 
extension in growth trends with respect to NUDE membership. 
The aggregate fall in combined staff association membership 
was not large at approximately 2000 persons (roughly 2.7 per 
cent of membership), although once again those figures 
translated into a somewhat more substantial density decline 
due to the continued increase in total clearing hank staffs 
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during the year. The falls in staff association membership 
were distributed in approximately equal proportions among 
men and women. Aggregate NUDE membership, by contrast, 
grew by over 5,500 persons (9.5%) in the clearing banks 
during 1968. Once again, the growth of female membership 
outstripped the growth of male membership both absolutely 
(by a factor of 2) and proportionately (by a factor of 2.5). 
This rapid increase in the numbers of female NUDE members 
was offset in density terms however by a further rapid 
increase in the numbers of female bank employees, whose 
growth was nearly four times as rapid as that of their male 
colleagues during 1968. As a result of this expansion, the 
union increased its overall density in the London Clearing 
Banks only by a little over two percentage points. 
Given the stress on the role of union recognition as a 
factor potentiating union growth by both Bain and Blackburn, 
NUIIE's growth performance during 1968 remains puzzling and 
disappointing. A two per cent growth in union density 
seems a poor reward for full recognition by an employer 
and is clearly a good deal less significant than one would 
expect in the light of Bain and Blackburn's respective 
arguments and conclusions. In order to evaluate this aspect 
of NUDE's growth during 1968, we turn to consider some aspects 
of the impact of recognition in facilitating union growth. 
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We may distinguish four major ways in which union 
recognition may contribute to subsequent union growth. 
Firstly, recognition dispels beliefs which may inhibit 
employees from joining unions, such as the notion that 
joining a union implies disloyalty to an employer or that 
union membership may impede career prospects. 
(51) 
Secondly, union recognition enables the union in question 
to demonstrate its effectiveness in negotiating over crucial 
'bread and butter' issues such as pay, hours and conditions 
of work. Thirdly, recognition enables a union to establish 
an overt and progressively institutionalised 'presence' in an 
employing organisation at national and local levels. At 
minimum, this 'presence' may consist of the visibility of 
union literature on staff notice boards, a union organiser's 
right to visit an employer's places of work and the announce- 
ment that changes in pay, hours etc., have been made with the 
agreement of the trade union. Greater institutionalisation 
however implies the establishment of permanent infrastructures 
of union facilities at workplace and local levels, together 
with repeated public acknowledgement by employers that their 
employment policies are the product of co-determination with 
union representatives. Fourthly, recognition may assist 
union growth when union representatives negotiate pay 
structures etc., which, via their acceleration of bureaucratic 
trends within the organisation, have an indirect impact on 
union growth by increasing the propensity of employees to 
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unionise. The most direct expression of this fourth type 
of effect occurs, of course, when a union is successful in 
closing some form of employment to non-union employees, 
This fourth type of gain from recognition does not normally 
develop within a year of a union's recognition and is 
clearly not applicable to the case in hand. 
If we look at the situation in banking during 1967-68 
in these terms, the reasons for NUBE's rather weak growth 
performance during 1968 become relatively clear. In the 
case of the first benefit of union recognition - the elimi- 
nation of employee inhibitions with respect to trade 
unions - it is by no means clear that. bank clerks were 
labouring under such inhibitions by 1968. NUBE, it will be 
recalled, had existed for fifty years by the time it was 
recognised. Two of the clearing banks had recognised it 
since the 'forties. The political climate was strongly 
favourable to trade unionism in general and white collar 
unionism in particular. In the post-Cameron era, the 
majority of the clearing banks had moderated their attitudes 
to LAUBE to the point of substantial acceptance and only in 
the Midland Bank did hostility to the union remain at a level 
which would seriously inhibit recruitment (see Table 7.10 
below). Moreover it is at least arguable that the disputes 
of 1967 had released any lingering inhibitions which bank 
staffs may have entertained concerning union acceptability 
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and indeed catalysed the majority of bank staffs who had 
pro-union sentiments into joining - thus effectively pre- 
empting a substantial proportion of the post-recognition 
growth of union membership in advance. All in all then 
there are good reasons for supposing that by 1968 the 
inhibited potential unionist lay rather thin on the ground 
in the majority of clearing banks and hence that the post- 
recognition advantage to the union deriving from the 
dispelling of inhibitions concerning union membership 
was correlatively small. 
With respect to the second category of membership gains 
associated with recognition, i. e. the gains accruing from a 
recognised union's capacity to deliver concrete benefits 
to 
its members, here too NUBE's new advantages were not 
unalloyed during 1968. Certainly advantages were achieved 
during the year: Saturday closing became a prospective 
reality and solid salary increases geared towards equal pay 
in the industry were negotiated. Yet the pay settlement was 
frustrated by a reference to the NBPI which generated a 
protracted period of doubt about its implementation which 
extended into 1969, and Saturday closing itself did not take 
effect until July 1969. The negotiating gains of 1968 were 
thus less clear-cut to a membership which beheld them through 
a haze of contingencies and deferments. Moreover the 
negotiating gains which would putatively attract now 
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membership were achieved in joint negotiations in partnership 
with the staff associations. Since NUDE membership gains 
would, in the nature of the case, emerge as an outcome of 
competition with the staff associations - indeed among male 
staff they could only be achieved by causing male staff to 
defect from the staff associations or take out membership 
of both organisations - the attribution of the (already 
'hazy') negotiating gains itself became the object of conflict 
between the two sets of organisations and hence unclear. 
Thus the 'results' benefit of recognition was triply 
impeded to NUBE. The benefit was impeded by the fact of 
continued competition with the staff associations, by the 
fact that negotiated benefits were co-negotiated with the 
staff associations and became the object of competition over 
their attribution, and by the fact the benefits themselves 
remained unclear to a relatively unsophisticated potential 
membership. 
In relation to the third aspect of membership gain 
through recognition, that iss the gain generated through 
the institutionalised 'presence' of the union and its access 
to bank staff, the union undoubtedly achieved considerable 
growth through the minimal level of institutionalisation 
achieved during 1968. 
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As Table 7.10 shows, the 1968 gains in NUDE female membership 
in Lloyds, Westminster and National Provincial Banks were 
between two and four times as great as those achieved in 
Barclays Bank where the union was already recognised. 
These gains were achieved despite very large gains in NUBE 
membership in those banks during 1967 which again exceeded 
the female growth in Barclays during 1967. Percentage 
gains in male membership in the three banks showed a similar 
pattern of increase in excess of union growth among men in 
Barclays - again despite the fact that all three banks had 
exceeded Barclays rate of male NUBE growth during 1967. 
The relatively higher rates of recruitment of both male and 
female NUBE members in Lloyds, Westminster and National 
Provincial Banks as compared to Barclays during 1968 testify 
to the significance of access to bank staffs by union 
organisers in the development of membership. Whereas in 
Barclays Bank such access had been available for many years, 
it was granted in the other three banks at the beginning of 
1968 and in these banks there was a corresponding spurt in 
membership. By contrast, the relatively low levels of 
recruitment in the Midland Bank reflect the fact that this 
bank delayed its recognition of NUDE until April 1968 and 
testify to the extent to which entrenched opposition to the 
union both by the bank's management and its staff association 
can continue to depress union growth and density levels even 
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during a period in which the union is visibly more 
respectable and effective than previously. 
Turning now to the continuation, during 1968, of the 
tendency for union growth to be concentrated among female 
staff, it seems clear that two relatively distinct factors 
lay behind this development. The first factor was the 
straightforward continuation of union policy objectives - 
notably the equal pay and Saturday closure issues - which 
had already proved their attractiveness to female staff and 
may reasonably be held to have maintained their capacity 
to incline female staff towards the union despite the 
ambiguities surrounding the relevant negotiations and the 
vicissitudes attending the attribution of the various 
negotiating successes. All in all, it is almost certain 
that the union continued to enjoy credit effects arising from 
its militant espousal of these objectives during 1967 and 1968. 
However, secondly, the newly recognised and incipiently 
institutionalised status of NUDE during 1968 must certainly 
have played a role in the considerable growth of the union's 
distaff side during this year. By the end of 1967 male bank 
staffs were 99.4 per cent organised and this meant that, by 
and large, now male unionists could only be recruited by 
attracting now entrants to the industry or by persuading 
staff association members to take out 'dual' membership or 
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defect to the union. By contrast, only 67.2 per cent of female 
bank staffs were organised and there was thus considerable 
scope for union organisers bent on gaining additional female 
recruits. Moreover union organisers now had legitimate 
access to the staffs of four out of the 'big five' clearing 
banks for the first time and were now in a position to recruit 
the less interested female potential which was distinctly 
favourable in comparison with previous years. This inter- 
section of relatively low levels of female density among 
female staffs allied with the new opportunities for union 
organisers to enter the banks and actively recruit new 
,h 
levels membership is abundantly apparent in the relatively hip 
of NUDE growth in Lloyds, Westminster and National Provincial 
Banks to which union organisers gained access for the first 
time during 1968. Since, as we have already seen, female 
bank staff are, by and large, less committed to the world of 
work and ipso facto trade union organisation, it is clear that 
one major advantage of NU]E's recognition was precisely this 
access to the less committed potential trade union members - 
particularly female - who would under other circumstances 
remain non-unionists. 
Adopting a concise formula for this period, we conclude 
that during 1967 the banks - hampered by government policy 
and by their own staff associations - took the staff policy 
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decisions which united the various constituencies among 
bank staffs and prompted the feminine 'clerical class' - 
potentially the most militant but in fact the most 
substantially inert group in bank employment - to provide 
the impetus for the industrial action which was essential 
for the union's campaign for recognition. During 1968, by 
contrast, the union began to reap the benefits of its 
industrial policy and the first fruits of its recently 
acquired recognition. 
7.4 Me 'Period 1969-19701 Consolidation 
The events of this final period of the decade under 
consideration are! perhaps inevitably, less spectacular than 
those of the previous two periods. They mark the emergence 
of an infra-structure for co], lective bargaining in the 
banking industry and the development of orderly relationships 
among the parties (the bank employers, the staff associations 
and the union) to that infrastructure. But although such 
developments do not attract headlines nor in any direct way 
attract new membership., they are an essential component 
of the development of the stable bilateral determination of 
industrial issues. With respect to the newly recognised 
union, the emergence of this infrastructure was an essential 
feature of its institutionalisation. 
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Perhaps the most significant element in this process 
of institutionalisation was the conclusion of a series of 
domestic negotiating agreements between NUBE and the various 
individual clearing banks. Once again, Barclays Bank led 
the way in the formation of these agreements and a tripartite 
agreement was signed in May 1969 by NUDE, Barclays Bank and 
Barclays Bank Staff Association which provided for negotia- 
tions between the bank and a NUBE/staff association 'staff 
side' co'ering matters outside the frame of reference of the 
JNC for Banking. The agreement also provided for recourse 
to arbitration. Similar tripartite agreements were 
subsequently negotiated with Lloyds Dank and the National 
Westminster Bank during 1970. At the end of 1970 a 
domestic agreement was also concluded between NUDE and the 
Midland Bank which did not include the staff association. 
These domestic agreements were important for the union 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, they enabled union 
representatives to participate with the staff associations 
in the formation of the banks' domestic policies - an area 
in which the staff associations had previously exercised 
sole negotiating rights, The union was thus admitted to 
an important additional area of policy formation, Secondly, 
the agreements enabled NUF3E to offer 'internal' services 
to its members with respect to individual banks which were 
similar in scope and effectiveness to those of the staff 
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associations. This development enabled the union to offer 
an attractive combination of national strength and 
institutional flexibility to its members and further to 
rebut the staff associations' claims that the union was an 
external interloper with respect to the affairs of 
individual banking institutions and could not provide the 
kinds of personalised interventions that individual cases 
might require. Finally, the union's institutional agree- 
ments frustrated any lingering tendencies which the staff 
associations may have had to pursue policies at an ihstitu- 
tional level which were radically divergent from those at 
national level. During 1969 and early 1970, union 
representatives had believed that the staff associations 
planned to attempt the major staff regrading exercise of 
the decade (embodying the principle of equal pay for women) 
on an institutional basis in defiance of the union's 
insistence that the exercise be formulated at national level. 
The development of tripartite institutional negotiating 
machinery eliminated this kind of possibility and thus 
contributed to the establishment of more harmonious relation- 
ships on the 'staff side' at the national level. 
Whilst the developments noted above had undoubted long- 
term importance in stabilising union membership in banking, 
more concrete negotiating successes were needed to mobilise 
support for the 'staff side', Hore, as noted above, the 
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union was successful in promoting a half-day strike early 
in 1969 over the referral of the 1968 national pay settle- 
ment to the NIiPI. More importantly, the union was 
successful in persuading the banks to -withdraw their 
undertaking to the government that the balance of the 
settlement above 31% would not be paid until July 1st 
1969, and to implement the pay settlement in full. 
This reversal of policy by the clearing banks, whilst 
stimulated by union pressure, also reflected a considerable 
change in the political atmosphere. Early in 1969, the 
publication of the White Paper In Place of Strife 
stimulated considerable disarray both within the trade 
union movement and within the Labour Party. 
(52) 
Amidst 
the general furore of the period, the role of the NBPI was 
weakened and the decay of government incomes policy was 
inaugurated in earnest during the autumn when the government 
sanctioned a number of above-norm settlements without 
reference to the NHPI. 
(53) 
It was against this background 
of uncertainty that the bank employers revoked their under- 
taking to the government over the 1968 pay settlement and 
further indicated their defiance of NDPI recommendations 
with respect to the thours and overtime' settlement of 
September 1969. 
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The latter settlement concerned the establishment of 
a basic 35 hour, five day week, as conceded during the 
previous year, and the rates of overtime to be paid in 
connection with the new banking hours. The overtime 
award, which was agreed after arbitration, provided for a 
reduction in the standard working week from 371 hours to 
35 hours. The award was not ungenerous as, with additional 
overtime payments resulting from late evening opening and 
additions to territorial allowances, it was worth 
approximately 61- per cent, 
(54) 
Inevitably, it was 
referred to the NBPI in September 1969 and a report was 
published in February 1970. In the hectic pay climate of 
1969-70 konsequent upon the collapse of the Labour 
government's prices and incomes policy, the banks took the 
unusual step of announcing in advance that they intended to 
implement the award, backdated to July ist 1969, regardless 
of the outcome of the report. 
(55) 
Whilst the moral 
justification for this course of action stemmed from the 
fact that the award was an arbitration award, the political 
facts were simply that the pay policy was in ruins and the 
banks could not afford, nor could the tstaff side' afford to 
allow them, to withhold the increase. 
As we have already noted, the period between 1969 and 
1970 was characterised by considerable uncertainty concerning 
the negotiations for a now staff grading structure and equal 
pay for women. In this connection -there was considerable 
prevarication from the staff associations within the Banking 
- 513 - 
Staff Council and, in this climate, the staff associations' 
proposal to proceed with a normal pay claim for 1969 was 
interpreted by the union representatives as an attempt to 
buy time for institutional regrading negotiations to take 
place and hence to narrow the range of issues falling 
within the scope of national negotiating machinery. Faced 
with union hostility which threatened the fabric of orderly 
negotiating relationships within the industry, the staff 
associations modified their stance and agreement was 
reached on a proposal for a 121 per cent interim demand 
pending full salary restructuring. This claim resulted 
in a7 per cent award. 
In February 1971 a new salary structure was announced 
which embodied both a new system of grades for bank posts 
and equal pay for women, With the implementation of this 
structure - which embodied pay increases of between 71 and 
15 per cent - the NUBE programme of the 'sixties embodying 
full national and institutional recognition, a five day week 
with Saturday closing and equal pay for women was achieved, 
This last section of the decade then wasa. period of 
relatively unspectacular consolidation of the now national 
negotiating machinery for clearing bank claims. During 
this period, the union progressively achieved parity with 
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the staff associations with respect to internal 
institutional negotiations with the individual clearing 
banks. This was also a period which brought solid 
economic benefits to bank staffs, albeit against a back- 
ground of accelerating inflation. These benefits 
included the full implementation of the 1968 pay award, 
a substantial award for 1,969, the introduction of the 
five day week during 1969 together with worthwhile additions 
to the earnings of most bank staffs through the 1969 
overtime award and salary restructuration which was 
completed in 1971. Despite these developments, the 
response from bank staffs in terms of membership of both 
organisations was distinctly lukewarm as Tables 7.11 and 
7.12 demonstrate. 
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As Tables 7.11 and 7.12 demonstrate, neither the staff 
associations nor NUBE maintained their 1968 density levels 
during the last two years of the decade. Within the 
staff associations, the progressive decline of aggregate 
membership which began in 1967 was only halted in 1970. 
Aggregate female staff association membership continued to 
fall however. Once again, the slight falls in aggregate 
staff association membership were greatly amplified in 
density terms because of increasing levels of employment 
within the clearing banks. This amplification was parti- 
cularly marked in the case of female employees whose 
numbers increased by 8,500 during 1969 alone. 
In the case of NUDE, the impetus for growth steadily 
fell away between 1968 and 1970. Thus whereas in 1968 
NUBE had recruited 150 per cent of male entrants to 
banking and 76 per cent of female entrants for that year, 
these figures had fallen to 19 per cent and 34 per cent 
respectively by 1969 and remained at approximately that 
level during 1970. NUBE did not therefore participate 
in the white collar union membership boom of 1969-70 and 
density levels in fact began to decline. The decline in 
the male propensity to join NUDE was most marked during 
this period and it is noticeable that male staff began to 
join the staff associations in larger numbers at the same 
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time, Among the female staff, by contrast, NUI3E broadly 
retained its 1968 level of attractiveness and the trend 
away from the staff associations continued among the 
female staff, 
These membership trends are consistent with the 
union's militant espousal of the 'equal pay' issue, the 
implementation of which - as we saw in the previous 
chapter - proved markedly less popular among male staff 
than it was among female staff, This differential 
response to the 'equal pay' issue is moreover further 
indicative of the predominantly 'instrumental' (as 
opposed to 'collectivistic') orientations to trade unionism 
displayed by the majority of bank staffs. 
7. r Summary Discussion 
Taking the decade as a whole, it is striking to note 
that despite the greatly increased significance of collective 
activity during the 'sixties the aggregate density for all 
the staff organisations recruiting in the London Clearing 
Danks actually fell by 9.7 percentage points between 1960 
and 1970. This density loss was shared between the sexes. 
Thus between 1960 and 1969 (the last year for which disaggro- 
gated figures are available), the combined density of male 
staff organisational membership fell by 5.2 percentage 
points from 101,8 per cent to 96.6 per cent. Similarly, 
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comparable density figures for female staff organisational 
membership reveal a fall of 4.9 percentage points from 67.6 
per cent in 1960 to 62.7 per cent in 1969. 
It is, of course, the case that it was the failing 
appeal of the staff associations which was largely reflected 
in these falls in aggregate density. Yet it is also true 
that the union failed to compensate for this falling appeal 
both among the men and the women. 
Thus between 1960 and 1969 the density of male staff 
association membership fell by 6.9 per cent whilst the 
density of male NUHE membership rose by only 1.7 per cent. 
Viewed in these terms, it would perhaps be nearest the truth 
to say that unionisation among male bank staff actually fell 
during a decade in which male confidence in the staff 
associations was eroded yet the new recognised status of 
the union barely restored the male density levels of a 
decade earlier when the union was still unrecognised. It 
is not surprising that this proved to be the case. The 
issues fought by the union during the second half of the 
decade were not, in the first instance, calculated to 
appeal to male bank staff. The hours issue was of 
generally lower salience to the male than the female staff 
and the 'equal pay' issue, whilst attractive to the female 
staff, may well have exerted a negative influonce on the 
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union's attractiveness to the men. The aggregate male 
membership of the staff associations was, in contrast to 
the female membership, barely depleted during the turbulent 
years of 1967 and 1968 and, although the aggregate male 
union membership rose by 28 per cent during these two 
years, this growth only restored the male union density 
which was lost during the middle years of the decade. 
Among the female staff there was a straightforward 
transfer of majority allegiance from the staff association 
to the union during the decade. Whilst the density of 
female staff association membership crumbled from 41.1 per 
cent in 1960 to 26.5 per cent in 1969, the density of female 
NUDE membership rose from 26.6 per cent in 1960 to 36.2 
per cent in 1969 and here the issues espoused by the union 
played an overwhelming part in securing this transfer of 
support. Although a judgement as to the unionisation of 
female bank. workers involves the weighing of the incommensurate 
criteria of union density and union character, it is reasonable 
to propose that the shift in majority allegiance to the more 
unionate NUDE constituted a growth in unionisation among 
female bank workers. 
k 
With these observations behind us, it is now necessary 
to raise the question of whether it is reasonable to suggest 
that unionisation in banking grew during a decade in which 
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the density of the more 'unionate' organisation grew by 
only 3.9 percentage points whilst the density of the 
less unionate organisations fell by 13.6 percentage points. 
In addressing this question, three different sets of 
considerations should be borne in mind. 
Firstly, the aggregate memberships of both the staff 
associations and the union grew during the decade, The 
aggregate membership of the staff associations expanded by 
8,500 (14.1 per cent) during this period whilst the aggre- 
gate membership of NUBE grew by over 28,500 (71.5 per cent). 
Viewed in these aggregate terms, it is clear that 'unionisa- 
tion', did grow in banking between 1960 and 1970. This 
aggregate perspective iss moreover, less misleading in the 
context of banking than the well known 'growth illusion' 
difficulties associated with aggregate figures would seem to 
imply, For, given the competitive relationship between the 
union and the staff associations and the high density of 
staff organisation membership in banking at the beginning of 
the decade, it is not only to be expected that gains by one 
type of organisation must be achieved at the expense of the 
other but also that, in this context of a shift in allegiance 
from one type of organisation to another, there will be a 
loss of overall density while employees having dropped out 
of one organisation decide whether or not to commit themselves 
to the other. In view of these complicating factors, the 
aggregate picture is an important additional factor to be 
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admitted to a consideration of the overall development of 
unionisation in banking, This aggregate picture portrays 
an unambiguous and substantial growth of unionisation in 
the field. 
A second consideration which should inform any 
judgement of the growth of unionisation in banking concerns 
the characters of the staff organisations concerned. Here 
too there can be little doubt that both the staff associations 
and the union became more unionate during the course of the 
decade. In the case of the staff associations, the growth 
in unionateness is evidenced by the increased sophistication, 
co-ordination and aggression which characterised salary 
negotiations with the bank employers and their increased 
willingness to take their claims to arbitration. Moreover 
it is arguable that, as their co-operation increased, the 
staff associations further distanciated themselves from the 
influence of individual bank employers and, in practice if 
not in theory, from the ideology of internalism. In the 
case of the union, the major growth in unionateness centred 
on the means which it was prepared to use in pursuit of its 
objectives. Here the foundations were laid by the 1960 
Annual Delegats Meeting; which enabled union members to 
undertake industrial action more easily and with greater 
flexibility and directedness. As we have soon, the strike 
clause was invoked in a variety of situations. The most 
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important of these were associated with the claim to recog- 
ni ion in the London Clearing Banks in 1967 and the pay 
laim referred to the NBPI in 1969. This growth in 
industrial aggression marked a decisive departure from the 
more cautious tactics of the previous 40 years and a very 
substantial change in the character of the union and its 
relationships with the bank employers, Any consideration' 
\of the character of the staff organisations in banking 
between 1960 and 1970 therefore points unambiguously towards 
the conclusion that a growth in unionisation occurred 
during this period. 
Thirdly, it is manifestly the case that with the 
recognition of the union its membership was established in 
a relationship of representative bilateral negotiation with 
the bank employers from which it had previously been excluded. 
From this standpoint of 'effective unionisation', it is 
clear that whereas only the staff association membership 
(52.3 per cent of bank staffs) were recognised for negotiating 
purposes in 1960,77.6 per cent of bank employees were 
(more aggressively) represented in such negotiations by 
1970. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the growth in unioni- 
sation in banking during this period was achieved against 
a background which was in several respects unfavourable to 
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such growth. The expansion of employment in banking in a 
context of high levels of staff organisational membership 
made it difficult to sustain pre-expansion density levels 
and this difficulty was compounded by the increasing rates 
of staff turnover which grew more rapid during the decade. 
The expansion of banking services, the feminisation of 
routine clerical tasks and the retirement of the post-war 
'bulge' of male clerks greatly enhanced the availability 
of promotion opportunities for the remaining male clerks 
and this too will have exerted an inhibiting effect on 
unionisation. Finally, the feminisation of bank employ- 
ment also tended to inhibit overall density growth because 
of the generally lower levels of density among female 
employees. It is against this background that the growth 
of unionisation in banking should be evaluated. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE FACTORS INFLUENCING UNIONISATION IN I3ANICING-. 
AN EVALUATION. 
8,1. Introduction 
In 1967, two major studies of white collar unionism, 
Bain's Trade Union Growth and Recognition and Blackburn's 
Union Character and Social Class, were published. Both 
studies laid considerable stress on the importance of emplo- 
yer recognition to white collar union growth and development 
and the difficulties which faced those white collar unions 
seeking recognition from the employers on behalf of their 
members. This coincidence of focus on the issues surrounding 
recognition is the more significant as the two studies 
differed in both scope and style; the first dealing with 
white collar unionism in manufacturing industry as a whole 
in largely quantitative terms, whilst the second dealt 
with trade unionism in banking in a more historical and 
descriptive fashion. Bain took the view that 
"One of the major factors impeding the 
expansion of union membership among 
white collar workers is the refusal of 
most employers to recognise unions 
representing these workers". (1) 
Ile argued that, where recognition of white collar unionism 
has taken place, 
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"These concessions generally came about 
not because the unions were in a position 
to force the employers to grant recognition, 
but as a result of government policies 
designed to ensure maximum and uninterrupted 
production throughout two world wars". (2) 
and that, in sum, 
"What white collar union recognition there is 
has come about largely as a result of 
government policies, and, if the amount of 
this recognition is to be increased, further 
government action will be required". (3) 
Similarly, in the context of his study of bank clerks, 
Blackburn gave a carefully documented account of the ways in 
which the hostility of the bank employers had impeded the 
growth of NUTE. In Blackburn's view, 
"The more hostility a bank has shown to the 
union, the lower has been the union's 
completeness, with the District Bank before 
the war providing a classic example of this 
... ... the employers' preference for staff 
associations and refusal to recognise NUBE 
persists, with one or two exceptions, so that 
the employers' attitudes still tend to boost 
staff association membership and depress 
NUDE membership". (4) 
Against this background, Dlackburn was exercised by the 
problems facing a union representing a traditionally moderate 
group of workers which was seeking recognition from the bank 
employers. In striking a balance between respectability and 
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effectiveness, the unrecognised white collar union facing a 
hostile employer is placed in a paradoxical situation. In 
order to attract its 'respectable' potential membership, the 
union must restrict its own access to the means of force which 
would enable it to gain recognition and secure its future 
respectability and effectiveness whilst, on the other hand, 
ineffective hostility to the employers would result in losses 
of membership on both counts of effectiveness and respectabi- 
lity. In banking, the situation is further complicated by 
the existence of a respectable and recognised alternate to 
NUBE in the form of internal staff associations. Thus, 
as Blackburn notes, the stalemate is compounded: 
"In both organisations there is a conflict 
between respectability and effectiveness, 
and at present, with NUBE unrecognised, 
there is dispute about which organisation 
is more effective, while the staff associa- 
tions have the advantage of being more 
respectable. Recognition from the banks 
would increase NUTE's respectability, while 
removing the grounds for criticisms about 
not being effective. However, bank staffs 
are not prepared to support the militancy 
necessary to overcome employer opposition, 
whilst the union cannot win recognition by 
being respectable if it is in competition 
with staff associations". (5) 
NUBE then had the classic white collar recognition problem, 
It was an active union with no ties of any sort to the 
employers but it was not, in Blackburn's words, 
"sufficiently unionate to be able to insist 
that the banks take notice of it". (6) 
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Informing the approaches of both writers to tho growth 
of white collar unionism was an additional common notion that 
employment concentration is a significant underlying deter- 
minant of white collar unionism. Thus in an expansion of 
his 1967 study(7) Bain, having dismissed a large variety of 
other factors, argued that, 
ýý... some but not all of the variation in 
the pattern of white collar unionism in 
Britain can be accounted for by variations 
in the degree of employment concentration. 
The greater the degree of employment 
concentration the greater the density of 
white collar unionism". (8) 
and went on to combine this finding with his previously cited 
views on the role of employer recognition in the development 
of white collar unionism and the role of the government in 
fostering such recognition. In a similar vein, Blackburn 
argues that the division of the clearing banks into large 
numbers of small branches militates against high densities of 
unionisation and states that 
".., there is a tendency among the clearing; 
banks for completeness of unionisation to be 
lower in those banks where the average branch 
size is smaller". (9) 
Whilst the second factor of employment concentration does not 
receive the same quantum of emphasis in Blackburn's study and 
whilst Blackburn discusses a number of factors operative in 
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banking which Dain dismisses, there is, nonetheless, an 
impressive convergence of interest in the issues of recognition 
and employment concentration. 
Unfortunately however, the views of Bain and Blackburn 
summarised above receive little support from a consideration 
of the growth of NUDE during the 'sixties. In the first 
instance, LAUBE gained recognition from the clearing banks as 
a consequence of undertaking industrial action in pursuance 
of a number of related disputes. In contrast to the vast 
majority of Pain's cases, 
(10) 
this industrial action did not 
have the support of powerful and established manual trade 
unions, nor was it supported by any form of government 
intervention although, as we have seen, the general 
political climate of the period was favourable to the recog- 
nition of white collar unions. 
With respect to the emphasis placed on employment 
concentration as a factor in the growth of white collar 
unionism by Bain and to a lessor extent Blackburn, there 
are also certain difficulties. Thus, whilst the significance 
of this factor is undeniable, it remains difficult to compare 
the impact of employment concentration on tintonisation in 
different industries with any degree of assurance or 
significance. Thus Bein finds a relatively hir*h degree of 
unionisation among clerical staff in the vehicle industry 
(22 per cent) 
(11) 
and correlates this figure with the high 
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concentration of clerical staff in the industry (44 persons 
per establishment). 
(12) 
Yet in banking, where the 
average branch had a staff of between 8 and 10 persons 
during the sixties, 
13) the level of density of staff 
organisation membership varied between 87 and 77 per cent, 
(14) 
At the same time, the Bain formulation takes no account 
of union character which we have argued should enter into the 
assessment of 'unionisation'. Thus, whilst the stability of 
overall staff organisation membership in banking between 1964 
and 1970 is consistent with Bain's hypothesis since the degree 
of employment concentration did not rise significantly in 
banking during this period, there was a substantial transfer 
of bank staffs' allegiances from the less unionate staff 
associat;. ons to the more unionate NUDE which resulted in a 
growth in unionisation overall. This shift is not explicable 
in terms of a growth in branch size. 
In general, it seems that the central difficulty in 
utilising the large scale findings of researches such as 
those of Bain turns on their applicability to specific cases, 
Such large scale generalisations lose traction when confronted 
by the active efforts of men and women to gain an increased 
measure of control over salaries and conditions of work, 
Whilst it is beyond question that the capacity to form 
effective trade unions is to some substantial degree a function 
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of the attitudes of employers and governmental agencies on the 
one hand and the degree of employment concentration on the 
other, the basic facts of human agency embedded in the very 
impulse to form trade unions cannot be ignored and least of 
all should they be ignored by students of the 'sixties. 
Equally, it is clear that by 1967 NUDE had overcome the 
'respectability-effectiveness' paradox alluded to above and 
had achieved the kind of balance between effectiveness and 
aggression on the one hand 
and 
respectability on the other 
which enabled it to generate a credible articulation of bank 
staffs aspirations towards bilateral job regulation in the 
industry. 
In this chapter, we seek to evaluate the relative 
importance of the factors described in chapter 2 in stimulating 
the growth of clerical unionism in banking during the period 
under consideration. Consideration of the factor described 
as the 'ownership of knowledge' is omitted from this review 
because this factor cannot be said to have undergone any 
major change during this period. 
ß. 2. The Role of the Level of Real Earnings 
In Chapter 2 we argued that white collar workers 
looked to the cost of living as their basic method of assessing 
the relative value of their incomes and that comparisons of 
relativities across types of occupations (e. g, white collar/ 
manual worker relativity comparisons) were essentially 
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academic exercises which were not employed systematically by 
white collar workers in order to evaluate their pay and 
conditions of work. This view was subsequently confirmed 
in interviews with bank staff, many of whom displayed 
considerable vagueness when asked to compare their earnings 
with those of other types of workers although this vagueness 
did not prevent them from producing an evaluation. We also 
noted the tendency for economists to rely on 'cost of living' 
indices rather than relativities when constructing econometric 
models of union growth. Table 8,1 depicts the major growth 
indices for NUBE and the staff associations alongside those 
for the cost of living and basic salary levels in banking. 
The interpretation of Table 8.1 is complicated by two 
factors. Firstly, as we have seen, the labour force in 
banking underwent a rapid expansion throughout the 'sixties 
and moreover this expansion was associated with an increasing 
rate of turnover among bank staffs. This factor was 
unfavourable to the maintenance of high and stable levels 
of organisational membership and both the union and the 
staff associations had to expend a great deal of effort in 
simply maintaining aggregate membership levels. In this 
context, the recognised staff associations enjoyed a 
considerable recruiting advantage for the majority of the 
decade. 
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A second difficulty associated with the interpretation 
of Table 8.1 stems from the fact that gains by one staff 
organisation were normally achieved at the expense of its 
rival. If NUBF, for instance, achieved gains in membership 
through the operation of a 'threat effect', the staff 
associations tended to undergo a corresponding decline in 
membership and vice versa. 
This competition for membership in an expanding, industry 
in circumstances which were decreasingly favourable for the 
maintenance of aggregate memberships helps to account for the 
fact that, despite the greatly increased significance of 
organisational negotiations in banking by the end of the 
decade, the combined memberships of NUDE and the staff 
associations were 9.7 points lower in density terms in 1970 
than they had been in 1960. 
We may distinguish four major points at which the level 
of real earnings in banking could have been a factor influencing 
the level and distribution of organisational memberships 
(1) The period between 1960 and 1963 during which the pay 
settlements negotiated by the staff associations failed to 
maintain levels of real earnings in the banks: 
(2) The period immediately after tho pay settlement with 
Westminster Bank employees ending with the consolidation of 
this award in pay negotiations with the remainder of the 
clearing banks in the 1964 pay round; 
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(3) The 1967 award to all clearing bank staffs; and 
(4) The referral of tho 1968 award to the NRPT. 
(1) During the first two years of the decade, basic 
bank salaries slipped progressively in relation to the cost 
of living. In this context, the staff associations, which 
were responsible for all salary negotiations, were unable to 
maintain a level of aggregate growth in membership necessary 
to sustain 1960 density levels. This trend was particularly 
marked among female staff whose numbers were expanding 
rapidly. Under these circumstances, there was a discernable 
*shii. ft towards union membership which increased more rapidly 
than bank recruitment. Between 1960 and 1962, female union 
membership grew by 28.7 per cent and the density of female 
membership grew by a little over 2 per cent. The union was 
also marginally more successful in recruiting male staff 
than the staff associations, although of course, there were 
important variations from bank to bank. 
Overall then we may discern a small 'threat effect' 
which drew bank workers towards the union between 1960 and 
the early months of 1963 possibly in the hope that the union 
might exert some influence in increasing levels of real 
earnings though more probably as a 'protest' at staff 
association failures to sustain a satisfactory levol of 
salary growth. Fiowevor other factors were also operative 
during this period. As we have seen, tho period was marked 
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by increasing union militancy over the recognition issue and 
the union was also making strenuous efforts to increase 
recruitment over this period. 
(2) If the 'threat effect' in respect of real earnings 
was rather weakly defined during 1960-63, the 'credit effect' 
following the pay settlement to Westminster Bank staff in 
1963 was rather more decisive in its impact. Staff associa- 
tion membership rose sharply among both male and female clerks 
- thus reversing the trend of the previous three years - whilst 
NU}3E membership fell sharply. As Table 7.6 indicates, 
these changes were not distributed evenly among the individual 
clearing bank staffs and it seems clear that they were mediated 
by factors specific to the individual banks. However, the 
maximum credit effect accrued to the Westminster Bank Guild 
which had won the award, and losser credit effects accrued to 
the other staff associations which benefitted from the award 
in the 1964 pay round in degrees that were probably influenced 
by the relative strengths of the various staff associations 
in the banks concerned, It is noticeable however that, with 
the exception of Barclays Bank, staff association gains were 
exceeded by NUBS losses and this tendency points to the 
possibility that NUBE losses were occasioned by factors other 
than the simple success of staff association negotiations. 
In particular, it will be recalled that 1963 witnessed a 
weakening of the union's prospects for immediate recognition 
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subsequent to the Cameron Inquiry and that there were 
substantial increases in union subscription rates at the end 
of the year. These factors cannot but have played some part 
in the overall weakening of NUBE's membership position during 
the latter half of. 1963 and 1964. 
Nonetheless however, it is evident that the Westminster 
Bank Guild had achieved a considerable success on behalf of 
the staff associations in taking the employers to arbitration 
so successfully. By the same token, it is reasonable to suppose 
that, in so doing, the Guild succeeded in restoring the faith 
of many bank employees in the staff association approach to 
collective bargaining. 
(3) The third crucial point at which the level of 
real earnings might have played a crucial role in stimulating 
unionisation was during 1967 when, following a two-year pay 
pause during which inflation had eroded the value of bank 
salaries by approximately 7.5 per cent, bank staffs received 
a 24- per cent award which left the growth of their basic 
money earnings behind the rise in the retail price index, 
Here again, there emerged a potential 'threat effect' to 
bank workers' standards of living but, as we have seen, there 
was no immediate move towards union membership in response to 
this issue. NUJ3r grew very rapidly during the last quarter 
of 1967, but this growth was primarily in response to the 
'hours' issue and the 'threat effect' to bank salaries of the 
poor pay settlement was of a rather secondary significance, 
- 543 - 
Whilst it is undoubtedly the case that the 'threat effect' 
of the pay settlement was overborne by other factors 
contributing to rapid unionisation before if could show 
itself in membership . figures, other 
factors may also have 
been responsible for the failure of any 'throat effect' 
generated to become translated into union membership. 
Firstly, the collapse of negotiations over the recognition 
of NUBE left the union in a rather weakened and vulnerable 
position. Thus the union was perhaps perceived as a poor 
focus for mobilisation in response to a perceived 'threat 
effect'. Secondly, the 2+ per cent settlement was clearly 
in line with the government's incomes policy guidelines and, 
in this context, bank workers lacked the strength and possibly 
the disposition to attempt to breach the policy. 
(4) The final significant incomes 'flash point' occurred 
during the last quarter of 1968 when the first nationally 
negotiated pay award (for between 7 and 11 per cent) was 
referred to the NßPI with immediate provisinn for payment of 
only 3-- per cent. This referral generated the only clearing 
bank strike of the decade which was wholly concerned with 
pay. The action took the form of a half-day strike involving 
12,000 bank staffs who conducted a lobby of M. P's. In this 
case the pay issue was very clear cut. Between the middle 
of 1965 and 1968 the cost of living had risen by 12 per cent, 
whereas during that period bank staffs had received an award 
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of 2- per cent in 1967 and a further award of 3-- per cent 
in mid-1968. Moreover the 1968 award had been negotiated 
by a body which bank staffs had recently taken industrial 
action to create. In this situation there was a relatively 
clear focus for staff dissatisfaction and the industrial action 
which ensued was ultimately successful. Once arain, however, 
the retrospective imple^ientation of the 1968 award in 
1969, together with the closure of the banks during that year, 
failed to result in any 'credit' effects for either the 
union or the staff associations and the memberships of 
both continued to decline in 1970. 
In reviewing the events of the 'sixties in banking, it 
is striking to find so little relationship between levels of 
real income on the one hand and unionisation on the other. 
In only one year (1964) was there a clear cut 'credit' 
effect in operation and here the situation was complicated by 
the collapse of N+'UBE's claims for recognition and the rise 
in its subscriptions. Similarly, the only point at which 
union growth was apparently associated with a clear-cut 
'threat effect' - following government intervention on the 
1968 pay award - was also associated with the operation of 
other factors, notably NIUDE's post-recognition 'honoymoon' 
period in which the institutionalisation of union recruit- 
ment together with other positive recruiting factors 
consequent upon recognition were in operation, 
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In seeking; to account for the attenuated relationship 
between levels of real earnings and unionisation, two groups 
of factors stand out; (1) those associated with the structure 
of bank salaries and their empirical relationship with the 
cost of living; and (2) those associated with the weakness 
of the staff organisations in banking. 
A comparison of columns 13 and 14 of Table 8.1 shows 
that, although there were temporary misalignments between 
basic salary scales and the cost of living mainly generated 
as a result of government incomes policies, the two indices 
remained in a relatively close degree of alignment throughout 
the decade. In particular, falls in levels of real earnings 
due to inflation were relatively slight and short-. lived. 
Such a pattern is perhaps to be expected in an industry which 
was generating high levels of profits throughout the decade 
and whose continuous expansion in an increasingly competitive 
labour. market characterised by 'over full' employment compelled 
the bank employers to raise salaries regardless of the strength 
or weakness of the collective organisatl. ons which faced them. 
All in all, 'threat effects' to real earnings arising from 
misalignment between basic salary levels and the cost of 
living; were not extensive. 
Additionally, such 'threat effects! as did arise were 
cushioned in their impact on bank staffs by the incremental 
structure of bank salaries. This topic has already been dealt 
with in the previoiis chapter, but it is worth rocalling the 
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order of magnitude of incremental increases operative in 
19 5. These are displayed in Table 8.2 below. 
Table 8,2 
Structure of Are Related Incremental Increases in Basic 
Salaries for. Midland Bank Staff (effective 1/9/65_, 
_ 
Axe Increments (ner cent 
Males Females 
18 22 22 
19 12.3 12.3 
20 10 10 
21 8.2 8.2 
22 8.4 8.4 
23 6.2 2.3 
24 5.8 2.2 
25 6.2 1.5 
26 12.3 1.5 
27 5.2 1.4 
28 3.8 1.4 
29 4.7 2.0 
30 4.5 3.4 
31 5.3 3.3 
--5147 - 
The incremental pattern sot out in Table 8.2 provides for 
a series of automatic increases in levels of real earnings 
which kept the salaries of indivi. dual. bank employees far 
ahead of the rate of inflation. It will be observed that 
salary increments are large at the lowest part of the age. 
range where the majority of female bank employees are located, 
and that the increments are maintained at a higher level for 
men at the upper end of the age-range at which point the men 
are increasingly expected to generate their own salary 
increases by striving for promotion. This pattern of 
increments ensured that, whilst basic salary levels may have 
declined in real terms from time to time, the vast majority 
of bank employees were experiencing solid increases in real 
earnings, 
Ile have alread-ýr noted that, for male staff, collective 
measures to increase earnings are frequently seen as 
subsidiary to-individual efforts to the same end through 
vromot,. on. Moreover the female bank staffs of the 'sixties 
were, in many cases, not disposed (in virtue of their social 
position as unmarried and prospectively temporary participants 
in the labour force) to involve themselves in expensive long- 
term organisational membership in order to refp benefits in 
the distant future. When wo add those considerations to 
the factors set out above, wo can appreciate why it is that 
'threat effects' apparently played so small a role in 
stimulating; unionisation in the industry. 
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If the structure of bank salaries played a powerful 
role in mitigating the 'threat effects' of inflation upon 
bank emplo,, -ees, the weakness of the banking staff organisa- 
tions and their competitive relationships tended to weaken 
the process by which 'threat effects' are translated into 
unionisation. 
In this connection, we may note firstly that bank 
staffs were represented for the first seven years of the 
decade by a collection of relatively weak staff associations 
which stood in a relationship of permanent competition with 
NUBE. Against a background of rapid expansion in banking 
business, employment and profits, the staff associations 
failed to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by 
these conditions to raise real incomes in the industry as 
a whole. They succeeded only in raising levels of money 
earnings to an extent sufficient to offset the emergence of 
large-scale 'threat effects' during a period of increasing 
inflation. 
The competitive relationship between the union and 
the staff associations also weakened the translation of 
'threat effects' into unionisation. Each bank employee, 
faced with a perceived 'threat effect', could thus entertain 
two possible options in rolation to collective action. 
Firstly, he could opt to join and/or exert pressure on his 
staff association. Alternatively, he could join NUDE 
which, for the majority of the period, was unrocognised and 
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relatively ineffective. Under these circumstances joining 
the union could only constitute a gesture of protest. The 
availability of this choice inevitably diffused and weakened 
the translation of 'threat effects' into organisational 
growth, whilst inter-organisational competition militated 
against the formation of a united staff approach in the face 
of 'threat effects'. In sum, in an industry in which 
conditions were favourable to the development of a 'virtuous 
cycle' of 'threat effects' stimulating organisati. onal growth 
and collective strength generating 'credit effects' and so on, 
the characteristics of the pay and occupational structures in 
banking militated against the emergence of 'threat effects' 
whilst, in turn, those threat effects which were emergent 
were frittered away in inter-organisational conflicts which 
precluded the generation of 'credit effects'. 
Similar conclusions are equally tenable concerning the 
credit effects resulting; from satisfactory settlements. The 
major settlements which could have been productive of such 
effects would certainly include the 1963 Westminster Bank 
Guild settlement and the pay awards negotiated in 1968 and 
1969. Only in the case of the first of these awards was any 
clear cut credit effect visible. In the case of tho latter 
two awards, both of which were negotiated by a combined 'staff 
side' within national negotiating machinery, the 'credit 
effects' of the awards were diffused in inter-organisational 
conflicts. 
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We thus conclude that prevaili. nfr levels of real 
earnings played only a secondary role in stimulating the 
growth of unionisation in banking du. r, i. ng the period tinder 
investigation and that this was the case largely because 
of the pay structure in the industry, the orientations 
towards pay of bank employees and the competitive relation- 
ships between the organisations seeking to recruit bank 
workers. 
E. 3. The Level of Unemployment 
It was argued in Chapter 21 that, assuming that unions 
are not politically institutionalised, unemployment would 
affect the propensity to unionise in the following kinds 
of ways. During periods of high unemployment, employers 
would tend to resist wage demands thus lowering the 'credit 
effects' to trade unions. In general therefore, membership 
levels would fall and, as a result, the wider political 
influence of the tre. de union movement would fall. Under such 
conditions, white collar unions would be weakened even in 
secure sections of the economy such as banking because the 
bargaining 'atmosphere' would deteriorate, the 'throat affects' 
fror. wage inflation would decline and the value of security 
of employment would increase. By contrast, under conditions 
of economic expansion and full o#mploymont, employers would 
NLIII 
be more willing to accede to trage demands thus increasing; 
the 'credit effects' to trade unions and hence membership 
levels. The political and economic influence of the trade 
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union movement as r w'zole would increase and 'threat effects' 
from wage inflation would induce weakly unionisod white 
collar workers towards union membership. 
There can be little doubt that levels of unemployment 
in the United Kingdom were favourable to the growth of 
unionism throughout the decade. Unemployment levels 
varied between 1.6 and 2.6 per cunt(15) during this period. 
As we have sees however, the impact of 'credit' and 'threat' 
effects upon collective organisations in banking was, for 
reasons described in the previous section, rather attenuated. 
Thus, even the 'threat'/'credit' effect cycle which fuelled 
the wage and membership 'explosion' of 1969-70(16) in the 
white collar sector was not effective in banking where 
densities actually declined in both the union and the staff 
associations during the period in question. 
Given the muted impact of 'credit' and 'threat' 
effects in banking during the decade, the impact of the level 
of employment upon unionisation in this field must be sought 
in the form of indirect effects. In particular, we may 
locate two significant indirect effects of the relatively high 
levels of. employment prevailing di'ri. ng the 'sixties upon 
unionisation in this field. Firstly, the expansion of white 
collar employment and, in particular, the expansion in demand 
for young; female white collar workers had a strong impact on 
labour turnover in banking(17) and this in turn made both 
recruitment and the maintenance of aggregate membership more 
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difficult both for NUJBI: and Its competitors. In this context, 
the impact of Tow levels of unemployment may have contributed 
margi. nel, ly to the obstacles in the way of unionisation rather 
than the reverse si. nce, although job security would have 
become less valuable, concrete opportunities for job mobility 
presented themselves and were taken up on a large scale. 
At the same time however, the union movement grew 
in strength and prestige during the 'sixties as a partial 
result of the favourable employment conditions prevailing 
during the period. This growth of prestige contributed to, 
and was itself augmented by, an increasingly favourable 
pattern of government attitudes towards the trade union 
movement which tzas broadly favourable to the extension of 
collective bargaining. 
Inevitably, any assessment- of the sirnifi. eance of the 
level of unemployment during; this period on the growth of 
trade unionism in banking must involve an element of subjective 
judgement. Overall however, our judgement is that the level 
of unemployment during this period was broadly favourable to 
the growth of trade unionism in banking , whilst acknowledging 
that the favourable effects deriving from this factor were 
considerably muted by local conditions in the industry and by 
increased occupational mobility during the decade. 
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8,4, ßureaucratisati. on 
in seeking to evaluate the impact of the bureaucratise- 
tion of banking employment on the growth of trade unionism in 
the field, it is convenient to discriminate between the 
effects of bureaucratisation on (1) the work sitt. uati. on and 
(2) the market situation of bank employees. 
Perhaps the central image lying behind discussions of 
the expansion and bureaucratisation of white collar work is 
an image which refers to changes in the work situation 
of the white collar worker. This image describes a terminal 
point in the expansion of white collar work which occurs when 
the 'office-factory' is reached. In the 'office-factory', 
large areas of uninterrupted floor space are given over to 
rank upon rank of office workers who perform mechanised, 
homogenised and alienating tasks - for instance, typing, 
punch-card operating and so on - on individual machines in a 
setting whose lay-out end noise levels result in high levels 
of social isolation and collective self-estrangement. In 
this context both the physical characteristics of the work 
environment and the impersonal and standardised relationships 
(based upon calculable work-measurement techniques) engendered 
in it, create a profound separation (or do-identification) 
between clerical workers and managers on the one hand and 
the growth of an awareness of common interests and class 
identification among the clerical workers themselves on the 
other. In seeking to identify the significance of bureaucra. 
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tisation for unionisation in banking, it therefore is 
relevant to inquire as to whether this image is an 
appropriate one for the banking industry at the and of the 
decade. 
Although the clearing banks underwent a massive 
expansion during the 'sixties, it remains true that the 
majority of bank staffs (that is, excluding central office 
and central computer staff) do not occupy work situations 
which remotely approximate to this image of the 'office- 
factory'. Few large concentrations of bank staffs exist 
outside regional and head offices, indeed the average sized 
bank branch contained approximately 8-10 staff in 1968 
after a period in which bank staff numbers had expanded by 
approximately 41 per cent in eight years. Far from 
fostering remote and impersonal relationships with superiors, 
the branch setting enforces relatively close and personalised 
relationships with superiors who are perceived as having 
worked their way up the hierarchy of branch life. 
(18) 
The 
characteristics of branch work also require considerable 
levels of co-operation between employees. 
By the same token, there has boon little or no 'homo- 
genisation' of work tasks in banking during the past decade. 
The small size of branches militates towards a situation in 
which, far from the regimented ranks of 'detail workers' in 
the 'office-factory', each bank employee continues to perceive 
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him or herself as a member of a 'team' with specific 
objectives 
(19) 
and with a specific and si¬; nificant(20) 
function to perform if these objectives are to be fulfilled. 
The advent of the comp7iter in banking, far from increasing 
the quantity and difficulty of 'detail work' in the office, 
is widely perceived as having decreased such work. In this 
respect perhaps, the image of the 'office-factory' derives 
from a somewhat romanticised view of the office prior to the 
development of the computer. Moreover each individual rarely 
performs highly routinised activities for protracted periods 
of time, but progressively moves through a series of roles 
which afford gradually increasing scope for the exercise of 
experience, judgement, responsibility and skills in handling 
other people. The variety of tasks to be performed in each 
small branch moreover, still requires the individual clerk 
to exercise flexibility and versatility in covering 'gaps' 
in branch activities and this variety of branch activities has, 
in turn, militated against the development both of impersonal 
systems of work measurement and the use of specialised tech. 
niques to train bank employees for a sin le specialised 
task. 
In sum, the work situation of the bank employee in the 
'HiGh Street' branch continues perhaps to approximate more 
nearly to the 'counting house' rather than the 'office-factory'. 
Whilst the 'office-factory', is perhaps close to being a 
reality in central offices and computer centres, it is by no 
means a reality for the vast majority of bank staffs. The 
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very large expansion in bank employment 
during the 'sixties 
has not resulted in a seriously deteriorated work situation 
for the majority of bank staffs. 
When -tie turn to the market situation of the 
individual 
clerk however, the impact of the expansion of 
bank employ- 
ment during the 'sixties and of the 
bureaucratisation of the 
market situation of bank clerks becomes more apparent. The 
period of particularism in the determination of salaries and 
conditions of work in banking is, of course, long past as 
the relatively high levels of staff organisational density 
both between the wars and during the post-war era testify. 
During the 'sixties however, the impact of bank expansion was, 
as we have seen, to enlarge and develop a systematic differen- 
tiation between male and female 'clerical classes' in terms 
of their respective market situations. 
Among male clerics, the option to influence individual 
market prospects by individual effort was not merely an 
opportunity made available by bank employers, it was virtually 
a moral norm enjoined by them. For this group of clerks, 
It 
personal opportunities to influence individual market prospects 
permanently co-exist with opportunities for collective 
advancement through organisationat;. onal effort. Moreover 
the individual opportunities for this group of clerks have 
been augmented by the enlargement of the second group of 
clerks, predominantly female, whose individual market power 
exercised through the mobilisation of career opportunities 
is negligible and whose major prospects for economic advance 
ment centre on collective means. 
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The effects of these aspects of bureaucratisation in 
the banking industry have been complex and, in some respects, 
paradoxical. Bureaucratisation or the work situation which 
leads to the 'office-factory' may be held to increase unioni- 
sation in two ways. Firstly, the concentration of emolovees 
in large units facilitates the growth of union membership 
and density by allowing ease of recruitment. Thus, as we 
have seen, Bain found a strong correlation between the 
employment concentration of white collar workers and their 
levels of unionisation. Secondly, the homogenisation and 
mechanisation of clerical work should increase the mutual 
identification of 'office-factory' workers and accentuate 
the impersonality and mutual antagonism of their relations 
with management. Under these conditions, increases in 
union membership would be expected to be associated with 
increases in the militancy of the membership. 
As we have seen, the 'office-factory' is very far from 
being a reality in banking, yet we find that this has not 
inhibited the density of unionisation in banking which was 
relatively high dur'Lng the 'fifties and grew further during 
the 'sixties. On the other hand, banking unionism has been 
characterised by a rather low level of militancy, Here 
the small size of branches, their hierarchic organisation 
and the requirements of co-operation and versatility among 
the staff have together moderated the character of unionism 
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In banking (and hence 'unionisation') by minimising perceived 
divergences of interest and orientation between senior and 
junior branch staff. These characteristics have undoubtedly 
contributed to the historical dominance of the less militant 
staff associations and the widespread acceptance of 
'internalise' ideologies among bank staffs. Thus the low 
levels of work situation bureaucratisation has diminished 
the militancy, but not the density, of trade unionism in 
banking. Insofar as this work situation has decreased 
militancy, it has, of course, decreased 'unionisation' in this 
field. 
Turning to the impact of bureaucratisation of the 
market situation of bank employees, we argue that there can 
be little doubt that the progressive standardisation of the 
parameters of bank employment - that is, the adoption of bank- 
wide and industry-wide age related salary scales, the 
increasingly bureaucratic specification of work roles and 
grades of employee and the high level of. Inter-banlc uniformity 
with respect to such specifications - which odcurred during 
the early decades of this century and has undergone refinement 
ever since, is centrally associated with the generally high 
levels of staff participation in collective organisations in 
banking since the 'twenties. 
At the same time however, the widespread availability 
of individual promotion opportunities within these bureaucratic 
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parameters has provided an element of individual market power 
which has significantly influenced the character of unionism 
in banlcing, Specifically, the availability of Individual 
promotion opportunities firstly rendered collective moans 
to salary advancement a less salient 'second string' for 
bank clerks oriented to the possibility of personal promotion, 
thus inclining them to join inexpensive organisations and to 
demand less from thorn. These tendencies favoured the staff 
associations. Moreover, individualistically oriented bank 
clerks were, secondly, inclined to join collective organisations 
favoured and recognised by bank employers on grounds of both 
personal and collective expediency. Again, this trend 
favoured the staff associations. 
Thus while the progressive bureaucratisation of the 
parameters of the bank clerk's market situation favoured the 
growth of collective organisations in banking from the 
'twenties onwards, the continued significance of a 
considerable degree of personal opportunity - allied with 
the particularisms of the work situation - favoured the 
largely pacific and predominantly 'internalist' nature 
of collective representation in the industry. 
Throughout the 'fifties, the element of individual 
opportunity alluded to above was available in a general way 
to approximately two thirds of all bank employees. The 
minority- female 'underclass' of employees who broadly 
lacked individual promotion opportunities remained willing 
to endorse the organisational allegiances of their male 
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colleagues in approximately similar (if generally lower) 
proportions as a result of the operation of 'branch norms' 
and the motives of indifference, pragmatism and so on which 
we have found in this study. 
The expansion of bank activities during the 'sixties 
however, greatly increased the numbers and significance of 
female employees until, by 1968, they constituted a majority 
of all bank employees. Throughout the 'sixties moreover, 
this group was actively courted by the union which increasingly 
sought to align its policies with the requirements and demands 
of this group. As this 'separate clerical class' grew both 
in size and in aspirations, its tenuous, male dominated and 
branch norm generated allegiance to the staff associations 
was eroded in both numbers and stability. Additional factors 
played a role in this development. The 'separate clerical 
class' was increasingly drawn from working class backgrounds 
and, because of the dependent domiciliary status of many of 
its members, it tended to retain greater social links with 
trade unionists in other fields of employment, Moreover the 
members of this 'clerical class' increasingly saw themselves 
as participants in a wider market of labour rather than as 
tied to a specific employer for the duration of their occupa- 
tional lives. In short, the members of this class brought 
attitudes from the outside world of collective bargaining 
into the cosy 'internalist' world of banking and also brought 
sharper standards of performance to bear on the staff 
associations. 
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The creation of this separate 'clerical class' 
introduced a disturbing factor into the pattern of banking 
employment which had previously favoured 'internall. st' 
collective organisations. For the first time, a majority 
of bank employees had no real individual market power to 
offset against collective failures and had no 'built-in' 
inclination to support the collective organisations favoured 
by the bank employers. Indeed, female bank employees had 
little reason to support organisations whose support for them 
was, at best, lukewarm. Faced with statements from the 
heart of the staff association framework such as the following: 
"The turnover of young women is terrific 
and they are not an integral part of 
banking; they are just the labour force. 
They are not worth their membership as 
they are mainly birds of passage. I am 
negotiating for the senior man; the 
person who is making his career in 
banking". (21 
female staffs could legitimately infer that their second 
class status in bank employment was paralleled by second 
class status in the bank staff associations. Thus, whilst 
the creation and enlargement of a separate 'clerical class' 
in banking was transforming traditional patterns of 
expectations and loyalties in banking, the staff associations 
made little attempt to adjust their outlooks and objectives 
in order to embrace the aims of the nowly expanding female 
labour force which was developing in their midst. 
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The expansion of hanlcint during the I sixties created 
an institutionalised dual labour force within the industry. 
Under these circumstances, an institutional basis was 
established for the erosion of traditional 'intornalist' 
loyalties. For the first time in banking, promotion 
opportunities (and with them individual market power) wer© 
distributed on a virtually ascriptive basis and, with this 
change, the possibilities for the development of a more 
vigorous form of trade unionism increased. 
8.5. The Composition of the Labour Force. 
In a very real sense, any consideration of the compo- 
sitlon of the labour force in banking cannot be separated 
from the bureaucratisation of the market opportunities in the 
industry which takes the form of a distinct segregation of 
opportunities for men and women in the industry. The 92 per 
cent expansion of the female labour force during the decade 
was straightforwardly an expansion of a group of employees 
whose major prospects for economic advancement were collective 
in character and whose participation in a wider labour market 
mitigated any effects which employer hostility towards 
unionisation may have had. At the same time, however, the 
comparative youth. and short-run orientation towards bank 
employment which was predominant in this group tended to off- 
set the pro-. unionisation tendencies stimulated by its structural 
location in the industry. 
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As we have seen, the expansion of the female labour 
force was concentrated in the youngest a Ca groups, the 
majority of whom envisaged that their period of employment 
with the banks would be of short duration. This belief is 
amply borne out by the labour ttirnovor figures from the 
industry. The youth of the female tabour force Is highly 
correlated with their dependent domioili. ary status, a low 
level of extensive or long-term financial commitments and 
a relatively low level of long-term commitment to bank 
employment, The ambitions and perceived future prospects 
of the female labour force were not and are not focused 
upon the growth of their own careers and earning capacities, 
but are focused instead upon marriage and the termination of 
bank employment. As a result, the commitment of this group 
towards trade union objectives tends to be short-run and, 
to this extent, weakened. 
This low level of commitment to bank employment and to 
organisations with long-term objectives in changing the 
levels of salaries and conditions of employment in the 
industry has a number of corollaries. As the results of the 
survey showed, there was a relatively low level of interest 
in union affairs(22) among female bank staffs as compared 
with their male colleagues. In this context, female interest 
in trade unionism in banking tended to be instrumental in 
character. The female staff tended to soe trade union 
membership as a form of 'investment' which should yield 
'dividends'3in the form of improved levels of earnings 
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preferably in the short term. This 'instrumentalism' is, 
we would hypothesise, responsible for the high level of 
female turnover in both types of staff orranisction which was 
equivalent to or higher than male levels despite the very 
much shorter periods which the surveyed female staff had 
spent in bank employment, 
23 
Overall, female staffs 
were not sustained in long term commitments to trade unionism 
either by ideology or by economic interests. 
Nonetheless, as we have seen, the growth in the female 
labour force was the central factor in the growth and 
recognition of NUDE. Here, we can only reiterate that the 
low level of commitment to trade unionism of the female labour 
force is paralleled by a distinct preparedness to join 
collective organisations in pursuit of concrete and tangible 
goals. Such a tangible goal which was deeply relevant to 
the relevances of the female work force did arise in 1967 and 
we may fairly state that, in the absence of that goal and 
the mobilising effect which it had upon female employees, 
the union could not have proceeded with its industrial action 
and the recognition of the union would have been deferred, 
perhaps indefinitely. In this context, the changing 
composition of the labour force in the banking industry was 
of quite decisive significance for the growth of trade 
unionism in banking. 
As Table 8.1 demonstrates, the decisive shift in 
organisational allogiancos which took place between 1960 anti 
1969 was the shift of female staff away from staff association 
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membership and towards NUDE membership. The proportion of 
female clearing bank staff organised by the staff associations 
fell by 35.5 per cent during this period, whilst the proporttn 
of female staff organised by tho union rose by 36 per cent. 
This shift was, of course, aligned with the union's osponnsal 
of policies geared to the interests of female staff. These 
policies are also reflected in the comparable growth figures 
for male staff. Herezefind that, despite the growth and 
recognition of NUDE in 1967-68, the proportion of male staff 
organised by the union rose by only IL per cent during the 
period 1960-69. At the same time however, male allegiances 
to the staff associations were undoubtedly weakened during 
this period and the staff associations' share of male staff 
fell by approximately 11 per cent during; the same period. 
Here it seems probable that union successes, fuelled by its 
female-oriented policies, punctured male confidence in the 
staff associations without providing the kind of attractive 
force necessary to extend male membership. Some of the 
survey evidence points to the possibility that the union's 
policy of positive discrimination in favour of female clerks 
may have alienated sections of the male staff, and there may 
have remained a considerable proportion of men whose career 
interests and ideologies were such as to insulate thorn from 
the attractions of a more aggressive form of trade unionism. 
During the 'sixties then, the staff associations 
straightforwardly lost the battle for the loyalty of female 
bank staffs. ý They lost this battlo because their policies 
were crucially shaped by the years spent reprosonting a pro. 
dominantly male staff who regarded female bank employees as of 
merely secondary significance, as an adjunct rather than an axis 
of collective market power. 
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8, i. The Attitudes of the Hank Employers 
There can be little doubt that the attitudes of the 
bank employers have been a crucial factor inhibiting the 
growth of trade unionism in the industry. The hostility 
of the employers to NUBE has expressed itself in recent years 
in a consistent refusal to recognise the union until compelled 
in 1967 and in support for the rival staff associations. In 
this context, it is unsurprising to find that NUDE density 
has been highest where there are no competing staff 
associations (as in the National and Williams Deacons Banks) 
or where the union has been recognised along side the staff 
associations (as in Barclays Bank). We have also seen 
substantial divergences in union growth within individual 
banks during the 'sixties which are largely attributable to 
inter-bank variations in levels of hostility towards the 
union during this period. 
The early part of the 'sixties witnessed armmoderate 
erosion in the general level of employer hostility towards 
NUDE and union representatives were successful in makinr, a 
a number of direct contacts with senior officials in several 
of the clearing banks (Midland, Williams Deacons, Westminster 
and Lloyds) for the first time since the union's formation. 
However, whilst these chances in stance of the bank employers 
towards union representation were predominantly voluntary in 
character, 
(24) 
more forceful union action was required to 
generate further changes in attitude. This action took the 
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form of the union's complaint to the ILO. Although, as we 
have seen, the substance of the union's complaint was rejected 
by Lord Cameron, the complaint itself occasioned a certain 
degree of embarrassment both to the banks and to the 
government. It was an embarrassment to the government for 
the obvious reason that no national government can welcome 
appeals to international bodies to enforce the application of 
conventions to which it is itself a signatory, and such an 
application is doubly burdensome to a government which prides 
itself on its liberalism in trade union matters. The appeal 
was embarrassing to the banks since aspects of the banks' 
policies towards their e^iployees (which were widespread 
throughout the industry and not confined to the banks named 
in the complaint) were exposed to public scrutiny for the 
first time. The banks' clear motivation to minimise this 
exposure is visible in their decision not to call witnesses 
to the Inquiry. Moreover, although the union's complaint 
was formally unsuccessful, Lord Cameron's comments on 'the 
question of union recognition were clearly favourable to the 
formation of national negotiating machinery. 
The effects of the Cameron Inquiry wore twofold. 
Firstly, Williams T)oacons Dank took steps to recognise the 
union in 1964. Given that the bank had no internal staff 
association and the union had a substantial membership 
within the bank, this move was certainly prudent in the light 
of the Inquiry and it may also have reflected a growing 
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dissatisfaction with the piecemeal character of collective 
bargaining in banking as a whole in which an award to an 
internal staff association could rapidly become a guide- 
line for the industry. The second, and more significant, 
development after Cameron was the formation of the intor- 
bank working party to develop national negotiating machinery, 
We can discern several influences at work in the formation 
of this working party. In the first instance, it is clear 
that the Cameron Inquiry gave a direct impetus to those 
employers (particularly Barclays Bank) who wished to 
reform, and in the process extend, collective bargaining 
procedures in banking. At the same time, the election of 
the Labour government in 1964 resulted in a more diffuso 
background pressure towards the same objective since the 
Labour government was itself exercised by trade union 
questions, as evidenced by the formation of the Donovan 
Commission and, ultimately, the CIR. Finally, as noted 
above, several of the smaller banks had a direct interest 
in organising collective bargaining in the industry along 
more orderly lines. 
Despite this general improvement in the employers' 
attitudes towards the recognition of NUDE however, there 
remained substantial disunity among individual employers on 
the issue and the working party commenced its deliberations 
without the support or co-operation of two of the then 'Big 
Five' (Midland and National Provincial Banks). All in all, 
it cannot be stated that the moderation of the employers' 
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hostility, significant though it was, was a decisive factor 
in the recognition of the union. The proposals of the 
working party on national negotiating machinery were rejected 
by three of the 'nipp rive' banks and received nosi. tive support 
only from Barclays Bank which had recognised the union for 
over twenty years. However the creation of the working 
party and, the publication of its conclusions did create an 
atmosphere in which national recognition seemed a concrete 
possibility to union members and one moreover which, in 
conjunction with other issues, might be worth taking 
industrial action for. To this extent, the creation of the 
working party signalled a moderation in the employers' 
attitudes which ultimately contributed to the genesis of 
strike action in pursuit of other ends, which themselves were 
intimately bound up with the recognition question. 
In his influential volume on union growth, Bain has arguod 
that, in the case of white collar unionism, national Covernmonts 
bear a heavy weight of responsibility in influencing the 
attitudes of employers in favour of union recognition. 
(2 ) 
In a subsequent article with Price, this argument has boon 
extended to suggest that, during the period from 1968 to 1970, 
this influence actually made itself felt with the result that: 
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All in all, nn atmosphere seems to have boon 
created in, whi. ch much mere importance was 
attached to industrial, relations principles 
and procedures by employers and managers, and 
in which the growth of unionism among virtually 
all levels of employees was seen es, if not 
desirable, at least inevitable. In short, 
it would seem that unions found ft easier to 
claim recognition anmit employers found it harder 
to resist these claims during 1968-70 than in 
any period since the Second World liar", (26) 
Without seeking to deny the general validity of those 
observations nor the specific relevance of the Donovan Commis- 
sion and the envisaged CIR to the banking industry, it is by 
no means possible to uphold the centrality of the role of govern- 
ment with respect to the ultimate recognition of NTJDE. This 
recognition was, it should not be forgotten, won by force. 
There can be no doubt that this force was absolutely necessary 
to overcome rooted opposition to union recognition from several 
large bank employers. ]Whilst it is possible that the prospect 
of the CIR may have persuaded several of the employers to 
recognise the union earlier in the conflict than might have 
been the case under different circumstances, there can be no 
question that force was necessary to achieve this recognition 
and that force would, in all probability, have proved 
necessary in pursuit of this end at some later date. 
However, if the government did not play quite the direct 
role in the recognition of NUT3E that was envisaged in the 
Bain recommendations of 1967, it nonetheless played a substan- 
tial role in the events loading up to the disputes of 1967. 
Direct government intervention, through the agencies of the 
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Ni3PI, the Minister for Employment and the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, was undoubtedly a causal factor both in 
inhibiting a more substantial salary award to 1967 and in 
delaying Saturday closing. Both these issues were, as we 
have seen, directly contributive to the 1967 dispute and 
provided firm 'pegs' on which claims for the union's 
recognition could be hung. To this extent, that the govern- 
ment tied the hands of the bank employers at the very point 
at which they most needed flexibility and to the extent 
that independently and indirectly the government fostered a 
climate of opinion favourable to union growth and recorn1i. tion, 
the government provided a substantial proportion of both 
the 'push' and the 'pull' factors necessary to launch NUTE 
on its first major industrial action against the bank 
employers and to secure their capitulation. ' 
8. Z. Conclusions 
At the conclusion of his study, The Growth of White 
Collar Unionism, Bain suggested that aggregate white collar 
union density could be expressed as a product of two 
equations: 
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D_ f(c, R) (1 
R_ g(D, G) (2) 
where D= the density of white collar unionism; 
C_ the degree of employment concentration; 
R_ the degree to which employers are prepared 
to recognise unions representing white collar 
employees; and 
G the extent of government action which promotes 
union recognition. 
27) 
In arriving at this conclusion, pain broadly discounted 
the influence of the following factors on white collar 
unionisation: 
"(a) such socio-demographic characteristics 
of white-collar Workers as their sex, social 
origins, age and status; (h) such aspects 
of their economic position as earnings, other 
terms and conditions of employment, and 
employment security; (c) such aspects of 
their work situation as the opportunities 
for promotion, the extent of mechanisation 
and automation, and the degree of proximity 
to unionised manual workers; and (d) such 
aspects of trade unions as their public 
image, recruitment policies, and structures". 
(28) 
Our conclusions, by contrast, are broadly that the factors 
cited by Rain in the above equations do not explain the growth 
of trade unionism in banking during the decade under study 
but that, on the contrary, some of the factors dismissed by 
Bain (in particular, sex, opportunities for promotion and, 
more generally, bureaucratisation) do go a. substantial way 
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towards explaining this growth, Thom are soveral. ways in 
which these explanatory discrepancies can be reconciled. 
Firstly, it could be claimed that, since Pain's study 
was directed to the analysis of aggregate, cross-sectional 
data concerning white collar workers in manufacturing 
industry, there is little reason to expect his conclusions 
to be supported in a disaggregated, longitudinal study of 
an industry wholly employing white collar workers. In 
short, it can be claimed that the differences between the 
analyses and the industries studied imply that there can be 
no conflict between the two sets of conclusions. 
Secondly, it is possible to claim that we are hero 
dealing with a 'deviant case' with respect to the Bain model. 
It can be suggested, in this connection, that any aggrogative 
model of unionisation must deal with the central strategic 
variables involved, Given that no model of this type can 
conceivably be stretched to account for every deviant case, 
it can be argued that the banking industry is simply such 
a case. Thus, for example, employment concentration is 
simply not a major factor influencing unionisation in 
4 
banking although, as Bain himself points out, buroaucrati%ation 
is a major feature and in banking 
"a considerable degree of unionint. on 
was ... possible simply on tho basis of large-scale bureaucratic organiation". 
(29) 
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The 'financial' industries may thus be considered deviant 
cases in that they are bureaucratized without this bureau- 
cratization boing associated with extensive employment 
concentration. Moreover the banking industry may, within 
this rubric, be further considered deviant insofar as 
inter-organisational rivalries have inhibited union growth 
and recognition which, if these rivalries had not been 
stimulated by employer hostility to NUDE - Bain's other 
major factor, might have resulted in the recognition of 
NUBS during the 'twenties. Once again therefore, there is, 
within this view, no inherent contradiction between Rain's 
conclusions and the conclusions of this study. 
A third position that could be taken up is suggosted 
by Bain's indication that the evidence he marshals with 
respect to some of the rejected factors 
"was not sufficiently reliable to permit 
them to be discounted completely", (30) 
Subsequently, Bath writes that 
"All that is claimed on behalf of the modol 
is that the variables it includes are those 
which have a systematic influence on aggre- 
gate union growth, while those it excludes 
behave in a random manner. If the equations 
in this model were to be estimated, they 
would both have to contain an error term which 
would represent not only the errors of measure- 
ment in the variables, but also the influence 
of the omitted variables which have a sporadic 
and unsystematic influence on union growth". 
(31) 
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There can be little doubt that we have been concerned in 
this study with what Weir has termed a. 'sporadic and inter- 
mittent ou+break of white collar militancy'. 
(32) 
However, 
as we indicated in commencing; this study, this fact need 
not entail that the factors discussed are not of general 
applicability. Indeed, we believe that we may have 
isolated a complex of factors which may turn out to have a 
general influence on white collar unionisation iisofar as 
this complex exists outside the banking industry. If we 
are correct, we would hope that this complex of factors 
should be reinstated from their 'discounted, ' status and 
rescued from their lowly location as a party of an 'error 
term' which, since it cannot easily be quantified, could 
hardly be a less satisfactory location. 
Thus our Judgement is that, whilst we have dealt 
with a special case which it'would not be reasonable to 
expect the Bain model to account for, nonetheless analysis 
of this special case does reveal factors underlying the 
growth of white collar unionism which have genoral signt- 
ficance. Our argument is this: that whereas the Bonoral 
bureaucratisation of the white collar market situation 
(and, 
in particular, the blockage of upward mobility and tho 
formation of a separate clerical class) conduces towards 
unionisation, this tendency can be blocked by emplovers who 
are opposed to unions using, two connected strategies 
embod'rinp^: 
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(1) the refusal to recognise the trade unter(s) 
in nuestion; and 
(2) the increased employment of short term femalo 
labour to perform routine white collar tasks. 
Under these conditions, the process of unionisation is likely 
to be inhibited. However, if the events in banking have 
any wider significance, it is to suggest broadly that this 
strategy will remain successful only to the extent that 
short-term female labour remains in a numerical minority. 
Insofar as the above conditions are widespread within white 
collar bureaucracies, then, we believe, they will exert a 
considerable inhibitory influence on the process of white 
collar unionisation. , Once however, the 'minority' 
condition is violated, then there is a likelihood that 
short-term female employees will begin to respond to the 
formulation of appropriate industrial objectives and to seek 
to organise accordingly. In the final chapter, we will 
briefly examine some features of female employment 
patterns which may prove likely to increase the propensity 
of women to unionise even in situations where employers seek 
to refuse recognition to the unions in question. 
8.7.1, Concluding Observations 
The very language of social science conduces towards an 
imagery of d©terminism and objectivism which reduces the 
elements of agency and contingency in historical dovolopmonts 
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to an apparently illusory Status. This same lanruago 
leads towards a cast of mind which results in an orientation 
to the conclusion of a series of developments as a point of 
departure from which to assert the necessary character of 
the elements and events adduced as contributing to the 
realisation of that conclusion. In these brief concluding 
comments therefore, we shall set out our conclusions 
concerning the growth of trade unionism in banking in the 
language of human agency rather than the language of 
social. determination, if only to remind ourselves that in 
the last analysis trade unionism represents an attempt by 
men and women to achieve a greater degree of control over 
their working lives. 
Our conclusion is that the changing composition of 
the labour force in banking, in association with the 
contingencies of bank and government policies during the 
'sixties, was the central factor behind the growth and 
ultimate recognition of NUBS. In concluding this, we claim 
merely that there was during this period an expanding influx 
of persons into banking; whose goals, aspirations and 
orientations - derived primarily outside the workplace -" 
sharply diverged from the entrenched patterns of goals and 
interests characteristic of the male dominated industry of 
the 'fifties. In pursuit of these goals, the influx of 
female clerks turned toward the union as a moans to achieve 
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their objectives and did so, moreover, at a crucial point 
in the union's development. The not result was a growth 
in the union's influence and significance in banking 
affairs which was unforeseen even in the mid-sixties. 
It is not a novel conclusion to suggest that 
collective organisations are very often forced to engage in 
persistent efforts to reconcile the conflicting orientations 
and objectives of their members. Yet, in the case of 
banking, the dilemmas associated with such a reconciliation 
are potentially acute. At the end of Chapter It, we suggested 
that during the 'fifties and 'sixties it was difficult for 
any collective organisation to establish a corpus of 
objectives having widespread appeal to all sections of the 
labour force in banking. One conclusion of this investiga- 
tion is that it is the differing orientations to work of 
male and female clerks - expressed both in the conflict 
between long-term and short-term objectives and in a commonly 
held 'low salience' orientation to collective organisation -" 
which underlies the difficulty in establishing objectives 
with powerful and widespread appeal, Indeed, without the 
'hours' issue of 1967 which united bank staffs over a 
national question, raised the salience of collective 
organisation albeit temporarily and fuelled the willingness 
of bank employees to take industrial action, it is likely 
that NUDE would have been recognised by the bank employers 
only as a result of government action, 
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The difficulty of formulating pol. ictos commanding 
widespread appeal among all sections of the bank staff is 
by itself a major hindrance to the growth of collective 
organisation in banking. This hindrance is redoubled 
however by the persistence of competition botween the 
collective organisations in the industry which has 
inhibited and continues to i. nhi. bit unioni. sati. on in two 
major ways. 
Firstly, the ideological and policy competition between 
the union and the staff associations has presented the union 
with acute difficulties in establishing itself as a respectable 
and effective organising force. Thus it has historically 
shrunk from, or been unable to pursue, militant policies 
which have, in other contexts, proved extremely popular and 
successful. For exa^iple, as we have soen, aggrossivo union 
policies which were pursued in the Trustee Savings Banks in 
the eerly 'sixties attracted very substantial membership 
growth and resulted in recognition by the banks' manaremont. 
In the clearing banks, by contrast, the union was inhibited 
from pursuing similar policies by the existence of the staff 
associations as the apparent crystallisation of moderate 
staff opinion. This inhibition porsistod despite the fact 
that when industrial action was ultimately taken it attracted 
widespread support and very groat momborship growth prior 
to the union's reco *niti. on. The oxistonco of the staff 
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exerted, 
P. ssoni. ati_ons hs. s//ane contintaes/ to exort, n brake on thn 
pursuit of a gressi. ve irdvistria/1 policies n. nrl raises the 
threshold at which such poli. c i. os will be cnntemplatod. 
Secondly, as we have seen, competition between the 
union and the staff associations after 1968 contributed to 
the dissipation of 'credit effects' derivinr, from the firm 
pursuit of more militant industrial policies. This 
dissipation weakens both types of organisation in membership 
terms and contributes to a sense of confusion among bank 
staffs as to the means and objectives of collective 
industrial policy which is manifest in the frequent changes 
from one organisation to the other and decisions to drop out 
from both. 
Thus the division in orientations to work and collective 
objectives among bank clerks contin»es in the post-recognition 
situation. Similarly, the competition between the union and 
the staff associations for membership, which is foc"sed on 
control of the policies of the Banking Staff Council, persists 
wastefully and to ill-purposo up to the present day. At the 
same time, conflicting ideological, bolto. fs relating to the 
two types of organisation do not continuo to exert any groat 
influence over bank staffs. In a survey of 4h* 000 employees 
of Barclays Bank, only 16 per cent agreed that 'NUDE doesn't 
really have bank staff's interests at heart whilst 26 par 
0 
- 581 - 
e_ent agreed tha; - 'the Staff Associ. ati. on Is a tool_ of 
management', In the same survey, 52 per cent of the 
flank's employees agreed that 'RT[Jflfl and thn Staff Association 
ought to merge'. Such a merger iss wo bolieve, long; 
overdue. Ultimately it is the condition not only of the 
formation of powerful and effective staff representation 
but also of the reunification of collective interests and 
objectives among all bank staff, whether male or female, 
career or non-career. 
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CFI" PTER ?NI TT . 
TTTE 1W7? TTTI COLLAR WORKER 7N TTTI' OCCTTP&TTOT\TAI, STRTJCTTTTlT` t 
PROT. ET&RTANTSATTO'`T FFMTNTSATT('T AND TTTE PROSPECTS FOR 
THE FTJTURE. 
9.1w Introduction 
In the introduction to this thesis, wo noted that one 
major source of sociological interest in the growth of white 
collar unionism derives from the possibility that studios of 
white collar unions can shed some light on the class 
structure of modern industrial societies. A proximate 
political impetus for studies of the social location of the 
white collar worker derives from the commitment to theortse 
about the potential class identification and class a]tirnmont 
of white collar workers in conditions of socio-economic 
crisis. In this connection, it is hold firstly that 
unionisation may be significant as an index of the perceptions 
of their social location by white collar workers and, 
secondly, that even where white collar unionisation may not 
be considered to be a response to perceptions of social 
location nor even to social stratificational variables, 
(') 
nonetheless trade unionism as the 'vehicle of working; class 
consciousness' 
(2) 
may exert a formative ideolorica1 
'infl, 
uence 
inn, li_n ing white collar woricers to Join 1,, t th tho3. r b1, ie-» 
collar brethren in an assault, upon capitalist tnst{tuiions 
at the point of socio-economic crisis. 
(3) 
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Although the political incorporation of trade unions 
within capitalist society has procoodod to stich an extent that 
their revolutionary, potential may now be geri misty do ibtod 
(tf 
we may yet argue - contra the 'industrial relations critique' 
(5) 
- that the study of white collar unionisation in relation to 
the class situation of white collar workers may result in the 
mutual illumination of both these aspects of social life. 
Lockwood's(r') conclusions concerning- the impact of the 
differentiated white collar marl et F. nd iror1c situations upon 
clerical unionisation stand as a most substantial confirmation 
that mutual illumination of this type may be achieved. 
For most students of social stratification, the primary 
focus of attention must fall upon the market situations of 
different groups within society, Thus, as Giddens has so 
forcefully argued recently/7) any analysis of the class 
structure must centre in the first instance on the distribu- 
tion of 'life chances' mediated by the market structure of 
capitalism. For the majority of contemporary social 
scientists/8) two social processes must be oncompassec1 
by any descr&otive approach to the class system: 
One is the allocation of rewards attaching 
to different positions in the social systoi 
the other is the process of recruitment to 
these positions. (9) 
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_A. r, uments about 
the p-oletari. a. ni snti. on of white collar workers 
have, by Rnd large, tended to fo us more exten4i. vety on the 
allocation of rewards to this grout of workers than on the 
processes of rocruitrient to white collar occupations, 
The question of the allocation of rewards to routine 
clerical workers as compared to their manual counterparts 
in Britain was extensively discussed in Chapter 2. There 
we found little to quarrel with in LiddonsI assertion that 
there has been 
A relative diminution of the income of 
clerical workers within the white collar 
sector and, secondlyr, the development of 
some degree of 'overlap' at the margins 
between non-manual and manual le. bo"r. (10) 
Assertions of this kind have, in the past, formed the stock 
in trade of those analysts, such as Klinpºonder, Allen, Mills 
and others, 
(11) 
who have been concerned to demonstrate the 
growing prolotarianisation of the routine non-manual 
employee. Typically, these assertions are coupled with 
discussions of the declining promoton opportunities 
available to routine white collar employees. Thus, in 
arguing their case for the prolotariantsation of the routine 
white collar worker, Westergaard and Resler(12) have recently 
stressed that male clerical earnings have fallen below the 
earnings of skilled and semi-skilled male manual workers on 
the one hand whilst, on the other, there exists only a low 
level of opportunity for routine white collar workers to 
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achieve positions higher in the non-manual occtinatii, onnl 
structure, especially for those 1ackinC eduicati mal 
qualifications. 
(13) 
The conclusions of these studies are, in the main, 
quite unexceptionable. In the present study we have our- 
selves described the expansion of unionisation nmona female 
bank workers as a consequence of their 'prolotar{an' market 
position as an isolated and separate clerical class alli. ed 
with their numerical growth as such. However those studios 
are primarily geared to accounting for the growth of unioni- 
sation and they are, in a majority of cases, only secondarily 
conceived as a contribution to the analysis of the class 
structure. 
Ironically the present study, which lends support to the 
above-mentioned conclusions to a considerable extent, "may also 
form a point of departure for the interrogation of these 
conclusions as a contribution to the analysis of the location 
of non-manual workers in the class structure. As we have 
seen, whilst studies of the class structure require a focus 
on the process of recruitment to the different social 
positions within it, most of the analyses cited abovo deal 
with this dimension of class structuration only from the 
stand-point of rromotion within rather than rocrnttment to, 
the white collar labour force. Whilst such an approach is 
consistent with an analysis of the market situuatd on of the 
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white collar worker in relation to his or her unionisation, 
it is insufficient as a basis on which to r*atn a f, ßii 
appreciation of the position of the w'ýi. to collar workor 
within the class structcure. 
It is here that o""r data on hank workers yields rethor 
more complex, and even ambiguous conclusions, than the above- 
cited studies. For, as we have seen, raeruitient to 
positions within the white collar division of labour i . s, 
insofar as the case of banking is typical, increasingly based 
on a sexually ascribed division of labour. A major result 
of this process is that the 'prolotarianisation' of the male 
white collar worker - at least as far as his 'market 
situation' is concerned - is averted by means of the full- 
blown 'proletariani. sationt (if only for a temporary , period) 
of his white-bloused colleague. This process is favourably 
influencing the inter- and intro-generational mobility of 
men and, since women are commonly excluded from consideration 
in studies o-° the class structure, this trend in turn creates 
the sense - whether 'illusory' or not - that 
(male) white 
collar workers are very far from undergoing a process nf 
pro letarianisation. 
This study of bank employees has sensitized "s to some 
of the social processes undorlyinr* what wo may call the 
'de- proletarinnisation' of male clerical workers, In the 
next section, we turn to look at the degree to which the 
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evidence from studies of the British occupational structure 
confirms the existence of o. general trend away from the 
proletarianisation of male white collar employees, a trend 
which depends for its continuation upon the increasing 
prol etarianisation of the market situations of female white 
collar workers. In this connection, we will briefly examine 
the evidence relating to the inter- and intra-generational 
mobility of white collar workers in the context of the 
changing British occupational structure. Subsequently, we 
will turn to look at social forces which may operate in such 
a way as to reverse the trend towards the 'do-proletari. anisa- 
tion' of the male white collar worker. 
'), 2. White Collar Occupational Mobility in. r. Ghstn, i. n, 
Occunat; 
_onal Struetitro 
It is an overwhelming fact that the major change in 
the British occupational structure concerns the growth of 
the Inew, middle classes' in the white collar sector. 
ro 
H 
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,; nctor The facts a1'nut the growth of tho twh3. tn collar . 
are quite unambigioins. Potwoen 1911 and 1971 the white 
collar labour force grew from 3.11 mt ll tons to 10.1; m3 17. t. on$ 
a growth factor of over 300 per cent. During the same 
period white collar workers expanded as a proportion of the 
total labour force from 18.7 per cent to l; 2.7 per cont. 
What were the sources of this growth? fotween 1911 
and 1971, the manual labour force remained constant 
numerically but fell from 74.6 per cent of the total 
labour force in 1911 to 54.7 per cent in 1971. Durinr this 
period the total occupied population rose by some six 
million persons (33 per cent). Thus one source of the 
growth in the white collar labour force is the expansion of 
the total labour force. This source accounts for by far 
the greatest proportion of the growth of white collar 
employees. A second source derives from the fail in the 
numbers of 'employers and proprietors' from 1,2 mUli. ons in 
1911 to 0.6 million in 1971 and from 6.7 to 2.6 per cent 
of the occupied population during the same period. 
Turning now to the white collar sector itself, by 
far the largest group is the clerical soctor which has 
expanded by 400 per cent between 1911 and 1971. This group 
grew from 4.5 per cent of the total labour force in 1911 to 
14.0 per cant in 1971. Second, the category of 'manapors and 
administrators' in the labour force has mono than tripled in 
- 592 - 
size from 0.6 million to 2.1 millions. This growth, from 
3,1E per cent to 8.6 per cent of the labour force, more than 
compensates for the decline in the num}, ers of 'emplo"ors 
and proprietors'. Third, the category of 'lower professionals 
and technicians' has expanded from 0.5 millions in 1911 to 
1,9 million in 1971 and constituted 7.7 per cent of the 
labour force in 1971. Fourth, 'sales personnel and shop 
assistants' have remained a broadly constant proportion of 
the labour force over the past sixty years, rising in the 
same proportion as the total labour force, Fifth, 'higher 
professional' workers have grown by 500 per cent to 0,9 
million in 1971 and now constitute 3,8 per cent of the labour 
force. Finally the category of 'foremen and inspectors' 
has grown by 300 per cent and now constitn tos 3 per cent of 
the labour force. 
From these figures the challenge to the Marxinn 
conception of the evolution of the labour force is clans. 
The white collar labour force has expanded at the expense both 
of the manual 'proletarian' sector of the labour force and also 
at the expense of the property owning classes, the 
classically bourgeois 'employers and proprietors'. Viewed 
from the perspective of the changing occupational structure, 
there has been less of a polarisation between bourgeois and 
proletarian than there has been an implosion of sections of 
both classes into the white collar sector. 
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if, with the aid of Table C). 2, wo now concontrnto on the 
redistribution of the non-property owning male wnrkforco, wo 
find that the decline of the male manual proletarian is loss 
marked than the figures cited above might have implied. 
Between 1951 and 1971,1.5 million male workers (10 per cent 
of the male occupied population) were lost from the manual 
labour force. 
- 594 - 
U) 
o' 
4J 
"ý 0 
N 
"a 
aý u 
C) 0 
.4 
.0 >1 Cd .0 H0 
0 
4) 
ro 
P4 
1) 
s 0 0 
0 u a 
w 
0 
c 
4.0 
cr. 
ti 
IH 
x 
w 
14 I'D 
ON 1-4 
z 
LeIA c. 
T-4 
.4 
w 
r., 
rn 
x 
w 
r+ cl 
r+ 
z 
w 
v4 
rn 
mo 
yd 
ß 41 
d 
UU 
,0 -4 ýNcI, 
b 
.. 4 1 i 
'0 0. 
a 
tt u 
+ý V 
N0 
-4' a% M 
r+ N eý 
lV O' 
ýG uA Q' 
O '. O 
cn 
t[1 Ci IA 
. 4' ' N 
O N N 
V 
CO t- CO 
CV to lp 
v O ý' ýG 
GL 
ti b N 
N 
'D N c1 
b t"1 c+ý 
-$ N 
N N 
co N O 4 
O .ý 
N 
O' 
uý UN M 
N C' U\ O 
Oý O O N 
O co u\ 0% 
0' I t1 ý0 
N 
O O O 
A 
O .ý M N 
O O 00 
r+ 
co O W4 Clý 
r+ N U1 U1 
c1 er CO lt1 
co Q, r+ .4 
r+ '4 u1 -1' 
CO N m 4 
IA O M 
-d' co .+ O 4 
.. u1 u1 
m 
C. 
co 
0 
r+ 
VZ 
N 
C1 
h 
" 
CV 
V-4 
" 
0 
eh 
N 
C'" 
0 
M 
" 0 
tý1 
N 
M 
a 
%IN 
t4 
Ö 
.r ic 10 to 4) 
s "w 
b t 
r-. 
M Ä. m ýc Vi 2 10 Ici (4 P. 4 c4 (9 ä Z 4 4) n! 4) 4. b md Z pn 1 to ö 0) v 0 to - in x C 2 0 01 4) tfi 4j 
( "Ö 41 
r. 
.. 4 1A O 3r Q Rf m H u! 9 4 la rtS R! 3, r+ ++ 0 $4 1, "w "w 0 0 Cº r+ 4' ei ý to 'L7 
r ++ 0 p. g 
1 W aý .° 'O 0 
ö "p 
.i 
"ý C $U O) 4l U N M or 1-4 rq 
>. 
Q 
n w v N4? - ( . ýt 
cý, 
e o ä 3 
ä ei U v# m rý d 
v 
C 
O 
U 
-. 595` - 
b 
ed 
N 
N 
r+ N 
- N N 
pý 
O 
N Lt. 
0% O 34 
" 
w N 
N 
.. 4 co ON 0, " " Q. ' 
N 
N 
CT 
to 
r+ 
0 
'. D C' r1 
H 
(7% M co 
a1 " f In 
_ N 
u.. 
f " N 
G4 n 
.' '. D H 
C'1 
O r- cT 
41 
N 
C% 
~ IA N e"ý 
- 
N 
O r+ N 
. -+ '. D CS Uý N 
S` N 
r+ N 
0 
ca 1 
:3 (M 
U) 4) 
J "4 4. 
cl 
- 
Cd 
uV 6 $10--. 
d 
8 4) V 4) (d P 
., 4 0 
M 
10 0 
VP 
+J x ( 0'4 W N 
(d 0.4 14 C 
P4 Q F-4 4J 
V, 
8 ý o . M 3 >0 . . . 
H 
- 596 - 
However when we look at where these men were 'rolncetod' in 
the occupational structure, we find that two thirds of thorn 
(approximately one million men) are now to he fonnnd in the 
upper reaches of white collar occupations, that is, amnnt* 
the 'managers and administrators' and the 'h: i her prof'essionals'. 
The remainder swelled the ranks of the 'lower professional 
groupings and, to a lesser extent, the foremen and 
supervisors'. A marginal increase among the male clerks 
was almost exactly matched by a fall in the numbers of male 
sales staff. There has, therefore, been no absolute or 
proportional growth in the numbers of men in routine white 
collar occupations. 
Turning to the female side of the table, we encounter 
a rather different picture. Once again, thorn has boon a 
shift of approximately 10 per cent of the female labour 
force from the manual to the white collar sector although 
here the absolute numbers of female manual workers have 
remained broadly constant between 1951 and 1971. During 
this period however, 1.8 million ndditianel women joined the 
white collar labour force. Of these, over one million 
women became a part of the much expanded clerical labour 
force and a further 160,000 women joined the sales sector. 
Of the remainder, approximately 400,000 women joined lower 
grade and technical occupations whilst a more 150,000 were 
added to higher professional, administrative and mnnagorinl 
occupations. 
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In sum, considering the overall 'shnico out I of men 
and women from manual occupations since 1951, wo find that 
whereas approximately 60 per cent of the man 'lost' to 
manual employment were redeployed in the upper reaches of 
the white collar occupational structure only 8 per cant of 
the women were so redeployed. During the past twenty years 
therefore, there has been a. very considerable redistribution 
of the labour force towards white collar occupations and bore 
the men have been far more successful than their female 
counterparts in securing positions in the upper echelons of 
the white collar occupational structure. As a result, the 
proportion of men to women in the highest white collar 
positions ('higher professionals' and 'managers and 
administrators') has actually risen from 5.8 to 1 in 1951 
to 6.1 to 1 in 1971. On the other hand, the proportion of 
men to women in the routine white collar occupations (clerical 
and sales) has fallen from 0.75 to 1 in 1951 to 0.1E2 to 1 
in 1971. 
The changing occupational distribution of tho Dritish 
work force indicates that there has been considerable upward 
mobility in British society especially since 1951. This 
upward mobility is clearly evidenced by the absolute loss of 
manpower from manual employment and the proportionate loss 
of female labour from this sector. Furthermore, as wo have 
seen, the 'long-range' upward 'mobility, is concentrated 
- 598 - 
within the male labour force. Thus the data indicates 
that it is not the case that low level clerical and sales 
jobs accounted, as Westergaard and Resler claim, 
for well over one in three men with 
non-manual jobs both in 1921 and in 
the 1960's. (16) 
In fact, in 1921 such routine jobs accounted for 48,. 9 per 
cent of all male white collar , lobs. By 1951 this 
proportion had fallen to 38.6 per cent and it fell further 
to 27.8 per cent in 1971. During the sane period, the 
proportion of the male white collar labour force occupying 
the two highest white collar categories rose from 31.1ß per 
cent in 1921 to-44.4 per cent in 1971. Correlatively, the 
numbers of women occupying routine white collar jobs rose 
progressively as a proportion of the total female white 
collar labour force from 6Z. 3 per cent in 1921 to 72 per 
cent in 1961 with a slight fall to 69.1 per cent in 1971.17) 
The proportion of women in the major occupational groups is 
set out in Table 9.3 below. 
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As Table 9.3 clearly demonstrates, the greatest expansion in 
the proportios of female workers in white collar occupations 
has occurred in the routine white collar occupations. The 
statistical evidence concerning the changing occu. zpationni, 
distributions of men and women indicates that while sections 
of the male labour force may be experiencing a measure of 
long-range upward mobility, the mobility of woman from 
manual backgrounds into white collar occupations is far more 
likely to be of a short-range variety. Insofar as female 
earnings and fringe benefits in the routine white collar 
sector begin to over-lap with female earnings and fringe 
benefits in the skilled manual sector, the movement into 
routine white collar occupations will itself to some extent 
be neutralised as 'upward mobility', 
(19) 
The evidence from the statistics of occupational dis. 
tribution indicate that it is likely that thoro has been a 
substantial degree of male occupational mobility into the 
upper band of white collar occupations. Those indications 
are confirmed by the results of a recently published survey 
into social mobility among men conducted by Goldthorpe and his 
colleagues in the Nuffield Mobility group. This study 
concludes that the extent of upward mobility among- men in 
England and Wales has been under-ostimatod in the past and 
that this under-estimation is duo, in some dogroo, to at 
failure to attend to the implications of the spootf'ic character 
-bot - 
of the growth of the non-manual labour force and, in 
particular, the tendency for the concomitant occupational 
distribution shift among men to be from manual oco'ipations 
to those in the higher reaches of white collar occupations. 
HO) 
Moreover, Goldthorpe and Llewellyn indicate that, altiiotuph 
mobility opportunities to sucht white collar occtlpatfons are 
increasingly influenced by ed'icat9 ons. l qua. li. fi. cttt. 1. ons, this 
factor has not in the recent past inhibited access to these 
higher level white collar occupations by the ind; root routos 
of 'work-life' mobility. 
(21 
Although there cannot, in the nature of things, be 
such a thing as a typical white collar worker, nonetheless 
the trends of change in the occupational structure described 
above are strikingly exemplified in changes in bank employ- 
ment. Thus the 96 per cent expansion in total bank 
employment between 1951 and 1970 exceeded the growth (l&9.7 
per cent) in the white collar sector esn whole between 
1951 and 1971. However whilst the exvansion of male employ- 
ment in banking was, at 38.6 per cent, marginally lower than 
the expansion in male white collar employment as a whole 
(39.2 per cent), the growth of female employment in honking; 
during this period vastly exceeded, at 209.9 per cent, the 
growth of female white collar employment as a whole (60.6 
per cent) and the growth in the female clerical labour force 
as a whole (740.4 per cent). 
As we have seon, the femaio lnbour force in bnnlctnj-! 
is primarily recruited for routine clerical tasks, In 
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1951, women formed rapprox3_motely 't0 nor cent of the clnarth 
banks' clerical l*. hoiir force. T17 1 q63, this proportion hall 
risen to 57.2 per cent and to 50,7 nor cent 1w 1)r, 7. 
Basing our estimate for 1970 on the banking ocetipati, onnl 
distribution of 1967, wo estimate that women for-nod 62.3 per 
cent of the banks' clerical labour force by this date. 
There wes thus e, rise in the proportion of women performing 
routine clerical occupations of 5.1 per cent in the seven 
years between 1963 and 1970. Taring the ten years between 
1961 and 1971, the proportion of women in the routine 
clerical labour force as a whole rose by 6.7 per cent -a 
similar rate of growth. 
Some estimate of the implications of the fomi. nisation 
of the routine clerical labour.. force for nrnl_e occupational 
mobility can be gained by an inspection of the banking 
pattern. Here the expansion of the banking system and 
the feminisation of the routine clerical labour force has 
increased 'within work' occupational mobility, i. e. 
promotion rates, for male staff. Thus between 1963 
and 1967 alone, the overall proportion of 'appointed' to 
'unappointed' men rose from 30.8 per cent to 32.7 per 
cent. Analysis of the changing proportions of 'appointed' 
to 'unappointed' men between 1963 and 1967 by ego cohort 
reveals striking differoncos as Pablo 9,1v shows, 
-603_ 
TRhi. e" cl, lt(22) 
Proportions of 'Appointod I Mon by Apo Cohort; 
in 1963 end 1967 
Age Cohort 19 3 1_ 
Under 18 0 0 
18-23 0 0.02 
24 - 31 
4.1 10.5 
32 - 4o 36.9 1x6.9 
41 - 50 53.2 6(). 2 
51 - 6o 64.3 68.6 
6o + 7.5 49. o 
All 30.8 32.7 
As Table 9.4 indicates, with the exception of the younpost 
and most junior age cohortt each ago group exhibits some 
growth in the proportions of men in appointed posts botwoon 
1963 and 1967 and the growth in several of the ago groups is 
quite spectacular. Assuming that the overall proportion of 
appointed to unappointed staff remains constant at 
approximately 17 per cent of the total banking labour force 
and the proportion of 'career' to 'non-careen staff falls 
to 36 per cent ns estimat©d in tho Wilda Roport, 
(23) 
ttio 
proportion of appointed to unappoi, ntod male staff may rise 
as high as 1i6 per cent by the and of tho 'seventies and will 
-6o1&- 
have very substantial effects on the promotion opportunities 
of the male clerks. By contrast, again assuming that the 
overall proportion of appointed to unnppointod staff of 17 
per cent, only 25 per cent of the male staff would have held 
appointed posts in 1951. 
These figures indicate that there has peon a very 
considerable change in the 'male' occitpati. onal %triictiiro of 
banking since 1951. This change is manifested in the 
increasing proportions of men occupying; administrative and 
managerial positions within the industry, nil of whom wou. xid 
fall into classes I and II of Goldthorpe and Llewellyn's 
'collapsed' typology, 
(24) 
This expansion of the upper 
echelons of the male occupational structure in banking, is 
the result of the expansion in the industry which has taken 
place over the past twenty years and the progressive 
. 
ferninisation of routine clerical Jobs. Thus the proportion 
of women occupying routine clerical positions in banking rose 
from approximately 40 per cent of the 'non""appointocl' labour 
force in 1951 to 62.3 per cent in 1970. This expansion implies 
that the growth of opportunities for men did not dononri on 
the growth of the industrtr, nor oven-upon the growth of the 
proportions of administrative posts within the industry, though 
both processes may have played a role in expanding male 
opportunities. For the fominisation of the labour force has 
meant that, whilst the numbers of 'appointed' posts may not 
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have risen greatly as a proportion of the total numhor of 
employees, the numbers of appointed posts will have rieten 
greatly as a proportion of the male employees elipiblo to 
fill them. In short, the feminisation of the banks' 
labour force has left an increasing- amount of 'room at the 
top' for the male bank employee. 
In addition to being an area where the changing 
occupational structure described by Coldtborpo and Llewellyn 
is exhibited par excellence, the career structure of banking 
is a locus classi_cus for the observation of what Goldthorpe 
and Llewellyn term 'work-life' mobility, For the occuupa- 
tional mobility of the bank clerk is, by definition, 'work- 
life' mobility. Each and every male bank worker starts 
his career in Goldthorpe and Llewellyn's class ITT, and a 
high proportion of such starters oxpertonco occupational 
Mobility to classes I and IT. Moreover this mobility is 
achieved as a result of 'on the job' training and experience 
together ý"rith specialised commercial training. It is not, 
except in a small minority of cases, a result of educational 
qualifications achieved prior to entry into the banks. 
We are thus justified in concluding that the growth 
of male access to managerial and administrativ, posts in 
banking and the 'work-lifo' mobility that such nocoss 
involves has been largely dependent upon the growth of women 
as an 'underclass', 
(25) 
in the banking sector, This conclu-- 
sion may also hold for other white collar burcrncractos, 
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9.3. 
The \rttiire and Pros ports of the Fomnl. o 'I7n(inrct. naa' in 
White Collar Eriplovront. 
The main sociological factors undnrlying the oxtstonoo 
of this 'underclass', which were first sot out by Ceplow in 
1954, still remain operative today. 
(26) 
The discontinuity 
of female employment engendered by culturally sanctioned 
norms assigning women the largest proportion of the burden 
attaching to child care and home maintenance, the secondary 
status of married women's incomes, the residential immobility 
of women sustained by the domtnanco of the huusband's work. -role 
and the large reserve of employable women 'overhanging' the 
labour market all continue to contribute to a situation in 
which.... 
a woman's job must be one in which omploymont 
is typically short-term, in which tho gain to 
skill achieved by continuous experience is 
slight, in which intorchangcability is very 
high, and in which the loss of skill daring 
periods of inactivity is relatively small. 
(27) 
However, if very genoral factors associated with the special 
role of women within the family have resulted in the 
constriction of employment and career opportunittos for 
women, employers have reinforced this process by structuri. n * 
incomes, fringe benefits and (among white collar wor1cors ) 
promot i. on opportunities in Ways which d+ scotirngn long- 
term female employment. Hero again the case of bnnlring 
during the 'sixties offers an instructive case : tu. rdy. 
Thus, as we have soon, clerical salary scales wore Iddenticni 
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for men and women up to the are of 23 years after which 
point they diverged sharply in favour of. men. Titus in the 
early stages of what Nyrcial and Klein term the 'family phase' 
of the life-cycle, 
(28) 
the banks sharply decreased the 
incentives for women to remain in full time employment by 
contracting the size of annual pay increments to female staff 
by over 50 per cent compared to female increments received 
up to 23 years. Similarly, the banks have traditionally 
claimed that the short-term character of female employment 
makes it impossible to give women equal access to the 'fringe 
benefits' made available to male bank employees. Thus, 
prior to the passage of the recent legislation against 
sex discrimination, women were not permitted to benefit from 
the low interest loans for houses which wore almost automatically 
made available to male employees and which constituted a very 
considerable economic benefit. Finally women are not 
encouraged to seek promotion to 'career' grades in banking 
nor to undertake the necessary training for such posts, 
Here It is possible that one of C: apiow's 'oontral themes' 
in cultural attitudes towerds women is operative; thn 
notion 'that it is disgraceful for a man to be directly 
subordinated to P. woman, except in family or sexuat 
relationships'. 
(29) 
Thus the female supervisors in banking 
are almost invariably to be found in the 'mac}hino roams 
supervising other women and outside the main channels of 
promotion to full 'career' grades. 
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Given the closi. nC of channel of promotion to womon 
in white collar occupations, it Is certain biet, despite the 
formal equality in 'rates for the Job' now provnjlint* for 
men and women, the major souron of inequality in the w'"i. tn 
collar market situation - inequality of' promotion opportunities - 
will continue to exert a nowo-ful i. nrluoncn in disndvnnt-ngi-r 
female white collar workers. As Caplow vrosei. ontly n+, t It 
over twenty years ago, 
the principle of equal pay for equal work 
is often officially accepted and embodtod 
in wage scales at about the time it becomes 
effectively meaningless - because of shar- 
pening job segregation..,, or because of a 
system which provides rapid promotion for 
men only. (30) 
Roth of the features mentioned by Caplow aro clearly operative 
in benki. n and, ' in all probability, in many other white collar 
bureaucracies of a similar nature. 
The advantages to the employer oF' what amounts to a dual 
labour market dortve, as Gordon has pointed o at, 
(1i) 
from ihn 
way in which f secondary labour' can be used to enable the 
employer to maintain employment stability in jobs requiring 
a high investment in training, and expertise and in nliowtng 
the employer to dissipate the potential for organised confltet, 
In ban]; ing the creation of the female clerical labour foreo 
has allowed the bank employers to hold out batter prospocts 
for pay and promotion to the male labour force whose 
identification with the bank and its policton is thereby made 
more secure, As a result the banks hnvo successfully averted 
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the development of militnnt collective netten by the main 
labour force and high labour turnover among oxnnri. encnd mabo 
staff in a post-World War IT environment in which, in 
contrast to the inter-war years, male bank staffs# 
occupational loyalties could not be maintained simply by 
the spectacle of mass unemployment, Moreover the high 
turnover of female labour in banking has and continuos to 
enable the banks to reduce average labour costs based on 
incremental scales. Finally, because their employment 
participation is projectedly short-term, female workers 
are not disposed to marked degrees of militancy over salaries 
and conditions of work or the character of work-tasks which, 
to the outsider at least, appear intrinsically dull. In 
short, female white collar employees constitute a docile and 
compliant labour force which is devoid of disturbing 
expectations or demands which would threaten the several 
advantages to be derived by employers from their employment, 
Thus the position of women in family life which structures the 
kinds of occupations they may enter, engenders a labour 
market and occupational structure which, in mirroring and 
reinforcing the impoverished range of opportunities for 
women, simultaneously creates an advantaged position for 
their employers and, in many cases, their male , itos o 
in 
the occupational structure. 
Are there any factors which are likely to exert an 
influence for change on the prevailing state of ttffnim? Of 
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all the factors cited by Caplow as constraining female 
occupational choice and opportunity, the most significant 
is the discontinuity of employment en tendered her the 
conventional female commitment to marriage and fnml lv 
support. Traditionally marriage and the birth of children 
have been the most widespread and general points at which 
employment is interrupted. Data from both the United 
States and the United Kingdom however indicate that 
marriage and child-birth may now be diminishing as points 
of interruption of female employment. Thus Oppenheimer 
has shown for the United States that there is a trend not 
only for increased overall female participation in the 
labour force, but also for increased participation after 
marriage, increased re-entry to the labour force after 
child-bearing and - most importantly from the point of view 
of career discontinuity - for increased labour force 
participation among young married women with children under 
school age. Thus, whilst in 1950 only 26 per cent of 
married women aged 20-24 worked, this figure hod risen 
to 47 per cent by 1970. Even more significantly, the 
proportion of women aged 20-24 with pro-school children in 
the labour force has risen from 13 per cent in 1950 to 31 
per cent in 1970. 
(32 
Similarly, there has been a substantial incrnaso in 
the proportions of married woman in Britain pnrtieipatinj* 
in the labour force. Thus in 1951 only 21.7 par cant of nutrriod 
women were employed whilst by 1971 this figuro had rison to 
41,9 per cent, 
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Table C), 
(33) 
Married Female Participation Rates in the Lrtbour Forces 
Great Britain 1251-1971 by \je 
Year 14 or 55 and All ages 
15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 over over 14-15 
1951 36.65 24.40 25.71 
1961 41.77 29.47 36.37 
1966 43,53 34.33 48.59 
1971 45.27 38.39 54.514 
23.6 8,10 21.74 
35.32 14.00 29.143 
49.81 21.30 38 , 08 
57.00 23.27 41.92 
As Table 9.5 shows, there have been sharp rises in the rates 
of female participation in the labour force among the various 
age groups of married women and, from the point of viel of 
continuity of employment, the significant rises in partici- 
pation rates are in the 25-34 and 35.44 a( To groups. IToro 
the growth of participation has been substantial and must, 
in all probability, indicate an underlying increase In the 
continuity of employment among women in those ng o rroitpa%, 
Given such an underlying increase, it is likely that, 
assuming that the legislation against sax discrimination 
provides a further incentive 
(or at least diminishes 
disincentives) for married women to maintain their 
continuous participation in the labour forco, this conttnnunup; 
participation should itself constitute a mrt, ior source of 
pressure towards the elimination of job sotrogttton and 
sharply differentiated opportunitios for promotion, 
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The pressures hypothesi sod above may be concoptu1Plti sold 
as exerting- their influence in the following ways. 
Initially, increased continuity of labour partir1, pation 
amonE female routine white collar workers is likely to 
increase their levels of unionisat. -i. on and, in turn, white 
collar unions may find it necessary to shrine union policy 
so as to accord to a greater degree with feminine objectives 
and aspirations. A major aspiration of continuously 
employed female white collar workers is likely to be 
increased equality of promotion opportunities within their 
occupations. To the extent that this objective is realised, 
male white collar employees will no longer enjoy privileged 
promotion opportunities and their level of unioni. satinn is 
likely to increase as a consequence. A possible outcome 
therefore of increasing; continuity of female participation 
in the labour force is a greatly expanded level of irninnisation 
among white collar workers in large scale burortucracios and, 
less certainly, a consequential shift in the mode of class 
identification of the white collar worker. 
This trend, if developed during the next quarter 
century, will undoubtedly provide a stimulus to rethink the 
sociological analysis of social stratification. As Into 
as 1965 it was still possible for Crozier to write that 
613 - 
The vroletarianisation of white., collar 
employees does not have tho same meanth, e 
at all if it is women, and not heads of 
family, who comprise the majority of, the 
group. (310 
Such a comment reflects the sociolorricni commonnloco of this 
century that the occupational structure, anti hence the 
class structure, must be defined and described in terms of 
the position of the male. 
(35) 
The porsi, stont growth of 
permanent and continuous employment among, married women 
must ultimately constitute a major challenge to Buch 
assumptions. 
0.4. Conctusion 
The primary determinant of female market power during 
the past hundred years has been a universally hold sat of 
orientations - maintained inside and outside the workplace 
and internalised by the women themselves - which focus an 
the inappropriateness of long-term female commitments to 
employment and the subordination of female occupational 
opportunities to those of their husbands and male collea(-nues. 
The sexual differentiation of roles within the family, an 
Oppenheimer puts its 'is carried into the occupational 
world', 
06) 
The erosion of this orientation presents a 
profound challenge to both employers and trade unions. 
This challenge will, in all probability, be experienced 
first in the white collar sector bocauso of thn concentration 
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of female employment in this sector and its occuprttionnl 
structure. The erosion of this orientation may further be 
decisive for the class identification of whole sections of 
white collar employees and honce the channint* characteristics 
of the class structure of advanced industrial societies for, 
as Marx once wrote, 'anyone who knows nnythin about history 
knows that great social changes are impossible without the 
fe~iinine ferment'. 
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APPENDIX 3 
THE GROWTH OF MALE AND FLMALL EMPLOYMENT IN THE LONDON 
CLEARING BANKS 1948-1970 
MEIN WOMEN 
1948 59,505 25,364 
1949 60,391 26,785 
1950 60,423 27,750 
1951 59,946 30,255 
1952 60,055 31,543 
1953 59,679 29,771 
1954 59,851 30,954 
1955 60,530 33,303 
1956 60,936 35,771 
1957 61,187 37,517 
1958 61,630 38,813 
1959 63 , 018 42,801 
1960 65,840 48,778 
1961 68,082 53,191 
1962 70,243 57,730 
1963 71,698 60,863 
1964 73,682 65,647 
1965 75,866 68,909 
1966 77,658 71,958 
'1967 78,565 76,507 
1968 79,875 81,404 
1969 82,270 89,984 
1970 83,100 '93s775 
TOTAL 
84,869 
87,176 
88,173 
90,201 
91,598 
89,650 
90,805 
93,833 
96,707 
98,704 
too, / 43 
105,819 
114,618 
121,273 
127,973 
132,561 
1399329 
144,775 
149,616 
155,072 
161,279 
'172,254 
176,875 
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APPENDIX 4 
NUDE AND STAFF ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP, BY SEX, IN BARCLAYS BANK, 
LLOYDS BANK, MIDLAND BANK, NATIONAL PROVINCIAL DANK AND WESTMINSTER 
BANK. 1948-1970 
BARCLAYS BANK 
Men Women All 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
NULJE 
6353 
6407 
6250 
6768 
7198 
7170 
7023 
8455 
8503 
8671 
8628 
8582 
8777 
9078 
9233 
9175 
8707 
9034 
8902 
10,352 
10,715 
io, 654 
SA 
4723 
4927 
4956 
4936 
5161 
5414 
5727 
5790 
5735 
5803 
6005 
6027 
6355 
6402 
6602 
6730 
7342 
7558 
7821 
7821 
7680 
9676 
9898 
NU13E 
1713 
1881 
1962 
2351} 
2705 
2838 
2775 
3832 
3905 
4083 
4144 
4185 
4548 
51,46 
6116 
6500 
5924 
6862 
6929 
10,232 
1,153 
12,033 
SA 
1217 
1301 
1334 
1344 
1513 
1702 
1858 
1793 
1713 
1881 
1904 
2365 
2976 
3233 
3415 
3516 
4024 
1737 
5053 
5053 
4961 
520 
5976 
NUBI: 
8066 
8288 
82122 
9122 
9903 
10,008 
9798 
12,92-87 
12,408 
12,754 
12,772 
12,767 
13,325 
14,524 
15049 
15,675 
14,631 
15,896 
15,831 
20,584 
21,868 
22,687 
'59513 
SA 
5940 
6228 
6290 
6280 
6674 
7116 
7585 
7583 
7448, 
7684 
7909 
892 
9331 
9635 
10,017 
10,246 
11,366 
12,295 
12,874 
12,074 
12,61,1 
15,596 
15074 
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LLOYDS BANK 
Men Women All 
NUBE SA NUTE SA NUUE SA 
1948 3490 7227 1173 4429 4663 11,656 
1949 3343 7363 1209 4513 4552 11,876 
1950 3122 7581 1229 4646 4351 12,227 
1951 3077 8017 1221 4914 4293 12,931 
1952 3012 8653 1228 5303 4240 13,956 
1953 2796 8695 1103 5329 3899 14,024 
1954 2594 9316 1028 5710 3622 15,026 
1955 3235 9191 1540 5683 4775 14,874 
1956 3278 9479 1654 5809 4932 15,288 
1957 3483 9301 1827 5808 5310 15,109 
1958 3367 9418 1805 5817 5172 15,235 
1959 3257 9633 1813 6042 5070 15,675 
1960 3339 9978 1940 6215 5279 16,193 
1961 3635 9890 2393 6o6i 6028 15,951 
1962 3928 9913 2711 6075 6639 15,988 
1963 4073 9858 2732 6042 6805 15,900 
1964 3811 o., 141 2120 6216 5931 16,357 
1965 3858 10,533 2111 6456 5969 16,989 
1966 3812 10,647 2145 6525 5957 17,172 
1967 4779 to, 506 3634 6440 8413 16,946 
1968 5342 10,308 4242 6318 9584 16,626 
1969 -- t1,091 -- 6120 109397 179211 
1970 -- 1 2038 --» 5461 10,787 17,799 
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MIDLAND BANK 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
Men 
NUBE 
2687 
2773 
3149 
5061 
5540 
5503 
5115 
6032 
5976 
5999 
5999 
5874 
5883 
6020 
5995 
5906 
5385 
5501 
5305 
5967 
6105 
SA 
2454 
3786 
3817 
4172 
4465 
4869 
5258 
5557 
5710 
6227 
6098 
71o8 
7348 
7603 
7862 
7781 
7537 
7353 
Women All 
NUUL I SA NULL' 
637 
632 
665 
1204 
1436 
1467 
1383 
1917 
1988 
2069 
2218 
2193 
2275 
2735 
2851 
2898 
2657 
2748 
2858 
4428 
486o 
-- 3324 
-- 3405 
-- 3814 
-- 6265 
-- 6976 
534 6970 
890 6498 
911 7949 
1236 7964 
1651 8o68 
2052 8217 
2342 8067 
2875 8158 
3026 8755 
3009 8846 
3298 8801, 
3867 7842 
4015 8249 
4111 8163 
4278 10,395 
6250 10,965 
3591 10,907 
3435 10,920 
SA 
ww 
ww 
2988 
1,676 
1728 
5408 
61i6 
6921 
7600 
8432 
8736 
9236 
9396 
10,975 
i11363 
11,714 
12,140 
12,031 
11,128 
10,790 
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NATIONAL PROVINCIAL BANK 
Men Women All 
NUBS SA NUDE SA NUB SA 
1948 1440 5546 238 1891 1678 7437 
1949 1488 5605 248 1860 1736 7445 
1950 1309 5548 189 1823 1498 7371 
1951 1611 5379 281 1937 1892 7316 
1952 1689 5575 322 2051 2011 7626 
1953 16o8 5648 312 2132 1920 7780 
1954 4 1522 5836 308 2233 1830 
8069 
1955 2363 5405 596 2315 2959 7720 
1956 2421 5446 697 2437 3118 7883 
1957 2459 5386 742 2421 3201 7805 
1958 2368 5447 743 2387, 3111 7834 
1959 2363 5447 7799 2674 3142 8121 
196o 2497 5975 846 2746 3343 8721 
1961 2560 6042 925 3127 3485 9169 
1962 2555 6235 1023 3256 3578 9491 
1963 2510 6483 1134 3748 3641, 10,231 
1964 2185 6693 861 3865 3046 10,558 
1965 2211 6767 897 3964 3108 10,731 
1966 2080 6731 897 3889 2977 10,620 
1967 2855 6271 1831 3290. 4686 9561 
1968 3086 5970 2352 3308 5 838 9278 
1969 -- -- 17,491k' 23,502+ 
1970 -- -- 18,824' 23%31-1* 
National Westminster Bank Membership 
- 627 - 
WFSTMINSTNR BANK 
Men Women All 
NUBE SA NUBE SA NUBE SA 
1948 1305 7085 328 2621 1633 9706 
1949 1260 7352 294 2719 1554 10,071 
1950 1289 7629 313 2822 1602 10,451 
1951 1462 7752 389 2867 1851 10,619 
1952 1467 8058 403 2980 1870 11,038 
1953 1392 7996 411 2957 1803 10,953 
1954 1361 7982 400 2952 1761 10,934 
1955 2280 7720 789 2855 3069 109575 
1956 2347 7939 8'i6 2936 3193 10,875 
1957 2372 8337 894 2704- 3266 11,041 
1958 2301 7992 924 2956 3225 10,948 
1959 2349 8434 936 2983 3285 11,417 
1960 2601 8598 1199 3471 3800 12,067 
1961 2759 8741 1384 3746 4143 12,487 
1962 3080 8662 1676 3040 4756 11,702 
1963 3214 8932 1857 4299 5071 13,231 
1964 2990 9466 1338 5003 4328 14,469 
1965 3076 9771 1262 5378 4338 15,149 
1966 3039 9931 1269 5246 4308 159177 
1967 4093 9270 2411 4402 6504 13,672 
1968 4534 8833 3214, 3872 7748 12,705 
1969 -- 17,494"` 23,502* 
1970 -- -- 18,824* 23,321'' 
* National Westminster Bank Membership. 
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APPENDIX 6 
AGE-RELATED ANNUAL SALARY SCALES (ADJUSTED) OF MIDLAND 
BANK EMPLOYEES, EFFECTIVE 1.9.65. 
Men Women 
Adjusted Adjusted 
Age scale scale 
effective effective 
1.9.65 1.9.65. 
I £ 
17 365 365 
18 445 445 
19 500 500 
20 550 550 
21 595 595 
22 645 61,5 
23 685 66o 
24 725 675 
25 770 685 
26 865 695 
27 910 705 
28 945 715 
29 990 730 
30 1,035 755 
31 19090 780 
Note: Scale Excludes London Allowances (150 p. a. inner London and 
£80 p. a. outer London). 
Source: National Board or Prices and Incomes (1965), 
Salaries of Midland Hank Staff, Heport No. 61 Cmnd. 
2839, uMSO, Appendix 21 p. 20. 
630 
APPENDIX 7 
THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
Interview code: Interview No: 
Name: 2. Married/Single 3. Male/Female 
SECTION 1- WORK HISTORY 
Now I would like to begin, if I may, by asking you some 
questions about your job here and the jobs which you may 
have done in the past. Perhaps we could begin by asking 
(i) When it was that you first came to the Dank......... 
(2) Have you ever worked anywhere other than at the Bank?.... 
(3a)What was the last post you held before coming here (see Q. l) 
(i) Name of Firm ........................ 
(ii) Location of Firm .................... 
(iii)Actual Type of Job .................. 
(iv) Industry or Profession.............. 
(b) What were the main posts you hold before that (over 1 year) 
(c) Did you like any of your other jobs more than the one 
you are in now? 
If Yes: Which Ones? ..................... 
Why was that? ................... 
(4ý Have you ever thought of leaving the Bank?..,.. 
If Yes: Why was that? 
Have you ever done anything about it? (Prompt)..... 
What is it then that keeps you hero? 
(5a)What sort of work does your father do (did he do if ho 
is no longer alive or 
(5b)Has he (had ho) been in that sort of work for most 
of his life? ................................. 
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SECTION 2- JOB SATISFACTION 
In this next section I want to ask you some questions about 
the actual nature of your job with the Bank, and how you 
feel about it. 
(1) First can I check with you your actual job title?...... 
(2) Could you tell me briefly what your job entails?....... 
(3) What other jobs have you done within the Dank?......... 
What were they Where were they When was that 
(A) 
(B) 
(c) 
(D) 
(E) 
(F) 
(Li) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
Do you prefer this job to your previous ones,?.......... 
If Yes: Why is that? 
If No : Which of your other jobs did you profer?....... 
Why is that?.......... 
On the whole how responsible would you say your job 
was? Would you say you had (a) a great deal of 
responsibility, (b) some responsibility, (c) a little 
responsibility, (d) no responsibility at all? 
How about initiative? Is your job one in which you 
can use (a) a great deal of initiative, (b) some 
initiative, (c) a, little initiative, (d) no initiative 
at all? 
Hand card. Here are some of the things which are often 
thought important. in a job:, which would you look for 
first in a job, and which next? Interest and Variety... 
Good promotion opportunities... Pleasant social 
Atmosphere... Good Salary... Convenient Working Hours... 
A Chance to take responsible decisions... A Strong; 
Union... Security of Prospects... Other... 
So far as those two things, ar, o rconcornod, , would you 
say that your job is, F_- 
(i) (it) 
First Rate 
Pretty Good 
Not Too Dad 
Dad 
- 632 - 
(9) What do you like most about your 
job? 
"... w. wrw. w rwrw. w. wrw. w" 
(10) What do you like least about yo'r job? ............. . w. w. w. ww" 
(11) Do you think that on the whole the switch to the new clerical 
grades has been a good thing or a bad thing? 
Why do you say that? 
(12) If the bank were to ask you to work on a Saturday, how'happy 
would you be about it? 
(a), Would not mind a bit. 
(b) Would mind a lot but would do it for time/overtime 
(c) Would mind a great deal 
(d) ' Would be disgusted. 
SECTION 3- PERCEPTION OF THE RANK AS AN EMPLOYE. 11 
This next series of questions is about how you see the Bank as an 
employer. 
(1) Check back to section 11 question 4 and ask if appropriate: you said 
you stayed at the Bank because .......... Do you think that 
there are many firms which would give you those advantages? ........ 
(2) How would you say that the Bank compares with other firms 
you know of as a firm to work for? Would you say it was (a) 
better than most, (b) worse. than most, (c) about averaDe? 
(3) Do you think you would be better off or better looked after if you 
worked for the government in a similar kind of capacity?... ........... 
If yes: In what way is that? 
(4) Hand Card. Here are two opposing views about industry generally. 
I'd like you to tell me which you agree with more. Some people 
say that a firm is like a sports teary - because good teamwork 
brings success and is to everyone's advantage. Others may that 
teamwork in a business firm is-impossible because employers and 
employees are really on. opposite sides. Which view do you agree 
with more? "........... se... a. a..... o. n..... " 
(5) It has been said that banking-. is characterised by very good 
relations between employers and staff. Do you agree? ............. 
Why do you think it is (isn't) ....................... .............. 
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(6) What do you think about the pay of men, in industry generally as 
opposed to your own? (income of say £22-32). Would you say that 
in general they earned (a) too little, (b) too much or (c) about right? 
(7) Do you think that the bank could afford to pay you more without 
damaging its competitive position or commercial prospects? ........... 
(8) How do you think the standard of service at tho Bank 
compares with that of other banks? (a) better, (b) worse or (c) 
about the same? 
(9) flow do you feel about your earnings compared to other people's? 
Do you think they are (a) good, (b) about average, (c) not 
very good? 
SECTION 4- SECURITY AND PROSPECTS 
Now we come to a slightly more complicated section about banking as a 
career. 
(1) Have you ever been unemployed for any length of time, (any for more 
than a month)? 
If Yes: When was that? ............ 
For how long were you unemployed? ......... 
(2) flow secure do you think your position is at the Bank? 
Would you say it was (a) very secure, (b) quite secure, (c) 
rather insecure, (d) very insecure. 
For those who answer (a) or (b) 
(3) If you were offered a job in which you could earn £30.00 per month 
more and have the same promotion prospects, but which was rather 
insecure, would you take it? ........... 
(5) (Hand Card) Here are a list of things which might help someone 
to get on in the world. Which do you think would help most? and 
the next? Ambition Education Character Hard Work 
Knowing the right people Intelligence Luck. 
(6) How much would you say that your standard of living had risen over 
the last ten years? Would you say it had risen (a) a great deal, 
(b) a fair amount, (c) not, very, much, (d)"notat all? 
(7) How about the next five years. Would you expect things to be 
better, (b) worse or (c) about. the same., 
lihy do you say that? ,d, - 
}! ow far up the Dank do you expect to be when you leave? 
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(8) Now I want to ask you some questions about promotion 
If unappointed 
(a) How would you estimate your chances of renchin{j an 
appointed post? 
Would you say that your chances were (a) good, (b) fairly good, 
(c) not too good, (d) poor? 
(9) Do you have any particular reasons for your optimism/pessimism? 
(10) Ask All: How would you estimate your chances of a branch manager- 
ship? Would you say they were (a) good, (b) fairly good, (c) 
not too good, (d) poor? 
(il) Do you have any particular reason for your optimism/pessimism? 
( 12) In general, what sort of a chance to you think a man hat; of 
reaching a branch managership? (a) good, (b) fairly good, 
(c) not too good, (d) poor? 
Why do you say that? 
(13) How about a woman, What sort of chance do you think a woman has 
of reaching a branch managership? (a) good, (b) fairly good, 
(c) not too good, (d) poor? 
Why do you say that? 
(14) If a person of ability really made the effort, how far up the 
bank do you think he or she could rise in the end? ............. 
(15) Ask all who were working at the branch before it was computerised. 
Do you think that the changeover to the computer has affected 
clerical work as a career for men? ................. 
In what way? 
How about for women? . "........ r... " 
In what way? .. w. w... w .. " 
(16) If you had all your opportunities over again, would you choose 
.a career in banking? ....... 
Why is that? ............... 
SLCTICN 5- ST. U F HEPIUSEN' 
Now if I may, I would like 
which operate in banking. 
(1) First of all, could 
you may be eligible 
Other ........... 
TATION 
to tallcr to 
ryotº about 
the staff organizations 
you tell me' the names of any staff organisations 
to Join? S. A. "...... r. " NUDEE. "ýýrýýýýý" 
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(2) Have you ever been a member of tho flank Star f 
Association? so ....... 
If No: Move to Q-3- 
If Yes: When did you join? .. +....... 
Now did you come to join (probe)? +. ww++www 
Was there any particular reason why you joined? +..... w 
What do you feel is the most important function of the Staff 
Association? 
Have you ever attended any meetings sponsored by the Staff 
Association (including fashion shows, public meetings etc. )? ...... 
How often would you say you go to them? ". sw+++w+w+. " 
Have you ever held office in the Staff Association (specify)? +. +...... +. 
Here is a list of activities undertaken by Staff organizations of 
various types. Could you tell me which of these activities you 
think are most important for the Staff Association to do? Which is 
most important? And which next? 
(1) Assist members who are in difficulty. 
(2) Represent members opinions to Employers. 
(3) Make sure that members are not unfairly treated. 
(/}) Promote the good name and status of members generally. 
(5) Negotiate with employers over salaries and conditions of work. 
(6) Provide the organization of social activities for members. 
(7) Consult with employers over aspects of the firm's operations. 
(ß) Other. 
Some people say that the Staff Association should consider the interests of 
the Bank when representing the opinions of its members, whilst others say 
that they should note What do you think? . ++w+. ++. +. 
Are there any times when the Staff Association need not act in the way 
you have suggested? ". +..... +++. ++++. " 
If the Staff Association were ever to recommend some form of industrial 
action to you (eg a letter of protest, not doing paperwork, or even a one 
day strike) how acceptable do you think yotu would find this recommendation? 
Are you a member of the Staff Association now? .. +w. +... 
If No: When did you leave? ......... 
Were you ever a member of any other staff organization before you joined 
the Bank? (Specify) ........... 
0 
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(3) Ask All 
Is there anything you particularly like about the Staff Association? 
Is there anything you particularly dislike or would want to change 
about the Staff Association? 
(4) Nave you ever been a member of NUE3I:? ....... 
If no: move to Q. 5" 
If yes: When did you join? ....... 
!! ow did you come to join? 
(probe) '....... 
Was there any particular reason why you joined? 
What do you feel is the most important function of the Union? ....... 
Have you ever attended any meetings sponsored by the Union 
(including fashion shows, public meetings etc)? ....... 
flow often would you say you go to them? ...... 
Have you ever held office in the Union (specify)? ....... 
Here is a list of activities undertaken by staff organizations of various 
types. Could you tell me which of these activities you think it is most 
important for the Union to do? Which is most important? And which next? 
(1) Assist members who are in difficulty. 
(2) Represent members opinions to Employers. 
(3) Make sure that members are not unfairly treated. 
(4) Promote the good name and status of members generally. 
(5) Negotiate with employers over salaries and conditions of 
work. 
(6) Provide the organization of social activities for members. 
(7) Consult with employers over aspects of the firm's operations. 
(8) Other. 
Some people say that the Unions should consider the interests of the flank 
when representing the opinions of its members, whilst others say that it 
_.... "........ should note What 
do you think? 
Are there any times when the Union need not act in the way you have 
suggested? .......... " 
If the Union was ever to recommend some_formof Industrial action to you 
(eg a letter of protest, not doing paperwork, or even a onn day strike) 
how acceptable do you think you would find this recommendation? .... "......... 
Are you a member of the Union now? ......... 
If No: when did you leave? ".,.....,, " 
Why did you leave? ..,... "..... 
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Were you ever a member of any other staff organization before you joined 
the Bank (specify)? ... s ............. 
(5) Ask All 
Is there anything you particularly like about the Union? 
Is there anything you particularly dislike or would like to 
change about it? 
(6) Ask all answering Yes to ti's 2 and/or 4. 
Is there any reason why you joined X rather than Y (changed from 
X to Y) 
. 
(7) Ask all who answered No to Q's 2 and 4. 
Have you ever been a member of any staff organization? ......... 
If Yes: Which was that? 
When was that? .......... 
Why did you leave? ........ 
Have you ever really considered joining either of the two ortianizatlons in 
Banking? .. a..... 4... Q......... o 
If Yes: Why didn't you then? (probe) ............ ý.. 
If No: Do you have any particular objection to them? ........... 
(8) Ask All 
Some people say that Unions are basically for manual workers, whilst 
others say that unions are for all kinds of employees and not just for 
the manual sector. Which view do you agree with most? .......... 
SECTION 6- SOCIAL LIFE. AND LEISURE 
In these next few sections, I would like to amic you About some aspects 
of your life which are less directly connected with the bank. This 
first set of questions which is to do with social and leisure activities 
includes a few about the bank. 
(1) Do you have a lot of contact with your colloaUunR at tho Bank? 
Would yauu say you saw them to talk to (a) a good deal, (b) occasionally. 
(c) hardly at all during the day? 
(2) When do you find you talk to them? (a) mainly in the office, (b) 
mainly during breaks or (c) quite a lot during both. 
(3) If answering "a good deal" or "occasionally" to Q. 1. 
What sorts of things do you talk about? Is it mainly about work or 
mainly about things outside the office? 
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(4) 
, t{ow would you feel if you were moved to a similnr jot) In a 
different branch of the bank in Leeds/Coventry/London? 
(a) Pretty upset, (b) quite upset, (c) not too upset, (d) not upset 
at all? 
(5) If you had to ask somebody's advice about a problem at work (for 
instance whether to accept a promotion) whose advice wr, uld you be 
most inclined to take? (Name and position, prompt) 
(6) Are there any people in the branch you would call friends? ..... 
how many people would you call friends (names and positions)? 
(7) When do you see them outside the office? ................. 
Now some questions about life outside the office. 
(1) Are you married? ....... 
If singles move to Q. 8. 
(2) Could you tell me whether your wife(husband works) ....... 
(3) Is that full time or part time? 
(4) Could you tell me lint he/she does exactly? ........ 
(5) Do you hive any children ".......,, 
If yes: How many ". "....... Names Ages 
(6) For eldest son still at school; or daughter at secondary school: 
Do you know what X would like to be when he finishes his education?.... 
What is it? ..,.... 
Is that the kind of Job you would like him to settle down in? ........ 
If No: what (10 you hope for then? ......... 
(7) If No to tß. 5 or 0.5 inapplicable. 
What kind of job do you hope X will eventually settle for? ..,.... 
Why in that? ....... 
(8) Roughly how many nights ,n weck do you see anything on television? 
Most (A) 3 or 4 (b), 1 or 2 (09 Lean than 1 (d). 
And roughly, how long on the average (in you watch when the 
television not is on in the evenings? 
Under an hour (o) 1+ (t), 2s (g), 3+ (h)t 6R (i), 54, (J) 
(9) Do any of your relatives live near you in Leeds/Covontry or the 
surrounding area? (probe for relationship) 
how many? ". o.. ýe.. s. e" 
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Here is it list of some of thinris you might do during your spare time. 
Could you indicate how often you do them by rinsing the npnrotipriate code 
on the form? 
flow often do you 
Uncc a werk 
or more 
Visit a local park a 
? feet your relatives to chat a 
Go to a cinema a 
Attend a place of worship It 
Watch television a 
Entertain friends at 
home a 
Go out for a drink a 
Participate in sports a 
Dine, out a 
Play bingo a 
Entertain relatives at 
home a 
Go to a public dance a 
Go to the theatre, 
concerts or recitals a 
Go to sportsa; aspectator a 
Go out into the country a 
About once Leas than once Never 
a month month 
b c d 
b c d 
b c d 
b c d 
b c d 
b c d 
b c d 
b c d 
b c d 
b c d 
b c d 
b c d 
b c d 
b c d 
b a d 
SECTION 7- POLITICS 
So far we have talked a bit about your work, your family and your leisure. 
Can we now have a look at some more general topics so as to Oct a rounded 
picture of the way you look at things? 
(1) Firstly, in the event of an election do you think that it will make 
a great deal of difference whether the Conservatives or Labour win. 
Of do you feel that it won't make much difference who wins? ...... 
If difference: In what ways would it make a difference? 
If no difference: Why do you say that? 
(2) When the election comes, how do you think you will vote?...... 
Could you tell nur how you voted In (a) 1970?..... 
(b) 1966?..... 
If no change: Have you over voted for (opposite side)...... 
If na: You seem pretty attached to the Crni-4nrviltive/Labour party. 
Why is that? 
If Change: Why was that? ........ 
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(3) As you know most Unions support the labour party; do you approve 
of this or do you think they should keep themselves separate?..... 
(4) Some people say that the trade unions have too much power in this 
country: would you agree or disagree on the Kole?...... 
ý5) Would you say that the new Industrial Relations Act was fair or 
unfair to the unions? ........ 
(6) Some people say that big businessmen have too much power in the 
country; do you agree or disagree on the whole?...... 
SECTION 8- IMAGES OF CLASS 
What I want to do in this section is to find out what you think about 
class. People often talk about there being different classes, what 
do you think? ...... 
Well, thinking about its how many classes do you think there are? .... 
Who would you say are in these classes: 
Where would you say the dividing lines are between the-classes? 
Different people have different ideas about what it is that puts 
people in one class rather than another. What do you think? 
Where would you put yourself in all this? 
Why (is there any justification) do you think people are in the classes 
they are? 
how easy do you think it is for a person to move from one class to another? 
What is your opinion of the English class system? (Probe for views on 
necessity and desirability) 
General comments. 
SL CTION 9- PEflSONAI. DETAILS 
In this section we are concerned with a number of %spects of your 
personal history as well ns a small attitude test. 
(1) First of all, would you mini telling ma your arge? ..... 
(2) flow old were you when you left school? 14 or loss (a)t 15 (b) 
16 (c), 17 (d), 18+ (e). 
What kind of secondary school did you attend? None (a)y 
Secondary Modern (b)v Comprehensive (c)v Secondary Technical (d)s 
Grammar (o), Public/Private (f), Other (G). 
Did you undertake any further education? .... 
Was it full time or part-time?..... 
What kind was it? (Specify) ....... 
Have you ever done any work for the Institute of 
Bankers Examinations? ". ý........... " 
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ý3ý If married. 
flow old was your spouse when he/she left school? 
14 or less (a), 15 (b), 16 (c)9 17 (d), 18+ (c). 
What kind of secondary school did he/she attend? 
None (a), Secondary Modern (b), Comprehensive (c), 
Secondary Technical (d), Grammar (o), Public/Private (f) t 
Other (9). 
Did he/she undertake any further education? ...... 
Was it full time or part-time? ............. 
What kind was it? ........... 
(4) Here is another question I would like you to fill In for me. 
WHICH[ OF THE FOLLOWING DO YOU FAVOUR OR RELIEVE IN? 
(circle 'yes' or 'no'. If absolutely uncertain, circle 174) 
(5) 
1. Modern art Yes ? No 
2. Conventional Clothes Yea ? No 
Bible truth Yes ? No 
4. Military drill Yes ? No 
5, mixed marriage Yes 7 No 
6. ; loyalty Yes ? No 
7. Coloured Immigration Yes ? No 
8. Chastity Yes 7 No 
9. ))Path Penalty Yes ? No 
10. Hippies Yes ? No 
11. Disarmament. Yes 7 No 
Final ly a question about personalities. 
Could you tell me who is Foreign Secreta r ? y ....... 
Could 
, you 
tell me who is the Chairman of your Bank? 
Could you tell me who is the General Secretary of the T. U. C? ...... 
Could you tell me who is the General Secretary of N11lt8.? ....... 
Could you toll me who is the Gonoral Socrotnry of your flank SA?.. 
Finally could you toll me who Was the Democratic candidate for the 
Presidency of the U. S. A.? ....................... 
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SECTION 10 - EXPENDITURE AND SAVINGS 
In this last section I have a few questions about saving 
and spending money: first of all - 
(1) I'd like to ask you if you use a number of different 
ways of saving money: 
(a) Do you have a Post Office account?....... 
(b) Do"you have a bank account?.......... 
(c) Do you have anything in a building society or 
savings banks or National Savings?...... 
(d) Do you have anything in stocks or shares or 
a unit trust?,........ 
(e) Do you have any kind oC insurance policy?...... 
(2) Do you have a car?........ "". 
(3) Do you have a telophone?........ 
(14) Do you own your own house?........ 
(5) if rented: Who do you rent the house from?....... 
Finally we come to the family income, 
(7) Is your salary paid by the week or by tim month? 
(8) hand appropriate card. Can you t ell me Into whiclh 
category your net income falls? 
Weekly A. Under £15 U. Z15 - 17.99 C. 918-20.99 
D, £21 - 23.99 r. Z21i - 26.99 11', C27-30.99 
G, £31 - 35.99 11. £96 - 110.99 1.00, + 
Monthly A. Under £60 11. £60 - 71.99 G. £72-83.99 
D. £8? - 95.99 E. £96 - 107.99 F. £108-123.99 
G. u24-143.99 II. c11s4-6160 I. £160+ 
Well, now that you've answerod all those q1tostionst call 
ask you one final general one, 
(gý Looking; at the years ahoad, what kind of Lmprovemont 
or change Ln your life are yogi: most oxpectinf;? 
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